

The Journal of Historical Review

This Issue:

James B. Whisker

Italian Fascism: An Interpretation

Sami Hadawi

Who Are The Palestinians?

Frank H. Hankins

'Holocaust' Demographics

L.A. Rollins

The 'Holocaust' As Sacred Cow

—Book Reviews—

*Barnes, Weckert, Hess,
Gilbert, Laqueur and Eisenberg*

The Journal of Historical Review

VOLUME FOUR, NUMBER ONE / SPRING 1983

Italian Fascism: An Interpretation by James B. Whisker

The "Holocaust" as Sacred Cow by L.A. Rollins

Who Are the Palestinians? by Sami Hadawi

How Many Jews were Eliminated by the Nazis? by Frank Hankins

BOOK REVIEWS: James J. Martin on Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace • L.A. Rollins on The Terrible Secret, Auschwitz and the Allies and Eyewitness to the Holocaust • Wayland D. Smith on Prisoner of Peace and Failure at Nuremberg • Mark Weber on Reichskristallnacht

The *Journal of Historical Review*
is published quarterly by the
INSTITUTE FOR HISTORICAL REVIEW

Thomas J. Marcellus, Director

Keith Stimely, Editor

EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

DR. WALTER B. ALLENDE
University of Buenos Aires

DR. AUSTIN J. APP
La Salle College, Phila. (Ret.)

DR. GEORGE ASHLEY
History Instructor
Los Angeles Unified School District

JOHN BENNETT
Victorian Council for Civil Liberties
Melbourne, Australia

DR. ARTHUR R. BUTZ
Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.

DR. ROBERT FAURISSON
University of Lyon-2, France

DITLIEB FELDERER
Revisionist History Magazine
Taby, Sweden

PERCY L. GREAVES, Jr.
Free Market Economist

SAMUEL E. KONKIN III
The New Libertarian, Long Beach, Cal.

DR. MARTIN A. LARSON
The Spotlight, Washington, D.C.

DR. WILLIAM B. LINDSEY

DR. JAMES J. MARTIN
Institute for Historical Review

DR. REVILO P. OLIVER
University of Illinois, Urbana

DR. WILHELM STAEGLICH
Retired Judge, West Germany

UDO WALENDY
Verlag fur Volkstum and
Zeitgeschichtsforschung
Vlotho/Weser, West Germany

DR. CHARLES E. WEBER
Former Head, Department of
Modern Languages
University of Tulsa, Oklahoma

DR. ANDREAS R. WESSERLE
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Ret.)

The *Journal of Historical Review* is published quarterly by the Institute for Historical Review, P.O. Box 1306, Torrance, California 90505, United States of America. Subscription prices are as follows: One year, \$30; two years, \$50; three years, \$70—or the equivalent in foreign currency. Foreign subscribers must add \$5 if paying by remittance drawn on a foreign bank. For domestic first class delivery add \$5 per year. For overseas air delivery add \$12 per year. Quantity subscription and bulk issue rates available on request. Appropriate manuscripts are welcomed by the editor, but must be accompanied by return postage.

Listed:

Library of Congress
British Library
Encyclopedia of Associations
Writers Market 1983
PTLA Catalog
EBSCO Librarians Handbook

ISSN: 0195-6752

Institute for Historical Review
P.O. Box 1306, Torrance, California 90505, U.S.A.

Permission is hereby granted for reprints of any article contained herein, providing that no changes or alterations are made prior to printing, and also providing that the following attribution appears with the article:

Reprinted by permission of The *Journal of Historical Review*, P.O. Box 1306, Torrance, California 90505, United States of America.
Subscription rate: \$30 per year.

Two copies of each printing should be submitted to the Editor of The *Journal of Historical Review*.

Contents

Italian Fascism: An Interpretation <i>James B. Whisker</i>	5
The 'Holocaust' as Sacred Cow <i>L.A. Rollins</i>	29
Who Are the Palestinians? <i>Sami Hadawi</i>	43
How Many Jews Were Eliminated by the Nazis? <i>Frank H. Hankins</i>	61
Review Article A Memoir of Globaloney, Orwellianism, and Dead Sea Fruit <i>James J. Martin</i>	83
Book Reviews	93
About the Contributors	128

A Note From The Editor

Human history is more than the history of politics, but it can never be less. Politics *pervades*, and any sphere of human activity or thought (including the record of it), at any time, is invariably colored—sometimes controlled—by the impulses of politics in the realm of thought or action, or both. Men make politics—which is simply *power-activity*, a constant in all life—and when they do they may or may not have a body of thought and belief, an ideological program, in mind. They may seek power merely for its own sake, perhaps holding and proclaiming an ideology only as a prop and justification for the grabbing and wielding of naked power, perhaps not even bothering with this. For years the fascism of Mussolini was subject in mainline Western scholarship to this interpretation: Mussolini had no ideology, he was merely a luster after power, there was never any such thing as a true “ideology of fascism,” merely late and unconvincing attempts to formulate an ethos to give some sort of intellectual and philosophical credence to the crude holding of power by the regime. This interpretation held fairly fast until the early 1960s, when a University of Rome scholar named Renzo De Felice began to publish his work on Mussolini (still incomplete in 1983 after six volumes), which granted the Duce more powers and sensitivity of mind than he had theretofore been commonly accorded, and in particular explored his intellectual roots in marxism and the revolutionary syndicalist tradition. In thus “revising” Italian fascist ideology, granting it a certain historical and intellectual legitimacy and developmental continuity, De Felice touched off a raging debate in his country among scholars and the lay public alike; the shout “neo-fascist” rang through the air, as always happens when someone departs from the communist (and liberal and democratic) line on this subject. The debate has hardly subsided since it began and indeed has seen intensification in this, the 100th anniversary year of Mussolini’s birth.

In America, De Felice has had his counterparts in the scholars A. James Gregor and Anthony James Joes, both of whom have followed much of De Felice’s line of exploration but have taken him one step further. Not only recognizing the actual success and supreme potential of fascism in uniting the two most dynamic impulses—nationalism and socialism—of our age of “mass society,” they have postulated a “universal” fascism, seeing in the Third World marxist regimes of today much that is, in fact, “national-socialist” or fascist. (De Felice himself, it should be noted, holds like Ernst Nolte to a quite more precise definition of fascism, strictly limiting it in place and time to Western Europe between the wars.)

The variations in the work of De Felice, Gregor, and Joes, but more especially the vast differences between their revisionist views as a whole and what remains the established “line” on the subject, have clearly opened up a whole new way of thinking about a political ideology that shook our century—and whose day may not be over. We are pleased to add to the contemporary discussion by presenting as our lead article this issue James Whisker’s “Italian Fascism: An Interpretation.” Whisker traces the four successive “phases” of ideological fascism in Italy, from Alfred Rocco’s first attempts at constructing a unified theory out of the jumble of ideas that had influenced Mussolini and his party, to Giovanni Gentile’s final construct, during Italy’s wartime collapse, of a deeply philosophical and romantic “pure” fascism. Whisker points out the influence throughout the whole process of the thought of Georges Sorel in the transmutation of marxian-socialist “rationalist” ideas into the anti-rational, mythical ethos of fascism with its elevation of “feeling” over thought.

Whisker also deals in illuminating fashion with the issues of the fascist corporate state and its claim to bridging the gap between workers and management, labor and capital; fascist relations with the Vatican (noting the similarity of fascist social goals with those being expressed by the Church at the same time); foreign policy and its role as the *unhinger* of the internal fascist consensus; and the genuine differences between Italian fascism and German national socialism.

In all, it is an excellent interdisciplinary introduction to a historical and political phenomenon that bears study and has seen a wave of revisionary interest in recent years. Combined with our other articles in this issue—on topics as diverse as European demographics, the origins of the Middle East imbroglio, Roosevelt and post-Roosevelt foreign policy, and a peculiar social-psychological phenomenon relating to the “Holocaust”—as well as a fine selection of reviews relating to World War II, it lends credence, we hope, to our journal’s aim of representing a truly interdisciplinary approach to re-thinking the history of our century.

—Keith Stimely

Italian Fascism: An Interpretation

JAMES B. WHISKER

When the Grand Council of Fascism on 25 July 1943 removed Benito Mussolini from his position as head of government, fascism ended in Italy. Its ending was as surprising as its beginning, when, on 28 March 1922, some 300,000 Blackshirts under Mussolini's command seized the Italian state. The events between those dates can be chronicled. The explanation of what had transpired is much more elusive. Fascism was touted by Mussolini as a unique combination of thought and action, yet fascism was still seeking an ideology after the Second World War was over.

The roots of fascism are many and complex.¹ The fascist leadership, notably Mussolini, admitted the multi-faceted influences of liberalism, marxism, syndicalism, risorgimento, socialism, catholicism and nationalism on their ideology.² Their speeches and writings were replete with quotations from Schopenhauer, Hegel,³ Sorel, Saint-Simon, Pareto, Mosca, Mazzini and a hundred other writers. They admitted fascism was a unique blending of all of these and much more, yet they were never able to wholly explain it to their own satisfactions.

Italian fascism was the first application of what would become a generic ideology encompassing, or allegedly encompassing, movements of the political right in every nation of Western Europe, the United States, the British Commonwealth nations and even Japan.⁴ It was believed by Italian leaders to be highly exportable, yet it carried strong Italian nationalistic overtones. It was essentially non-racist, yet in Italy it preached the gospel of the coming Italian race of overmen.

Italian fascism had at least four principal phases. Until 1925, it was political action seeking an ideology. Mussolini had himself been variously a socialist, a pacifist, an internationalist, a war hawk, an anarchist, a statist, and, most of all, a pragmatist.⁵ When he sought an ideology he found none to satisfy him. When he came to power after the 1922 March on Rome he found himself in charge of the state but without a guiding and inspirational system of thought. The first phase lasted until the first fascist state was founded in 1925.

From 1925 until 1938 the first fascist state operated. Its primary theoretician was Alfredo Rocco.⁶ As he conceived it, the state was to be a strong, modern nation-state, accepting both the ideas of capitalism in the socio-economic sphere and a syndicalist state which brought about a forced union of labor and capital. Rocco encouraged the tendency of the fascist-sponsored capitalism to form monopolies and cartels because he believed that this increased productivity and thus encouraged the growth of state powers. The new elites of modern society—labor unions, industrialists, party bureaucracy and civil servants—were to be placed under the authoritarian control of the state. Indeed, the state became the single value to which all other values, including the fascist party itself, were to be subordinated.

Rocco conceived of creating direct channels of communication between the masses and the party hierarchy. He demanded that a hierarchical arrangement of capitalism be created, one in which the masses would be supportive of the regime because the regime would guarantee them full employment and higher wages. The party would provide the mechanism for mass communication with the leaders of the state. The combination of workers, industrialists and the omnipresent party representatives would ensure full and peaceful cooperation which would benefit all while strengthening the power of the Italian state.

In this second period of fascism, the Italian electorate still played a major role. The 400 candidates for the legislature had to be approved by the voters. The workers played a larger role in the selection of their representatives and the people at large had some role in the nomination of the 400 candidates for the legislature.⁷

In the third phase of fascism, Mussolini had come under the spell of Adolf Hitler and his national socialist state. He was increasingly influenced by the anti-Semitic wing of the fascist party led by Farinacci and Preziosi. From 1938 until he was relieved of command by the Grand Fascist Council in 1943 Mussolini became the victim of his own propaganda efforts. He dreamed of wars of conquest, wars that were far and away beyond the industrial capacity of the state to sustain. He involved

the state in wars of colonial conquest, perhaps the last of the great imperialistic wars of Europe.⁸

In 1938 a change was made in the Italian government which separated the people from the decision-making process entirely. The list of parliamentary candidates was no longer offered to the masses for their approval. Mussolini merely emulated Hitler by creating the totalitarian state while removing basic democracy.⁹

During the final years of the second phase of fascism¹⁰ Alfredo Rocco had fallen into disfavor as had the quadrupvir Balbo,¹¹ the party leader Starace, the syndicalist thinker Rossini and former party secretary Giuriati. Mario Palmieri¹² had a brief career as party theoretician and Mussolini¹³ had attempted himself to create a theory of fascism. Generally, the third period of fascism had produced neither the prescriptions for an ideology Rocco had offered earlier nor the descriptions of fascist procedures that marked the attempts to explain fascist doctrine in the later stages of the second fascist period.

After Mussolini's fall from power and his heroic rescue by German paratroopers, a proto-fascist state with Mussolini nominally at its head was created under the watchful protection of nazi troops. Precious little time remained to develop a theory. Mussolini was wholly preoccupied with staying alive and with dealing with his protectors. Valuable time was spent in dealing with the traitors within the party who had fired the Duce in 1943. A show trial and subsequent executions of these traitors took place. Mussolini's son-in-law Count Ciano was among those executed.

Giovanni Gentile had been among those competing with Rocco for Mussolini's favor in earlier periods of fascism. He had held positions of minor consequence in the fascist state, culminating in his ministership of education. Now, with the Italian fascist state crumbling around him, and without a direct charge from Mussolini, Gentile created the last Italian fascist theory.¹⁴ Properly enough, it was more philosophical than the earlier attempts at creating an ideology were.

Gentile's theory had its descriptive moments, but, in the large, he offered a wholly philosophical oversight into pure fascism. It had little in the way of a call to arms. It was not the usual *post facto* justification for what had transpired. It was a highly exportable theory of the state set against a fascist state background.

Each man is unique because of his own individual experiences. He forms other associations which become unique because of the collective group experiences; these group experiences, in turn, bear on the individual. The highest association an individual can form is with all his fellows in the state mechanism. The state is the ultimate association and it has its own collective experiences

which mark it different from all other states which have existed, do exist or can exist. The state, like all other human associations, profits from both its own collective experiences as a state and the individual experiences of its component parts, that is, both the individuals and the subservient associations which are merged into the organic state. The state, the individual and all human associations thus have life, conscience, and will to achieve. The uniqueness of the state experiences then bend back upon each and every citizen who fully cooperates within the state to enrich these lives and add to their individual memories and experiences.

The state is thus given a real, organic life. It is necessarily supreme. All that is, within the state, is brought to fulfillment in the state. Nothing that is, within the state, can be permitted to exist beyond the reaches of the state. Nothing that is, within the state, can be permitted to go against the state. The state is the culmination of all human endeavors. It is the final resting place of all that man has created. The state knows, sees, participates in, profits by all that man does. Man is because the state is. Man lives because he has the state wherein to live. Without the state man is nothing, can become nothing.

It is thus the natural destiny of man to be linked with the state. The corporate state gives man the schema wherewith to associate himself with other men. The corporate state provides the forum for discussion of problems. It is the conduit with which man communicates with the natural leaders of the state. It is also the pipeline which the state uses in communicating with individual men or corporations or groups of men who are employed in industries. Without the corporate framework man could not associate with the state. He would be separated from the state and from his fellow men. He would be isolated and devoured by the nameless and uncontrolled masses who would be without form, substance or discipline.

By the time Gentile had completed his *Genesis and Structure of Society* fascism was dead as an ideology. The proto-fascist states such as Spain, Argentina and Portugal were, at best, minimally interested in having a philosophy of fascism articulated for the use of the leaders. The final stage of fascism is, thus, largely an artificial construct of political scientists and historians. Mussolini apparently was even unaware of Gentile's work and Gentile could hardly have been expected to have been especially interested in the German occupation government nominally headed by Mussolini.

Fascism operated as a reasonably efficient statist system with admitted strong totalitarian overtones until it became interested in wars of colonial conquest. It had come to power because of the decaying social, economic and political conditions of post-World War I Italy. It had brought order out of chaos. Indeed, order was

its strong selling point when, after a series of crippling strikes sponsored by the socialists, it had managed when the liberal democratic state could not manage. Fascism bragged of its accomplishments in areas such as making trains run on time and draining swamps. With agencies not unlike those found in the American New Deal of Franklin Roosevelt, it tried to use state power to combat the economic catastrophies of the great depression.¹⁵

The great irony of fascism is that it taught that the highest form of the state is found in the nation at war. No matter how great the state may be in normal times it takes on even greater dimensions, greater self-fulfillment, greater attributes as a result of a national war. Of these national wars, the most significant in the life of the nation was the war of imperialistic conquest. A state for fascism grows or it dies. A vibrant and dynamic state is constantly seeking new areas of conquest. It seeks to grow at the expense of those states which are dying, hence contracting, and it grows at the expense of those states which have never matured and become great nations. Wars are the duty of the truly modern, organic state.¹⁶

Where fascism had grown, even flourished, in peacetime, it faltered in war. While it is true that the Italian state had grave problems in trying to support the war machinery when engaged against the Western Allies, it is equally true that Italy had grave problems even against backward, non-industrial powers before the beginnings of the Second World War. Only with the greatest difficulties had Italy defeated Ethiopia and Albania. Its ill-fated expeditions against Greece were saved from defeat only by the ultimate, but reluctant, involvement of the German war machine. Of course, later, Hitler was pulled into North Africa in an attempt to aid the failing Italian armies of his ally, Mussolini.

The interest of Mussolini in re-establishing the Roman Empire, or at least a portion of it, illustrates the point made above that, after a decade and a half of propaganda directed at the masses, Mussolini and much of his sub-leaders had become themselves victims of fascist propaganda. Had he not sought colonial expansion, Mussolini might have ruled indefinitely. European leaders made little attempt to discredit Italian fascism. As late as the mid-1930s, most European leaders seemed to have supported the fascist state as merely an expression of rightist political reaction to socialism and bolshevism. The Communist International did not really begin to see fascism as a competing ideology until its Sixth Congress in 1928.¹⁷ Still, it was to the Comintern mostly a reactionary state which defended big business while offering nationalistic slogans to the workers. When it failed to control the workers by propaganda it was, as a typical reactionary capitalist

political form, willing to use force, murder, terrorism and coercion to work its will.

Fascism shared with bolshevism a common Marxian heritage.¹⁸ Both were formally rooted in socialist tradition, both scientific and utopian.¹⁹ Several modern analysts have suggested that Mussolini was at heart a Marxist. It was largely an academic dispute on how Marx was to be read and interpreted that kept Marxists and fascists apart ideologically. It was a question of whose Marxism one accepted as true belief that separated fascism from bolshevism. Fascism accepted, in the large, the unorthodox renderings of Marxism as transmuted by Georges Sorel whereas Lenin accepted his own and other Russian interpretations of Marxism.

Sorel²⁰ added to Marxism a belief in myth. Social phenomena were to be studied through an image of irrational force, and not pragmatically as Marx had stated. Sorel had found Marx to be impractical in terms of solving the problems of the workers. Rather than concluding that a broad and sweeping revolution to destroy the old capitalist state and create a new communist state was necessary. Sorel concluded that rational and planned activity was useless in the face of irrational nature. He had fathomed natural and irrational forces that could be understood and assailed only by mythical means. The dissatisfaction of the proletariat was essentially irrational and emotional. The solution to the problems had then to be irrational and mythical, harnessing irrational and mythical nature. Once fathomed by the working class, or at least by their leaders, this irrational nature could unleash such mythical forces as the world had never seen before. The emotional needs and drive of the workers could only be directed by myth.

For Sorel the force which accompanies a drive by a people is always and necessarily accompanied by violence. Irrational power, the consequence of working with irrational nature, is especially violent. One then must accept violence as a fact of life, a necessary condition of mankind moving and changing and achieving. It is in effect the price one must pay for progress. But unless the violence is understood it can be as destructive to the mover as to the intended object of the violence.

Marx had offered rational explanations for reality as Sorel saw it. But rational explanations imply the existence of rational problems. Indeed, the problems of the proletariat were natural, hence, for Sorel, irrational, hence, mythical. Thus Marxism had failed and would continue to fail as an explanation of reality because it sought only rational reasons, rational means and rational explanations. Sorel's philosophy was essentially a philosophy of myth, irrational and natural. It would succeed because it was irrational and offered man a belief and not a logic.

Political solutions, in the normal sense of politics, were worse than useless; they were misleading. Offer instead, Sorel taught, new beliefs, new myths to men. Ask them to believe, not to reason and the solution to the proletarian dilemmas were at hand.²¹

The proletarian problem was, first, a professional, not a political, problem. The frustrations of the proletariat were professional in nature. Professional problems implied professional remedies, including strikes and trade unionism. Action must be violent professional activity to be most effective. One must have or develop faith in the natural, irrational but professional capabilities of the proletarian class. One must follow the basic worker impulses to action. These impulses will be mythical visions of the better world, but not blueprints designed to lay out in specific terms the design of the new city. The road to the new city would clearly be dotted with incidents of physical violence. One must be prepared for such violence or its occurrences will shock and delay.

As with every problem there is a solution. Cooperation within a state sponsored framework will provide an answer. This came about through an unusual, Italian conception of Hegel's dialectic.²² In the writings of Italian Hegelians, the conflicting and mutually exclusive thesis and anti-thesis do not disappear completely as they do in Hegel's pure dialectic. Rather, in the synthesis, formed by the clash of thesis with antithesis, the individual elements of both thesis and antithesis are still evident. While the synthesis may indeed be a higher and better idea than its progenitors, the thesis and the antithesis, it still shows separately each of its sires. Thus, in Italian Hegelian philosophy it is possible to see labor and management, that is, proletariat and bourgeoisie, existing together, although diametrically opposed to one another, in the synthesis.²³

The practical application of this doctrine is seen in syndicalism.²⁴ Within the syndicate one finds both labor and management. They are joined there by the fascist representative, that is, the representative of the omnipresent state mechanism. In the co-joining of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie one has a new synthesis, the others being respectively the thesis and the anti-thesis. The new synthesis is the syndicate and it has recognizably within it the heretofore diametrically opposed classes of the workers and management. Hegel's law of "negation of the negation"²⁵ wherein the worst or most negative elements of each of the dialectically opposed thesis and antithesis cross one another out is at work. The most negative, the most mutually exclusive, the most hostile elements of management and labor are negated. Under the beneficent eye of the fascist representatives this frozen dialectic, this syndicate, operates to the good of state, labor and management.

With the introduction of the syndicate would also be created what French utopian writer Saint-Simon²⁶ called a national-industrious class, what Sorel called a producer class. Within the group were all those who were productively engaged in bettering the state. It was, in turn, opposed by those indolent souls who contributed nothing to the well-being of the state, what Saint-Simon called the anti-national class.

Sorel did not trust the workers and the industrialists to come up with such a cooperative arrangement on their own. Indeed, even after the syndical arrangement was fixed one might reasonably expect neither would wholeheartedly support it or work within it. This then was the reason for the fascist party. It would be given the coercive power by Mussolini not only to control the syndicalist structure but to force creation of it in the beginning. Without the use of force, violence if necessary, syndicalism could neither be created nor maintained.

One can see in the willingness to use state coercive power to achieve an end the general will philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In his *Social Contract*²⁷ he had spoken of a general will, that is, of a set of values which had to be created and then authoritatively allocated for the masses, even if they did not consent to such allocation. There was a general will, that which represented the greatest good for the masses, a distillate remaining from the individual wills of all men after their own petty desires had crossed one another out. This was really a political program that carried with it quality of moral necessity. It had to be enacted, once recognized, for the good of all men in the state. Where men could not or did not recognize what was in their own best interests the state was obliged, in order to justify its existence, to step in and guarantee that the provisions of the general will be carried into execution.

The fascist state then could justify its actions both in creating syndicalism and in enforcing compliance with its requirements under good, liberal Rousseauist philosophy. Creating a general will and carrying it into execution is correct liberal philosophy.

The general will of course could be expressed in natural, irrational terms in order to make that compatible with Sorel. The fascist party was able to sustain its claim to legitimacy by assuming a guardianship over the contents of the general will. The myth, in turn, was legitimate because it was recognized, sustained and articulated by the fascist party. The myth became whatever the fascist party saw it being at any given time. It was ultimately enforced by legitimatized violence and the power of the totalitarian state mechanism.

In fascism there was a reciprocity established with the producer class. Production, full employment, wages, prices, distribution and the like were guaranteed by the state. In turn, both

management and labor gave up the right to have strikes, lockouts, and disorders which would interrupt the production processes. Since they could not legally act independently, they would only act together, not as capital and labor, but as the producer class. Outside fascism such a class was not held to be possible.²⁸

Since only fascism could provide the essential union of workers and management into the producer class, it was logical that the state should have a monopoly of power. Power and coercion go hand in glove for Sorel. Fascist theoreticians had no reason to change this when they were required to articulate an ideology of fascism. No rival power was to be permitted. The state's monopoly on power and coercion effectively translated to a monopoly for the fascist party since no other party was permitted. This exclusiveness is also based on an obvious logic. The fascist party had conceived the fascist state. One could not think of a "corporate state" or a "syndicalist state" without thinking of the fascist party. Fascism was inseparable from corporativism or syndicalism. If one removed the one concept, he necessarily removed the others. The fascist party, not the state, was the guardian of the fascist ideals, especially including syndicalism and the corporate organization of the state. The orthodoxy of syndicalist ideas was safeguarded in the fascist party. Hence, the highest value in the fascist state was syndicalism-corporativism. All force must be available to ensure its purity and its continued existence. The fascist party then is able to exercise in the name of ideological orthodoxy the state's power.

The fascist party had a special mission to the world as well as to the Italian people in keeping the ideology orthodox. Initially, fascism was conceived as an Italian movement, the natural by-product and the logical culmination of the emerging Italian nationalism and its cultural *risorgimento*.²⁹ Little thought was given to its potential exportability. By the middle of the 1930s Mussolini had come to the conclusion that fascism represented the new dynamic driving force that would conquer the world and take the place of the faded liberalism of the nineteenth century.

Giuseppe Mazzini,³⁰ philosopher, revolutionary, soldier-of-fortune, patriot and nationalist leader of the nineteenth century had sought in vain a set of Italian principles wherewith Italy could re-establish her intellectual leadership and philosophical pre-eminence in Europe. One or two great ideas, ideas that would motivate mankind to abandon the false premises of French liberalism, that was all Mazzini wanted. His own search for ideas or revolutionary zeal failed. Nonetheless, he was quite convinced that the rebirth of Italian philosophy and culture, the *risorgimento*, would indeed be ultimately productive to the extent the Italy would once again be the birthplace of some new idea wherewith the world would become enticed away from liberalism.

When the nineteenth century ended without producing such an awe-inspiring idea many Italian patriots were heartbroken, but the dream was not vacated. After Italy's catastrophic betrayal at Versailles, after so many promises made and broken by England and France, after her dreams of territorial acquisitions had been betrayed, after so much loss of life, the dream seemed lost forever. But with the post-war rise of fascism some few fascist supporters saw the fulfillment of Mazzini's dream. Fascism was to be the single inspiration point for the Italian nationalistic dream of cultural and spiritual leadership. All that remained was to export the idea, the idea that was to supplant liberalism, to others civilized nations.

By the time of the great depression, other fascist movements had arisen in Europe. Even in Southern and Eastern Europe fascist movements and parties had been founded.³¹ The rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany was the culmination of Mazzini's idea. Germany, a mighty culture producing nation had seemingly accepted an Italian idea. England was on the brink of discovering fascism with Oswald Mosley³² a mighty leader at the helm.

It soon appeared that the fascisms that grew up in the remainder of Europe bore only little similarity to that of Italy, excepting notably Mosley's British party. Germany's Nazism was based not on Italian ideals but on German myths, on racism grounded in a Nordic-Aryan race. The movements in Eastern Europe remained mystical-religious movements for the most part, excepting anti-Semitic ideals accepted especially in Poland³³ and Roumania.³⁴ These movements were decidedly anti-foreign and extremely nationalistic. They had little interest in the syndicalist-corporativist state that lay at the heart of Italian fascism. They shared common features more of national socialism than of Italian fascism, although each was based in the nationalist sentiments and frustrations of the particular nationality involved.

Fascist movements in general had certain distinguishing features.³⁵ They opposed parliamentary governments as being impotent to handle such worldwide crises as the great depression of 1929. They distrusted the *laissez-faire* economic system of capitalism as associated with the French liberal philosophy of the nineteenth century, for the system had collapsed in 1929. They preferred authoritarian governments which they felt alone were powerful enough to deal with crises without failing. They looked for collective social security against the social atomism of the liberal society. Liberal value systems grounded in utilitarian and value-relativism had failed to provide basic morality for society.

In seeking collectivist alternatives to the socially disintegrating systems of liberal philosophy, fascist movements rushed toward the deification of the state. They reacted collectively to problems of society and the state. Fascism was thus able to attract follow-

ers by offering class solidarity against individual isolationism. The groups found, discovered or fabricated common ethnic heritages and found the enemy within to be those who did not share these characteristics. The community was sewn together with the fabric of tradition, custom, language, religion and culture. Those not possessing these group characteristics were different, hence evil, the cause of the problems of state.

The fascist movements exhibited essentially lower-middle class values. They viewed the upper strata of society as being run by those who shared other, often foreign, values. They found that the values that the upper classes created were foreign, non-traditional, liberal-value relative, and removed from their kind. Where foreigners made up a goodly portion of the upper strata, or where natives were socialized to foreign, internationalistic or non-traditional value systems, the lower and lower-middle class groups were treated as merely tributary classes in their own nation.

Fascist movements as nationally oriented parties were most distrustful of international communism. The short-lived Bela Kun regime in Hungary had, through its excesses, put real fear in the hearts of many. Fascism often became a convenient stopover point for militant anti-communists. Communism was often associated with Judaism because many of the communist leaders were Jews. Thus, traditional Christian anti-Semitism was combined in fascism with political anti-Semitism in anti-communist crusades.

Fascism often offered elitist movements which spun off the ordinary fascist parties and which were dedicated strongly or exclusively to fundamentalist religion. Such movements lost virtually all ties with the real world of politics and spent their time and effort on frequently quite bizarre religious practices. The tie here is most clear in Roumania and in Hungary, but such elitist fascist religious organizations were known to exist on the fringes of most fascist movements.

Many fascist movements looked fondly backwards to a former period of alleged accomplishment. The members had liked simpler times with less demanding schedules and ideals. Fascism often became a kind of telescope through which one could look behind him and enjoy the blessings of medieval society. The prospects of a highly industrialized society frightened many fascists, especially in Central Europe. Fascism there often offered a lower class rejection of the fragmentation of society brought about by modernization of industry. A kind of emotional revivalism was presented against archaic medieval backgrounds, with primitive displays of symbolisms being offered almost as a rejection of anything modern.

Against this varied background Italian fascism stood out as a nearly unique movement. It had no special longing for the past,

for its leaders pointed the way to modernity as the desired road to be travelled. Italy's future greatness was indeed predicated upon past greatness, but the future offered a mission quite different than that performed by Rome. The only similarity was to be found in the fact that in both the case of Rome and in the case of fascism, Italy was predestined to lead other nations.

While it would have been more than possible for Italy to have spent much time and effort on the past, it had no inordinate preoccupation with past glories. To be certain, the symbol of the fasces had Roman roots, but the doctrine that stood behind Mussolini's fascism was thoroughly modern. Mussolini gloried in past cultural and artistic accomplishments, with Italy's role as creator of art types, but he sought futuristic fascist art as the way of the future.

Anti-Semitism was virtually unknown in fascist Italy, at least before the Second World War. Italy as a nation before fascism was one of the least anti-Semitic nations of Europe. It had little racial prejudice of any type. In the third phase of fascism there was some anti-Semitic literature associated with the regime, but that was never incorporated into the ideology in the way racism became a part of Nazism or many of the East European fascist movements. While there was ample reason why anti-foreign sentiments might have developed, given Italy's long occupation by a variety of foreign powers and her late achievement of nationhood, this did not become an important integral part of the ideology.

Religion did become an important consideration in Italian fascism, but, again, in a way unlike other fascisms. The Roman Catholic church was dominant in Italy. Mussolini reached an important accord with the papacy, ending a struggle that had gone on since Italian reunification. After that the conservative papacy, seeing in fascism a bulwark against communism, transferred its loyalty from aristocratic conservatism to fascism. Mussolini had no plans for a fascist religion as did many of Nazi Germany's leaders. He was generally content to accept the recognition of the papacy and had no good reason to break the generally quiet accord.

Fascist found in several papal encyclicals apparent justification and support for fascist doctrines. The denunciation of liberalism in *Rerum Novarum* (1891) seemed to justify subsequent fascist doctrine. Pope Leo XIII³⁶ and Pope Pius XI³⁷ had both denounced communism,³⁸ and, generally, socialism, while praising the interventionist state and capitalism. They had called, especially Pius XI in *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931), for control over the unions and moral responsibility in the application of economic laws and principles. The call by Pius XI for worker-employer confederations seemed to justify the corporate state. The call for

rebuilding society along the lines of harmonizing social-producers classes again seemed directed at the syndicalist organization of fascism. Superfluous income could be redirected by the state. The intervention on behalf of the very poor according to principles of charity but by the state and not just by individuals again seemed tailor made for fascism's practices. With socialism proscribed by papal decree fascism offered one viable alternative for the proletariat to the liberal state which had failed it.

The great enemy of Italian fascism was liberalism. There would, of course, have been no fascism without liberalism, but nonetheless fascism found in liberalism the antithesis of the needs of the working class. It was nineteenth century *laissez-faire* liberalism that was objected to, not the contemporary interventionist liberalism. Since liberalism had originated in France there was a certain measure of Italian national pride involved in the out of hand rejection. Still, there were other, far graver errors associated with liberalism that caused the fascist state to regard it so bitterly. Virtually every evil modern society was associated with it.

Liberalism offered no place for the individual who wished to join with his fellow men in fraternal association. Liberalism was atomistic, meaning that it isolated men from one another, forbidding cooperation and association. Liberalism placed man higher than the state so that the state ultimately was subordinate to the individual. It denied the organic nature and structure of the state.

Liberalism supported democracy. It was thought that a liberal democracy was inherently the most unstable form of government that man could create. The Italian flirtation with democracy had been short and it had been a very unfortunate experience. The majority of Italians were not enfranchised; among those who were there existed, for the formative years, a papal prohibition on political participation owing to the fact that the papacy was most displeased at the seizure of papal lands and other properties during the unification. Democracy had been blamed for all the failures of the infant republic. It had never served the agrarian interests of the Southern rural poor. It had become the seat of state capitalism, serving large industry and corporate monopoly. It had failed to accomplish tangible results in the first world war, even after the machinations of secret diplomacy. And it had collapsed during the workers strikes in the immediate post-war period, opening the door for the march on Rome and the institution of fascism.

Liberal democracy was seen as an anachronism, an unfortunate vestige of a past epoch. It was impotent to deal with crises of the modern world. It was made up of many political parties, none of which could serve the worker, each of which could argue

endlessly over trivial matters without ever reconciling even the pettiest matters. It functioned satisfactorily so long as there was nothing to be done and so long as the state was not involved in crisis. Once crisis came the leaders crawled away and the parliament failed. Such was the political legacy of liberalism.

Liberalism not only fragmented society into isolated individuals, it encouraged the fragmentation of industry into bourgeoisie and proletariat. Rather than seeking closer cooperation between classes in society it acted as a separating agent. The Marxian analysis of the two classes is nothing more than natural observation of the consequences of liberalism. Marx had thought it necessary to wholly reconstruct society after the liberal state. That was because he was a victim of liberal ideology. Outside a liberal state a reconstruction of society was possible without undergoing a Marxian revolution. Thus, Marx was himself entrapped by the same liberal society he chose to try to overthrow. Marxism was a product of liberalism, as was any doctrine which taught the class struggle as culminating in revolution.

Liberalism was universalist whereas fascism was nationalistic. The various worldwide movements such as the League of Nations were the stepchild of liberalism as were pacifist movements. The spirit of nationalism would be freed only when the liberal state was destroyed.

Liberalism encouraged monopoly and international cartels. While fascism was monopolistic itself, it found the same practice in liberalism to be quite objectionable. The *laissez-faire* economy of liberalism produced only monopoly while bringing about none of the benefits consequent to fascist monopolies.

The romantic spirit that was part and parcel of liberalism had its counterpart in fascism. Indeed, the romanticism of such writers as Rousseau find much in the way of fulfillment in fascism. Still, fascism criticized the romantic spirit as being too rational, not mythical enough.

Perhaps the most objectionable feature of liberalism, in fascist terms, was its value relativism. While fascism entertained some elements of value relativism, it preached, by and large, value absolutism. In many areas of ethics this meant a return to Roman Catholic teachings. In other areas the state merely granted values authoritatively by virtue of its supremacy. In any case the pragmatic or utilitarian values of especially English liberalism were rejected. An idea in the fascist state was absolute today, yesterday and tomorrow. Truth was not an event that happened to an idea; it was a necessary part of that idea. There is a paradox here, for fascism was the value of the twentieth century —having superseded liberalism, the value of the nineteenth century. Hence, the value of ideologies came to them in their own epoch and not in another epoch, certainly a relativist concept.

Fascism sought to create an idea that would be as lasting and as influential in its own time as liberalism was in its time. First and foremost it wished to achieve the quality Mazzini had posited of any system: it must necessarily represent the unity of thought and action. Action without some sort of doctrine was useless; and, conversely, doctrine alone without consequent action was useless. The thought need not be too specific. A general idea, some sort of dream of the future, some picture of the new and better world had to precede action. After the action commenced, a goodly portion of the thought could be made up along the way. Better to begin action before the ideology is completed than miss the opportunity for action.

Mussolini expanded that idea of creating while practicing to include the individual and the nation. The nation need not exist before nationalist fascism begins to forge the state. Indeed, he thought of the state as most generally preceding the creating of a nation. The state could, on its anvil, forge the people of that state into precisely what it wished them to become.

The contrast with Nazism is obvious. Only with satisfactory materials could a nation be built, according to Nazi ideology. Inferior races could never be forged into anything worthwhile, no matter how great the effort. The national spirit in Nazism exists within the people, albeit latently. Nazism can only reawaken that spirit; it could not create it. Only Nordics could ever realize the Nazi racist dream.³⁹

In fascism there is no suggestion of either recruitment of suitable subjects or of the exclusion of unsuitable ones. The fascist state could take people as they were given to it and then make them over according to the desires of the power elite. While there might still be within the population those who dreamed the Roman dream and could identify with the Roman spirit of the past, it was far more important what they should become rather than what they were at the time of fascist ascension to power.

Since nothing eluded the fascist state its power must necessarily extend to the creation of a superior race. It was the ideology, the doctrine of fascism, that would make of the race a people fit to control a substantial share of the earth. The vitality of the race would be shown by its works and deeds rather than by its genetic purity and its physical characteristics. A manufactured nation would enjoy power and prestige; one that had not been properly articulated could not enjoy the fruits of expansionism. If the state has done its job properly its race will show an aggressive foreign policy. Its art, drama, music and literature will show an ideologically motivated vitality that can be appreciated only if observed.

The people inhabiting a given geographical area are a nation after they have been motivated and inspired by the ideological fascist state. Their nationhood is then not a natural but an

artificial construct, one superimposed on them from above by a charismatic leader and his fascist party. Thus the state is fully empowered to educate its people, to offer them propaganda, to indoctrinate them fully, and to persuade them by force if necessary. It is charged with maintaining ideological purity and with spreading that orthodoxy. This is the civilizing mission of the state.

The state must provide enriching experiences for its members. Inasmuch as each individual is unique he must be fulfilled by offering him opportunities to develop his unique nature. The state must make him subservient to the state, its party and its leaders, but it must also enrich his life. While in the final analysis the individual lives to serve the state, it is equally important that the fully socialized citizen be given as many opportunities as he can utilize. Without individualizing experiences as offered by the state there would be no meaningful way for the individual to be differentiated from all other persons in the state. The uniqueness of the fascist state is to no small extent dependent upon the gathering in of the unique and individualizing experiences of its various members.

By offering him help in self-fulfillment, the state has helped to create the individual. By indoctrinating him with the ideology with which to approach outside phenomena, it has made him in its own image. For the fascist, the state has the obligation, while performing its social, political, and economic functions, to create the individual person. It must teach him the values established authoritatively by the state. It must strengthen the virtues of man. It must provide him with a world view. It must teach him to reject such alien values as move him from the state. He and every other individual must be inside the state, not against it nor outside it. He and all other persons make up the living body of the organic state.

The state is properly viewed as a real organic being.⁴⁰ It is not only like any other organic being; it is a living organism. It has a life all its own. It undergoes various experiences, including happiness, sorrow, joy, melancholy, ecstasy and the like. It is born out of the ideas of men and their courage in culminating the act of creation. It matures to adulthood. It can become ill and it can die. All other beings living within the state help to comprise it. Some parts die and others are born to replenish the needs of the state. The state can show courage, especially in an aggressive foreign policy; it can also show cowardice in the face of its enemies. Since the state is primary its life is far and away more important than the lives of the individuals who are its component parts. Like individuals it can create art, drama, poetry, music and literature as a national characteristic.

There is a spirit, a motivating factor, placed in the state much like the soul is for man. One can really speak of the "Italian national spirit" as being something actual, real and existing. Take away the spirit and the body public dies. Give the state a healthy spirit and its accomplishments can be almost without limits.

The organic analogy offered by fascism is very important because it tells something of the individual's role in the state. Ideally, the individual cannot consider himself independent of his fascist state. He is completely immersed in his state. It would be unthinkable, inconceivable to be outside the state. When an individual posits his existence, he is positing the existence of his state simultaneously. The fascist state offers the only possible existence for him. The individual without the state would not exist. The individual and his fascist state are inseparable.

Fascist ideology articulates the reason for the individual's being. It is his source of legitimacy. It is his home, his *patria*, his source of thoughts and ideas. An anti-state thought is impossible.

When his state accomplishes something he is proud. When his state suffers so does each individual. Creations of the state give the individual national pride which is itself inseparable from pride in self. The state's ideology is his own. He accepts no other state or ideology. The fascist party is legitimate because it is interconnected with the state. It guards the ideology and offers an orthodoxy which makes the individual orthodox.

The party is supreme and allows no competition. As the bearer of the ideological orthodoxy⁴¹ it has an historical mission. It cannot tolerate public factionalism or party disputes. It cannot legitimately allow power to pass out of its hands, say, to the army or the bureaucracy. The fascist party is the sole agent of secular redemption; it is the guardian of the future and the protector of the past. It thus has an unquestioned right to an absolute monopoly of power. The party monopoly of power is not a part of fascist ideology, but it is the most important inference from it.

Since the fascist state remained Roman Catholic and did not attempt to eradicate organized religion it did not create a rival religion. To be certain, as a carryover from the days of the reunification there was some anti-clericalism, but its effect was negligible on the ideology. Therefore, the fascist party's role as the agent of secular redemption and secular salvation was not nearly so important as it was in Nazism. The emphasis on a perfect society was less than that of Nazism. It wished to produce the good society, but disdained the possibilities of the perfect society. The inordinate emphasis on the perfect society was one of the fallacies of communism. There was no teleology in fascism as there was in Nazism and communism.

Fascism did propound a theory of a nearly infallible leader. The cult of the personality was as well developed in Italy as it was in Germany. The word Duce was roughly the equivalent of Fuehrer. It was this charismatic figure who had created the fascist movement and who was destined to lead it to the final victory. He was the choice of the deity, the man of destiny. Through his personal intervention history had been changed and given a new direction. His movement was one of the great accomplishments of mankind. In Italy this rhetoric failed to find deep roots, for *Il Duce* was fired by his own Grand Fascist Council when his movement collapsed along with the Italian army on the field of battle.

As long as the leader remained in power he spoke with a single voice of authority for his nation. Fascism never conceived of an oligarchy or a democracy governing. It is rather pointless to speculate about what the death of Mussolini might have brought, provided fascism lived after him, for every fascist movement has risen and fallen with its single leader. Surely another leader would have risen to the position of *Il Duce*. Fascism required that the party be led by a single individual who could, by sheer force of will, decide all disputes and right all wrongs. Only a single individual was considered to be the rightful spokesperson for an entire nation; no combination of individuals could accomplish this. Where fascist movements have not come to power they usually die with their charismatic leader. Where a fascist movement might outlive its leader because he has brought the movement to power is just a matter of guesswork.

Fascism, as noted above, accepted the idea of violence as a political tool; indeed, it was one of the most useful tools available to those seeking political power and those already possessed of political power. We also noted that fascism rejected the idea of the class struggle that would culminate in revolution. The doctrine of violence and the idea of revolution require additional qualification and explanation.

Mussolini rejected the notion of the warfare between opposing classes. Following Gaetano Mosca,⁴² he did not reject the possibility of warfare between segments of classes, as between, say, socialist workers and fascist workers, or between socialist workers and reactionary strikebreakers hired by industrial management. These portions of classes were less guided by ideological considerations than by a natural, irrational, and generally incomprehensible determinism. Most frequently portions of classes would clash because they were seeking identical goals through identical means than because they were conscious of differences between them.

The determinism of Marxism was found in the class struggle whereas Mosca⁴³ and Mussolini found it to be unrelated to any social struggle. Whatever struggles there may be in society were

determined beyond the powers of man to change or alter. Men became the pawns of deterministic fate. In the long run, the politicized portions of all classes struggled with one another in a predetermined manner for control over the rest of the men in that state. Hence, fascists could expect, as one political element or fragment of the classes in Italy, to have to meet socialists, anarchists and communists, these being other politicized fragments of the various classes, in open combat. Violence was thus fully justified, indeed, determined, long ago and by powers beyond the pale of men to control.

This leads us to the ideas of Roberto Michels.⁴⁴ Michels formulated a hypothesis known as the Iron Law of Oligarchy.⁴⁵ He believed that there would necessarily and inevitably be competition among elites for political control of all states. Political leadership is then recognizable only in small groups, fragments of society, never in larger organizations. Leadership is always in the hands of the few who compete with other small groups for control. Stated simply, society requires organization; organization requires leadership; and leadership is inevitably oligarchical. To Mussolini, this meant that Mosca's politicized fragments of society were nothing more than oligarchical groups who were competing for power. The socialists, the anarchists, the communists and the fascists were all oligarchies. The competition was necessarily accompanied by violence. The most prepared and the most violent would win. The fascists had to be ever vigilant because no victory was final. The competing fragments of society were always waiting in the wings, ready to rotate power to themselves. Hence, another of Michels laws comes into play. Because of the threat to the oligarchy in power from other potential rivals the ruling elite becomes obsessed with the maintenance of power rather than the application of programs.

If the proposition that action and thought should always go together was to have meaning the fascist party had to both maintain power and develop programs. Without power, programs were useless. Without doctrine, the maintenance of power was nothing but an exercise in futility. Mussolini theorized that the threat of an opposition party ready to seize power would stimulate fascism to increasingly superior acts on behalf of the state and its people. Without the agitation of a bit of sand inside its shell the oyster does not produce a pearl and its value is naught.

Violence is necessarily produced by an irrational act, but, then, fascism was an irrational ideology. It was not an ideology of violence, but it was a doctrine that found violence useful. The violence was to be directed at its enemies. Both fascists and their enemies were predetermined to use violence or fail.

The revolution, since it involved only competing elites, was superimposed on society from above. Fascism rejected complete-

ly the Marxist doctrine of whole class struggles as we saw above following Mosca. Thus the idea of a mass revolution, a popular revolution involving the masses of men rising up spontaneously from below, this was unthinkable in fascism. All revolutions were elitist and involved only small fragments of all classes. By many standards, these titanic struggles could not be called revolutions since they presume the seizure of the state by the few, classically called coups d'etat. The bulk of the fighting would be done in the underworld of society, much like two giant sea monsters fighting in the depths who only occasionally surface enough to show us that a struggle is going on.

Fascism never claimed that it would necessarily win all such struggles the way communism claimed inevitable and final victory. The determining features of nature offer only determined struggle, not determined outcome. No fascist victory was necessarily final. While fascist states could cause by their own efforts final victory, they could as well by errors of omission and commission cause the battle to be lost.

Since no victory was final, violence would never disappear in the state. Violence was the means to come to power and it was the means of most successfully maintaining power. Violence was seen to harden the individual. Life after fascism was not to be the proverbial bed of roses. Fascism promised neither a millenium nor utopia.

The heart and soul of fascism was the corporative state. Its great concern was the syndicalist organization of industry through the worker-management cooperatives. This was and remains its most exportable element. Mosley recognized this in Great Britain. Few other fascists have seen this fact. The racist fascism of contemporary fascism is more kindred to Nazism than to fascism, and even it has generally lacked the basic understanding of Nordic volk and Aryan racism.

Footnotes

1. For a good general treatment of the roots of fascist thought see, J.L. Radel, *Roots of Totalitarianism*, New York, 1975. See also, John H. Hallowell, *Main Currents in Modern Political Thought*, New York, 1950, pp. 521-617; S.J. Woolf (ed.) *European Fascism*, New York, 1968, especially Hugh Trevor-Roper's "Phenomenon of Fascism"; also Eugen Weber, *Varieties of Fascism*, Princeton, 1964, and M. Halperin, *Mussolini and Italian Fascism*, Princeton, 1964.
2. More than any other ideology, fascism openly acknowledged its roots. Mussolini's speeches are flavored with quotations from intellectual giants of the nineteenth century. Such quotations are not footnoted, but no real effort was made to conceal the sources either.

3. Hegel's influence on Italian philosophy is often understated. Few if any Italian writers openly expressed their indebtedness to Hegel, but Gentile was especially influenced by Hegelian concepts.
4. See the Report to the Grand Council of Fascism included herein.
5. See Radel, *op. cit.*, pp. 78ff.
6. See Alfredo Rocco, "The Political Doctrine of Fascism" in 223 *International Conciliation*, 1926.
7. See the flow chart provided in Radel, *op. cit.*, p. 92.
8. See S.J. Woolf, "Italy" in Woolf (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 60.
9. See flow chart in Radel, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
10. See Woolf, *op. cit.*, p. 58.
11. There were four *quadrupvirs*, leaders, along with Mussolini, of the March on Rome. They were elected for life to the Grand Fascist Council.
12. Mario Palmieri, *The Philosophy of Fascism*, Chicago, 1936.
13. See Benito Mussolini, "The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism" in 306 *International Conciliation*, 1935; see also his *Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions*, Rome, 1935.
14. On Gentile we have his own *Genesis and Structure of Society* (trans. H.S. Harris, Urbana, 1960), and Harris' book, *The Social Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile*, Urbana, 1960.
15. These are the facts of fascist accomplishment admitted even by its severest critics.
16. This is a constant theme of Mussolini's speeches from the early 1930s on.
17. See Hallowell, *op. cit.*, pp. 592-93, Sabine, *op. cit.*, pp. 863-64 and Woolf, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
18. See especially Radel, *op. cit.*, pp. 66f.
19. The influence of "pre-scientific" thinkers is greater than one might imagine for we are victims of Marx's criticism of them as being unscientific. Many were quite influential in regard to the development of European doctrines including fascism. Note Desjacques, Babeuf, Blanqui, Proudhon, Saint-Simon, Fourier and others.
20. Georges Sorel (1847-1922) authored *Le Proces du Socrate*, 1889; *La ruine du monde antique*, 1890; *L'avenir socialiste des syndicats*, 1900; *Saggi di critica del marxismo*, 1903; *L'illusion du progress*, 1909; and *Reflections on Violence*, (trans. T.E. Hulme, New York, 1914), this latter being of greatest concern to us.
21. See J.P. Mayer, *Political Thought in France from Sieyes to Sorel*, London, 1943, and Hallowell, *op. cit.*, pp. 458-63.
22. The "Italian" conception of Hegel really begins with Benedetto Croce (1866-1952). Croce was a major philosopher of international reputation. Mussolini would have liked to have had Croce write a theory of fascism, but Croce refused to have anything to do with the fascist state. Nonetheless, Mussolini allowed Croce to continue his liberal-democratic writing without interference. Unlike many other Italian intellectuals, Croce was neither harrassed nor forced to emigrate. See Croce's obviously Hegelian philosophy in his *Philosophy of the Spirit*, 1917, or in his *Aesthetics*, 1902.

23. See Croce's *Philosophy of the Spirit and his History: Its Theory and Practice*, (trans. Ainstre; New York, 1921).
24. See William N. Loucks, *Comparative Economic Systems*, New York, 1952, and H.A. Steiner, *Government in Fascist Italy*, London, 1938, for good explanations of the corporate state.
25. See Sabine, *op. cit.*, pp. 638-47; see the explanation of the dialectic in G.R.G. Mure, *An Introduction to Hegel*, Oxford, 1940; or W.T. Stace *The Philosophy of Hegel*, London, 1924, especially IV, part 2.
26. See Radel, *op. cit.*, pp. 47ff. Claude Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) wrote *Reorganization of Europe*, 1814; *The Industrial System*, 1821; *Catechism of Industrials*, 1824; and *The New Christianity*, 1825.
27. See Rousseau's *Social Contract*, especially Book II, parts i and iv.
28. See the Fascist Labor Charter, included in this book.
29. See Derek Beales. *The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy*, London, 1971, and A. Gramsci, *Il Risorgimento*, Turin, 1949.
30. Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872) is covered well in Radel, *op. cit.*, pp. 38ff. Radel attributes the fascist idea of the unity of thought and action to Mazzini. He attaches great importance to Mazzini as a necessary forerunner of fascist doctrine.
31. See Woolf, *op. cit.*, for a good general treatment of various European fascisms. The essays in his book include treatments of Italy, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Roumania, Poland, Finland, Norway, Great Britain, France, Spain and Portugal. See also Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (eds.) *The European Right: A Historical Profile*, Berkeley, 1964.
32. See Colin Cross, *The Fascists in Britain*, London, 1961. Mosley's principal work is *The Greater Britain*, London, 1932.
33. See S. Andreski's "Poland" in Woolf, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-83.
34. See Z. Barbu's "Rumania" in *Ibid.*, pp. 146-66.
35. See H.R. Trevor-Roper, "The Phenomenon of Fascism" in *Ibid.*, pp. 18-38. See also Christopher Seton-Watson, "Fascism in Contemporary Europe" in *Ibid.*, pp. 337-353. See also Eugen Weber, *Varieties of Fascism*, Princeton, 1964, and Ernst Nolte, *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche*, Munich, 1963.
36. Leo XIII, "The Condition of Labor," usually cited by its Latin title, "Rerum Novarum" issued 15 May 1891. A convenient English language source is Gerald C. Treacy and William J. Gibbons (ed.) *Seven Great Encyclicals*, Paulist fathers, 1963.
37. Pius XI, "Reconstruction of the Social Order" more commonly known by its Latin title, "Quadragesimo Anno," issued 15 May 1931, included in Treacy and Gibbons, *op. cit.*
38. Atheistic communism was again rejected by the Church in stronger language in an encyclical issue by Pius XI, "On Atheistic Communism" known by the Latin title, "Divini Redemptoris," issued 19 March 1937, included in Treacy and Gibbons, *op. cit.*
39. This is one of the principal topics of Alfred Rosenberg, *Myth of the Twentieth Century*, Munich, 1935. See also the English language commentary on Rosenberg, A.R. Chandler, *Rosenberg's Nazi Myth*, Ithaca, New York, 1945.
40. There is an obvious comparison with Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), *Leviathan*, wherein Hobbes writes on the third type of body, the

body politic, the highest and most complex body, the state. Hobbes developed a substantial analogy between a human body and the state.

41. It is important to understand that within all ideological party doctrines the role of the party as the carrier of legitimacy is vital to the existence of the party. This was true in Nazism. It is emphasized to the extreme by all branches of the communist party.
42. Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941) wrote *Sulla teorica dei governi e sul governo parlamentare*, 1884; *Elements of Political Science*, 1896, which was revised several times and is known in English as *The Ruling Class*, New York, 1939, and *Storia delle dottrine politiche*, 1932.
43. See James H. Meisel, *Pareto and Mosca*, Englewood Cliffs, 1965, and his *Myth of the Ruling Class*, Ann Arbor, 1962. See also a discussion of Pareto and Mosca and their respective relations to fascism in Radel, *op. cit.*, pp. 66ff.
44. Roberto Michels wrote *Political Parties*, 1915, which developed the Iron Law of Oligarchy, his thesis being that leadership is always oligarchical and that such oligarchies cannot be prevented by any devise, including constitutional limitations.
45. See Chester C. Maxey, "Iron Law of Oligarchy" in Joseph Dunner (ed.) *The Dictionary of Political Science*, New York, 1964, p. 270.

THE TRUE STORY OF AN UNCLAIMED REWARD

IHR SPECIAL REPORT

*\$50,000 Auschwitz Reward Unclaimed;
"Gas Chambers" Myth Continues to Crumble*

4, KEITH STIMSON

None Could Prove Auschwitz Claims

A golden opportunity for the "Holocaust" establishment to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt what it and its mass media have been contending so loudly so long—that the Nazis exterminated six million Jews during World War II in gas chambers—termination camps, principally Auschwitz—has passed. The gas chamber thesis has not been proved.

The Institute for Historical Review (IHR), California-based organization that has been fighting the "Holocaust" establishment since 1978, has set as its December 31, 1985 deadline for claims to its offer of \$50,000 for proof that "gas chambers for the purpose of killing humans" being situated at or in Auschwitz Concentration Camp during World War II" had come and gone with not a single and

possibly to attempt to determine such by estimation of a body so affected. And if some \$11 million be spent million or even two million as estimates in the sites have shown to be justified that was there must be certain extraction such body or at the very

In some combinations, older houses carried out such functions as public baths and sewage systems. The gas chambers made possible the mass extermination of Jews and other minorities and groups in society. Such a classless and peaceful culture was never built up in mass Europe. I am afraid the war could lead to the same kind of social and political conditions in the aftermath of the battle zones of gas chamber victims. Thus, it would be appropriate to analyze the Hitler regime's policies toward the Jews and other minorities and groups in society.

Thus, what the IHRC was attempting to investigate, from its initial institutions, as well as conduct its research project of the gas chambers all along, was specifically to expose the Hitler regime's policies toward the Jews and other minorities and groups in society. The IHRC has also been involved in the Holocaust.

The members, as a group, are a

It is interesting to note that the period of greatest activity in the study of the HBC and its history coincided with a time of great interest in the history of the Hudson's Bay Company. This was due in part to the fact that the HBC and Hudson's Bay were both engaged in a similar business, that of the fur trade. It was also due to the fact that the HBC had been granted a royal charter in 1670, while Hudson's Bay had not. The Royal Charter gave the HBC a monopoly over the fur trade in the area west of the Mississippi River. This gave the HBC a great deal of power and influence. The Hudson's Bay Company, on the other hand, did not have such a monopoly. It was a smaller company and did not have as much power or influence. The HBC's monopoly over the fur trade in the area west of the Mississippi River gave it a great deal of power and influence. This, in turn, led to a great deal of interest in the history of the HBC and its activities.

KITTY HARY

**25 COPIES
FOR \$3.50.
PASS THEM
OUT!**

On April 1, 1982, the Institute for Historical Review announced the opening of a \$50,000 reward for proof that "gas chambers for the purpose of killing human beings existed at or in Auschwitz concentration camp during World War II." On December 21, 1982, the offer was closed, with no serious takers.

This eight-page, full-size tabloid gives the complete details of this extraordinary reward offer—the terms, the reasons, the several claims received and why each did not measure up, the reactions among the "Holocaust" Establishment. In its course it also provides an excellent introduction to and review of the *entire* "Holocaust" controversy, with a full page, five-language bibliography at the end of *every* publication that has ever questioned the "Holocaust." This tabloid is both a handy reference guide for the convinced revisionist, and an excellent tool for influencing and converting new people.

**IN STOCK IN A DELUXE, LIMITED EDITION:
VOLUME TWO, 1981**

Through its second year of publication, *The Journal of Historical Review* has achieved what no other periodical dared even to attempt: the dissemination of the most impacting "Holocaust" revisionist material ever to appear.

Articles, book reviews and commentary devastating to the "Holocaust" Establishment by such prominent revisionist scholars as Faurisson, Rassinier, Butz, Martin, Buchner, Staeglich, Wesserle, Weber and Lilienthal—to name but a few—have earmarked *The Journal* as the only consistently reliable and in-depth source of such information so vital in this age of historical blackout.

Now, the four 1981 issues have been bound into a handsomely-crafted, gold-imprinted hardcover volume of 414 pages—including a comprehensive 30 page index, a valuable guide to finding virtually any name, place or subject which appears in the volume.

You will treasure this volume not only for its enjoyable readability and use as a continued reference source, but as an attractive addition to your revisionist collection. Each copy comes wrapped in protective plastic. Order your copy now while supplies last.

The Journal of Historical Review, Volume Two/1981, \$20.00
■ (A limited number of Volume One is still in stock, \$20.00) ■

The Holocaust As Sacred Cow

L.A. ROLLINS

There's been a lot of . . . people walkin' around my ranch lately, talkin' about some hollow-cast. What's a hollow-cast? Is it like a spin-cast or a dry-cast? They don't look like fishin' types, and there ain't no water here anyhow.

—Letter to National Lampoon

Men become civilized, not in proportion to their willingness to believe, but in proportion to their readiness to doubt.

—H.L. Mencken

That one man or ten thousand or ten million men find a dogma acceptable does not argue for its soundness.

—David Starr Jordan

Dogma demands authority, rather than intelligent thought, as the source of opinion; it requires persecution of heretics and hostility to unbelievers; it asks of its disciples that they should inhibit natural kindness in favor of systematic hatred.

—Bertrand Russell

Everybody knows about the Holocaust. In barest essentials, the Nazi State, on Adolf Hitler's orders, planned and attempted to kill all European Jews, and succeeded in killing six million of them, mainly in gas chambers in such death camps as Auschwitz and Treblinka. Everybody knows this.

A few years ago, I got into a discussion with the brother of a friend of mine. He had recently returned from Israel, where he had been living for a few years. (He is not Jewish, but had gone to Israel with his Israeli-Jewish wife.) Eventually we ended up debating the merits of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and, in the course of that debate, he brought up the six million Jews who, so the familiar story goes, were killed by the Nazis. Since a few years before this I had become a skeptic regarding the Holocaust in general and the six million Jewish victims in particular, I asked him if he was sure that the Nazis had killed six million Jews. He then told me of a visit he had made to Yad Vashem, the state of Israel's official memorial to the "martyrs and heroes" of the Holocaust. He told me that he had seen the names of the victims of the Nazis. I asked if he had counted the names. Of course, he had not, but he informed me that he didn't need to count the names to know that there were six million of them.

This fellow's remarkable ability to determine the number of names at Yad Vashem without counting becomes even more remarkable if one knows that, in fact, Yad Vashem has thus far managed to collect only about three million names of supposed Jewish victims of the Nazis. According to Los Angeles Times staff writer Dial Torgerson in a 25 October 1980 story from Jerusalem: "In the somber Hall of Names at Yad Vashem, Israel's memorial to the victims of the Holocaust, are the names of nearly 3 million Jews who died in the Nazi death camps of the 1930s and '40s." Yet, despite this, my friend's brother somehow "knew" that he had seen six million names of Jewish victims at Yad Vashem! This fellow's will-to-believe in the Six Million murdered Jews was so strong that he imagined a non-fact (the six million names at Yad Vashem) to give support to his belief. Such are the absurdities of which a true believer is capable.

But this is by no means a unique case of dogmatism. For many people, the six million figure is not a fact, although they call it that; rather it is an article of faith, believed in not because of compelling evidence in its support, but because of compelling psychological reasons. For such people, the six million figure is a Sacred Truth, not to be doubted and, if necessary, to be defended with dogmatism, mysticism, illogic, fantasy or even downright lies. (Such pious frauds, or holy lies, have a venerable pedigree, going back to the early Christians who attributed their writings to other persons better known and more revered than themselves, to the pre-Christian Jewish writers who forged pro-Jewish versions of the *Sybilline Oracles*, and to even earlier true believers.)

In April of 1982, controversy swirled about a Los Angeles teacher, George Ashley, who had reportedly told a class of Jewish students that the number of Jewish deaths in the Holocaust had

been greatly exaggerated, that, perhaps, one million had died, rather than the familiar six million. Among the responses to the news reports of Ashley's heresy was a letter published in the *Los Angeles Times* signed by one Joseph Rosenfeld, which proclaimed: "All reputable scholars have accepted the 6 million figure—a figure reached painfully and painstakingly by pouring over countless lists of concentration camp victims, family histories, body counts, and every conceivable heartbreaking method available to social scientists and historians."

But Rosenfeld's story of how the six million figure was arrived at is pure fantasy. In fact, as early as 1943, two years before the end of the Holocaust, the narrator of Ben Hecht's propaganda play *We Will Never Die*, was already claiming that two million Jews had been killed and that four million more would die by the end of the war. Thus, the six million figure was never more than a very rough estimate of Jewish deaths. How could it have been anything more, given that, as Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel wrote in their 1967 book, *The Incomparable Crime*, "No figures have been published giving the numbers of Jews left alive in the Soviet Union; the estimate differ widely, and lie between 1.6 and 2.6 million." Of course, the number of Jews killed in the Soviet Union is a correlative of the number of Jews left alive. The more Jews that were killed, the fewer that would have been left alive. The less that were killed, the more that would have been left alive. If the estimates of the numbers of Jews left alive in the Soviet Union differ by as much as one million, then, by implication, the estimates of the numbers of Jews killed in the Soviet Union must also differ by as much as one million. And so I repeat: Rosenfeld's story of how the six million figure was "painfully and painstakingly" arrived at is pure fantasy. It is akin to, though not nearly as entertaining as, Alice's adventures in wonderland.

Rosenfeld's assertion that all reputable historians have accepted the six million figure smacks of a tautology. If he defines "reputable historians" to mean "historians who have accepted the six million figure," then what he says is, by definition, true, but also trivial because there is no reason why anyone else should accept such an obviously loaded definition. On the other hand, if he does not define his terms in a loaded manner, then he has the problem of explaining how French-Jewish historian Pierre Vidal-Naquet, in an essay devoted primarily to criticizing revisionism regarding the Holocaust, could say that "nothing must be considered sacred. The figure of the six million Jews exterminated, which originated at Nuremberg [not true, as I've already pointed out] has nothing sacred or definitive about it, and many historians arrived at a somewhat lower figure."

Among the historians who have arrived at lower figures are two prominent Jewish Holocaust historians (Holocaustarians), Raul Hilberg and Gerald Reitlinger, both firm believers in Nazi genocide and the gas chambers. Hilberg estimated that about 5.1 million European Jews died during World War II, while Reitlinger estimated between 4.2 and 4.6 million dead. An appendix to Nora Levin's *The Holocaust* (pages 715-718) gives the estimates of Hilberg and Reitlinger as well as the more conventional estimates of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry Regarding the Problems of European Jewry and Palestine (5,721,500) and of Jacob Lestchinsky (5,957,000). As Levin explains:

Reitlinger's considerably lower estimates are traceable largely to what he calls "highly conjectural estimates" of losses in territory presently controlled by the Soviet Union and losses in Romania. He has also pointed to the "widely differing estimates of the Jewish populations of Russia, Poland, Hungary, Romania and the Balkans" before the war.

One wonders if Rosenfeld would dismiss Hilberg and Reitlinger as disreputable. If so, then it would only be fair to dismiss Rosenfeld as an incorrigible dogmatist.

In any case, Nazi-hunter Simon Wiesenthal, "the avenging angel of the Holocaust," has his own fantasy about the six million figure. In the wake of a brief but favorable commentary by British author Colin Wilson on a booklet titled *Did Six Million Really Die?*, Wiesenthal wrote a letter, published in the April 1975 issue of *books and bookmen*. According to Wiesenthal: "Scientific researchers and historians in various countries reached the conclusion, based on German documents, that the figure of exterminated Jews was between five million eight hundred thousand and six million two hundred thousand. They agreed to a round figure of six million."

I think I've already given enough information about the widely divergent estimates of Jewish deaths to show that this is just another fairy story. The only question is: does Wiesenthal himself actually believe it?

Another letter published in the *Los Angeles Times* concerning the aforementioned Ashley affair was signed by one Robert Glasser, self-identified as "the Anti-Defamation League's staff person handling the case of George Ashley . . ." Glasser insisted that "the question regarding this instructor is not . . . one of academic freedom. It is simply a fact that 6 million Jews were killed in the Holocaust, and any attempt to teach otherwise is akin to teaching that 1 plus 1 equals 3." But, as I've already demonstrated, the six million figure is not a fact; it is, at best, an estimate, an estimate disputed even by some prominent Jewish Holocaustarians. If Glasser is not simply a tale-spinner, his assertion can best be

explained as a result of ignorance and dogmatism, which so frequently go hand-in-hand. As Montaigne said, "Nothing is so firmly believed as that which we least know."

In any case, Robert Glasser is not the only ADLer in L.A. given to making dogmatic assertions about the six million figure. The Los Angeles Times of 3 May, 1981 quoted ADL attorney David Lehrer's comment on the claim that the Holocaust is a myth: "It's a historical fact and we're not going to debate it. Are there any reputable historians who deny that 6 million Jews were killed in the Holocaust?"

Yes, Mr. Lehrer, there are "reputable" historians, i.e., Jewish Holocaustarians, who deny that six million Jews were killed in the Holocaust. But, in any case, if the Holocaust is a historical fact, rather than an article of faith, why is Lehrer unwilling to debate it? Is it not because, as Learned Hand said, "All discussion, all debate, all dissidence tends to question, and in consequence to upset existing convictions"? Apparently, Lehrer cannot tolerate the thought that existing convictions about the Holocaust might be upset by open discussion and debate, and so he simply refuses to debate.

My point that the six million figure is sacred to many people is explicitly confirmed by the oath sworn by attendees of the World Gathering of Holocaust Survivors in June of 1981: "We vow we shall never let the sacred memory of our perished 6 million be scorned or erased." But the belief in the six million figure is only one of the tenets comprising what might be called the Holocaust Creed. And, though some may not regard the six million figure as sacred, they may nevertheless consider other tenets of the Holocaust Creed to be sacred and unquestionable.

For example, Eugene Wetzler, a Jewish Marxist, has written an essay largely devoted to attacking Noam Chomsky, the libertarian socialist and MIT linguist, because of his defense of the civil liberties of French Holocaust revisionist Robert Faurisson. Wetzler writes:

The often quoted figure of 6,000,000 may be an underestimate. It was the figure given by the Allied Tribunal at Nuremberg. Studies of objective facts that tend to lower or raise the figure are acceptable . . . None of this brings into question the fact that genocide was indeed committed.

For Wetzler, to raise or lower the six million figure is acceptable, but to bring into question "the fact" of genocide is not. Thus, for Wetzler, "the fact" of genocide is a Sacred Truth, not to be doubted or questioned.

But I propose to question this Sacred Truth of genocide. Did the Nazi State attempt to kill all European Jews? Consider this passage from Goebbel's diary of 27 March 1942, which is sometimes

cited as evidence of Goebbel's supposed knowledge of a program to exterminate all Jews:

Beginning with Lublin, the Jews in the General Government [German-occupied central Poland] are now being evacuated eastward. The procedure is a pretty barbaric one and not to be described here more definitely. Not much will remain of the Jews. On the whole it can be said that about 60 per cent of them will have to be liquidated whereas only about 40 per cent can be used for forced labor.

Assuming the authenticity of the passage, and assuming that "liquidated" meant "killed," then Goebbels was projecting the killing of about 60 per cent of the Jews, with the others to be used for forced labor. While such an interpretation does give support to a charge of mass murder committed by certain Nazis, it does not support a charge of genocide, of total extermination.

Now consider the postwar confessions of Rudolph Hoess, commandant of Auschwitz. Hoess repeatedly said that in June of 1941 he received from Himmler an order for the total extermination of European Jewry. There are, however, a number of oddities in Hoess' confessions, including his reference to an "extermination camp" named "Wolzek," which nobody else on Planet Earth ever heard of. Also, the confessions Hoess made as a prisoner of the British and at Nuremberg differ in some respects from the confessions he later made as a prisoner of the Polish Communists. For example, in his later confessions he reduced his estimate of the number of Jews killed at Auschwitz from about 2½ million to about 1¼ million. And he modified his story about the extermination order he said he received from Himmler. While he still claimed to have received such an order, he also claimed that Himmler had soon modified the order to exempt from extermination Jews capable of war work. As Hoess put it:

Originally all the Jews transported to Auschwitz on the authority of Eichmann's office were, in accordance with orders of the Reichsfuehrer SS, to be destroyed without exception. This also applied to the Jews from Upper Silesia, but on the arrival of the first transports of German Jews, the order was given that all those who were able-bodied, whether men or women, were to be segregated and employed in war work. This happened before the construction of the women's camp, since the need for a women's camp in Auschwitz only arose as a result of this order. (Commandant of Auschwitz, Popular Library, pp178-179.)

Putting it more succinctly, Hoess wrote that, "When the Reichsfuehrer SS modified his original Extermination Order of 1941, by which all Jews without exception were to be destroyed, and ordered instead that those capable of work were to be separated

from the rest and employed in the armaments industry, Auschwitz became a Jewish camp." (Op. cit., p122.)

Whatever one may think of Hoess' confessions, it is a fact, acknowledged by nearly all Holocaustorians, that many Jews were used by the Nazis for forced labor. So, if there was an extermination program, it is hard to see how it could have been a program for total extermination, for genocide. Thus, Eugene Wetzler's unquestionable "fact" of genocide is questionable indeed.

Of course, dogmatism comes as easily to a Marxist intellectual like Wetzler as swimming does to a fish. But consider the way in which 34 French historians responded to the heresies of Holocaust revisionist Robert Faurisson. These historians signed a declaration, published in *Le Monde* on 21 February 1979, which concluded thusly:

Every one is free to interpret a phenomenon like the Hitlerite genocide according to his own philosophy. Everyone is free to compare it with other enterprises of murder committed earlier, at the same time, later. Everyone is free to offer such or such kind of explanation; everyone is free, to the limit, to imagine or to dream that these monstrous deeds did not take place. Unfortunately they did take place and no one can deny their existence without committing an outrage on the truth. It is not necessary to ask how technically such mass murder was possible. It was technically possible, seeing that it took place. That is the required point of departure of every historical inquiry on this subject. This truth it behooves us to remember in simple terms: there is not and there cannot be a debate about the existence of the gas chambers.

But who, other than two-legged sheep, would take seriously such a dogmatic declaration? For all I know, there may have been gas chambers used for the mass murder of Jews in some of the Nazi camps. But I refuse to believe in such gas chambers merely because some gang of would-be intellectual dictators tries to lay down the law. As the late novelist-philosopher Ayn Rand once said, speaking through John Galt, the hero of her novel, *Atlas Shrugged*, "Independence is the recognition of the fact that yours is the responsibility of judgement and nothing can help you escape it—that no substitute can do your thinking, as no pinch-hitter can live your life—that the vilest form of self-abasement and self-destruction is the subordination of your mind to the mind of another, the acceptance of an authority over your brain, the acceptance of his assertions as facts, his say-so as truth, his edicts as middle-man between your consciousness and your existence."

The insistence of 34 French historians that the mass murder of Jews in gas chambers was technically possible because "it took

place" is reminiscent of the argument of Joseph Glanvill in *Saducismus Triumphatus* (1681): "Matters of fact well proved ought not to be denied, because we cannot conceive how they can be performed. Nor is it a reasonable method of inference, first to presume the thing impossible, and thence to conclude that the fact cannot be proved." What were the "matters of fact well proved" that Glanvill thought should not be denied? They were the well proved "facts" of existence of witches and witchcraft.

It should be pointed out, however, that, unlike those who denied the existence of witches and witchcraft because, as Glanvill said, they "presumed" it to be impossible, Robert Faurisson does not simply presume the Nazi gas chambers to have been impossible. Rather, he presents arguments based on allegedly factual information about the properties of Zyklon B, the gas allegedly used for mass murder at Auschwitz. For example, in "The Gas Chambers of Auschwitz Appear to be Physically Inconceivable," (*The Journal of Historical Review*, Winter 1981), Faurisson writes that, "This gas is inflammable and explosive; there must not be any naked flame in the vicinity and, most definitely, it is necessary not to smoke." He then cites the testimony of Auschwitz commandant Rudolf Hoess that immediately after opening the door of a gas chamber, following the gassing, prisoners would begin to remove the corpses, smoking and eating as they worked. Faurisson asks:

How could they smoke in a place with vapors from an inflammable and explosive gas? How could all of that be done near the doors of the crematory ovens in which they were burning thousands of bodies? The gas chambers were allegedly housed in the same buildings as the crematory ovens. Who are these beings endowed with supernatural powers? From what world do these tremendous creatures come? Do they belong to our world which is ruled by inflexible, known laws of the physicist, the doctor, the chemist, the toxicologist? Or do they indeed belong to the world of the imagination where all those laws, even the law of gravity, are overcome by magic or disappear by enchantment?

Assuming that Faurisson is right about the inflammability and explosiveness of Zyklon B, he has raised some pertinent (and impertinent) questions about the physical possibility of the notorious Nazi gas chambers, questions which deserve to be answered by those who maintain that those gas chambers really existed. But, rather than answer Faurisson's questions, 34 French historians dogmatically insist that the alleged mass murder with Zyklon B was possible because "it took place." Such dogmatism regarding the gas chambers is the intellectual equivalent of the dogmatism of Catholic historians who insist that it was possible for the sun to plunge toward the earth above Fatima because "it

took place," as attested by thousands of eyewitnesses. As some people believe in the Holy Ghost, others believe in the Holocaust.

However, Lucy Dawidowicz, one of the leading Jewish Holocaustarians, actually approves of the French historians' dogmatic declaration, which, she says, "could well serve as a guide to American historians." Dawidowicz would undoubtedly be pleased, therefore, to know that some American academics have reacted to Holocaust revisionism with the same degree of open-mindedness as was displayed by the astronomers who refused to look through Galileo's telescope but nevertheless "knew" that he could not possibly have discovered any new heavenly bodies with it. One of the reactions to newspaper reports about Holocaust revisionist Arthur Butz and his book, *The Hoax of the Twentieth Century*, was a letter to the *New York Times* by one Professor Wolfe of New York University. Wolfe said that Northwestern University, where Butz teaches electrical engineering and computer sciences, should bring him up on charges of "academic incompetence" and "moral turpitude" for having written a book whose title he gave as *Fabrication of a Hoax*. Wolfe had seen the *New York Times* story which reported this incorrect title, but he had not seen the book itself. Noam Chomsky has written that, "No rational person will condemn a book, however outlandish its conclusions may seem, without at least reading it carefully; in this case, checking the documentation offered, and so on." But Professor Wolfe is not a rational person, at least, not in relation to Holocaust revisionism.

Another true believer who was moved to comment on "the Faurisson affair" was a Michael Blankfort of Los Angeles, perhaps the same Michael Blankfort who was a playwright, novelist, and screenwriter, and who, in an interview given shortly before his death in July 1982, spoke of a visit he made to Israel in 1948 which resulted in "the onset of a devotion to Israel that is without parallel in my life." In a letter published in *The Nation*, Blankfort wrote, "Anyone who claims the Holocaust never happened is insane. Why shouldn't a university fire a crazy teacher who might harm his students with his criminal delusions?" Coincidentally, iconoclastic psychiatrist Thomas Szasz, in *The Manufacture of Madness*, mentioned a doctor of the Sorbonne who wrote in 1609 that the witches' sabbat was an objective fact, disbelieved only by those of unsound mind. The parallel is obvious, and ominous.

Blankfort's dogmatic assertion that anyone who says the Holocaust never happened is insane, is an example of one of the most common ploys of Holocaust dogmatists, a fallacy Ayn Rand identified as "the Argument from Intimidation," which, as she explained,

. . . is not an argument, but a means of forestalling debate and extorting an opponent's agreement with one's undiscussed notions. It is a method of bypassing logic by means of psychological pressure.

. . . the psychological pressure method consists of threatening to impeach an opponent's character by means of his argument, thus impeaching the argument without debate.

The essential characteristic of the Argument from Intimidation is its appeal to moral self-doubt and its reliance on the fear, guilt or ignorance of the victim. It is used in the form of an ultimatum demanding that the victim renounce a given idea without discussion, under threat of being considered morally unworthy. The pattern is always: "Only those who are evil (dishonest, heartless, insensitive, ignorant, etc.) can hold such an idea."

In Blankfort's case, "the Argument from Intimidation" took the form: Only those who are insane can hold such an idea, i.e., the idea that the Holocaust never happened. But, as Rand said, "The Argument from Intimidation is a confession of intellectual impotence."

Another true believer is my very own Congressman, Representative Henry A. Waxman. In a column published in *The B'nai B'rith Messenger* of Los Angeles, Waxman waxed abusive:

To be realistic, we must note that the recognition of the horrors of the Holocaust in civilized circles has been sharply answered by an incredible repudiation of the Holocaust by those who would destroy us. How perverse, how deranged and utterly sick are the people behind the "debunking of the Holocaust?"

Who are these people who offer prizes to anyone who can prove a single Jew died in the concentration camps?

It appears that Waxman does not even know what he's talking about. The Institute for Historical Review has offered a reward of \$50,000 to the first person to prove to its satisfaction, in accord with American legal standards, that Jews were gassed to death at Auschwitz, but no one has offered prizes "to anyone who can prove that a single Jew died in the concentration camps." In any case, Waxman's response to Holocaust revisionism is simply a variation of "the Argument from Intimidation": Only the perverse, the deranged or the utterly sick can engage in debunking the Holocaust. Another confession of intellectual impotence.

One more variation of "the Argument from Intimidation" was employed by British writer Alan "The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner" Sillitoe in a letter published in *books and bookmen*, April 1975. Responding to Colin Wilson's aforementioned favorable comments on *Did Six Million Really Die?*, Sillitoe declared: "To disbelieve that an act of colossal and monstrous injustice has been committed is an act of injustice in itself." In other words: Only the unjust can disbelieve the Holocaust. Yet

another confession of intellectual impotence.

Some true believers, however, are not content merely to censor Holocaust heretics; they want to censor them as well. For example, Professor Franklin H. Littell of the religious studies department at Temple University, who is a member of the U.S. Council on the Holocaust, warned participants in a Jerusalem symposium on anti-Semitism that the damage being done by revisionists (what damage?) should be taken seriously. According to *The Jerusalem Post International Edition*, 19-25 October 1980, Littell announced, "You can't 'discuss' the truth of the Holocaust. That's distortion of free speech," and was applauded when he declared, "The U.S. shold emulate West Germany, which outlaws such public exercises. We now have to deal with a minimum of violence; later, we'll have to fight them in the streets." Thus, in true Orwellian fashion, Littell declares: Censorship is free speech. But, as Ayn Rand wrote in her book, *For the New Intellectual*:

Let no man posture as an advocate of freedom if he claims the right to establish his version of a good society where individual dissenters are to be suppressed by means of physical force. Let no man posture as an intellectual if he proposes to elevate a thug into the position of final authority over the intellect.

No advocate of reason can claim the right to force his ideas on others. No advocate of the free mind can claim the right to force the minds of others. No rational society, no co-operation, no agreement, no understanding, no discussion are possible among men who propose to substitute guns for rational persuasion.

Since Littell proposes precisely to substitute guns for rational persuasion, no discussion of the truth of the Holocaust is possible with him. So I have only one thing to say to Littell: Just try and stop me from discussing the truth of the Holocaust! Wendell Phillips once said: "If there is anything in the universe that can't stand discussion, let it crack." And I say: If the Sacred Truth of the Holocaust can't stand discussion, let it crack.

Another confirmation of my point about the sacredness of the Holocaust for true believers can be found in what I call the canonization of the survivors. With rare exceptions, such as Roman Polanski, Holocaust survivors are seen as Semitic saints. Instead of halos over their heads, though, concentration camp numbers tattooed on their arms serve as the insignia of their sainthood. This canonization of survivors is reflected in their immunity from criticism, or even skepticism, by the minions of the mass media of communications. How often have you seen or read any mass-medium journalist doubting or disputing the word of a Holocaust survivor? Rarely, if ever, I'll wager.

Yet another manifestation of the sacredness of the Holocaust is revealed in the headline of a *Los Angeles Times* story about the

increasing numbers of people visiting the site of the Dachau concentration camp. The headline: "Record Number Visit Shrine to Nazi Victims." Thus, Dachau is a shrine, one of many, to which the pious make pilgrimages.

But, if, for so many people, the Holocaust is a sacred cow, a matter of blind faith, the question is: Why? I think that Jewish psychohistorian Howard F. Stein has given at least part of the answer in "The Holocaust and the Myth of the Past as History," (*The Journal of Historical Review*, Winter 1980):

. . . why, for Jews, the Holocaust? What, in sanctifying the Holocaust, do Jews not want to know about that grim era? Whatever be the "facts" of the Holocaust, it is experienced as a necessity, as part of a recurrent historic pattern. Reality must be made to conform to fantasy. Whatever did happen in the Holocaust must be made to conform to the group-fantasy of what ought to have happened. For the Jews, the term "Holocaust" does not simply denote a single catastrophic era in history, but is a grim metaphor for the meaning of Jewish history.

. . . the "reality" of the Holocaust is inextricably part of the myth in which it is woven—and for which myth it serves as further confirmatory evidence for the timeless Jewish theme that the world is in conspiracy to annihilate them, one way or another, at least eventually.

Jean-Louis Tristani, one of the contributors to the book *Intolerable Intolerance*, gives an analysis which I think complements that of Howard Stein:

The Holocaust, which represents one of the most popular themes of contemporary Judaism, thus falls into a long tradition. It is bound up with what it would be necessary to call the "invention of Israel," of the Israel of today. The Hitlerian genocide perpetrated in the gas chambers, the Exodus and the creation of the Israeli state, do they not attain in effect the lofty meaning which the servitude in Egypt, the Exodus, and the installation in the Promised Land once had?

Judaic scholar Jacob Neusner, in his book, *Stranger at Home*, treats the Holocaust as part of a myth of "Holocaust and redemption."

The myth is that "the Holocaust" is a unique event, which, despite its "uniqueness," teaches compelling lessons about why Jews must be Jewish, and, in consequence of that fact, do certain things known in advance (which have nothing to do with the extermination of European Jewry). The redemptive part of the myth maintains that the State of Israel is the "guarantee" that "the Holocaust" will not happen again, that it is that State and its achievements which give meaning and significance, even fulfillment, to "the Holocaust."

. . . so if you want to know why be Jewish, you have to remember that (1) the gentiles wiped out the Jews of Europe, so are not to be trusted, let alone joined; (2) if there had been "Israel," meaning the State of Israel, there would have been no "Holocaust"; and so (3) for the sake of your personal safety, you have to "support Israel."

If we synthesize these three analyses, we get the following conclusions: (1) the Holocaust is a metaphor for the meaning of Jewish history, that is, that the world is in conspiracy to annihilate the Jews; (2) the Holocaust is part of a myth, comparable to earlier Jewish myths, encompassing the Holocaust, the Exodus and the Rebirth of the State of Israel; and (3) this myth explains to Jews why they must support the State of Israel.

Thus, it is not surprising to find Alfred Lilienthal reporting, in *The Zionist Connection*:

To ingrain the State of Israel more deeply into the Jewish consciousness, the International Association of Conservative Rabbis incorporated the events of the last 2,000 years in prayer. The death of the six million as well as the establishment of Israel, the June war, and the reunification of Jerusalem was all woven into the revised liturgy.

One Holocaust prayer can be found in Bernard Martin's *Prayer in Judaism*. It is "An elegy for the Six Million" by David Polish. (Polish, incidentally, makes use of numerous variations on the mythic theme that the fat of murdered Jews was used by the Nazis to make soap.)

As Howard Stein says, the Holocaust—the alleged Nazi extermination of European Jewry—is a metaphor for the meaning of Jewish history. The question is: is it anything more than a metaphor? In his book *Heresies*, Thomas Szasz says, "Most of the heresies in the book . . . pertain to matters where language is used in two ways, literally and metaphorically: where the true believer speaks metaphorically but claims that he asserts literal truths; and where heresy may consist in no more than insisting that a metaphorical truth may be a literal falsehood." Szasz, however, believes that the metaphor of the Holocaust expresses a literal truth, so let me be the one to commit the heresy of insisting that the metaphorical truth of the Holocaust may be a literal falsehood.

"Factual, well written, well documented. The reading of this book will add to one's depth of the subject and particularly of the thinking and feelings of tens of millions of Arab people." —DR. JOHN H. DAVIS

BITTER HARVEST

Palestine: 1914-1979

SAMI HADAWI

*To the future generations
of Palestinians
lest they forget what they lost
and how they lost it.*

BITTER HARVEST

Palestine Between 1914-1979

by Sami Hadawi

With a foreword by Dr. John H. Davis
*Former Commissioner-General of the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency
for Palestine (UNRWA)*

This book places before the reader fully documented evidence of the history of the struggle for Palestine, with an understanding of the forces responsible for the conflict, the ambitions, traditions and alliances that make up the Palestine problem.

Writing with clarity and force, the author also gives an unrivalled account of the events and factors behind the current high-tension occurrences in the Middle East with a special section dealing with the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agreement of 1979.

Bitter Harvest is not only the result of meticulous research, but also of first hand knowledge of the problems of the area. The author's conclusions therefore deserve careful study.

Sami Hadawi was born in 1904 in Jerusalem. He served with the Palestine Government under the British as Official Land Valuer and Inspector of Tax Assessments. In 1940 he was awarded the M.B.E. for "outstanding service."

In 1960 he established the Arab Information Center of the League of Arab States in Dallas and became its first director. Five years later he moved to Beirut as Director of the Institute for Palestine Studies.

During the past twenty years he has lectured extensively and has written numerous pamphlets and monographs. He is the author of the Prize-winning book, *Palestine: Loss of a Heritage*, and co-author of the two-volume *The Palestine Diary 1914-1945* and *1945-1948*.

The chapters in *Bitter Harvest* include • *Historical Background* • Palestine and the Jews • *The Zionist Movement* • Palestine Under Mandate • *Palestine Problem Before United Nations* • Strife, War, Truce • *The Armistice* • The United Nations Efforts for Settlements • *The Arab Refugee Problem* • The Arab Minority in Israel • *Repatriation and Compensation* • Violation of Human Rights • *Racism and Racial Discrimination* • Terrorism • *The Palestine Resistance Movement* • The Arab Boycott of Israel • *Israeli Policy of Expansion* • River Jordan Irrigation Project • *Israel and the United States* • United Nations Peace Efforts and Failures • *Palestine Between War and Peace*.

Bitter Harvest by Sami Hadawi, Pb, 326pp, index, bibliography, appendices.\$8.00

available from: INSTITUTE FOR HISTORICAL REVIEW

Post Office Box 1306 • Torrance, California 90505

—available after May 1, 1983—

Who Are the Palestinians?

SAMI HADAWI

Since Mr. Hadawi's paper was prepared for the IHR's 1982 Chicago conference, much of a one-sided and devastating nature has transpired in the Middle East.

Particularly, the world witnessed with mounting horror the massive invasion of Lebanon carried out by Israeli "Defense" Forces allegedly in response to one of their own being slain elsewhere.

But the public information trough was soon thereafter filled with so much illogic, obfuscation and anxiety over the increase in anti-Israeli sentiment that the final question pouring forth from the majority of Op/Ed pages across the land came as no surprise: Was the invasion justifiable?

As usual, few stirrings of consideration of the deeper question were to be found—the deeper question that refuses to go away despite the column miles of anguished, argumentative waste offered in its stead for the past 30 years: What are these "Israelis" doing in the first place on lands belonging to a people who have lived there for countless generations; what Palestinian counter-terror would not be justifiable in order to simply regain what has been expropriated from them?

Zionism both here and abroad appeared outraged when the reports of the slaughter of thousands of defenseless refugees were made known the world over—outraged not particularly at the massacres themselves, but at the fact that they were being talked about with fingers pointing in the direction of Jerusalem.

So in a last-ditch effort to stave off the mounting criticism, they held a court of inquiry and politically hung (but still we're not sure) a few of their own—a turn of events, incidentally, tailor-made to make all that came before off-handedly appear "legitimate," thus further clouding the deeper question by focusing attention elsewhere.

To reiterate, it was the immigrant Zionists from Eastern Europe who ganged up on the Palestinian Arabs and threw them off their own lands. And yet it is these very usurpers who most loudly

screech about the "PLO terrorists," who remonstrate that if but a single one is abroad in Lebanon (or any nearby Arab nation?) the entire region must be put to the torch.

This is not only the "logic" of the insane, but, to boot, it adds considerably more chutzpah to the big lie. Who, now, can keep track of what really has been going on in the area, and why?

With better than \$251 billion in various forms of direct assistance from our elected since 1948, Americans have been committed to nurse-maiding what has turned out to be the most uncontrollable step-child since the Workers' Paradise idea gained a Wall Street following.

In 1970 about 1% of the total U.S. foreign aid budget wound up in Israel's pocket. In 1971 Israel knocked on Congress's door for 7.4% and it was verily opened unto them. In 1974 "the only democracy in a sea of Arab tyranny" wanted 28% of our foreign aid budget and got it—a figure that jumped to nearly 35% in 1976. These figures do not even include America's indirect subsidies such as tax-free Israeli bond sales here, tax-exempt donations and bribe money to Egypt. The figure will probably top \$10 billion in fiscal 1984—but no George F. Will or Geraldo Rivera will dare highlight these facts in juxtaposition to the growing financial crunch said to be besetting our own economy.

In early March 1983 at a meeting of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, pro-Israeli chairman Rep. Lee Hamilton (D.-Ind.) questioned what the political [read: media] impact would be of a proposed decrease in direct U.S. aid to the nation that, with somebody else's money, made somebody else's desert bloom.

Speaking to Nicholas Veliotis, assistant Secretary of State, Hamilton asked "What kind of signal do you think would be sent to Israel in the event Congress would agree to the . . . decrease (in) assistance to Israel?"

When the assistant Secretary of State replied that assistance to Israel was already quite substantial, Hamilton countered that the Israeli economy had weakened, making a decrease in aid difficult to justify. (!)

Veliotis then remarked that he didn't think that was particularly relevant, whereupon Rep. Hamilton emphatically rejoined: "In due course you'll find that it's relevant."

That, in a nutshell, is the essence of the problem. The whole contemporary Middle East mess, its basic nature and the reason for its continuance, can be traced back to the U.S.A. Only the tremendous economic leverage extending from these shores could hope to "pacify" an Arab region which has suffered such continual betrayal and has witnessed with amazingly calm resolve, given the situation, the unabating hypocrisy and black propaganda.

Historically, it has been the Palestinian Arabs who have worked for peace, and for what is rightfull theirs.

It is the "Holocaust" Establishment, and all who urge it on with dollars and favorable editorials, which is the real Middle East problem. The excuse for the Israelis to seize more real estate does not have to amount to much—most anything will do. This excuse is that the only way the Arab "threat" can be eliminated is by eliminating all non-subservient, proximate Arabs.

With this said, let us start at the beginning with Mr. Hadawi's brief on the development of the conflict—a history written by one who has spent the greater part of his life in Palestinian diplomatic service. Mr. Hadawi's thesis may not be entirely free of passion, but it certainly deserves a hearing because of the justice of its cause, the scarcity of opportunities to present the case for that cause, and the overwhelming indications that the conflict will continue for years and even decades to come until the suppressed side of the story is understood broadly and something resembling justice and reason prevails.

—Tom Marcellus

To many Americans the expression "Palestinian" is synonymous with either a refugee or a terrorist. The first receives philanthropic sympathy like all other refugees of the world; the second outright condemnation. Few attempt to find out the background of either. Let me explain:

Responsibility of the creation of the Palestine refugee problem rests primarily with the Christian Church. Influenced by Zionist arguments that the Jews as the "Chosen People" enjoyed special favor and interest of an omnipotent deity and that Palestine was their "Promised Land," many of the church leaders used their frocks and the pulpit to misinterpret Holy Scriptures into the belief that in supporting the realization of the dreams and goals of political Zionism of establishing a state in Palestine and ingathering the Jews of the world into it, they would be pleasing God and bringing closer the Second Coming of the Messiah. They made no attempt to explain, or even to comprehend, the difference between Judaism as a religion and Zionism as a political movement which was deliberately and maliciously using Judaism and Christianity to achieve its political aims in Palestine. Thus the Holy Land and its Moslem and Christian indigenous inhabitants, who claim descent from the earliest people of the country, were crucified on the cross of political intrigue and personal greed with the Christian Church acting as the Judas Escariot of the 20th century. What the Christian Church began in the early 1900s, the Western politician accomplished in 1948 to make the crime against humanity complete.

After the creation of the state of Israel and the expulsion and dispossession of the Moslem and Christian inhabitants of the country, Christian church leaders began to doubt that the newly established "physical Israel" that they so unwisely helped to create was the "Israel of God" which is ordained in Holy Scriptures. They realized that their blind support of political Zionism was ill-advised and, strictly speaking, had nothing to do with the Bible; while Israel's treatment of the Palestinians brought home to them the enormity of the sin that was being committed against humanity. Consequently, certain American Christian leaders made demands on the U.S. President to terminate all military aid to Israel which continues to act as judge, jury, and executioner in its own cause without regard to human decency, equity and justice.

The exposure of the true character of Zionism and the aggressive nature of Israel and the resultant change in attitude of the Christian Church, were a setback which the Zionists and Israelis had not contemplated. For succor they turned their attention to evangelical Christians and found support among some who were willing to sell their soul to the devil for thirty pieces of silver. Dangling fame and the dollar before their eyes with free trips to the Holy Land, the honor of being photographed with Israeli leaders, as well as adequate financial means to maintain a comfortable way of life for themselves, the misguided and corrupt among them have turned Christianity into a lucrative business with Christ serving as the product and they the beneficiaries. They take out television and radio time for their Sunday so-called "Crusade for Christ," and conduct tours of the Holy Land under the guise of visiting holy sites but the real purpose behind these is to influence Christians in favor of Israel. For example, if their faith was what they claim it to be, where is their Christian charity and conscience on what has been going on in Lebanon? Not a word of sympathy, not a word of condemnation, not even a prayer for the bereaved, the murdered men, women, and children, the maimed and those buried under the rubble of their own homes!

In 1975 the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution which determined that "Zionism was a form of racism and racial discrimination."¹ This placed it on the same level with the "apartheid" policy of South Africa. The U.S. Government, faithful to the prodigies of the Jewish Lobby, condemned the Resolution without taking into account the actual character of Zionism as declared in its principles of a state for Jews only. The Neturei Karta, a community of pious orthodox Jews, described Israel as a state "conceived in atheism, based on materialism, nurtured by anti-Semitism, led by Marxism, ruled by chauvinism, and trusting in militarism."² For anyone to support such a racist destructive movement is to court disaster!

With regard to the Palestinians and terrorism, the Jewish Lobby in the United States has succeeded through intrigue, intimidation, economic power, and corruption in influencing the U.S. media of information and politicians to label the Palestinians as terrorists without attempting to understand the nature and reasons for their so-called terrorism. There are two basic categories of terrorism that can be defined, namely:

(1) There is the violent act done to destroy or disrupt an oppressive or tyrannical institution which has violated the legitimate rights and offended the fundamental values of a society or people; and

(2) There is the act of an institution or body against a society or people which tends to force or enforce its will and achieve thereby the surrender of principles and rights maintained by the society or people being acted against.

Under the first category fall such cases as the operations of the resistance movement in France during World War II. The Allies described their members as "freedom fighters" and supported them morally, militarily, and financially. The Occupying Power, on the other hand, called them "terrorists, saboteurs, murderers" and tried to exterminate them by any means at their disposal because their activities were intended to destroy their potential and military strength and re-establish freedom and human dignity. Although this type of action might terrorize the ruling and military institution, it cannot be conceived as a depraved "terrorism" in the true sense of the word. For all its negative attributes the world has seen fit to exonerate it as a struggle for human freedom, liberty, and dignity, and to endow it with almost religious sanction. Included in this category are the Palestinians who are fighting to regain possession of their usurped homeland, confiscated homes, and plundered property. In this category also fall the peoples of Africa who fought and those who are still fighting for their freedom, liberty, and independence.

The second category comprises such cases as the unique case of Palestine. There the Zionist movement, after enjoying for thirty years British patronage and protection for its programs to achieve political control over the country, turned against its erstwhile patron when the latter began to show signs of vacillation. One must be careful not to confuse the image of the French underground pitting itself against an army of occupation, or even PLO operations, and the illegal underground subversive organizations, the Hagana, the Irgun Zvei Leumi, and the Stern Gang, striking off the restraining fetters of their sponsor-turned-disciplinarian. When the time was right and the demoralized British were committed to abandon their mandate, the Zionist momentum was smoothly channelled into achieving what they had ex-

pected the British to achieve for them, namely, the seizure of Palestine, the demographic purgation of Palestine's Moslem and Christian inhabitants, and the declaration of the all-Jewish state of Israel, contrary to the provisions and spirit of the U.N. Charter, the U.N. Resolution of Partition, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and every principle of international law, justice and equity. Thus the Zionist movement's successful so-called "resistance" against the British mandatory government cannot be described as a liberation movement against colonialism, but was more in the nature of a "palace coup" carried out by one colonialist against another. Recalling the situation in those days, author Arthur Koestler said of the present Israeli leadership that as Zionists they "preached resistance but denied indignantly acting against the law; they alternately tolerated, fought against or engaged in terrorism, according to the opportunity of the moment, but all the time carefully maintained the fiction of being guardians of civil virtue."³ Correspondent David Hirst, on the other hand, referring to the present situation reported: "After the creation of the state of Israel, classical terrorism gave way to the outwardly more respectable terrorism designed to cow and subjugate the Palestinians and the Arab sympathizers." He condemned "an Israel which was built on terrorism and continues to glorify its terrorists to this day."⁴

Commenting on U.S. policy in this respect, White House Correspondent Robert Pierpont accused the Government of having

lost its sense of fair play and justice, and seems to be operating on a double standard. This double standard is present even when it comes to terror and murder. For so long Americans have become used to thinking of the Israelis as the "good guys" and the Arabs as the "bad guys" that many react emotionally along the lines of previous prejudices.⁵

Never in the modern history of mankind have human rights been so grossly violated as in the case of the Palestinian people and naked aggression so strongly and generously supported morally, politically, economically, and militarily, as in the case of Israel, by a nation which professes to be the champion of human dignity, liberty, and freedom.

It should be understood that the Palestinians are human too, made up of flesh and blood and have feelings like other human beings. They too love their country, regard their homes as their castles and, like people in the West, are willing to sacrifice all in defense of the same fundamental rights and principles for which peoples of the West fought two world wars and now enjoy and take for granted. The fact that the Palestinians have been denied similar rights and principles for the past thirty-four years should disturb the conscience of those who truly believe in equality for

all peoples, human dignity, and the right to be free and secure in one's own homeland. The Palestinians believe in these principles and will go to any length of sacrifice to attain their objective whatever the cost.

To understand the issues involved in the Palestine Problem one must begin with three basic questions, namely, who are the Palestinians, what are their rights and grievances, and why are these rights denied. Unless these questions are amply recognized and equitably dealt with, man's inhumanity to man will continue unabated until it explodes into greater and wider conflagration. Today there is a madman loose in the Middle East aided and abetted by a gang of criminals including such people as Ariel Sharon and Yithak Shamir of pre-Israel Stern Gang fame who will stop at nothing to reach their objective of a "Greater Israel." The invasion of Lebanon and the cruelty of the invader have produced surprises that the Israel which emerged is not the Israel contemplated when it was born. The impotence of the world to stop the genocide of men, women, and children, and the indiscriminate bombing and shelling of Beirut encouraged Menachem Begin to arrogantly tell his benefactors in moral, political, economic, and military support that "a Jew will not bow to anybody except God" and that Israel today does not need the help of anybody. It is the duty of all peace-loving peoples to ensure that this madman and his gang do not by their irresponsible actions gradually embroil the world in a nuclear tragedy. While it is not too late, time is running out.

Before I deal with the three questions I have posed, I would like to present certain background information relative to Israeli thinking:

When it was suggested to the late Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir that Israel would be wise to agree to return occupied territories to their Arab owners as a gesture of goodwill and compromise in return for peace with its Arab neighbors, she replied: "How can we return occupied territories? There is nobody to return them to."⁶ On another occasion she said: "There is no such thing as a Palestinian . . . It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestine people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist."⁷

The late Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol was no less emphatic in his denials and distortions. In an interview with Israeli newspaper *Davar*, he declared:

What are the Palestinians? When I came here (to Palestine) there were only 250,000 non-Jews, mainly Arabs and bedouins. It was desert—more than underdeveloped. Nothing. It was only after we made the desert bloom and populated it that they became interested in taking it from us.⁸

Such denials and distortions of facts are not only preposterous but are also an insult to the intelligence of man. When I read of them, I could not help but wonder if both ex-prime ministers were in their right mind. At the same time I pinched myself to find out if I, as a Palestinian, really existed. I can assure the Israelis and their friends that the Palestinians do exist and that nothing said or done will ever make me and the other over four million Palestinians scattered throughout the world to "go away" as former U.S. President Jimmy Carter once hoped the Palestinians would do. The Palestinians are here to stay and to multiply until justice triumphs and right overcomes wrong. The world has experienced grave injustices and great crimes but in the end the rule of law and order has prevailed. The Palestinians believe that through their own endeavour and determination they are not going to be an exception.

The Zionists endeavoured during the early period of their movement to make the world believe that "Palestine was a country without a people and that the Jews were a people without a country." Given the opportunity, they said, they would be able to make the desert bloom and bring prosperity to the few nomad bedouins who roamed the countryside.

The facts about the number of the Arab population and the extent of the productivity of the land have been grossly distorted. According to the Palestine Government statistics, the total population of Palestine in 1918 was 700,000 persons. Of these 570,000 were Moslems, 70,000 were Christians, and 56,000 were Jews;⁹ with the Jews owning less than 3% of the total land area. According to a study carried out by the British authorities soon after the occupation of the country, the estimated Jewish population between the years 1882 and 1922 was placed at a figure of 24,000 in 1882, rose to 85,000 in 1914, dropped to 56,000 during the war years of 1916-1918, and according to a government census rose in 1922 to 83,794 persons.¹⁰ By the year 1948 when the British mandate over Palestine came to an end, the population of the country stood at 1,415,000 Arabs (including 35,000 "others"), and 700,000 Jews who not formed one-third of the total population.¹¹ Jewish ownership of land increased from about 3% to about 6%, still an infinitesimal figure.

For Levi Eshkol to claim that the so-called "non-Jews" were only 250,000 souls and that the Jews had made the desert bloom is misleading. The 3% of Jewish owned land fell within the fertile lands of the coastal and other plains. They could therefore not have been in a position to make the desert bloom because the desert was not under their control. Even today with Israeli control over all the lands of Palestine the desert lands are still desert except for patches here and there where soil exists. The Israeli allegation of development consists chiefly of confiscated Arab

orange groves which made the "Jaffa orange" famous, centuries-old olive trees and fruit orchards, and first class cultivable land for all of which they now claim unearned credit and pride!

Given the financial support the Israelis received from the U.S. Government and world Jewry during the period 1948 to date, estimated to exceed fifty billion dollars, is it any wonder that extensive developments could have taken place in Israeli-occupied territory? With such colossal amounts of aid, it is possible to make even the vast deserts of Africa bloom! Incidentally, a visit to the Arab Gulf states show what money can do in the way of development; but if Israeli developments with free U.S. dollar contributions were to be compared with what the penniless Palestinian refugees were able to do on their own in Jordan, for example, the contrast would be enormous.

In regard to the fertility of the soil and production, foreign travellers visiting Palestine have described the country as it existed before the Jewish immigration, in glowing terms. One visitor of the 18th century said Palestine was "a land that flowed with milk and honey; in the midst as it were of the habitable world, and under a temperate clime; adorned with beautiful mountains and luxurious valleys; the rocks producing excellent waters; and no part empty of delight or profit." Such reports persist in profusion through the 18th and 19th centuries, not only in travellers' accounts but, by the end of the 19th century, in scientific reports published by the Palestine Exploration Fund.¹²

To go farther back in time, perhaps it would be in order to solicit the help of the Holy Bible that describes Palestine as a land flowing with milk and honey and the fact that when Joshua sent his scouts ahead of the Israelites they returned carrying huge bunches of grapes which clearly proved that the country was inhabited, that its lands were fertile, and that its production was abundant. If that were the case in these ancient times, surely the situation could not have deteriorated to such an extent that it needed Jewish skills and endeavours to revive the land!

Whether Palestine was a land flowing with milk and honey or a desolate desert is beside the point. The fact remains that the country in whatever form it is belongs to its indigenous inhabitants and should not be taken away from them merely because the new-comers are in a better position to develop the land. If such Zionist logic were to be accepted in the world today there would be utter chaos.

The Zionists were aware all the time that Palestine was fully occupied and about its agriculture productivity potentials. In claiming otherwise, they hoped to raise the minimum of objections to their schemes of removal of the Arab inhabitants from their ancestral homeland and the seizure of their lands. In 1895

Theodor Herzl noted in his diaries that something will have to be done about the Palestinians. He wrote:

We should try to spirit the penniless Arab population across the borders by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our own country. Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly.¹³

Other diabolical intentions towards the Palestinians came to light in later years. In 1921 Dr. Eder, a member of the Zionist Commission in Jerusalem, told the British court of enquiry appointed to investigate the causes of the first riots to break out between Arabs and Jews that "There can be only one national home in Palestine, and that a Jewish one, and no equality in the partnership between the Jews and Arabs, but a Jewish preponderance as soon as the numbers of the (Jewish) race are sufficiently increased." He then asked that only Jews should be allowed to bear arms.¹⁴

A later disclosure of Zionist plans of expulsion and dispossession of the Moslem and Christian inhabitants was reported by General Patrick Hurley, Personal Representative of U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt. He wrote in 1943:

The Zionist Organization in Palestine has committed itself to an enlarged program which would include (1) a sovereign Jewish state which would embrace Palestine and probably eventually Trans-Jordan; (2) an eventual transfer of the Arab population from Palestine to Iraq; and (3) Jewish leadership for the whole Middle East in the fields of economic development and control.

Zionist plans were partly realized in the 1948 and 1967 wars of aggression, and a third attempt at expansion is now in progress in southern Lebanon.

The history of Palestine and the Palestinian people is being deliberately obscured and distorted by the Zionist/Israeli propaganda machine. Palestine was traditionally a wholly Arab country until the arrival of the Zionists after World War I. The name Palestine, it should be remembered, was derived from the word "Philista" which was the land of the biblical Philistines who occupied the southern coastal area in the 12th century B.C. and remained there even after the Israelites had invaded the land. An examination of human remains by anthropologists revealed that 50,000 years ago the inhabitants of the country were of mixed racial stock. From the 4th millennium B.C. until 900 B.C., the predominant indigenous stock were the Canaanites.¹⁶

The Zionist claim to Palestine is based on pure fiction and would not have been taken seriously in this modern age but for Jewish political and economic influences and pressures over the

Christian Church and Western politicians. The claim is based mainly on two premises, namely, on ancient biblical promises of 4,000 years ago, and on Israelite (or Hebrew) historical connection.

In the case of the first, the "Divine Promise" said to have been given by God to Abraham, if it were to be taken seriously in the 20th century, was not made to the Jews but to the "seed of Abraham" which includes the Arabs who are the descendants of Abraham through his son Ishmael who was born and circumcized before Isaac was even conceived. Furthermore, the Jews of Ashkenazi extraction are descendants of the Khazars, a people of Turkish stock, who occupied an area between the Black and Caspian Seas, a territory now a part of the Soviet Union. The Khazars, originally pagans, had in 740 A.D. embraced Judaism and their descendants, while they may profess the Jewish faith today, cannot claim to be of the "seed of Abraham" and "heirs according to the Promise." The ancestors of those Jews who today immigrate to Palestine from Europe and the Americas and claim Palestine and beyond as their ancestral homeland, came not from Jordan but from the Volga, not from Canaan but from the Caucasus, and that genetically, they are more closely related to the Hun and Magyar than to the seed of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Besides, religion does not confer heritage or property rights on people! (For a full understanding of the Khazar origin of Ashkenazi Jews, see *The 13th Tribe*, by Arthur Koestler.)

As regards the second claim that the Israelites were in previous occupation of the land, this occupation started with an invasion under Joshua in 1100 B.C. and lasted to 585 B.C. when the Israelites were driven into captivity by Nebuchadnezzar. That occupation was limited to the hill regions, and at no time covered the entire country. It was short-lived, unstable, intermittent, long extinct, based on nothing better than the right of conquest and subject to the condition that there should have been national affinity between the Hebrews of 4,000 years ago and the Russian, Polish, American, and European Jew of today. If this transitory occupation can give the Zionists an historic right to the country, then it may be argued that the Arabs, who occupied Spain continuously for 800 years could claim that country today, while the Italians could claim the British Isles and the Red Indians could demand withdrawal from the Americas of all those who settled in the Western hemisphere and now call themselves Americans, Canadians, and Latin Americans!

To consider the three questions posed at the beginning of this statement, namely, who are the Palestinians, what are their rights, and why are these rights denied, I would explain:

(1) The present Palestinians are not, as is popularly believed, exclusively the descendants of the Islamic desert conquerors

resolution was affirmed and reaffirmed annually but Israeli non-compliance continued with impunity. Other Israeli defiances are in respect of the following provisions:

(A) *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)*: Article 13 provides that "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country."

(B) *The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)* reaffirmed the fundamental rights of people and, in 1976 the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution which, in Article 12, stated: "Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own . . . (and) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country."

(C) The U.N. Commission on Human Rights, emphatically and solemnly declared that "Everyone is entitled, without distinction of any kind . . . to return to his country; No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality . . . as a means of divesting him of the right to return to his country; no one shall be denied the right to return to his own country on the ground that he has no passport or other travel document."¹⁸

The Israelis argue that since the Palestinians left the country they have forfeited their right of return. But the principles quoted above do not place any restriction or conditions on the right of return whatever the circumstances. Furthermore, the United Nations resolution admitting the state of Israel into membership of the World Organization was on the understanding that the Israelis were ready to comply with the provisions of U.N. resolutions of 1947 (on territory) and 1948 (on repatriation and compensation).¹⁹

Before I conclude I would like to comment on the Second Camp David Accord dealing with a comprehensive settlement of the Palestine Problem. The Accord provides for so-called "autonomy"—not for self-determination—for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Menachem Begin made it clear on more than one occasion that autonomy, according to Israeli definition, means that the local population will be allowed to run their own internal affairs under Israeli supervision but will have no jurisdiction over the land which shall remain the responsibility of the Israeli Government.

Apart from this absurd interpretation, the Accord makes three other very important omissions, namely, it ignores all resolutions of the United Nations on Palestine since 1948; it makes no mention of the status of Jerusalem; and it puts aside the question of the future of the majority of the Palestinians who now live outside the West Bank and Gaza. For these and other reasons the Camp David Accord is regarded to have been still-born, and its resur-

rection is as close to realization as "the entry of Satan into Heaven," to quote an Arabic expression.

Because of Zionist control over the mass media of information in the West few people are aware that the Camp David Accord was rejected and strongly opposed by the majority of the world community of nations. Due to its importance I will quote in some detail the provisions of U.N. Resolution No. 34/65B of 29 November 1979:

The General Assembly, recalling and reaffirming the declaration contained in paragraph 4 of its resolution 33/28A of 7 December 1978, that the validity of agreements purporting to solve the problem of Palestine requires that they be within the framework of the United Nations and its Charter and its resolutions on the basis of the full attainment and exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, and with the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization,

(1) Notes with concern that the Camp David Accords have been concluded outside the framework of the United Nations and without the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people;

(2) Rejects those provisions of the Accords which ignore, infringe upon, violate, or deny the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return, the right of self-determination, and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and which envisage and condone continued Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967;

(3) Strongly condemns all partial agreements and separate treaties which constitute a flagrant violation of the rights of the Palestinian people, the principles of the Charter, and the resolutions adopted in the various international forums on the Palestinian issue;

(4) Declares that the Camp David Accords and other agreements have no validity in so far as they purport to determine the future of the Palestinian people and of the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967.

In a subsequent resolution No. 35/169D dated 15 December 1980, the General Assembly reaffirmed its rejection, expressed strong opposition to the Camp David Accords, and declared

that no State has the right to undertake any actions, measures, or negotiations that could affect the future of the Palestinian people, its inalienable rights, and the occupied Palestinian territories without the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization on an equal footing, in accordance with the relevant U.N. resolutions, and rejects all such actions, measures and negotiations.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the indiscriminate bombings and shellings, the cold-blooded murder, maiming, burning, and burying under the rubble of innocent men, women, and children, the wanton devastation of Beirut, and the murder and torture of young men in the hurriedly established concentration camps in southern Lebanon under the pretext that these young men were either PLO guerrillas or sympathizers, and claiming that all this is being done in defense of border security and peace in the Middle East, have left the conscience of the world stunned by the magnitude and cruelty of the Israeli action.

But what is more pathetic and distressing is the fact that whereas the U.S. Government would apply sanctions against the Soviet Union and urges other Western nations to follow suit because of the political situation in Poland, it opposes sanctions against Israel for its invasion and genocide in Lebanon, and has gone so far as to veto resolutions of the U.N. Security Council calling upon the Israelis to stop the aggression and withdraw from Lebanese territory.

All this leads to the conclusion that the Israeli invasion was arranged if not with the connivance at least with the full knowledge of President Reagan and Alexander Haig. It is American planes which are flying over Lebanon; it is American bombs of every description including those prohibited by international agreements which are being dropped on Beirut; it is American tanks, guns and ammunition which are being used against the Lebanese capital; and it is American money which is paying for the entire operation. To claim that the U.S. Government can do nothing to stop the holocaust, is an insult to the intelligence of man.

The mere removal of the PLO from Beirut will not solve the issue. On the contrary it has complicated the matter further. While the Israelis may now feel free to dig in themselves in southern Lebanon up to the Litani River, annex the West Bank and Gaza, and thereby realize part of their dream of "Greater Israel," the Palestinians are not likely to give up and resign their fate to remaining refugees in other peoples' lands. It is too early to comment on what is likely to happen.

It is now more urgent than ever that Menachem Begin and his gang of criminals should be out-maneuvered by the world community of nations by following up the withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon with immediate and determined steps for a political settlement of the entire Palestine Problem on a just and equitable basis.

It is my personal considered opinion that the U.S. Government, which holds the purse strings of the Israeli state and provides it with the needed weapons to carry out its aggression against the Arabs, is the only power in the world that can bring about an

amicable and just settlement between Arab and Jew. After what has happened in Lebanon, it is no longer advisable to delay or procrastinate. Immediate steps must be taken first to stop the bloodshed and destruction in Lebanon to be followed by complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces, and then to follow up by taking the following measures:

(1) Recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people wherever they may be;

(2) Arrange for the immediate withdrawal of Israel from the West Bank and Gaza and the dismantling of the Jewish settlements established since 1967;

(3) Hand over authority in the West Bank and Gaza to the United Nations with the objective of assisting the Palestinians to gradually take over and administer their own affairs;

(4) The United Nations to arrange for the transfer of those Palestinians who are willing and are now living in refugee camps in Lebanon and are in receipt of UNRWA rations to new locations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and to assist them to get established on a permanent basis;

(5) Arrange for a conference between the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and the Israeli authorities, attended by representatives of the Arab governments concerned and the United States to settle the position of the Palestinians who originated from the territory now known as Israel either by repatriation or compensation;

(6) An international tribunal should then be established to assess Palestinian losses and damages since 1948, using as a guide the settlement concluded between West Germany and the Jews whereby the latter have been accorded reparations in the total sum of 85.3 billion German Marks of which, ironically, the state of Israel received by March 1966 3.5 billion German Marks (equivalent to \$862 million at the then rate of exchange) as its share in the settlement.

Once these steps are taken and completed and the Israelis are made to recognize and hopefully discard the racist expansionist character of Zionism which has done the Jews more harm than good in their relations with the Arabs during the last thirty-four years, there is no reason why the peace of pre-Balfour Declaration days between Arab and Jew should not return once again to the Holy Land.

Footnotes

1. U.N. Resolution 3379 (XXX) of 10 November 1975.
2. From *Principles and Definitions and Judaism and Zionism*, by the Neturei Karta, P.O. Box 2143, Brooklyn, N.Y., 11202.

3. Koestler, Arthur, *Promise and Fulfilment*, p. 139.
4. Hirst, David, *The Daily Star*, Beirut, 13 October 1972.
5. *Christian Science Monitor*, 8 March 1973.
6. Golda Meir, 8 March 1969.
7. Golda Meir, 15 June 1969.
8. *Davar*, January 1969.
9. Hadawi, Sami, *Bitter Harvest*, Caravan Books, New York, 1979, p. 43.
10. *A Survey of Palestine 1945-1946*, Vol. I, p. 144.
11. Hadawi, Sami, *Palestine: Loss of a Heritage*, The Naylor Co., San Antonio, 1963, p. 131.
12. Said, Edward, *The Question of Palestine*, Times Books, New York, 1980, p. 11.
13. Herzl, Theodor, *Complete Diaries*, The Herzl Press, New York, 1960, p. 88.
14. Ziff, William, *The Rape of Palestine*, Longans, Greens & Co., New York, 1938, p. 171.
15. *Foreign Relations of the United States: Near East & Africa*, Washington D.C., 1960, pp. 776-777.
16. Lilienthal, Alfred, *The Zionist Connection*, Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, 1978, p. 149.
17. U.N. Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948.
18. U.N. Publication 1978, pp. 6-7.
19. U.N. Resolution 273 (III) of 11 May 1949.

*NOW IN ITS SIXTH U.S. PRINTING
IT CONTINUES TO INFLUENCE
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
AROUND THE WORLD*

Each time we order a new printing of Arthur Butz's book we think of it as a celebration.

The book survives as the definitive statement on what did and did not happen to the Jews of Europe during the time they are alleged to have been nearly wiped out.

But *The Hoax of the Twentieth Century* doesn't merely survive—it *prospers*. Now in its sixth American printing, it has developed into a force that has broken through the barriers of cultural lag and historical blackout and is now finally on its way toward the recognition of excellence it deserves.

When the book was first released here in 1977, revisionists were quick to make it a success, but its basic distribution appeared limited mainly to that market.

Today, however, individual and wholesale orders are received from all over the world, and from sources we never could have anticipated. Demand for the book seems to be increasing at a much faster rate.

This sixth big printing is not just a new printing, but a *new edition* incorporating as two addenda in 53 pages the complete texts of Professor Butz's lectures delivered at the 1979 and 1982 IHR Revisionist Conferences. These will bring the reader right up to date on the continuing controversy over Professor Butz's thesis and where it is expected to lead in future years.

More works within this genre have appeared and will appear courtesy of the IHR in future months, but it was Arthur Butz's *The Hoax of the Twentieth Century* that brought a new and far deeper understanding of the "Holocaust" to literally hundreds of thousands who might have otherwise been kept deliberately in the dark. It is a mighty book, written by a man who simply discerned a gaping historical void and took it upon himself to fill it.

Join with us in celebrating this brand-new, permanent-quality paperback edition by ordering a copy for yourself, or as a gift for a friend, associate or library. It is a classic book—one which will live on for generations to come, we plan, as a testament to the quest for truth in history.

THE HOAX OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

New paperback edition with addenda \$8.00

Hardcover edition without addenda \$12.00

INSTITUTE FOR HISTORICAL REVIEW
POST OFFICE BOX 1306 • TORRANCE, CALIFORNIA 90505 • U.S.A.

How Many Jews Were Eliminated by the Nazis?

A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THE QUESTION

FRANK H. HANKINS

This study is part of the history of World War Two revisionism. It was written by Prof. Frank H. Hankins in 1958 at the suggestion of Prof. Harry Elmer Barnes, Hankins's friend and colleague from Smith College days in the 1920s. Barnes—spurred to investigating the "Six Million" thesis as part of his revisionist program by his own long-held doubts and particularly by James J. Martin's seminal letter to him of 13 July 1955—could have found no better qualified scholar than Hankins to work on this project. Besides being a renowned sociologist and historian (at one time president of the American Sociological Society and editor of the American Sociological Review), Hankins was an expert demographer with a world-wide reputation. He was a fellow and president (1945) of the American Population Association, a member of the American committee of the International Population Union, the National Committee for Planned Parenthood, the editorial board of Birth Control Review, and the Association for Research in Human Heredity. He was the author of Adolphe Quetelet as Statistician, The Racial Basis of Civilization (a liberal book of 1928 attacking the Nordic supremacist sentiments then in vogue), An Introduction to the Study of Society, and a contributor to many other books, including Biology in Human Affairs, Contemporary Social Theory, and History and Prospects of the Social Sciences.

Hankins thus brought to the study of Jewish population movements in the mid-twentieth century an expertise sorely needed in a field noted—then and now—for the inherent malleability of its base-data, the extreme ease with which that data might be obtained or interpreted in entirely different ways by different persons, professional or amateur, who would wish to have any advance-conclusion "confirmed." No twentieth century subject within the study of population movements has seen more varied conclusions arrived at, nor more varied ways of arriving at those conclusions, than the subject of what happened to the Jews of Europe during World War Two. Hankins's effort was an attempt to review and explore this situation, approaching it objectively as a demographer, minus the standard starting-assumption that, six million (or more) Jews having perished, therefore any analysis of the problem must fit the data to this assumption rather than the other way around. It was a testament to the times in which he

wrote that Hankins could not, because of this approach, affix in all wisdom his name to his study, and that it has remained unpublished—circulating only in photocopied manuscript form among a limited number of interested students—until now.

It is an early study, based on documentation available at the time. The mighty increase in source material and published analyses since then has not alleviated the basic problems inherent in any such study, problems which Prof. Hankins explicates at the outset. The whole essay may indeed be viewed as no more—nor less—than “a statement of a problem.” It is certainly not intended to be a “final word”—viz. its subtitle. The author was concerned with, first, showing how conjectural in 1958 was any approach to the problem of determining how many Jews were “missing” by the end of the war and, second, demonstrating the factors that would have to be considered in finding the answer to another problem, namely, that of determining how many Jews—whatever their number “missing”—actually died, and of these how many died as a result of deliberate Nazi extermination (as opposed to a host of other causes). Hankins was the first demographer to raise seriously these issues in a way which tended to cast doubt on the commonly-cited demographic bases of the “Six Million (exterminated)” thesis.

Though his private correspondence with Barnes of the period shows that Hankins was extremely skeptical of the entire “Six Million” story—the story of a deliberate extermination program, of “gas chambers” in “death camps,” and so forth—he deliberately refrained from couching his essay in terms of a general debate on that whole question. Rather he restricted himself purely to a study of the possible numbers involved, a critique of previous explanations and methods of arriving at conclusions. Hence the particular question-form in which the title of the essay is given.

Note should be taken of one item Hankins brings up which is, in fact, outdated. At one point in the essay he states that “Those who have led in the charge that the Nazis did exterminate 4-7 million Jews do not allege that the large-scale extermination plan was formulated until after the Casablanca Conference of January, 1943, which launched the Unconditional Surrender formula for ending the War. . . . But even those who support the extermination charges do not contend that the machinery for such extermination was well established before the late autumn of 1943.” Hankins was referring to standard sources which in 1958 alleged just this. Since then, of course, the recognized mainstream “line” of the “Holocaust” school as it has developed is that an extermination plan was decided on in 1941-42 (cf. Goering’s directive to Heydrich of 31 July 1941 and the Wannsee Conference of 20 January 1942), with the first “actions” as part of this plan occur-

ring later in 1942. But Hankins's citation of the earlier line was merely an aside, reflecting the established notion of the time, and does not affect his general conclusions.

The appearance after so many years of "How Many Jews Were Eliminated by the Nazis?" is especially noteworthy in view of the planned publication by the IHR in June 1983 of *The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry* by Walter N. Sanning, with an Introduction by Dr. Arthur R. Butz. Sanning's book is the result of years of intensive study utilizing the latest in technological research methods. It was actually written, its figures compiled and cross-checked, on a computer. It will be, in a word, the definitive study of the demographics of the Jewish population of Europe during World War Two, rendering all other studies of the particular question "Whatever happened to the 'Six Million'?" obsolete or superfluous. Its conclusions will not comfort the "Holocaust" Establishment. It is fitting that the publication of what promises to be the "final word" for years to come on this subject from the revisionist point of view should be immediately preceded by the publication at last of Frank Hankins's first foreshadowing of that word.

—Keith Stimely

Introductory Considerations

The usual estimates, generally based on Jewish figures or charges, range from about 4 million to 6 or even a possible 7 million. Every estimate is, however, little more than an informed guess. The extensive variations in estimates show that all include a wide margin of probable error. The more one studies the matter, the clearer it becomes that the larger the estimate the greater the probable error. In most of these there is the tacit but gratuitous assumption that any decrease in the numbers of Jews in a given area after 1939, some allowance being made for the shifting of territories from one jurisdiction to another, gives an approximation to the number of Jews deliberately eliminated. Such decreases, however, actually included large numbers who escaped by various routes and devices. Large numbers were lost behind the Iron Curtain; thousands died from the same conditions that caused the abnormal increase in the wartime mortality of the civilian populations of all central Europe. There would seem to be no reasonable way to give the Jews special exemption from the general hardships of wartime, especially in occupied areas. Indeed, they were probably worse for the Jews. The correct estimate of those who perished because of Nazi persecution should only include: (1) those who were slaughtered by shootings, gas chambers and other violence, and (2) those who died of hardships

during the numerous forced deportations, or in the concentration camps because of excessive labor, starvation or disease, which they would probably have escaped had they remained in the usual civilian status.

Some Difficulties in Getting Reliable Figures

The most obvious and troublesome difficulty is the scarcity of census materials. In some areas, the last prewar census was made in 1930, 1931, or 1933. For areas of special Jewish concentration there were: for Poland, a census, 9 December 1931 and an "official estimate," 1 January 1939; for Russia, a census in 1926, and January 1939, but neither included a question as to religion; for Rumania, a census of December 1930 and an "official estimate" of December 1938; also a "census" in April 1941; and for Hungary, a census of 31 December 1930 and an "official estimate" of December 1938. To these may be added the immediate postwar census of Poland of February 1946 which, like most of the other population countings of the immediate postwar years, was largely only a sampling and an estimate computation. This was made inevitable by the vast movements of population still going on to the end of 1946, and even later.

The result is that one finds very considerable differences among the estimates of the numbers of Jews in various areas in the critical year 1939. It should be recalled that, from 1939 on, there was an unprecedented upheaval of populations, both Jewish and Gentile, throughout central Europe, first ahead of the German armies as they swept eastward after September 1939, and especially after 22 June 1941, and then behind the Russian forces as they swept westward, beginning in 1943. As the Germans went east, large numbers followed, especially from Germany; as the Russians went west, large numbers sought to return to former homesteads. In these moving hordes of all nationalities, including Jews, large numbers died from the hardships of war; other millions of several nationalities, including Jews, were deported; still other millions throughout the area were killed in civilian bombings, or died in the armed forces. During this whole period, the records of births and deaths were incomplete and otherwise defective.

It should be obvious that this situation makes all estimates of the numbers, both of total populations and especially of the numbers of Jews, at the best only informed guesses. It opens the way for tendentious calculations. A perusal of the literature shows that the large unknowns led to much carelessness in the use of figures. The same author, in a number of cases, gives different figures for the same item on different pages, as though a variation by some thousands could not add anything to the errors

already involved. Every calculation has to have what the U.S. Bureau of the Census workers call a "residual" item, or a figure to strike a reasonable balance between the very probable numbers with which you start. For example, in 1939, the probable changes due to "normal" births and deaths, the probable number dying from various abnormal causes, and the probable number still surviving. This residual figure opens the way for all sorts of manipulations.

Thus, the Bureau of the Census (*The Population of Poland*, pp29 &31) says, after noting that it is impossible to strike a true balance for the Polish changes, 1939-1945: "[Even after July, 1945] millions of displaced persons milled about... Across these currents of voluntary migration moved other millions permanently expelled from their homes etc." and (p31) "War losses could have been anywhere from 2 million to 7 million persons. Either of the extreme figures seems unlikely, but the exact war losses cannot be determined precisely." (For same quote, see p187.)

These are some of the problems which face even the most honest and competent persons who seek to obtain reliable figures about the number of the Jews in Europe in 1939, the number who perished in some way during the war, how they perished, how many that remain unaccounted for really perished, and how many may now be living behind the Iron Curtain, in Israel, in the United States, and elsewhere. It is obvious that all these uncertainties which confront honest and objective students of the subject also provide almost unlimited opportunities for those who wish to juggle the figures, whether they seek to minimize or exaggerate the number of Jews who perished during the war.

Some Avenues of Escape for the Jews

Several studies make passing reference to the numerous Jews who escaped the Nazi round-ups by: (a) being secreted by non-Jewish friends; (b) using false identification papers; and (c) baptism into a Christian religious community. Those under (a) were probably not very numerous because the Nazi penalty was death for the entire family of the "good Samaritan." Some find the numbers under (b) and (c) running into the thousands or tens of thousands.

In census taking the individual classifies himself as of a certain nationality. This somewhat ambiguous term covers such alternatives as race, country of birth, country of residence, and country of citizenship. Jews could thus classify themselves as of Jewish or of some other nationality, according to their background, physical traits or language proficiency. Those born in Poland, but

speaking German fluently and living in Germany, could classify themselves as Jewish, Polish or German, the latter on occasion requiring a new set of identification papers. A Jew born in Germany, living in Poland, and speaking Polish, had similar choices. This old method of escaping the harsher aspects of anti-Semitism seems to have been widely practiced by Jews under the pressure of the Nazis and the intense hostility in Poland and elsewhere, especially after 1933.

Some illustrations: The U.S. Census Bureau report on Poland, with reference to an additional 900,000 Poles unaccounted for in their calculations, says (p78) that "these may have been non-Poles reclassified as Poles and thus lost to their previous category." There is no way of knowing how many of these were Jews, but they certainly had the strongest motivation to use this avenue of escape, and it is difficult to conceive of any other racial or nationality group that would thus shift their classification on a large scale. This same authority in its study of Czechoslovakia notes (p26 & Ftnt. p14) that the last prewar census of 1930 reported 354,000 Jews by religion but only 110,000 by nationality. Jacoby (pp308 & 310) gives comparable figures but with a larger difference. In this case, the small number classed as Jews by nationality was due to the large number classing themselves as German by nationality. Jews in the Soviet Satellites states (pp239-240) that "thousands of Jews in Poland went through the occupation masquerading as Poles"; at the war's end some 20,000 Jews were estimated still to possess forged identification papers.

The number of Jews reported as Jews by religion is rather uniformly greater than the number so reported by nationality. This is partly due to the Jewish custom of reporting as Jews all members of the Jewish community, regardless of their religious orthodoxy. It is partly due to the associated fact that Hebraism is not a universal type of religion but is closely identified with the Jews as a racial or genetically related group. However, special wartime conditions made conversion to some branch of Christianity a logical avenue of escape from surrounding hostilities. For example: The Hungarian Statistical Review for 1944 estimated that the number of Christians of Jewish origin in Greater Hungary was about 100,000. (See Jews in the Soviet Satellites, pp184-5.) Kulischer notes (p199) that the number of Jews in Austria declined from 222,000 in 1923 to 180,000 in 1938, and adds that this was due in part to change of religion.

These avenues of escape may account for a considerable part of the reduction in the number of Jews reported as still in Europe. Official Jewish statistics, which are almost the only ones now available for postwar calculations, are likely to reflect the numbers living in organized communities or congregations. Many of these, as stable groups, were disorganized by various causes,

and the members scattered more or less widely. If they have adopted a protective coloring (classification), they may not reappear until another day. Other statistics are based on the numbers of "professing" Jews, and these would at any time be only a part of the total number. It does not seem likely that we shall have clear guides to the number of "escapees" for a long time to come.

These are samples of what was a general practice which must have been widely utilized from 1933 onward. The hunted cannot be blamed for seeking out all avenues of escape.

Some thousands of Jews were killed in the fighting forces of the various nations, notably Poland and Russia. Just how many is conjectural. *Jews in the Soviet Satellites* (p242) says that thousands of young Jewish males were drafted into the Russian army and labor battalions. Also (p229), some 250,000 to 300,000 Jews were sent by the Russians to forced labor camps and settlements in northern and Asiatic Russia in the early 1940's. And again (p226), 68,000 Jewish officers and enlisted men were in the Polish army. Lestschinsky (p9) estimates that 200,000 Jewish soldiers in the Red armies fell during the war. Also "About half a million Jews died in the Asiatic provinces where twice that number were deported after evacuation from previous Polish and Rumanian regions as well as from the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet White Russia." It is to be noted that some of the computations class all missing Jews as "killed" or "murdered" (notably Frumkin), making no allowance for those who died either in the fighting forces, or in air raids, or as a result of the increased hardships and special mortality of wartime.

Many Jews were either evacuated, as by the Russians, to safer areas, or migrated to refugee territory such as Switzerland, England, Turkey, Palestine, the United States and elsewhere. The numbers are uncertain, but that they were very large is evident from the scant data available. Hitler's Ten-Year War on the Jews (p300) says: "Some 1,800,000 have been evacuated into the interior of the Soviet Union." This figure for the period immediately following the outbreak of the war with Russia becomes only 1,200,000 five pages later in the summary table but no explanation for the change is given. *Jews in the Soviet Satellites* (p182) found in 1945 no less than 21,000 refugees, mostly from Germany, in the ghetto of Japanese Shanghai. It also notes (p183) that Spain and Portugal harbor about 8,000 refugees; (p183) 163,423 Jews entered the U.S., 1933-42; (pp183 & 190) there are 27,000 refugees in Switzerland, mostly from France and Italy; (pp190-1) 6,000 Jewish refugees are in Sweden, mainly Danish; 150,000 Rumanian Jews were living in Transnistria, behind the Dniester. The numbers migrating to Great Britain 1938-45 are placed at 300,000 with a similar number migrating to Palestine between 1933 and 1947. It should not be overlooked that even

those who migrated from 1933 to 1939 might appear among the "losses," since most calculations necessarily begin with censuses dating from the early 1930s.

Kulischer's *Europe on the Move* (p192) notes that migration from Germany, Austria and Bohemia-Moravia amounted to 370,000 from 1933 to 1939-40. Of these, 200,000 went overseas and 50,000 to Switzerland, Great Britain and Scandinavia, 85,000 to France and the Low Countries, 10,000 elsewhere in western and southern Europe and only 25,000 eastward. Among them, about 250,000 were thus removed from Nazi reach. Elsewhere, the same author (p260) adds that, with the German advance eastward, the Russian "officials and a large proportion of the Jews were evacuated" (along with factories and factory workers). He estimates the total thus evacuated at 12,000,000 including more than 1,500,000 transferred or deported from former eastern Poland, the Baltic countries, northern Bukovina and Bessarabia.

Since these were thus moved "to save them from German atrocities," it would not seem unreasonable to consider at least 2 million of them to have been Jews. Kulischer, however, considers the number to have been only about 1.2 millions. Of the millions of Jews uprooted by the war, he finds (p264) that only "about 1.5 million escaped Nazi rule, some 300,000 by emigration overseas and to the neutral countries, and the remainder through evacuation to interior USSR." The figure here is crucial to any estimate of what happened to the 3.1 million Jews estimated for prewar Poland and the probable even larger number that lived in the Soviet Union. As the quote above from the Census Bureau study of Poland indicates, the "probable error" of estimates relating to the Polish population is colossal. An additional million Jews behind the Iron Curtain alters the picture for all Europe.

We can add to the above "Avenues of Escape" three areas of difficulty and probable sources of error in the estimates.

Excess Mortality and Decreased Fertility

While the total population of Europe outside Russia remained almost the same in 1945 that it had been in 1939, the total excess of births over deaths almost exactly balancing the losses due to war, this was almost entirely due to the rise in fertility among the countries of western Europe. The opposite situation obtained in central Europe, the scene of the main war depredations. Here, there was an "excess mortality" above what would have occurred in peace times. There was no way for the Jews here to escape the usual hazards of war, such as deaths from air raids and other military attacks on the towns and cities. Nor could they escape the reduction in vitality and, hence, of resistance to usual diseases, due to the increased hardships which affected all other

elements in the civilian populations. Their infant mortality also went up along with that of their fellow citizens.

Now, curious as it may seem, this "excess mortality" item is usually given separate computation for Jews and non-Jews. For the Jews it is quite unfairly added to the numbers "killed" or "murdered." Thus, Frumkin's summary table (p173) for "Total Europe" outside the 1939 Soviet Union (that is, including the Poles and Jews of the Ceded Polish Territory but excluding N. Bukovina, Bessarabia and part of Carpathia) gives the following figures:

War Losses	15,117,000
i) Military	5,824,000
ii) Civilian excluding Jews	4,922,000
iii) Jews killed	4,371,000

It should be obvious that, among the Jews "killed" are listed all those who suffered from the increased mortality which they shared on an enlarged scale with other civilians. Since this figure gives the total reduction in the Jewish population of this area, it obviously includes also those Jews who should be listed under all the above items as well as the one that follows. The Jewish population, because it was so largely concentrated in the heart of the eastern war zone would, along with the rest of the population there, have suffered its proportionate diminution of numbers even if they had been treated exactly like all others. The "excess mortality" cannot be charged to Nazi "murders." Frumkin thus, quite dishonestly, lists all Jews lost or unaccounted for during the war as "killed," implying that they were deliberately exterminated by the Nazis, which is nonsense. More may have perished in other ways than lost their lives in all Nazi camps. And in the camps more may have died from exposure, disease, lack of medical care, and starvation than from deliberate extermination.

The importance of this item can be shown from Frumkin's figures for Poland. He starts with a total population, including only the Poles and Jews in the Ceded Territory, of 28,400,000 of whom 3,500,000 are Jews. He estimates the civilians other than Jews who died from "excess mortality" at 2,500,000; and Jews "killed" at 3,400,000. If one subtracts the original number of Jews from the original total, he gets 24,900,000 among whom there were 2,500,000 deaths from the extra hazards of wartimes. That equals 10 percent of the original population. The same proportion for the Jews would have been 350,000. These, to be sure, died, but they were not "killed" in Frumkin's meaning.

In much the same category, mention should be made of the reduced fertility (i.e. births) of the Jewish population as a result of the forced migrations, under-nourishment, and other hardships and deprivations they experienced. This item is of second-

ary import; but one cannot list among the "killed" those who were never born. This reduced fertility naturally lessened the numbers surviving after 6 years of harassment, but all reductions in the numbers of Jews become "killed" in some of the calculations. Numbers that might have been were not there at the end of the upheaval; they were "missing" and "lost." But all of them were not "killed" by the Nazis or anybody else.

Numerous and Extensive Population Shifts during the War

A supreme difficulty with all estimates arises from the repeated shifting of populations and territories. A major illustration is the division of Poland in 1939. The main question here is not the number of Jews in the Polish territory ceded to Russia in 1939, although even here differences need not be neglected, but what happened to the Jews in the Ceded Territory. Some estimate that they were all caught in the Nazi net by the eastward advance of the German forces after 22 June 1941. Others estimate that from 1.2 to 1.8 million of Polish and other central European Jews migrated, were evacuated by the Russians, or were forcefully deported by them to areas behind the Russian lines. Moreover, the number of German, Polish and Czech Jews who had moved east ahead of the Germans on their first advance in September, 1939, is unknown, but guesses are made.

An equally striking case is supplied by Rumania.* Parts of this country, estimated to have 900,000 Jews in 1939, were shifted back and forth between Russia and Rumania; other sections went to Hungary and back; still others to Bulgaria and back; the Germans controlled different parts for different periods. With every shift of political control there were varying shifts of populations, including Jews. At the same time, the Jews in self-defense were migrating in different directions and escaping their Jewishness by every device known. It is little wonder that the Rumanian figures, whatever they are, should be suspect.

The Rumanian census of 1930, the last before the war, found a Jewish population of 756,930. This is the figure used by Sylvain (Jews in the Soviet Satellites, Table 1, p493) as the prewar popu-

*After finishing the manuscript I find in my notes that Frumkin (p170) puts the "Jews killed" for the postwar area at 160,000. The "killed" for him, as already noted, includes all missing or lacking by his estimates. He admits that this figure "is substantially adjusted" (see his p12 footnote), that is, "represents a rough estimate with a wide margin of error." Elsewhere (p131) he estimates those "killed" in Bessarabia, Bukovina and S. Dobrudja at 230,000, also subject to "adjustment." For a good sample of the necessity of really juggling with figures in order to arrive at any estimate for such areas as Rumania see this author's study, op. cit., pp129-134.

lation, instead of the number 900,000 which is found in most other references as the 1939 number. (In this table, incidentally, he gives the figure for Bukovina as 93,101, but this becomes 102,900 three pages later.) It is now necessary to keep track of the shifts of land and people. Bessarabia, previously part of Rumania, went to Russia in 1940, back to Rumania, 1941-44, and to Russia again in 1944. Much the same changes apply to Bukovina. Transsylvania was divided, the southern portion going to Bulgaria in 1940 and returning after the war. Sylvain gives the combined areas of Bessarabia, all Bukovina and all of Transylvania a Jewish population of 381,562 for the prewar era in Table I, but (pp516-7) this figure becomes 457,000, excluding S. Bukovina, from whom there were only 100,000 survivors.

There are other glaring question marks which one must put alongside his text. In Table VII, giving the Jewish population of Rumania for the present area (excluding S. Dobrudja, N. Bukovina and Bessarabia), he computed 478,042 in 1930; 466,128 in 1941—the year of a census; and 300,000 in 1944. By 1947 their number in this "Rump Rumania" had risen to 428,000. He then allows 28,000 as the probable number of returnees from German and Hungarian camps, N. Bukovina, Bessarabia and Transnistria. Then comes this remarkable statement: "Thus around 100,000 persons out of this population . . . represent in fact what remained of the 457,000 Jews of Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transsylvania." (Italics in original.) Since the territories mentioned were excluded from Table VII, I cannot understand how he can conclude from it the numbers of Jews missing therefrom. Perhaps I do not understand his manipulations of the data.

In any case, it is interesting to note that the numbers given in Table VII for the present territory were much the same in 1930, 1941, 1942 and 1947. The difference between the first and last is about 50,000. This figure makes no allowance for the natural increase of numbers, but on the other hand neither does it make any allowance for the excess mortality of civilians, the thousands who are said to have fled to Turkey, the 150,000 noted above as having taken refuge behind the Dniester. As for the 381,562 Jews reported in the prewar census in Table I (not the 457,000 derived by some mysterious process) they were under German-Rumanian control from 1941 to 1944, when they once more slipped behind the Iron Curtain. What happened to them is as much an enigma as what happened elsewhere along the borders of the War Zone.

The above examples are designed to show how the lack of reliable census materials makes it necessary for the computer to continually conjecture the numbers here and there, now and then. If he is inclined to over-estimate the missing in repeated guesses, he may end up with a compounding of exaggerations.

I see I have overlooked some other sources of possible error. First: the computers make different allowances for the number of deportees who died in the process of deportation, never less than 25%, usually 50% and in some cases as high as 80% or more. Since there were no actual counts in such cases, these estimates must be charged with a large probable error.

Secondly: the vast upheaval, with its migrations, deportations and evacuations, made some duplication in the count of those "lost" or "killed" quite easy. The evacuees behind the Iron Curtain, e.g., are considered among the latter, unless they returned, at least in large part. Those sent to the camps of Poland by the Germans could easily be counted as among the "losses" of the countries from which deported and charged again among those killed in Poland. That this is done in some instances seems indicated by the fact that out of the estimated original Polish Jewish population of 3.1 million in 1939, somewhat more than that are usually estimated to have been killed there.

Examples of Varying Estimates

1. HOW MANY JEWS WERE THERE IN EUROPE IN 1939?

Since this is the basic figure from which any over-all estimate must start, variations in it are of primary significance. The following represent the estimates of the American Jewish Committee as given in the *World Almanacs* in various years:

Year of Publication	Year of Statistics	Numbers	Numbers given under World Religions
1939	1933	9,494,363	9,494,363
1941	1939	8,939,608	not given
1945	1939?	9,372,666	8,939,608
1949	1939	9,739,200	not given
1949	1947	3,920,100	not given

One is bound to wonder at the reduction of nearly 555,000 between 1933 and 1939. Even more striking is the increase for the year 1939 in comparing the *World Almanac* issues of 1941 and 1949. This amounts to almost 800,000 (8,939,608 in the 1941 issue, and 9,739,200 in the 1949 issue). It is easy to see that this makes the loss much greater than if the numbers given in 1941 for the year 1939 were used as the basis of computation.

We may note a similar elevation of the base in the same organization's estimates of Jews in the World:

Year of Publication	Year of Statistics	Numbers
1939	1933	15,319,459

1941	1939	15,748,091
1945	1939	15,688,259
1949	1939	16,643,120

Here is an increase in the figure for 1939 of almost 955,000 as given in the 1949 issue. How account for such a huge elevation of the world total? Were more Jews discovered? Was a more careful count made? Or was it seen by that time that a larger base from which to compute the war losses would serve a useful purpose?

2. HOW MANY JEWS WERE ELIMINATED IN EUROPE BY THE WAR?

This is the leading question and one now impossible to answer with any assurance. However, it is pertinent to take a look at the variations in the estimates of various investigators.

A. SOME FIGURES FOR POLAND

1. Bureau of the Census, (p2)—“War losses in postwar boundaries amounted to approximately 4 million persons, of whom 2 million were Jews executed by the Nazis.” (See p3 above for quotation from pp31 & 187.)
2. Frumkin, (p119)—for approximately the same territory, 2.3 million.
3. Gottschalk & Duker, (p11)—Poland, the Baltic States, Soviet White Russia and the Ukraine, “the greatest areas of Jewish concentration in Europe, became a vast death-chamber for about 5 million Jews.”
4. Frumkin, (p119)—for Poland’s Ceded (to Russia) Territory, with a prewar Jewish population of 1.2 million, the number of “killed” is estimated at 1.1 million. For all prewar Poland he thus computes a loss of 3.4 million.

5. Frumkin, (p182)—having estimated (p173) the Jews killed outside the Russian areas at 4,371,000, comments that, if the Ceded Territory is added “the total number of Jews murdered by the Germans amounted to some 5 million.” (Note that this would give only about 700,000 for the Ceded Territory, although the figure quoted just above is 1.1 million.)

B. EUROPE AS A WHOLE

6. Frumkin, (p182)—following the above quote, goes on to say: “if the USSR territory occupied by the Germans during the war were likewise taken into account, the figure might easily be between 6 and 7 million.” (This of course excludes the USSR territory behind the Russian lines.) As a comment on the reliability of Frumkin’s methods and figures, the competent and objective Belgian statistician Maurice-Pierre Herremans estimated that only 25,000 of the prewar Jewish population of Belgium were

"missing" from all causes at the end of the war, while Frumkin states that 27,000 of them were "killed," mostly by the Nazis.

7. Kulischer, (p279)—puts the number of Jews "exterminated" at 5.5 million.*

8. Institute of Jewish Affairs, (*World Almanac*, 1952, p240)—estimates that 71% of Jews in Europe at the start of the war were lost, of whom 5.7 million were killed and 200,000 lost in battle. (This would give the 1939 Jewish population of Europe as 8,450,000.)

There are many other estimates made by Jews or based on Jewish figures, but most of these are either copied from statements of the Institute of Jewish Affairs or the World Jewish Congress or, like Fay's statement in *Current History* of 6 million, round numbers loosely used without any investigation of the facts and reflecting the prevailing mood of the day. To quote them adds nothing to the picture.

9. As a commentary on the above estimates, most of them by Jewish writers, and nearly all based on Jewish figures, one may well point out that Gerald Reitlinger, in his *SS: Alibi of a Nation* (1956), a large and heavily documented work, estimated that the number of Jews actually deliberately exterminated by the Nazis in their death camps, euthansia camps, gas chambers, and the like, was far less than 500,000. Reitlinger writes as a strong critic of the Nazis, so he is not seeking to defend or exonerate them.

General Conclusions

The foregoing pages should have made it clear that the answer to our title question is, for the time being, unanswerable in terms that satisfy any scientific standards. There are so many loopholes amid so few relatively sound figures that the calculator can set his own figure in advance and arrive there by estimates and guesses, all of which can be given a certain plausibility. Even the best studies, therefore, are little more than crazy quilts of conjectures made somewhat more substantial than a tissue of lies by scattered bits of fact.

Frumkin, former statistician for the United Nations, has made the most ambitious effort to estimate the numbers of Jews missing ("killed" in his findings). He starts with a 1930-33 census, estimates the number attained in 1939 through an excess of births over deaths, and thus gets a base figure for the prewar year. He then estimates the changes due to "normal" births and deaths to

*". . . nearly 3 million were nationals or residents of European countries and territories lying now outside the Soviet Union." (See No. 5 above)

1945, the changes resulting from changes in territory, the war losses and the gains and losses for given areas due to population shifts, and thus gets an "adjusted" population for each area for 1945. He frequently notes that his figures are "elevated" or "represent an upper limit" but has the scientific honesty at least to indicate that most of them are "slightly" or "substantially" adjusted. He thus lends himself to the charge of piling Ossa on Pelion by adding one high estimate to one and then another and another.

His conclusions are severely criticized by the Bureau of the Census study of the Polish figures, mainly on the grounds that (1) they make no allowance in the case of the Jews for the excess mortality of all civilian populations in the war areas, and (2) no account is taken of the highly problematical number of Jews who left Poland and elsewhere in central and western Europe, and are still behind the Iron Curtain.

To show how one may manipulate the figures, taking only those that someone considers quite authentic or reasonably so, look at the following:*

1. Jews in Europe, including USSR & Turkey, 1939 . . .	8,940,000
2. Jews in the remainder of Asia	<u>771,000</u>
Total in Europe & Asia, 1939	9,711,000
3. Jews in Europe, including USSR & Turkey, 1946 . . .	<u>3,920,000</u>
	5,791,000
4. Jews in the remainder of Asia, 1946	<u>917,000</u>
	4,874,000
5. Migrants to areas outside Europe & Asia	<u>300,000</u>
	4,574,000
6. Number dying in military forces, Poland & USSR . . .	<u>274,000</u>
	4,300,000
7. Probable underestimate of USSR areas	<u>1,000,000</u>
	3,300,000
8. Possible underestimate for remainder of Asia	<u>300,000</u>
Total loss to Jews in Europe & Asia	3,000,000
9. Excess wartime mortality, like others	<u>300,000</u>
10. Killed by excess wartime persecution	2,700,000

The first four of the above figures are taken from estimates of the American Jewish Committee. The probable underestimate for the USSR & Turkey derives from the statement of the Bureau of

*Caution: Do not take the above table too seriously as it is intended merely to show the possibilities of manipulating data, every item of which seems within reason. Omitting items 7 & 8 gives a total killed of about 4 million.

the Census study of Poland (p189) that possibly as many as 2 million more Polish refugees were there than Frumkin allows for. Since the racial Poles would be far more likely to return to their own country than the Jews-Poles by residence—anti-Semitism being very strong in Poland after the war—it is quite likely that most of the underestimate would be composed of Jews.

Here is another possibility: Kulischer, as noted above (*Europe on the Move*, p279) puts the total Jews exterminated at 5.5 million, of whom “nearly 3 million” lived in Europe outside the present USSR territories. His total allows 2.5 million for the Soviet Union and is thus highly conjectural. Schwartz, whose study is the only extensive one of the USSR, computes the Jewish “losses” there as follows:

Region	Prewar	Loss
White Russia	375,000	300,000
Ukraine	1,533,000	900,000*
RSFSR	250,000 to 275,000	100,000
		Total loss 1,300,000

*Exclusive of 133,000 who died in the Russian armies, a figure which Lestchinsky puts at 200,000.

Since this “loss” includes deaths from all causes and this was the area of greatest population upheaval and civilian hardship, it is reasonable to allow 300,000 for all items of “excess mortality” from causes suffered by all residents. That would leave a net loss due to Nazi persecution of 1 million.

If we add this to Kulischer’s “nearly 3 million” we get a total for all Europe and all the Soviet Union of nearly 4 million or 1.5 million less than Kulischer’s total.*

The writer cannot claim in these pages to have done more than scratch the surface of the question. It is for the statistician a most frustrating problem, because of the numerous pitfalls. My aim has not been to seek a more decisive estimate than those made by others, who may have spent many months and consulted thousands of original documents. Rather it has been to show the transparently conjectural nature of the current estimates and to point out some of the probable sources of error, which are mainly

*Caution: This estimate may be too large or too small because the estimates of Schwartz for losses in Soviet territory are conjectural, and a much larger margin of error attaches to Kulischer’s. However, the 4 million estimate is likely to be far closer to the actual figure than the 5, 6 or 7 million of some studies. And, of course, 4 million may be grotesquely in excess of the actuality, since most of the figures which have to be used are those of Jewish students of the problem or are based on figures given out by Jews and Jewish organizations.

lack of adequate and up-to-date population statistics, the manufacture of statistics where they are actually lacking, the manipulation and juggling of such statistics (both reliable and manufactured) as are used, to exaggerate the number of Jews in Europe and the world in 1939 and decrease the number known in 1945, and the general absence of students or studies that have no political, racial or religious axe to grind and are really seeking facts to promote truth and serve scientific purposes.

Many interesting aspects have been neglected. For example, Reitlinger in several passages notes the conflicts between Himmler, who was commissioned to find a "final solution" to the Jewish problem, and Goering who wanted Jewish workers for his munitions factories. On one occasion, Hitler himself intervened for a like reason, and Himmler then bragged of the large numbers preserved for such purposes. There are numerous cases authentically reported of Jews who were led to believe that they were headed for extermination camps but actually turned up at factories or in labor camps.

Another aspect to be considered is the large increase in numbers of Jews in Israel. That increase was about 400,000 from 1933 to 15 May 1948, when independent statehood was achieved. From then to February 1954 the population rose from 650,000 to 1,675,000. This and other items suggest that, during the immediate postwar years, a million or more Jews may have been among the displaced persons scattered all over the Eurasian map. As time passes, more of these come to statistical counting. At least, the vast increase in Israel has not been accompanied by concurrent diminutions in the settled populations elsewhere. The Jews can keep close account of their numbers where there are settled communities but even they could not keep a close count during the recent Diaspora following 1939 and 1945.

Another point to be considered is that, even if it could be proved that vast numbers of Jews died in the Nazi concentration, euthanasia, and death camps, it would not follow that all, or possibly even a majority of these, were deliberately exterminated by the Nazis. There was a huge death rate in all of these camps due to disease. In one camp, at least, there was a serious typhus epidemic. Lack of drugs and medical treatment, coupled with general low vitality and lowered physical resistance to disease, made the death rate abnormally high. Many died from exposure, and others from hard labor. Starvation was common, especially toward the end of the war, when supplies ran low even for soldiers and civilians. It is useful to reflect that it is generally estimated that at least five million expellees from East Prussia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and eastern Germany perished mainly after the war was over, and it is generally conceded that relatively few of these were deliberately murdered. They died in

large part from the horrible exposure and starvation during the process of expulsion. The Jews who moved back and forth during the war, either voluntarily or by forceful evacuation, before and following the movement of the armies, were subjected to just as harsh conditions as the expellees, in some cases to even worse situations. Until it is disproved by better Jewish and other studies than are currently available, one may express some confidence in Reitlinger's estimate that the number of Jews deliberately exterminated by the Nazis was considerably less than 500,000.

The soundest basis for scepticism regarding any such figure as 6 or even 4 million Jews exterminated by Hitler and the Nazis is that contributed by logistics rather than statistics. As you have seen, the latter are inadequate, manufactured, garbled, and consciously manipulated to establish a thesis and figure assumed in advance. Logistics is a well-established science, knows no political, racial or religious bias, and in this case relies upon a vast body of materials accumulated during the Second World War. Evidence in this field is as copious and precise for the years between 1939 and 1945 as it is sparse and fugitive for population changes and shifts during the same period.

Students of logistics who have given some attention to the charge that the Nazis, however evil-minded and however much they wished to do so, actually exterminated 4 to 7 million Jews in less than two years during a desperate two-front war which turned against Hitler at the very moment he is alleged to have set up his extermination program, contend that it would have been utterly impossible for them to have achieved anything like such a result. It would have required so much more effort and manpower and would have brought such confusion and added strain to the already overtaxed transportation facilities that the Nazis could not have waged even a reduced one-front conflict.

Those who have led in the charge that the Nazis did exterminate 4-7 million Jews do not allege that the large-scale extermination plan was formulated until after the Casablanca Conference of January, 1943, which launched the Unconditional Surrender formula for ending the war. Hitler realized the implied threat to him, blamed the Jews for the decision, and may have decided on more drastic treatment of them at this time. But even those who support the extermination charges do not contend that the machinery for such extermination was well established before the late autumn of 1943.

By 1944, Allied bombing in the West and Russian victories in the East rendered the German situation much more desperate and placed ever greater strains on German war material, plant, manpower, and transportation. Hitler could not have diverted enough effort to the extermination of the Jews between November

1943, and May 1945, to have disposed of 6 million Jews without producing a virtual collapse of his whole war effort. Some students of logistics contend that such a breakdown would have resulted from the actual extermination of 3 million or considerably less. Further, as the tide turned against the Nazis, the Jews became ever more essential to the German war effort, and it would have placed a strain on even Hitler's folly to have wasted their urgently needed services in behalf of extermination based on hatred.

Other considerations to be taken into account are such things as the paucity of authentic evidence as to the nature and extent of the Nazi extermination facilities and operations. A number of the sources are obvious forgeries. The testimony of many of the Germans at Nuremberg and other trials was extracted after the most cruel and atrocious tortures. Some of these "witnesses," knowing that they were going to be hanged in any event, boasted of what they very possibly never did at all but at the moment wished they had done, or they boasted to inflate their own egos. The total of such boasts amounts to far more than all the Jews in the world in 1939. One such German "witness" boasted that the Nazis had exterminated 40 million Jews! The charges about vast Nazi extermination operations came very late, most of them after the war. The first statement of the claim that the Nazis exterminated 6 million Jews was made in the *New Jewish Frontier* in January, 1945.

The most competent Jewish account of Hitler's treatment of the Jews does not even mention the wholesale extermination program. Another leading Jewish historian of the subject even contends that Hitler deliberately forbade any extensive extermination of Jews in the latter part of the war, when it appeared that he was likely to lose the war, lest any such actions bring ruthless retaliation on the German people. The 6 million theme was picked up by President Truman early in his first administration, without anything but hearsay on his part, and has been so frequently repeated during the last decade that it is used almost automatically by journalists who have never made the slightest study of the subject. It has now become commonplace in journalistic lore.

It is quite possible that more thorough studies of population statistics, more evidence from actual witnesses, historical study of the origins and dissemination of the extermination charges, checking of the charges with what is actually known, and demonstration of deliberate fakery and falsehood, in other words, such techniques as Lord Ponsonby and J.M. Read applied to the atrocity myths of the First World War, may reduce the allegation of massive Nazi extermination of Jews to the same level of morbid

imagination and irresponsible, if deliberate, mendacity that the alleged Belgian atrocities were reduced to in the years following 1918. Surely, the authenticity of the Nazi extermination program has never been vouched for by any person of the prestige and reputation for integrity enjoyed by James Bryce in 1915. Of course, no realistic and informed student of the Second World War doubts the actuality of incredibly inhumane atrocities during the conflict, atrocities on both sides carried out against Jews and Gentiles alike, especially in the guerrilla and partisan warfare behind the lines of battle. As one competent authority has well described the situation, the fictitious atrocities of the First World War became the actual atrocities of the Second.

Partial List of References Used

Gregory Frumkin, *Population Changes in Europe Since 1939*, London, 1951, 191pp.

Gerald Reitlinger, *The SS: Alibi of a Nation*, London, 1956, 502pp.

Eugene Kulischer, *Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes, 1917-1947*, N.Y., 1947, 377pp.

Displaced Persons Analytical Bibliography, Report of a Special Committee of the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1950, 82pp. (Special section on the Jews.)

Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, *Report to the U.S. Government and His Majesty's Government*, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 1946. (2 vols.—Europe and the Near East.)

Max Gottschalk & Abraham Duker, *Jews in the Post-War World*, Dryden Press, N.Y., 1945.

*Maurice-Pierre Herremans, *Personnes Déplacées (Repatriés, Disparus, Refugies)*, Brussels, 1948.

Eugene Kulischer, *Jewish Migrations: Past Experiences and Post-War Prospects*, American Jewish Committee, N.Y., 1943.

Meyer, Weinryb, Duschunsky & Sylvain, *The Jews in the Soviet Satellites*, American Jewish Committee, Syracuse University Press, 1953.

Institute of Jewish Affairs, *Hitler's Ten Year War on the Jews*, N.Y., 1943, 311pp.

Gerhard Jacoby, *Racial State: The German Nationalities Policy in the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia*, Institute of Jewish Affairs, N.Y., 1944.

U.S. Bureau of the Census: A series published by the Government Printing Office, *The Population of Poland*, 1954, 198pp; *The Population of Czechoslovakia*, 1953, 72pp.

*This work is somewhat revealing, in that the careful calculations of the Belgian statistician find only 25,000 of the prewar Jewish population of Belgium "missing" while Frumkin finds 27,000 of them "killed."

Encyclopedia Britannica
Year Books of the American Jewish Committee
World Almanacs
Statistical Bulletin, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, January 1946.

Commentary

Current History—Two articles by Sydney B. Fay on Europe's expellees, etc., Volumes 11 & 12, 1946-7.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, Series noted above: *Population of the Federal Republic of Germany & West Berlin, 1952, 95pp; Israel: Jewish Population and Immigration, 1952, 58pp.*

Solomon M. Schwarz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union*, Syracuse University Press, 1951, 380pp.

Jacob Lestschinsky, "Soviet Jews and Soviet Jewry," *New Leader*, 8 March 1947, p9.

THE VERY FIRST ISSUE
OF THE FIRST PERIODICAL
TO OPENLY AND CONSISTENTLY CHALLENGE
THE "HOLOCAUST" ESTABLISHMENT:
—VOLUME ONE, NUMBER ONE / SPRING 1980—

The Journal of Historical Review

With the opening of the First International Revisionist Conference in the Fall of 1979, the Institute for Historical Review made an unparalleled leap forward in the systematic debunking of the most sweeping distortion of truth of this or perhaps any other century.

The papers from that conference formed the very first issue of *The Journal of Historical Review*, launching a new era of historical inquiry that would, for the first time, bring together the best of revisionist scholarship into a single, highly readable forum that would shake the tenuous foundations right out from underneath the myth-makers of our age.

Now, for those who missed that first, landmark issue of *The Journal of Historical Review*, we've arranged an additional printing and are making a special offer for as long as supplies last: a copy of that first issue for only \$2.00. Here's what that issue contains:

Arthur R. Butz

THE INTERNATIONAL "HOLOCAUST" CONTROVERSY

Robert Faurisson

THE MECHANICS OF GASSING

Austin J. App

THE "HOLOCAUST" PUT IN PERSPECTIVE

Louis FitzGibbon

HIDDEN ASPECTS OF THE KATYN MASSACRE

Udo Walendy

THE FAKE PHOTOGRAPH PROBLEM

Ditlieb Felderer

AUSCHWITZ NOTEBOOK

and more . . .

Order your copy today from

—INSTITUTE FOR HISTORICAL REVIEW—

Post Office Box 1306 • Torrance, California 90505

REVIEW ARTICLE

A Memoir of Globaloney, Orwellianism and Dead Sea Fruit

JAMES J. MARTIN

PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT AND ITS AFTERMATH. Edited by Harry Elmer Barnes, with the collaboration of William Henry Chamberlin, Percy L. Greaves, Jr., George A. Lundberg, George Morgenstern, William L. Neumann, Frederic R. Sanborn, and Charles Callan Tansill. Second, expanded edition, Torrance, California: Institute for Historical Review, 1982. Xvi+ 723 pp., \$11.00 paperbound, ISBN 0-939484-01-3

I first saw *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace* in the form of long galley sheets draped over the back of a chair in the study of Harry Elmer Barnes's spread, "Stonewood," overlooking Lake Otsego, a few miles above Cooperstown, N.Y. A few months later in the fall of 1953 it was published by Caxton Printers of Caldwell, Idaho. To say that it caused delight among revisionists and consternation and outrage among Establishmentarians is a most subdued relation. When Professor Bernard C. Cohen of Princeton University started his review of *Perpetual War* in the American Political Science Review with the sentence, "This is an unpleasant book to read," he uttered about the most neutral words regarding the book that one might have read in the estimates made by the official defenders of the Roosevelt faith in those turbulent days 30 years ago. The majority of reviews were notable for their incensed and abusive tone, making the long-observed mistake of confusing generalized snarling with criticism.

That it has taken thirty years for it to reappear, in this new Institute for Historical Review edition, is a commentary on a number of things taking place in our land. One thing can be said of its current form: it at last is in the shape it was intended to be initially by its editor Barnes, with the addition of an originally suppressed chapter by him, about which more later. However, the wide distribution of the original edition, its many reviews and its inclusion in so many bibliographies over the last generation call not for a conventional review but for an assessment of the history of the three decades which have elapsed since the origi-

nal edition, while calling attention to its contents for the benefit of a generation just now making its first acquaintance with this basic foundation work of revisionism as it developed, historically, in this country.

Like subsequent verses of well known songs, not many even of those well acquainted with this book recall or remember its subtitle: *A Critical Examination of the Foreign Policy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and its Aftermath*. That is the subject of the book, undertaken by its editor, Barnes, who wrote three of its chapters, assisted by Charles Callan Tansill, who wrote two, and six others participating in the symposium, who produced the remaining six. I often regret that political and other circumstances prevailing prevented it from being a two-volume set. Though its inspiration and supplier of its main title, Charles A. Beard, had died five years earlier, there were about the land sufficient members of the revisionist fold to have made a companion volume equally significant; the additional contributions of, say, John T. Flynn, C. Hartley Grattan, George Hartmann, Clyde R. Miller, William B. Hesseltine (I wonder what ever happened to Bill's work on Cordell Hull?), Fred A. Shannon (a chapter by him on the imbecilities of the wartime economy would have been a hilarious interlude in this somber tale), Francis Neilson and Harry Paxton Howard, would have induced utter disintegration among the brigade of critics who found the one book simply unbearable. But it was not to be, even if some of this latter contingent did get in their say in other works.

In looking back on this book across the 30 years between editions, it is necessary to pay attention to the kind of world existing when it was put together. The various authors worked on the essays in *Perpetual War* mostly between 1951 and early 1953, a time of immense agony in the U.S.A. It was the time of the doleful Korean war, the shooting stage of which ended a bare three months prior to publication. It was a time when the high hysteria and megalomania of World War Two "victory" finally rubbed off, and the boasting and posturing of 1945-50 finally was eclipsed by the reality of another war undertaken under circumstances quite removed from those which eventuated after December 7, 1941. It was not a case of jumping into someone else's war with the guidelines all drawn and the odds already determined. It was not the nice comfortable adventure in comradeship with an overwhelming coalition of world power and people and with resources so stacked in their favor that the wonder was that any war at all lasted more than a year. (Americans rarely undertook any campaign in the Pacific, for example, without manpower superiority of 3-1 or 4-1, against an antagonist with hardly any raw material resources and virtually no sources of energy.)

The Korean conflict was something else, begun from scratch in June, 1950 under the auspices of the United Nations, the then five-year-old mutual insurance company put together in imitation of the defunct League of Nations created in 1919-21, but with important new designated functions which seemed to commit it in perpetuity to sending its armed bands *a la* the scalping parties of 1941-45 to put down political sin wherever it might surface in the world. It was this looming function emerging out of the organizing sessions of 1945-48 which had induced Beard to remark about the UNO's goal apparently being the guaranteeing of perpetual peace by fighting perpetual wars to achieve it, an absurd juxtaposition that appealed to Barnes's sense of humor as well as seeming to be quite an accurate analysis of the situation, leading to its adoption as the title of the symposium.

The Korean war was no joke, an anyone who saw combat in this ugly, dreary, repelling struggle can tell you. But it was a complicated conflict, probably the earliest Orwellian skirmish, fought on several levels, but with little visibility for most of them. It undoubtedly had far more tangible results on the home front, quite as Orwellian wars are fought to achieve, but not all of these were expectable or desirable. A backlash caused by Americans finding out that they were almost the only ones involved in the "United Nations" war against the massed Communists of the eastern extremities of Asia where China, Korea, Manchuria and Siberia came together, accelerated an anti-Communist ferreting-out program which grievously disturbed the in-place totalitarian liberal Establishment responsible for getting the country involved in it. The war in Asia, appearing more doleful by the month in that it appeared to promise an everlasting slogging across the immense reaches of East Asia in pursuit of an objective lost right at the start, provoked massive unhappiness with the state of politics on every level.

The domestic search for Communists in places high and low alike was intimately related to this absence of military success the stacked scene of World War Two had encouraged all to expect all the time. Another consequence of this rattled state of the public mind was the encouragement of study about how these sorry situations had come to pass, and one of the beneficiaries of this psychic condition was revisionism. Overwhelmed in the first few years of national euphoria after "victory" in 1945, when few wanted to hear anything but "positive" things about the latest Great Crusade, revisionism made a sharp gain in these days of national dolors in the early '50s, and one of its emanations was this book, as Americans began to taste the Dead Sea fruit of "victory," and some of the consequences of emerging as the monitor of planetary political behavior, and did not like the flavor one bit.

So it was in the decade of the '50s that the majority of the most influential revisionist books were to appear, powered by these same pressures and owing much of the reason for their birth and modest success to a climate of opinion more ready to listen to the obscured and suppressed reasons for this doleful state of affairs in the body politic, international and domestic. That the struggling and troubled New Order of things was immensely unsure of itself in this decade also contributed to the growth of an audience for the revisionist critics.

To be sure, the country had not got over its addiction to the fierce drug of world-saving. The "fix" of 1917-18 had gone into remission during the subsequent two decades, only to return with even stronger symptoms after 1937 and heightened in 1939. But the participation in the lethal posse from 1941-45 had really strengthened the dependence on the hallucinatory impact of the newest essaying-forth, ridding the planet of new ideological sin under Mr. Roosevelt at a cost, among other items, of several hundred thousand American lives and a quintupling of the national debt. The prospect that this might be exceeded and go on forever starting with the era of Mr. Truman had a depressing impact on this zeal for world political purity, though the spectacle of what a war can do to erase unemployment and blot up the nation's energies was not entirely lost among even those who deplored other consequences. The half-hearted pursuit of "victory" in Korea, the first of the Orwellian wars, contrasted sharply with the all-out "total victory" effort of 1942-45. Its agonized serpentine crawl across the early 1950s had a domestic counterpart which gravely upset the lot running it however, and the campaign against all varieties of Communists and their transmission belts on the home front, viewed with such horror from the perspective of 30 years later, was thought quite proper and harmonious, when it happened, by a percentage of the community which truly frightened totalitarian liberalism.

A measure of this fright was indicated in a booklet being worked on at the same time *Perpetual War* was nearing production, published by Barnes under the title *The Chickens of the Interventionist Liberals Have Come Home to Roost: The Bitter Fruits of Globaloney*. In a letter accompanying a pre-publication copy of what we were to refer to for years as "The Chickens," Barnes acknowledged my assistance by declaring, "I would dearly love to share the title page of this with you, but it would do you far more harm than good," a reference to his belief that I had a future in the academic world. I believe it is a good barometer for measuring the ideological climate of the land a generation ago, as well as assessing the state of impact of the early revisionism.

When the restrained and cautious Establishment historian Dr. Louis Morton admitted in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings

two years later that World War Two revisionism was an authentic force to conjure with, perhaps the apogee had been reached in the U.S.A. By that time a potent list of volumes was on the record, including those by Beard, Morgenstern, F.R. Sanborn, Chamberlin, Tansill and Francis Neilson, formidably buttressed by a succession of works by Britons, especially Russell Grenfell's *Unconditional Hatred*, the best-seller among revisionist books of the '50s; F.J.P. Veale's *Advance to Barbarism*; Montgomery Belgion's *Victors' Justice*; Victor Gollancz's two remarkable books on the nightmare the Western "victors" had made out of Germany in the first 4 years of "peace"; Freda Utley's *The High Cost of Vengeance*, and the two remarkable books cutting Churchill down to size by Neilson and Emrys Hughes. (Over the years this early sobered assessment of Churchill the great war leader has gone into obscurity while those who warmed up to the confrontation with Stalin and his successors tended to ignore what had happened to Britain and chose to refurbish and re-sell Churchill, simply replacing Germany with the Soviet Union in rephrasing his famous declamatory hokum in the bombastic period of 1938-43, the latter year being the one when Sir Winston first began to indicate he had some political sense. In 1976 Solzhenitsyn remarked that as of that date Britain was about as important or influential in the world as Romania or Uganda. Another Churchill and Britain will have the political importance of Easter Island.)

The mention of Churchill recalls other worldwide political facts of life at the time of the publication of *Perpetual War*. The throaty blather of "war aims" during the recently concluded planetary war had become much muted by now, and a plaintive whining tempered the continuous outflow of "gee, what a great job we did" wartime histories and memoirs from the lands of the "victors." Other than doubling the area of the world under Communism there was not much to point toward in the area of achievements except the kangaroo court convictions and killing of limited numbers of enemy leaders, which in fact set a very ominous precedent for the future in that it guaranteed future wars, if fought to the same kind of conclusion as that of 1941-45, might well be fought with unprecedented ferocity and savagery, whatever it might take to avoid defeat and subsequent hanging or shooting as "war criminals." (Now, contrary to 1939, when no legal code in the world included a category specifically designated as "war crimes," there were all kinds of them, especially as stipulated in the long, tedious compilations of new "law" in the four Geneva Conventions signed on 12 August 1949, so many parts of which have been violated or ignored so many times in the 130 wars fought since 1949 that collected together as a single statement the infractions of these four Conventions might exceed in wordage the original Conventions themselves.)

In the area of irretrievably lost war goals of the "victors" however was a most palpable physical one, the immense colonial empires of the British, French, Dutch and others; even the United States targeted the Philippine Islands for "independence." And China had come under the dominance of Maoist Communism less than a year before the Korean conflict, thus completing the bankruptcy of about all the "Western Allies" had told their populaces the war was being fought for. India was already adrift even before the Communist investment of China, and the prize Dutch and French real estate of Indonesia and Indo-China were departing or about to.

One might argue that in the case of the Philippines, the U.S.A. was about to experience getting out from under an impossible burden, though it had not begun that way. Pearl Buck had remarked in a pre-war issue of *Asia* magazine that in the early years of the century after America acquired the Philippines, part of the aspirations expressed by some hinged around a standing envy of Singapore, conditioned by the belief that a rival and competitor could be built in the Philippines. But what had been put together in some 40 years was another British West Indies instead, than which there was no worse slum.

In the case of the European powers the losses sustained in East Asia were catastrophic, and they were shortly to be expelled from Western Asia and most of Africa as well. The ear-splitting bellowing about the "One World" during the conflict ending in 1945 had declined to a whisper by the early '50s, and no one helped anyone as the colonial plantations of Asia and Africa went into local or "native" receivership. Few were so indecent as to suggest that the scuttle was a direct consequence of the total debility, exhaustion and indigence which their great "victory" had demanded. But the French did put up a fight for Algeria and for Indo-China (Vietnam), a pair of excruciating affairs during which they howled as though their fingernails were being pulled out, but to no avail. These were two more of the Dead Sea fruit harvested from "victory."

It had been grand good fun financing and arming an immense civilian guerrilla war against the Germans, 1941-45, all in contravention of the very first article of the Hague Convention of 29 July 1899, and the Annex to this Convention, also signed at The Hague on 18 October 1907. Now, when the "victors" began to experience the very same thing in Asia and Africa, it did not seem anywhere near as pleasant. Even the U.S.A. were to get their share, first against the Hukbalahap Communists in the Philippines, and then for an extended period of time in their ill-fated years in Vietnam, when for a time it looked as though the administrations of three successive Presidents were determined to succeed in the recolonization of Southeast Asia where the French

had failed so miserably. (It now appears that thanks to enlightened new "international law," future wars will increasingly be fought around and through civilian populations, the massive removal of such populations now being construed a "war crime.")

It is quite possible, it is true, to put a constructive emphasis on the American replacement of France in the fighting in Southeast Asia. Given U.S. military success and a lot of Japanese economic help, South Vietnam might easily have become another South Korea, a prodigious volcanic industrial beehive, contributing to the pouring of more billions of dollars' worth of manufactured goods upon Europe and America, to increase further American unemployment, resentment and social disorder. Of such things does "victory" often consist.

A further case in point, while dealing with possible consequences of unanticipated results which come about from myopic "statesmanship" and gravely aggravated atrophy in the capability to look ahead, is the remarkable series of articles in the London *Daily Mail* in the last week of November 1982. A near high in hysteria is reached therein as the paper's Far East reporter, after several weeks in Japan and the other "four dragons" of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, witnessing what this Asian production is doing to Britain, the one-time "workshop of the world," suggests that if anyone in the United Kingdom looks forward to having a job of any kind by the year 2000, then they had better busy themselves in "finding another planet" at their earliest convenience. When the reporter contemplated what would happen in the field of cost and price cutting and competition should mainland China ever chuck their preposterous Communism and join the free enterprise system of the "free world," he could only summon a profound shudder.

The republication of a 30-year-old book does not call for reviews. They are already part of the record and can be consulted. The purpose of republication, mainly to make the book available to those not born or too young to profit from its information and analyses at the time of original issue, calls for some effort on the part of these new readers in recapitulating the events between the two editions. In this way some rough measure of assessing the validity of the original authors' approach, mustering of facts and conclusions can be made, an effort the readers in 1953 and the years immediately following did not have to make, since they had lived and were still living through the actual times themselves.

This brings up the aspect of the book related to the British novelist George Orwell and his influence on the thinking of Barnes, especially. The latter's chapter analyzing the early 1950s in terms of Orwell's nightmare vision of world politics laid out in his novel 1984 deserves special attention, since it was omitted from the 1953 edition and made available to readers old and young alike

just recently. This however presents a problem ruminated upon by the hero of Orwell's tale, Winston Smith, reproduced as an epi-paragraph gracing the first page of Barnes's Chapter 10. With the passage of sufficient time and given systematic suppression or distortion of the past, it often becomes impossible to estimate the present because there is no reliable standard or picture of previous times against which to measure it. And the problem is not one just facing any given generation in such a place as the Soviet Union or any other Communist land, where constant tailoring of the past to conform to current policy is commonplace and procedurally expectable. What Orwell calls the "Memory Hole" is present everywhere; how diligently and comprehensively it is used to dispose of the inconvenient past is what separates one state from another, and there are none which are not involved in practical applications of it. Today efforts are made to blot out memory of things that happened just a few months or even weeks ago, let alone decades or generations past. Those in charge of the present are always in a position of asserting that things never were better, and given the assistance of sufficient camp-followers specializing in the past, can always come up with a version of what took place to provide the necessary comforting support. It is the republication of books such as *Perpetual War* which does so much to discommode and annoy the beneficiaries of the New Order. It is for this reason that the essays of William Henry Chamberlin and George Lundberg should also be paid special attention. Neglected 30 years ago, the passage of three decades gives these sober treatments a significance they could not have had in 1953, since we were still too close to it all.

Eventually, the new Establishment steadied and began to assert itself in the euphoric years of the Eisenhower presidency, particularly 1954-60, laying the groundwork for the perfection of an essentially one-party State in regard to foreign policy in the last two decades. The concomitant derailing of revisionism is an integral aspect of this enlarging monolith, despite the recurrence of new crises and in recent years the growth of signs that the whole enterprise is in trouble, globally. But by and large the essential phoniness of the conflict we tend to call the Cold War, generically, can be buttressed with sufficient evidence to make the Orwellian analysis still essentially sound. And one must remember that the central idea in his book was the use of foreign policy to control domestic populations, thus requiring that world conflict be confined to sporadic and very localized encounters, easily terminated if necessary, employed as much as possible to entrench further the entrenched, while simulating endless confrontation. The utter failure to support anti-Soviet uprisings in "East" Germany (read: Central Germany, the East having disap-

peared behind the western frontier of Poland, after Stalin cut himself in on the eastern 45% of 1939 Poland at Potsdam), Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the 1950s puzzled many in view of the stentorian generalized anti-Communism of regimes both Democratic and Republican in this country. There may have been some connection between this action and the famous wire from Mr. Eisenhower's Secretary of State to Marshal Tito, the "independent" Red dictator of Yugoslavia in November, 1956 which announced that the U.S. did not favor the establishment of anti-Soviet regimes on the borders of the Soviet Union. But we can not get into the strange relationship between the "West" and the "East" these last 38 years at this point without grievously overrunning the space originally allocated to a commentary on a book and its times.

Perpetual War is a work which few settle down to reading at a simple sitting. Its diversity appeals rather to absorption of single chapters and reflection on the implications of their relationships as one goes along. Barnes's opening gun on the total situation, laying the foundation for the persisting confrontation between the Revisionists and the Establishment, will often be as much as some can deal with in one dose; it is a masterpiece, the result of much re-writing and concentration via several editions of his privately-published brochure, *The Struggle Against the Historical Blackout*, an early edition of which came my way in the summer of 1948, initiating our first correspondence.

The separate diplomatic history chapters by the late Professors Tansill and Neumann and the Oxford-trained international law scholar and subsequent Judge, F.R. Sanborn, have aroused no refutation, but much sputtering and choking on the part of angered paladins of Rooseveltian innocence in foreign affairs, annoyed at this attention to his steady movement toward war while uttering little but the formalized political patter of "peace." The chapters dealing with the Pearl Harbor tragedy stand to this day as capable of little improvement despite all that has come upon the record in the 30 years since they were published. George Morgenstern's is an admirable appendix to his 1947 book *Pearl Harbor*, a volume which should never have been allowed to go out of print. As for the analysis of the nine investigations of Pearl Harbor by Percy Greaves, it is still the only thing of its kind and of inestimable value and utility. If one wants to see in outline the recent book *Infamy* by John Toland a generation before it was published, one just has to read Greaves's essay carefully. Reference has already been made to the balance-sheet contributors by Lundberg and Chamberlin. They and the concluding chapters by Barnes may excite someone some day to carry their story forward across the thirty years separating them then from us today. The final result may be well nigh unendurable. It is a landmark

occasion and a publishing event to see *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace* back again. It is indeed most pleasurable for me to say, "Welcome back!"



James J. Martin (left) with Harry Elmer Barnes in the back yard of Barnes's hunting camp, Redfield, New York, 8 August 1954.

Book Reviews

THE TERRIBLE SECRET: SUPPRESSION OF THE TRUTH ABOUT HITLER'S "FINAL SOLUTION," by Walter Laqueur, Little, Brown and Company, 262pp, \$12.95, ISBN 0-316-51474-8

AUSCHWITZ AND THE ALLIES, by Martin Gilbert, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 368pp, \$15.95, ISBN 0-03-059284-4

According to a German proverb recorded for posterity by H.L. Mencken, "It takes a great many shovelfuls to bury the truth." Walter Laqueur, "a distinguished professor of history," whose book *The Terrible Secret* is subtitled "Suppression of the Truth about Hitler's 'Final Solution,'" might find this proverb apt. But, ironically, the question that arises from a critical examination of Laqueur's book is whether, in regard to the burying of the truth about "Hitler's 'Final Solution,'" it is an exposé or an example. Did Laqueur produce this book with a typewriter, or with a shovel?

As I've said, Laqueur's book is subtitled "Suppression of the Truth about Hitler's 'Final Solution,'" which immediately begs the question: what is the truth about "Hitler's 'Final Solution'"? In this book, which purports to be a study of when "the information" about "the Final Solution" became "known," Laqueur reveals himself to be a rather dogmatic exponent of the conventional wisdom about "the Final Solution," to wit, that on Hitler's orders, the Nazi regime during World War Two embarked upon a program aimed at killing all the Jews of Nazi-dominated Europe, and succeeded in killing millions (5 or 6 million the figures most often claimed) by shooting and by gassing, mainly the latter.

For example, Laqueur, in line with the conventional wisdom, asserts (p11) that Hitler gave orders to Himmler and Heydrich for the extermination of all European Jews soon after he signed the Barbarossa Directive in December 1940. But how Laqueur "knows" this is his (terrible?) secret. He cites no corroborating documentation or testimony; he cites no source of any sort in support of his claim.

This scholarly sin could be forgiven if Laqueur were stating a well-known and indisputable fact. But, in fact, even the exponents of the conventional wisdom cannot agree on when Hitler is supposed to have given his supposed extermination order. According to Helmut Krausnick (*Anatomy of the SS State*, Walker and Company, 1968, p60), "It cannot have been later than March 1941, when [Hitler] openly declared his intention of having the political commissars of the Red Army shot, that he issued his secret decree—which never appeared in writing though it was

mentioned verbally on several occasions—that the Jews should be eliminated." But according to Raul Hilberg (*The Destruction of the European Jews*, Harper Colophon, 1979, p177):

. . . we are dealing with two of Hitler's decisions. One order was given in the spring of 1941, during the planning of the invasion of the USSR; it provided that small units of the SS and Police be dispatched to Soviet territory, where they were to move from town to town to kill all Jewish inhabitants on the spot. This method may be called the "mobile killing operations." Shortly after the mobile operations had begun [in June 1941] in the occupied Soviet territories, Hitler handed down his second order. That decision doomed the rest of European Jewry.

Thus, Hilberg does not agree with Krausnick, and Laqueur does not agree with either of them about when Hitler is supposed to have ordered the extermination of all European Jews. In such a situation, Laqueur's unsupported, dogmatic assertions are worthless, and leave unanswered the question of whether or not Hitler ever actually gave such an order.

Laqueur virtually concedes that Hitler never gave a written order for the extermination of European Jewry, but then tries to save the day for the conventional wisdom. He says (p196) that

witnesses claimed to have seen the order, but it is doubtful whether there ever was a written order. This has given rise to endless speculation and inspired a whole "revisionist" literature—quite needlessly, because Hitler, whatever his other vices, was not a bureaucrat. He was not in the habit of giving written orders on all occasions: there were no written orders for the murderous "purge" of June 1934, for the killing of gypsies, the so-called euthanasia action (T-4) and on other such occasions.

But first, how does Laqueur know that Hitler ordered the killing of gypsies? Second, regarding the Blood Purge of 1934, David Irving points out (*The War Path*, Viking, 1978, p39) that Hitler did give a written order to Sepp Dietrich, in the form of a list of seven names of men to be executed. That 82 people were killed resulted, according to Irving, from the exceeding of Hitler's orders, mainly by Himmler and Goering. And, third, Hitler's written order for the T-4 "euthanasia" program is well-known. Gitta Sereny, journalist and devotee of the conventional wisdom about "the Final Solution," quotes it as follows:

Reichsleiter Bouhler and Dr. Brandt are charged with the responsibility for expanding the authority of physicians who are to be designated by name, to the end that patients who are considered incurable in the best available human judgment after critical evaluation of their condition can be granted mercy-killing. (Into That Darkness, McGraw-Hill, 1974, p63.)

Say, Professor Laqueur, just what are you doing with that shovel in your hand? Digging for the truth about 'Hitler's 'Final Solution' '? Or burying it?

In any case, Laqueur tells his readers (p30) that "... on 25 October 1941, in a conversation between Hitler, Himmler and Heydrich, rumours among the population about the destruction of the Jews had already been mentioned. ('Public rumours attribute to us a plan to exterminate the Jews.')" But what he doesn't tell his readers is that it was Hitler who was speaking and that this reference to rumors about an extermination plan was made in the following context:

From the rostrum of the Reichstag I prophesied to Jewry that, in the event of war's proving inevitable, the Jew would disappear from Europe. That race of criminals has on its conscience the two million dead of the first World War, and now already hundreds of thousands more. Let nobody tell me that all the same we can't park them in the marshy parts of Russia! Who's worrying about our troops? It's not a bad idea, by the way, that public rumour attributes to us a plan to exterminate the Jews. Terror is a salutary thing. (*Hitler's Secret Conversations 1941-1944*, Signet, 1961, pp108-109. See also David Irving, *Hitler's War*, Viking, 1977, p331.)

If, as Laqueur asserts, Hitler in December 1940 gave Himmler and Heydrich orders to exterminate all European Jews, then why was he making statements implying that his policy was to "park them in the marshy parts of Russia" in a conversation with none other than Himmler and Heydrich almost a year later? Hmmmm? That is the question that Laqueur seeks to avoid answering by quoting Hitler out of context. Considering how good he is at burying things, perhaps Laqueur should give some thought to a career as a grave digger.

In the meantime, "distinguished professor of history" Walter Laqueur makes many "factual" assertions about what "could have been known" about "the extermination of the Jews" at various times. Almost invariably, these assertions, like his claim regarding a Hitler order for genocide, are unsupported by the citation of any source. But even when he does cite a source, his interpretations can be misleading.

For example, regarding what "could have been known" by 1 January 1943, Laqueur writes (p14) that, "According to an official SS report, 2.5 million Jews had been 'deported' by the end of 1942 and were no longer alive." A footnote reveals that the SS report in question is the report of the statistician Korherr, submitted to Himmler on 23 March 1943. But it was not according to the Korherr report that those 2.5 million deported Jews were no longer alive at the end of 1942. Rather, it is according to Laqueur that they were no longer alive then. And, by equating deportation

with killing, Laqueur is exaggerating the number of Jews killed by the Nazis by the end of 1942. As Laqueur knows, some of those deportees were not only still alive at the end of 1942, but managed to survive to bear witness to "the truth" later on. For example, Vrba (nee Rosenberg) and Wetzler, whose escape from Auschwitz in 1944 Laqueur mentions, were among the Slovakian Jews deported during 1942 who, according to Laqueur's interpretation of the Korherr report, were all dead by the end of that year!

The *Terrible Secret* is supposed to be a study of when "the truth" about "the extermination of the Jews" became "known" in various quarters. But Laqueur is determined to demonstrate, by fair means or foul, that "knowledge" of "the truth" was widespread by the end of 1942. To that end he has gathered together a motley collection of wartime rumors (some travelling through diplomatic channels), "reports" of Resistance groups, accounts of self-proclaimed eyewitnesses, newspaper articles, radio broadcasts, letters, diaries, etc., as well as way too many post-war recollections, unsupported assertions, specious inferences and unproven assumptions.

* * * * *

Auschwitz and the Allies, by Martin Gilbert, a Fellow of Merton College, Oxford, and the official Churchill biographer since 1968, covers some of the same ground as *The Terrible Secret*, from a similar point of view. The book purports to be "an account of the facts of the extermination as they filtered out of Nazi-dominated Europe, and the Allied reaction to these facts. . ." But regarding the matter of the Allied reaction to "the facts," Gilbert is concerned not just with the question of belief or disbelief, as Laqueur, but also with what was done, or not done, to save the lives of European Jews. There are other differences in the scopes of these two volumes. Laqueur has focussed mainly on the period July 1941-December 1942, while Gilbert carries his account through to early 1945. Gilbert is only concerned with when the Allies, especially Britain and the U.S., "learned" about "Hitler's mass murder," while Laqueur also poses this question in relation to Germany and her allies, the neutral European nations, and the Jews, both inside and outside of the Nazi-ruled Europe. Finally, Gilbert gives special attention to the story of one particular "extermination camp," Auschwitz.

Like Laqueur, Gilbert repeatedly makes "factual" statements about what was "really" happening to European Jews during the war. And Gilbert is not much better than Laqueur at citing supporting sources for these statements. For example, after alleging a Nazi plan for millions of Jews "using the most efficient and modern methods," Gilbert writes (p18) that "The first step in carrying out this new plan was taken on 8 December 1941, when

several hundred Jews from small Polish towns were taken to a wood outside the village of Chelmno, and gassed in a specially designed building." It's bad enough that this unsupported assertion is contradicted by the conventional wisdom about Chelmno, according to which Jews were gassed there in specially designed motor vehicles of some sort, not in a specially designed building, but, what's worse, it's contradicted by the official Churchill biographer himself! On page 40, Gilbert quotes a "report" sent to London in May 1942 by the underground Jewish Socialist Bund of Poland. Regarding the gassing of the Jews at Chelmno, the "report" said: "'A special automobile (a gas chamber) was used.' " And, comments Gilbert, "... the details given in the Bund Report were precise, and, as we now know, accurate." So, why did Gilbert contradict it on page 18? Who knows? It seems that the mind of the official Churchill biographer, like God, works in mysterious ways, its wonders of scholarship to perform.

It also seems that the official Churchill biographer does not know the meaning of the word "eyewitness," which my dictionary defines thusly: "One who has seen something happen and can give testimony about it." Chapter 10 of *Auschwitz and the Allies*, titled "Eyewitness," is concerned primarily with a group of Palestinian Jews (women, children and a few elderly men, according to Laqueur) who, in an exchange for German internees, had reached "the Holy Land" from Europe on 16 November 1942. Writes Gilbert (p88),

All had been eye-witnesses to Nazi brutality. Each one had horrific tales to tell of deportation, brutality, or mass murder.

Among the facts reported were "Harrowing details recounted by eyewitnesses of people thrown into flames, specially constructed crematorium, locked up in poison gas chambers, and other forms of torture." (Gilbert is quoting Moshe Shertok's summary of these "eyewitness" accounts.)

But later in the chapter (p92) we find out that "what the eyewitnesses did report . . . was 'all sorts of rumours' which told 'of large concrete buildings on the Russian-Polish border where people are killed by gas and burned.'" Thus, on this crucial point in these "eyewitness" reports, the "eyewitnesses" were not eyewitnesses at all. They had not seen anything; they had merely heard some things, some rumors.

Laqueur also discusses the stories of this group of Palestinian Jewish repatriates, since it was their "evidence" which supposedly convinced the leaders of Palestinian Jewry of the "reality" of a program to exterminate all European Jews. Laqueur, at least, does not call these people "eyewitnesses"; he merely calls them "witnesses." But he seems to take their "evidence" just as seriously as Gilbert. He writes (p191):

So often before, simple-minded (and even not so simple-minded) people had simply repeated rumours, often baseless in character. But the new arrivals could not be so easily dismissed: among them was a scientific researcher at the Hebrew University, two members of Kibbutz Degania B—members of the Palestinian elite—a Zionist leader of long standing from Piotrkow and other such witnesses. (“People on whose judgment and discernment one could rely,” E. Dobkin was later to say.)

But was there really such a big difference between these people and earlier repatriates who “simply repeated rumours, often baseless in character”? Laqueur himself tells us that “what emerged from these accounts was firstly that a German government commission had been set up earlier that summer (Sonder- or Vernichtungskommission) under a certain commissar Feu or Foy to destroy Polish Jewry. (This information was, in fact, wrong or at least inaccurate. . . .)” (p191) Apparently, these people “on whose judgement and discernment one could rely” were simply repeating a baseless rumor. Furthermore, as I’ve already pointed out, on the crucial question of the fate of Jewish deportees, these “witnesses” reported “all sorts of rumors” about “large concrete buildings on the Russian-Polish border where people are killed by gas and burned.” Laqueur says (p192) that these rumors “were apparently correct,” presumably meaning that they appeared to be correct to those to whom they were repeated in Palestine in November of 1942. But what was there about these rumors that made them appear more correct than any of the other rumors circulating about the fate of Jewish deportees? According to Vladka Meed (*On Both Sides of the Wall*, Holocaust Library, p43), “One rumor” regarding the deportees from Warsaw “was that they had been dispatched to the city of Smolensk, close to the Russo-German front, to dig trenches.” And, in addition to the rumors about gassing, there were rumors about mass extermination by various other methods, including rumors about killing by live burial, rumors about thousands of Jews being run over by heavy motor lorries, rumors about throwing Jews into lime kilns, rumors about mass electrocutions at Belzec and Auschwitz, rumors about killing people with air pressure at Auschwitz, and rumors about mass executions by hot steam chambers of Treblinka. (*The Black Book of Polish Jewry*, published in 1943, contains an “Official Report submitted to the Polish Government,” which includes “the report of an eyewitness” describing in detail the steam chambers of Treblinka. See pages 141-147. This was asserted to be “irrefutable proof of the atrocious horror wielded over their victims by the Germans.”) So, why, in November 1942, were the rumors about gassing “apparently correct”? Laqueur does not explain this, though he does give a possible explanation of why rumors about mass extermination (not necessarily by gassing) may have appeared correct. He says of the deportees (p192)

that "... there was not news from them, no letters, no personal regards conveyed." But there were letters, and Laqueur knows that. According to Vladka Meed (op. cit., p31), "Some letters from deportees were received in the [Warsaw] ghetto which gave credence to the German assurances that those forced to leave had been given employment elsewhere." And Laqueur himself writes (p153) that,

When . . . the Slovak leaders, slightly perturbed, mentioned to the Germans the "fantastic rumours" about the fate of the evacuated Jews, pretending they had no idea about what was happening to them in Poland, Eichmann referred to more than one thousand letters and postcards which had been received in Slovakia from evacuated Jews within the previous two months.

Laqueur also mentions letters received from deportees in other countries, although he usually emphasizes that the number of letters received was small in relation to the number of deportees. In any case, letters were received from some deportees. So if the rumors about the mass extermination of the deportees "were apparently correct" because of the claim that there were no letters from them, then the rumors about mass extermination "were apparently correct" because of what Laqueur knows to be a falsehood! Ironic, isn't it, that people could have learned "the truth" about "the Final Solution" by means of such falsehoods?

Immediately following his mistitled chapter "Eyewitness," Martin Gilbert discusses the case of another "eyewitness," further demonstrating his incompetence as a historian. Gilbert writes (p93):

On November 25, at the very moment when the half-million Jews in Palestine were learning of the mass murder of their fellow Jews in Europe, yet another report had reached the Jewish leadership in London. This new report described "the liquidation" of the Warsaw ghetto, and the gassings at Belzec. It had been brought from Poland to the Polish Government-in-Exile in London by an eyewitness, Jan Karski, a non-Jew.

A naive reader would most likely conclude from this passage that Jan Karski, the non-Jew, was an eyewitness to "the gassings at Belzec." But, strangely enough, in the course of detailing the contents of "Karski's report," Gilbert says (p94), "There followed an account of the different methods of 'mass extermination': execution by firing squads, electrocution, and 'lethal gas-chambers', and the report continued with an account of the 'electrocuting station' at Belzec camp. . . ." Here is that account:

Transports of "settlers" arrive at a siding, on the spot where the execution is to take place. The camp is policed by Ukrainians. The victims are ordered to strip naked—to have a bath, ostensibly—and are then led to a barrack with a metal plate for floor. The door

is then locked, electric current passes through the victims and their death is almost instantaneous. The bodies are loaded on to waggons and taken to a mass grave some distance from the camp.

The question that all this raises is this: did the "eye-witness, Jan Karski," see "the gassings at Belzec," or did he see the operation of the "electrocuting station" at Belzec? Or did he, perhaps, see both? Gilbert sees no need to clear up the confusion he has created and moves on to other things. But, according to Karski's account of his experience at Belzec (Chapter 30, *The Story of a Secret State*, Houghton Mifflin, 1944), he saw neither!

Karski, a Polish diplomat before the war, and a Lieutenant of the Mounted Artillery in 1939, was a member of the Polish underground. He engaged in some "black propaganda" operations, such as the printing and posting of fake German decrees, as well as serving as a courier for the underground. According to his book, Karski had a meeting with two leaders of the Jewish underground, one a Zionist and the other a member of the Bund, who, so he says, arranged for him to visit the Warsaw ghetto and then to infiltrate "the Jewish death camp" near Belzec disguised as an Estonian camp guard. Here is Walter Laqueur's synopsis of what Karski said he saw at Belzec (p231):

There he saw "bedlam"—the ground littered with weakened bodies, hundreds of Jews packed into railway cars covered with a layer of quicklime. The cars were closed and moved outside the camp; after some time they were opened, the corpses were burned and the cars returned to the camp to fetch new cargo.

Actually, Karski did not claim to have seen where the train went or what happened to the Jews inside the railway cars after they left the camp. In his book, he wrote (p350): "As I listened to the dwindling outcries from the train, I thought of the destination toward which it was speeding. My informants had minutely described the journey." His informants were the Jewish underground leaders who had arranged his visit to Belzec, in particular "the Bund leader." According to Karski (p339), "The Bund leader had never been in it [i.e., "the Jewish death camp" near Belzec] but he had the most detailed information in [sic] its operations." Thus, Karski was told by "the Bund leader" (it was Leon Feiner) that, after leaving Belzec,

The train would travel about eighty miles and finally come to a halt in an empty, barren field. Then nothing at all would happen. The train would stand stock still, patiently waiting while death penetrated into every corner of its interior. This would take from two to four days. (p350)

Thus, what Karski saw at the Belzec "death camp" was Jews being herded into railroad cars which then left the "death camp."

Nowhere in his book did Karski mention gassings or electrocution. So why does Gilbert say (p93) that Karski's report "described . . . the gassings at Belzec" and (p94) that it included "an account of the 'electrocution station' at Belzec camp. . . ."? It may be of interest to know that the "account of the 'electrocuting station' at Belzec camp," which Gilbert attributes to Karski, can be found on page 131 of the 1943 publication, *The Black Book of Polish Jewry* (Jacob Apenszlak, ed.), where it is quoted as part of a 15 November 1942 "report" of Dr. Ignacy Schwarzbart, a member of the Polish National Council in London. In fact, other parts of what Gilbert calls "Karski's report" can be found in *The Black Book of Polish Jewry*, all attributed to sources other than Karski.

Ironically, *The Black Book of the Polish Jewry* also contains two descriptions of the Belzec camp, both of them obviously based on Karski's account, though each of them contradicts Karski's book regarding some details, as well as contradicting each other. (See pp135-138 and 329-332.) One of these accounts of Belzec, after "reporting" the killing of Jews by their being left in railway cars "from two to eight days," then asserts that, "Because there are not enough cars to kill the Jews in this relatively inexpensive manner many of them are taken to nearby Belzec where they are murdered by poison gasses or by the application of electric currents." It would be very interesting to know who actually wrote this statement. Was it Karski, who did not see fit to mention either gassing or electrocution in his own 1944 book? Or was it somebody else, who took Karski's report and, for propaganda purposes, interpolated these references to gassing and electrocution? In any case, Karski, now a Professor in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, has not answered my inquiries about these matters.

Laqueur, unlike Gilbert, gives a fairly accurate account of Karski's observations at Belzec, observations which, at the very least, raise questions about the conventional wisdom that Jews were killed by gassing at Belzec. But Laqueur tries to save the day for conventional wisdom thusly:

Karski says that he learned only in later years that Belzec was not a transit but a death camp and that most of the victims were killed in gas chambers. He had not actually seen the gas chambers during his visit, apparently because these were walled in and could be approached only with a special permit. (p231)

But if Karski ‘learned only in later years that Belzec was not a transit but a death camp and that most of the victims were killed in gas chambers,’ then why did he, in his 1944 book, refer to the camp as “the Jewish death camp” while saying nary a word about gassing? As I’ve already pointed out, Karski’s story about the Jews who were shipped out of the Belzec camp being left in railway cars until they died was based on what he was told by Jewish Bund leader Leon Feiner, who supposedly “had the most detailed information” about the operations of the Belzec camp. But if Feiner “had the most detailed information” about Belzec and if “most of the victims were killed in gas chambers,” then wouldn’t Feiner have known about that? And, if so, then wouldn’t he have told Karski about that too? In any case, Laqueur suggests that Karski “had not actually seen the gas chambers during his visit, apparently because these were walled in and could be approached only with a special permit.” “Apparently” the gas chambers were walled in, eh? Apparently, Laqueur has conjured up an ad hoc hypothesis, based on no actual evidence, in an attempt to reconcile Karski’s story with the conventional wisdom about gas chambers at Belzec. But one could read Karski’s story and conclude that “apparently” Jews were not gassed at Belzec.

Martin Gilbert laments (p170) that:

As 1943 came to an end, and 1944 began, the stories of German atrocities were still not fully believed. One of those concerned by this fact was a Hungarian Jewish refugee, Arthur Koestler, then working as a journalist and lecturer in Britain. “At present,” he wrote in an article which was published in the *New York Times Magazine* in January 1944, “we have the mania of trying to tell you about the killing, by hot steam, mass-electrocution and live burial, of the total Jewish population of Europe.”

Koestler’s own “emotion and bitterness” arose, he wrote, because he had in his desk in front of him photographs of the killings, photographs which had been smuggled out of Poland. “People died to smuggle them out,” he commented, and added caustically, “They thought it worth while.”

But if Koestler had “photographs of the killings,” then, pray tell, Mr. Gilbert, were they photographs of the killings by hot steam, or of the killings by mass-electrocution, or the killings by live burial? Hmmmm? I think it is significant that what Koestler actually wrote was this: “I have photographs before me on the desk while I am writing this, and this accounts for my emotion and bitterness.” (See “On Disbelieving Atrocities,” reprinted in *The Yogi and the Commissar*, Macmillan, 1945, p89.) Koestler did not say that he had photographs “of the killings.” He did not say what he had photographs of. He just said he had photographs. Quite possibly, Koestler wanted his readers to assume, as Gilbert

has assumed, that he had photographs "of the killings," but, if that was the case, wouldn't he have made that point quite explicit in order to make his appeal for belief in German atrocities that much more persuasive?

In any case, on the two pages preceding his account of Koestler's article (pp168-169), Gilbert discusses "the second Soviet trial of German war criminals, at Kharkov," by means of which, he says, "[f]urther evidence of the scale of the slaughter of Warsaw Jewry reached the Allies and western Jewry. . . ."

During the Kharkov trial a twenty-four-year-old SS Lieutenant, Hans Ritz, was questioned about the use of gas vans in Kharkov. On first hearing the words "gas van" mentioned in Kharkov, Ritz told the prosecutor, "I remember the vehicle from my stay in Warsaw, when I witnessed the evacuation in it of the unreliable sections of the Warsaw population." While in Warsaw, Ritz added, "I got to know that part of the Warsaw population was evacuated by railway and another part were loaded into the 'gas vans' and exterminated."

Hans Ritz also gave evidence of the mass shooting, in sand pits and stone quarries, of tens of thousands of people in the Soviet cities of Krasnodar, Vitebsk and Taganrog. During the shooting of some three hundred people at a village near Kharkov, Ritz recalled, a woman, trying to save her child, "covered it with her body. But this did not help her, because the bullet went through her and the child."

Although Gilbert seems to take all of Ritz' "confessions" quite seriously, it is interesting to note that Ritz "confessed" to a crime that none of the other postwar exponents of the conventional wisdom have ever accused the Germans of, that is, the killing of Warsaw residents in gas vans. Ironically, a likely explanation of Ritz' "confessions" is suggested by our old friend, Arthur Koestler, in this passage from "Soviet Myth and Reality," in *The Yogi and the Commissar*:

The method of gross over-simplifications in Soviet home-propaganda led to the tradition that the accused in a political trial must confess lustily and voluntarily his alleged crimes; and once this tradition became established there was no going back. Hence the curious phenomenon that during the Kharkov trial of German war-criminals in December, 1943, the accused German officers and N.C.O.'s were made to behave like characters from Dostoevsky. One of them at the trial told of his own accord how during a mass-execution of Russians he took a tommy gun from a soldier and shot a mother with a child in her arms. For the foreign observer the Kharkov trial (which was filmed and publicly shown in London) gave the same impression of unreality as the Moscow trials, the accused reciting their parts in stilted phrases which they had obviously learned by heart, sometimes taking the wrong

cue from the State-Prosecutor and then coming back to the same part again. There is no doubt that the Germans committed bestialities in Russia which surpass the imagination of the Western mind; but that those particular Germans committed those crimes was proved by no other evidence than their own confession. (p143)

That the official Churchill biographer should take the "confessions" of the Kharkov trial seriously merely demonstrates his gross credulity. No doubt he would also take seriously the "confession" referred to in the following:

... the last culprit burned at Paris for heresy suffered in 1663, when a certain Simon Morin, a native of Aumale in Normandy, was sent to the stake. Morin preached that he was Christ Incarnate, that to him all power had been given by God, and that his followers, those who possessed the true light, were incapable of sinning. These Illuminati practiced the most infamous debaucheries under the pretext of religious assemblies, and it was shown that Morin was insatiable in his lusts and corruptions. A wealthy widow, named Malherbe, who had joined the sect, confessed the usual catalogue of filth and folly. She had had sexual connexion with the Devil, had attended the Sabbat, banqueted with demons, entertained imps and familiars. The Parliament ordered her to be branded with the *fleur-de-lys* and banished from the city. (Montague Summers, *The Geography of Witchcraft*, Citadel, p430.)

The "confessions" of a Soviet show trial are about as credible as the "confessions" of a "witch" trial. That the official Churchill biographer takes such "confessions" seriously is further evidence of his incompetence as a historian. But, perhaps, he can find work with Walter Laqueur, as an assistant grave digger.

Gilbert devotes much attention to the story of Auschwitz escapees Vrba and Wetzler, and their "report" on Auschwitz-Birkenau. According to Gilbert (p236), "The Vrba-Wetzler Report, although based entirely on the power of two men's memories, was remarkably accurate in its details." But what were those details? Gilbert does not quote any substantial portion of the "report" itself, but he does quote (pp262-264) a good chunk of an 8-page summary of "the report" that reached the British Foreign Office on 4 July 1944. Here are the details concerning the crematoria of Birkenau:

At the end of February, 1943, four new crematoria were built, two large and two small, in the camp of Birkenau itself. The crematorium contains a large hall, a gas chamber and a furnace. People are assembled in the hall which holds 2,000 and gives the impression of a swimming-bath. They have to undress and are given a piece of soap and a towel as if they were going to the baths. Then they are crowded into the gas chamber which is hermetically sealed.

Several SS men in gas-masks then pour into the gas chamber through three openings in the ceiling a preparation of the poison gas megacyklon, which is made in Hamburg. At the end of three minutes all the persons are dead. The dead bodies are then taken away in carts to the furnace to be burnt. The furnace has nine chambers, each of them with four openings. Each opening will take three bodies at once. They are completely burnt after 1½ hours. Thus each crematorium can burn 1,500 bodies daily.

The question that naturally arises (though, naturally, not in the mind of the official Churchill biographer) is: how did Vrba and Wetzler "know" all this? According to a deposition made by Vrba for submission at the Eichmann trial, Vrba's source of information was Filip Müller, "who worked in the Gas Chamber Department." (See *I Cannot Forgive*, Rudolph Vrba and Alan Bestic, Bantam, 1964, p270.) In his own book, *Eyewitness Auschwitz* (Stein and Day, 1979), Filip Müller expounds (expands?) upon his role as informant to Vrba and Wetzler (pp121-122). However, Müller's "descriptions" of the Birkenau grematoria do not jibe very well with those Gilbert quotes from the summary of the Vrba-Wetzler "report." For one thing, the Vrba-Wetzler summary says the four new crematoria at Birkenau were built at the end of February 1943, while Müller (p51) says they were ready "[b]y mid-July 1943." According to the Vrba-Wetzler summary, several SS men would pour "a preparation of the poison gas" into the gas chamber. But, according to Müller (p81), only "two SS men took the so-called disinfectants, several canisters of Zyklon B and poured their contents into the openings of the gas chamber." An apparently minor discrepancy is the Vrba-Wetzler summary's identification of the poison gas as "megacyklon," while Müller identifies it as Zyklon B. However, this discrepancy becomes more significant in the light of Müller's claim (p122) that he gave Vrba and Wetzler "one of those labels which were stuck on the tins containing Zyklon B poison gas." If Müller is telling the truth, how did Vrba and Wetzler manage to get the name wrong? In any case, another discrepancy is that the Vrba-Wetzler summary says, regarding the gassings, that at the end of three minutes everyone was dead, while Müller says (p116) that it usually took more than ten minutes before everybody was dead. The Vrba-Wetzler summary says the furnace of the crematorium had nine chambers, each with four openings, while Müller (p59) says that one of the larger crematoria had only five ovens, each with only three combustion chambers. The Vrba-Wetzler summary says the bodies were "completely completely burnt after 1½ hours," while Müller (p17) says that corpses went into each oven "at intervals of twenty minutes." The Vrba-Wetzler summary calculated that each crematorium could burn 1,500 bodies daily, while Müller

says of one of the larger crematoria (p59) that "Its fifteen ovens, working non-stop, could cremate more than 3,000 corps daily." Clearly, the "facts" about Auschwitz are rather malleable, somewhat like Silly Putty. But despite the fact that, on the crucial matter of the crematoria, most of the details of the Vrba-Wetzler "report" are contradicted by none other than Filip Müller, Vrba and Wetzlers' source of information about the crematoria, the official Churchill biographer calls the "report" of Vrba and Wetzler "remarkably accurate in its details," demonstrating thereby his own remarkable will-to-believe.

In his introduction, Gilbert tells the reader that he has "set out the barest facts of the principal deportations, murders and gasings as they happened. . . ." To give one example out of many, Gilbert asserts (p169) that "On December 20 [1943] . . . a train-load of 849 Jews reached Auschwitz from Paris; more than five hundred were taken away to be gassed." Gilbert makes this sort of assertion again and again throughout the book. Apparently his source for the "the barest facts" (at least regarding Auschwitz) is Danuta Czech. In a footnote on page 264, he says that "The principal features of the Vrba-Wetzler report, the arrival of deportation trains at Auschwitz between March 1942 and April 1944, the gassing of the majority of the deportees, and the numbers gassed, are fully borne out by the facts and figures in Danuta Czech's, 'Kalendarium der Ereignisse im Konzentrationslager Auschwitz-Birkenau,' published in *Hefte von Auschwitz*. . . ."

But how reliable are Danuta Czech's "facts and figures"? One indication of their reliability is given in this passage from Pierre Vidal-Naguett's "A Paper Eichmann?" in the April 1981 issue of *democracy*:

[Robert] Faurisson has triumphantly published a photograph of Simone Veil, the current president of the European Parliament, who, although she was reported to be gassed, is alive and well. The mechanism of this mistake is extremely simple, and the information that Faurisson gives . . . makes it easy to understand. According to the Polish historian Danuta Czech, the original camp calendar for April 1944 establishes the fact that convoy number 71, which came from Drancy, near Paris, on April 16 was handled in the following manner: 165 men were registered, and the rest of the convoy were gassed (*Hefte von Auschwitz* no.7, p.88). The camp archives, which were incomplete, no longer included the names of women who had been registered. This mistake was corrected by Serge Klarsfeld, in his [*Le*] Memorial [de la déportation des juifs de France]. "The Auschwitz calendar gives no names of women who were selected [for labor], but this is misleading, since 70 women survivors of this convoy were counted in 1945. There were also 35 male survivors." (p83)

Was Danuta Czech's "mistake" about convoy 71 from France just a fluke? That it was not is suggested by the one case in which I have been able to compare Czech's "facts and figures," as parroted by Gilbert, with the testimony of a survivor of the convoy in question. According to Gilbert (p210):

On May 21 [1944] the railway sidings, gas chambers and crematoria at Birkenau were more active than they had ever been before. For on that day three trains arrived from Hungary, two from Holland, and one from Belgium. . . . From the three Hungarian trains, only eleven men and six women were sent to the barracks, and more than 12,000 gassed. This was the largest number to be gassed in a single day in the history of Auschwitz up to that moment. But it was a number that was now to be repeated day after day.

But, praise Yahweh, who should have been on one of the trains that arrived at Auschwitz from Hungary on 21 May 1944? None other than our litigious old friend, Mel Mermelstein! (See Mermelstein's *By Bread Alone*, p276.) And, according to Mermelstein's account of his arrival at Auschwitz, "hundreds of men" (p115) from the train he arrived in, including himself, his father, his brother and four acquaintances named Lajos, Tibi, Bram and Joey, were selected for labor and sent to the barracks. (He says nothing about how many women were selected for labor, since, according to his account, the men and women were separated before the selections for labor were made.) Mel Mermelstein says that hundreds of men were selected for labor from just one of the three Hungarian trains, yet Gilbert says that only eleven men from all three Hungarian trains were sent to the barracks and that all the rest were gassed. A bit of a discrepancy, eh, Mr. Gilbert? Perhaps, Pierre Vidal-Naquet will be so kind as to explain how Danuta Czech and, thereby, Martin Gilbert made this "mistake." In any case, in Gilbert's usage, "the barest facts" turn out to mean something other than the naked truth. One might even suspect that Gilbert's "barest facts" are really the baldest fictions.

The question of what was done, or not done, to save the lives of European Jews is a major theme of *Auschwitz and the Allies*. I'm not going to discuss the matter in any detail. However, I want to make one observation. Apparently, none of the people who, in Gilbert's account, were so concerned about saving European Jews ever suggested that this end might have been achieved by trying to bring the war to a more rapid conclusion through a negotiated peace, as opposed to prolonging the war by insisting on Germany's "unconditional surrender." Apparently, saving the lives of European Jews was of less importance than destroying Nazi Germany. "Victory at all costs" was the ruling idea, and one

of the costs, it so happened, was the death of many European Jews as a direct or indirect consequence of the war.

The Terrible Secret and Auschwitz and the Allies, despite all their flaws, are each, to some extent, interesting and informative. Each contains some new material on the various rumors, "reports," etc. that were circulating during World War Two about the fate of European Jewry. They also contain some new information about the skepticism with which those rumors, "reports," etc. were received, at least initially, by various parties, including Jews. And there are tidbits of new information about other matters as well. But, each of these books, taken as a whole, is a mishmash of information and misinformation, of fact and fiction, of truth and falsehood. Readers of either book would be well advised to take its author's assertions about "the Final Solution" with not just a grain, but more like a pillar, of salt.

—L.A. Rollins

WITNESS TO THE HOLOCAUST, by Azriel Eisenberg, The Pilgrim Press, 649pp, \$17.95, ISBN 0-8298-0432-3

Witness to the Holocaust is a collection of "eyewitness accounts of a brutal period in history," compiled and edited by Dr. Azriel Eisenberg, "a leading Jewish scholar," who has provided introductions to each of the 27 chapters and to many of the selections contained therein. As psychohistorian Howard Stein has written, "Between 1933 and 1945 some awesomely terrible things took place in Europe—to everyone. It is, however, another matter to view the entire sordid era through the eyes of a single group—the Jew—and to accept this interpretation as the only valid one." But that is pretty much what *Witness to the Holocaust* does; it views the entire Nazi era almost exclusively through the eyes of a single group—the Jews—and accepts this Judeocentric interpretation as the only valid one.

Eisenberg's Judeocentrism comes out, for example, in his dogmatic proclamation (p5) that "The Holocaust was unique." Of course, in a trivial sense, the Holocaust was unique, for, as Harry Elmer Barnes once wrote, "Every historical situation is essentially unique, never again to be repeated in its entirety." But Eisenberg's proclamation is supposed to be a significant truth. So in what significant sense was the Holocaust unique? According to Eisenberg (p2), ". . . it was the Jews that were singled out for total destruction." But, as readers of this journal know, this assertion is, at best, debatable. And Eisenberg makes no attempt whatever to prove this at-best-debatable assertion. But even if the Jews were slated for total destruction by the Third Reich, that doesn't necessarily make the Holocaust unique. According to the

Old Testament, the Hittites, the Amorites, the Canaanites, the Perizzites, the Hivites and the Jebusites were all marked out for total destruction by the Lord God of Israel. "And so Joshua defeated the whole land, the hill country and the Negeb, and the lowland and the slopes, and their kings. He left none remaining, but utterly destroyed all that breathed, as the Lord God of Israel commanded." (Joshua 10:40) Furthermore, Eisenberg himself contradicts his claim that the Jews were singled out for total destruction. In the very next paragraph after the one in which he makes that claim, he turns around and says:

One people that shared the fate of the Jews were the Gypsies. They, too, had been persecuted through the ages, and like the Jews, the Gypsies were isolated and liquidated, country by country. . . . When the bloodbath was over, only pitiful remnants were left alive. . . . Except for the few survivors, a whole people, unique in its life-style, language, culture, and art, was wiped off the face of the earth. There are no memorials to their dead or commemorations of their tragedy. The death of the Gypsy nation was more than physical; it was total oblivion. (p2)

Thus Eisenberg contradicts Eisenberg. The implication, of course, is that the Holocaust, the alleged extermination of the Jews, was not unique. Nevertheless, three pages later, Eisenberg is insisting, "The Holocaust was unique."

Why the doublethink? Why this insistence on the uniqueness of the Holocaust? Well, as Eric Hoffer observed in *The Passionate State of Mind*:

Monotheism—the adherence to a one and only God, truth, cause, leader, nation and so on—is usually the end result of a search for pride. It was the craving to be a one and only people which impelled the ancient Hebrews to invent a one and only God whose one and only people they were to be.

Whenever we proclaim the uniqueness of a religion, a truth, a leader, a nation, a race, a party or a holy cause [or a holocaust—L.A.R.], we are also proclaiming our own uniqueness.

Azriel Eisenberg and all the other Jews who proclaim the uniqueness of the Holocaust are also proclaiming their own uniqueness. What is the nature of this uniqueness? As Howard Stein puts it, "To Jews, the Holocaust . . . interweaves two elements of the doctrine of Choseness: (a) election as moral superiority, and (b) election to suffer." In fact, we find both of these elements of the doctrine of Choseness explicitly affirmed in one of Eisenberg's selections. In "The Time Was Midnight," Zionist Rabbi Joachim Prinz reminisces about his life in Nazi Germany during the 1930s:

I told them from the pulpit, in every sermon, that to be a Jew is to be beautiful, great, noble, and that we had every right to feel

superior. . . There are times when people who have been degraded and humiliated have to say that in reality they are "beautiful." Sometimes I exaggerated. But it was planned exaggeration. I spoke about the Jewish face, the beauty of the Jew as a human being; I spoke about the Jewish contribution to civilization and that the world could not really exist without us, and that Christianity and Islam were indebted to us. All of this was designed not merely to reject the Nazi propaganda, but to replace it with a sense of superiority—moral, cultural, religious and human.

. . . I spoke about hammer and anvil, and the hammer had to be rejected and detested. It hurt to be the anvil, but it was morally superior. I often preached about "pity the prosecutor," and how superior are the people who are subjected to persecution, how much pride there is in suffering because we believe that in the end hammers and persecutors will be discarded while we shall continue to live. (pp92-93)

As Holocaustomania goes, Eisenberg's case is extreme. We are told that he "has devoted much of his life to a study of the Holocaust." And, apparently, he wants every other Jew to do likewise. He says (p1), ". . . we must study the Holocaust; the deaths of six million Jews have charged us to live, to learn, to remember, and to tell the world." And, he says (p4), "We should be furious with our peers who are apathetic and to whom this catastrophe is irrelevant to their daily lives." In other words, to be a good Jew, and to avoid Eisenberg's fury, one must be as obsessed with the Holocaust as he is. Now that's Holocaustomania!

Although Eisenberg wants Jews to study the Holocaust, he wants them to study it in approximately the manner in which Catholics study the catechism. He actually has the nerve to tell his readers (pp4-5), "This is not just another book on a heart-rending chapter of modern history; it is a scroll of agony and heroism. As such, it must be studied with awe and reverence." And, he declares (p5), "The Shoah [a Hebrew term which is used interchangeably with "Holocaust"] cannot be intellectualized." In other words, Eisenberg is telling his readers: Don't think; don't question; don't criticize. Just feel and believe.

I wonder if Eisenberg has ever read Ayn Rand's novel, *The Fountainhead*. Here is Ellsworth Toohey, the villain of the novel, explaining his methods of achieving power over others:

"If you get caught at some point and somebody tells you that your doctrine doesn't make sense—you're ready for him. You tell him that there's something above sense. That here he must not try to think, he must feel. He must believe. Suspend reason and you play it deuces wild. Anything goes in any manner you wish whenever you need it. You've got him. Can you rule a thinking man? We don't want any thinking men." (p638, Signet, 25th anniversary edition)

When Eisenberg tells his readers the Holocaust cannot be intellectualized (viewed intellectually), that is his way to suspend reason and play it deuces wild. And play it deuces wild he does. I've already shown how he asserts the uniqueness of the Holocaust while making other claims contradicting this assertion. But when it comes to the fate of German Jews under Nazism, Eisenberg goes hog wild playing it deuces wild. According to Eisenberg (p70), "Between 1933 and 1938, 300,000 Jews emigrated [from Germany], 40,000 died, and 160,000 were murdered." This is ridiculous inasmuch as there were about 500,000 German Jews in 1933 so that Eisenberg's statistics imply the gross falsehood that there were no Jews left in Germany as of 1939. In fact, Eisenberg's ridiculous statistics are contradicted by those that were published in 1943 by the Institute of Jewish Affairs of the World Jewish Congress and which are reprinted by Eisenberg on page 115. The IJA cited a June 1933 census (not including the Saar) showing 499,682 German Jews and a May 1939 unpublished census showing 235,000 Jews remaining in Germany. These figures indicate a decline in the German Jewish population of almost 300,000, Eisenberg's figure for the number who had emigrated from Germany during roughly the same period. But while the IJA said 235,000 Jews remained in Germany in May 1939, Eisenberg says 200,000 had died or been murdered between 1933 and 1938. This is confusing enough, but Eisenberg achieves total confusion when, on page 605, he informs us that in the early 1950s the Bonn government agreed that "Germany must pay a billion dollars to cover the expenses of integrating the surviving half-million German Jews into Israeli society. . . ." Come again? The surviving half-million German Jews? In other words, all the Jews of Germany survived both the Third Reich and the Second World War! Presumably, the 200,000 who died or were murdered between 1933 and 1938 had all been resurrected in time to collect reparations from the West German government beginning in the '50s. Quite a miracle! But, of course, in the magical, mystical kingdom of the Holocaust, "anything goes in any manner you wish whenever you need it."

One of the reasons Eisenberg advances for studying the Holocaust is that "We must be prepared to challenge the prevarications and downright falsifications expressed in books, movies, and plays by dodgers of guilt." But what about the prevarications and downright falsifications expressed by mongers of guilt—for example, Eisenberg? On the page preceding his claptrap about challenging prevarications and falsifications, he himself expresses the following flaming falsehoods: "As the Nazi armies overran Europe, Jews were immediately hunted down, transported, and liquidated. The whole Nazi war machine, even when overtaxed and facing certain defeat, was bent on destroying

them." (p2) But the "Nazi" armies invaded Western Poland in 1939 and Norway, Northern France and the Low Countries in 1940. Since the alleged extermination of Jews did not begin until mid-1941 (Eisenberg, for reasons known only to Eisenberg, says on page 134 that "the mass deportations to the death factories began . . . at the end of 1942"), the Jews of Western Poland, Norway, Northern France and the Low countries were not "immediately hunted down, transported, and liquidated." And, if "the whole Nazi war machine . . . was bent on destroying" the Jews, then who the hell was fighting against the Allied war machines? This is a "leading Jewish scholar?" This is a misleading Jewish scholar.

On page 40, in an excerpt from Friedrich Percyval Reck-Malleczewen's *Diary of a Man in Despair*, there is this bit of gossip about Hitler from 1936: "[Hitler] has taken to spending his nights in his private projection room, where his poor projectionists have to show sex films for him, night after night." Aha! Hitler the voyeur! But if one consults the Collier Books edition of Reck-Malleczewen's *Diary*, one finds this on page 26: ". . . he has taken to spending his nights in his private projection room, where his poor projectionists have to show six films for him, night after night." So the actual gossip, itself almost certainly exaggerated, was that Hitler watched six films, not sex films, every night. Admittedly, this particular falsification might have occurred accidentally. Nevertheless, there it is waiting to mislead any devout Holocaustomaniac reading Eisenberg's book with the necessary "awe and reverence."

Another falsification concerning Hitler can be found on page 33, where Eisenberg asserts: "Hitler glorified the 'big lie.' In his book, *Mein Kampf*, he wrote, 'The [people] more readily fall victims to the big lie than the small lie.'" (Bracketed insertion by Eisenberg.) That Hitler did not glorify the big lie can be seen quite clearly if one reads his remarks on the subject in their full context:

It required the whole bottomless falsehood of the Jews and their Marxist fighting organization to lay the blame for the collapse on that very man who alone, with superhuman energy and will power, tried to prevent the catastrophe he foresaw and save the nation from its time of deepest humiliation and disgrace. By branding Ludendorff as guilty for the loss of the World War, they took the weapon of moral right from the one dangerous accuser who could have risen against the traitors to the fatherland. In this they proceeded on the sound principle that the magnitude of a lie always contains a certain factor of credibility, since the great masses of the people in the very bottom of their hearts tend to be corrupted rather than consciously and purposely evil, and that, therefore, in view of the primitive simplicity of their minds, they more easily fall victim to a big lie than to a little one, since they

themselves lie in little things, but would be ashamed of lies that were too big. Such a falsehood will never enter their heads, and they will not be able to believe in the possibility of such monstrous effrontery and infamous misrepresentation in others; yes, even when enlightened on the subject, they will long doubt and waver, and continue to accept at least one of these causes as true. Therefore, something of even the most insolent lie will always remain and stick—a fact which all the great lie-virtuosi and lying-clubs in this world know only too well and also make the most treacherous use of.

The foremost connoisseurs of this truth regarding the possibilities in the use of falsehood and slander have always been the Jews; for after all, their whole existence is based on one single great lie, to wit, that they are a religious community while actually they are a race—and what a race! One of the greatest minds of humanity [Schopenhauer] has nailed them forever as such in an eternally correct phrase of fundamental truth: he called them “the great masters of the lie.” And anyone who does not recognize this or does not want to believe it will never in this world be able to help the truth to victory. (*Mein Kampf*, Sentry edition, pp231-232.)

“Monstrous effrontery?” “Infamous misrepresentation?” Not exactly glorification of the big lie. The irony is positively exquisite. Hitler accused “the Jews” of being the foremost practitioners of the big lie. So how does Azriel Eisenberg respond? With a big lie, to wit, that Hitler “glorified” the big lie. How’s that for chutzpah? (For the record, I want to point out that Hitler did not pretend to be a paragon of veracity; he did defend deception in political propaganda. See, for example, *Mein Kampf*, Sentry edition, p182.)

On page 133, Eisenberg informs us:

The SS used the famine [in Warsaw] as a fiendish trap to ensnare more Jews for extermination. Thus in Warsaw, in July 1942, they posted a notice that those “who will present themselves for selection for resettlement will receive three kilograms of bread and one kilogram of marmalade.” Hungry and desperate Jews flocked to the railroad station, where they were packed into deportation trains without food. Why feed people who were soon to die?

Ah, the “fiendish deviousness” of the Nazis! But wait. Here is how Warsaw ghetto survivor Vladka Meed describes the Nazis’ “diabolic tactics,” in *On Both Sides of the Wall* (p44): “Hunger drove famished Jews to the bread line, where each received his three kilograms of bread—before being pushed into the waiting railroad cars.” And here is what Alexander Donat says, in *The Death Camp Treblinka* (p13): “Despite some initial apprehensions, most of the Jews of Warsaw really believed that this was no more than a bona fide resettlement. This belief was enhanced by the fact that at one point every Jew who volunteered for ‘resettle-

ment' received three kilograms of bread and one kilogram of marmalade." Eisenberg asks, "Why feed people who were soon to die?" But, since the Nazis did feed the volunteers for resettlement (according to Meed, Donat and others), Eisenberg's question actually suggests the possibility that those people were not soon to die. What do you have to say about that, Dr. Eisenberg?

In any case, Eisenberg's distorted account of Auschwitz includes the following (p216): "It is estimated that the ovens 'processed' as many as seven million people." Oh, really? Seven million? But, pray tell, Dr. Eisenberg, estimated by whom? Even the official Soviet estimate, the largest that I recall seeing previously, was "only" four million. I suspect that what Eisenberg has done is to calculate 10,000 killed and cremated daily for almost two years, from early 1943 to late 1944, the period during which the four large crematoria of Birkenau were in use. The figure of 10,000 killed and cremated daily is commonly given as the peak figure for Auschwitz, supposedly reached during the period of the Hungarian deportations in the spring and summer of 1944. But apparently Eisenberg has taken this peak figure and turned it into the norm for the entire period during which the crematoria were operating. Thereby he exaggerates the already-exaggerated death toll for Auschwitz. Good work, Dr. Eisenberg. But why settle for seven million victims at Auschwitz? Why not estimate eight million, nine million, ten million, or even 100 million? After all, those who read your book with the appropriate awe and reverence will surely swallow everything you serve up.*

But perhaps Eisenberg does think there are limits to what his readers will swallow. Perhaps that is why his edited version of the Gerstein statement omits Gerstein's claim that 25 million people were killed by gassing. (While Eisenberg normally indicates his editorial omissions with the customary ellipses, he does not indicate this particular omission from the Gerstein statement with an ellipsis.)

In any case, it is interesting to note that Gerstein's purported eyewitness account of the gassing of Jews at Belzec is the only such eyewitness account of the gassing of Jews to be found in Eisenberg's 649-page tome. So how reliable is this account? Paul Rassinier wrote (*Debunking the Genocide Myth*, pp269-270): "If it is not true that the gas chambers at Belzec, Treblinka, and Sobibor could asphyxiate between 15,000 and 25,000 persons a day; if it is not true that a gas chamber 25 meters square could hold 700 to 800 persons; if it is not true that a train with 45 cars could transport 6,700 persons; and if it is not true that Hitler was at Belzec on 15 August 1942, I ask what does it contain that is true since it contains nothing else?" Before concluding that it contains

* On cremators, see Reinhard Buchner, "The Problem of Cremator Hours and Incineration Time," *Journal of Historical Review* II, No. 3 (Fall 1981): pp219-48.

nothing that is true, revisionists should consider the deposition of Dr. Wilhelm Pfannenstiel who, according to both the Gerstein statement and his own deposition, accompanied Gerstein on his fateful visit to Belzec. In his deposition of 6 June 1950, Pfannenstiel claims to have witnessed a gassing of Jews at Belzec. Here is his description of it:

. . . a shipment of Jews—men, women, and some children—arrived . . . They were ordered to strip completely and to hand over their possessions. They were informed that they were to be incorporated into a working process and must be deloused to prevent epidemics. They would also have to inhale something.

After the women's hair had been cut off, the whole shipment of people was taken to a building containing six rooms. On that occasion, to my knowledge, only four were used. After these people had been shut up in the rooms, the exhaust gas from the engine was piped in. Gerstein stated that it took about eighteen minutes before quiet was restored inside. While the Jews were being taken in, the rooms were lit up with electric light and everything passed off peacefully. But when the lights were turned off, loud cries burst out inside, which then gradually died away. As soon as everything was quiet again, the doors in the outside walls were opened, the corpses were brought out, and, after being searched for gold teeth, they were stacked in a trench. Here, too, the work was done by Jews. No doctor was present. I noticed nothing special about the corpses, except that some of them showed a bluish puffiness about the face. But this is not surprising since they had died of asphyxiation. (See Saul Friedlander, Kurt Gerstein: *The Ambiguity of Good*, pp117-118.)

Interestingly enough, Pfannenstiel went on to comment on the Gerstein statement. "I know that Dr. Gerstein gives an entirely different description of this gassing scene. That version is false. It is full of exaggerations." (The reader is referred to Friedlander's book, pages 119-120, for Pfannenstiel's entire criticism of the Gerstein statement.)

Thus, Pfannenstiel pretty much agreed with the revisionists about the Gerstein statement, but, nevertheless, claimed to have witnessed a gassing of Jews at Belzec. Thus far, revisionists have been content to attack the extremely dubious Gerstein statement, and have not seen fit to even mention the Pfannenstiel deposition, which appears to be somewhat more credible. (I presume that Arthur Butz, for example, knows about the Pfannenstiel deposition, since his bibliography in *The Hoax of the Twentieth Century* includes Friedlander's book on Gerstein.)

For his own rather different reasons, Eisenberg includes a lengthy excerpt from the Gerstein statement in his book, but not a single syllable from the Pfannenstiel deposition. This despite his pious asseveration that he has "endeavored to include the latest significant data which appeared before this book went to press."

The Pfannenstiel deposition was made over 30 years ago, and the well-known Friedlander book, which quotes it, was published in 1969, but apparently Eisenberg still doesn't know about it. That's what I call keeping up with the latest developments.

(The question of the reality of gassing at Belzec is complicated by the testimony of another self-proclaimed eyewitness, Jan Karski, a wartime member of the Polish resistance who claimed to have infiltrated Belzec, disguised as a camp guard, in early October of 1942, not quite two months after the supposed visit by Gerstein and Pfannenstiel. Although Karski's supposed infiltration of Belzec was supposedly organized by leaders of Jewish resistance groups precisely in order for Karski to observe and then bear witness to the supposed extermination of the Jews, Karski did not report seeing any gas chambers or gassings of Jews. Karski said he saw Jews being herded into railroad cars which then left Belzec. Karski claimed that the Jews were killed by leaving them in the railroad cars until they died of suffocation, starvation or whatever, but he did not claim to have seen this. And what he did claim to have seen is consistent with the revisionist claim that Belzec was a transit camp for Jews being sent "to the East," not an extermination camp. Eisenberg includes an excerpt from Karski's 1944 book, *The Story of a Secret State*, but it is Karski's description of the Warsaw ghetto, not his account of Belzec.)

In a chapter entitled, "Grim End and Judgment Day," Eisenberg tries to paint a pretty picture of various "war crimes" trials. Regarding the Eichmann trial, he tells us (p575):

. . . Argentina complained that Israel had violated its sovereignty by abducting Eichmann from Buenos Aires. Others challenged Isreal's right to try Eichmann. The trial, however, was meticulously fair. Eichmann was represented by the defense counsel of his choice, all the normal judicial procedures were maintained, and the world press was constantly in attendance.

So the Eichmann trial "was meticulously fair." But here's a second opinion on the Eichmann trial, from Lenny Bruce:

Eichmann really figured, you know, "The Jews—most liberal people in the world—they'll give me a fair shake." Fair? Certainly. "Rabbi" means lawyer. He'll get the best trial in the world, Eichmann. Ha! they were shaving his legs while he was giving his appeal! That's the last bit of insanity, man. (*The Essential Lenny Bruce*, Ballantine, p35.)

In a more serious vein, consider some of Hannah Arendt's revelations in *Eichmann in Jerusalem*. On page 3 (Viking Compass edition), she says, ". . . it is among the minor mysteries of the new State of Israel that, with its high percentage of German-born

people, it was unable to find an adequate translator into the only language the accused and his counsel could understand." On page 7, Arendt reports that in Israel "rabbinical law rules the personal status of Jewish citizens, with the result that no Jew can marry a non-Jew. . . ." Then she goes on to comment:

Whatever the reason, there was something breathtaking in the naivete with which the prosecution denounced the infamous Nuremberg Laws of 1935, which had prohibited intermarriage and sexual intercourse between the Jews and Germans. The better informed among the correspondents were well aware of the irony, but they did not mention it in their reports. This, they figured, was not the time to tell the Jews what was wrong with the laws and institutions of their own country. (pp7-8)

So, even if, as Eisenberg says, "the world press was constantly in attendance" at the trial, it may have done nothing to guarantee fairness for Eichmann. In any case, according to Arendt (p8), "The journalists remained faithful for not much more than two weeks, after which the audience changed drastically." On page 220, Arendt reports:

The story [of the Final Solution] was confirmed by sworn and unsworn statements usually given by witnesses and defendants in previous trials and frequently by persons who were no longer alive. (All this, as well as a certain amount of hearsay testimony, was admitted as evidence)

So much for Eisenberg's claim that "all the normal judicial procedures were maintained." On page 221, Arendt says,

It quickly turned out that Israel was the only country in the world where defense witnesses could not be heard [since they were threatened with prosecutioin under the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators Law], and where certain witnesses for the prosecution, those who had given affidavits in previous trials, could not be cross-examined by the defense. And this was all the more serious as the accused and his lawyer were indeed not "in a position to obtain their own defense documents."

Despite all this, Eisenberg has the gall to assert that the Eichmann trial "was meticulously fair." As Lenny Bruce said, "Ha!"

Eisenberg's tedious tome does contain a few tidbits of interesting information. For example, there is an account (pp551-553) of a Purim celebration in a Displaced Persons camp in 1946. This account mentions a poster which announced: ("'At 6:30 p.m. a public burning of Mein Kampf will take place in the Square." Eisenberg does not denounce this book-burning as "a medieval spectacle," his characterization of the Nazis' public burning of books written by "Jews, Christian liberals, and humanitarians"

on 10 May 1933. As he says on page 628, "We must guard the freedom of the press and must protect the basic rights of all; at the same time, we must make sure that freedom is not turned to license and used against us."

Another interesting tidbit, necessitating a revision of revisionism, is an excerpt from Salo W. Baron's 1961 book, *A Historian's Notebook: European Jewry Before and After Hitler* (pp498-500). What is of interest is Baron's statement (p498) that "According to the survey prepared by the Central Jewish Committee in Poland on August 15, 1945, there were altogether 73,955 Jews left in that country including some 13,000 serving in the Polish army and 5,446 recorded in 10 camps in Germany and Austria." This is of interest because it tends to confirm something I was told by a correspondent some years back, to wit, that Paul Rassinier was wrong in asserting that ". . . Mr. Shalom [sic] Baron, brandishing his title of Professor of Jewish History at Columbia University, claimed on April 4, 1961, before the Jerusalem Tribunal, that 700,000 of them [Polish Jews] were still living in 1945 when the country was liberated by Russian troops. . ." (Debunking the Genocide Myth, p219.) Since Rassinier, on the supposed authority of Baron, employs this figure of 700,000 Jews in postwar Poland in his demographic study in "The Drama of the European Jews," that demographic study must be revised. If this 700,000 figure is discarded as spurious, then the highest Jewish estimate, mentioned by Rassinier, of Jews surviving in Poland is the estimate of 500,000 which Rassinier attributed to the World Center of Contemporary Jewish Documentation. (In his demographic study, Rassinier restricted himself to using statistics from Jewish sources.) Therefore, Rassinier's calculations of the total number of Jewish survivors must be revised downward by 200,000. And his calculations of the total number of Jewish deaths must be revised upward by the same amount.

Because of space limitations, there are a number of aspects of *Witness to the Holocaust*, such as its strong pro-Zionist bias and its anti-assimilationist conclusion, which I shall not discuss.

Over 2,000 years ago, Cicero insisted that, "The first law is that the historian shall never dare to set down what is false; the second, that he shall never dare to conceal the truth; the third that there shall be no suspicion in his work of either favoritism or prejudice." If Cicero's "laws" for the writing of history were enforced by my enemy, the State, then Azriel Eisenberg, misleading Jewish educator, would be in jeopardy of the maximum penalty. *Witness to the Holocaust* is, in several senses, including the literal one, a heavy book. As a work of history, however, it makes a good doorstop.

—L.A. Rollins

FAILURE AT NUERMBERG: AN ANALYSIS OF THE TRIAL, EVIDENCE AND VERDICT, Institute for Historical Review (pb reprint) 42pp, \$2.50, ISBN 0-939484-04-8.

RUDOLF HESS: PRISONER OF PEACE, by Ilse Hess and Rudolf Hess, translated from the German by Meyrick Booth, Ph.D. and edited by George Pile with a Foreword by Air-Commodore G.S. Oddie, D.F.C., A.F.C. (Royal Air Force). Institute for Historical Review (pb reprint) 151pp, \$5.00, ISBN 0-939484-02-1.

The republication in inexpensive editions of these two books is a fine contribution to the dawning understanding of the monstrous perversion of law and justice that the victors of World War II inflicted upon their defeated enemies. More specifically, one should say: upon the Germans and, to a very much smaller degree, upon the Japanese. As for the Italians, despite the seizure of Ethiopia and Albania and the attack upon an already collapsing France (recalling Roosevelt's "the hand that held the daggah has struck it into the back of its neighbor") there were for them no analogous "trials." Eugene Davidson (*The Trial of the Germans*) explains this anomaly with what must be the understatement of all time. "The kind of war the Italians fought," he writes, "left the Allied nations with a sense of security in regard to future Italian military power."

Failure at Nuremberg and *Rudolf Hess: Prisoner of Peace* were both originally published in England shortly after the war. The former appeared in 1947 and was published by the British People's Party; the latter was published in hardback in London in 1954 by the Briton's Publishing Company. Both books had become rare collector's items until their republication currently by the IHR. The title of the smaller book, *Failure*, as well as the most graphic and evocative cover-illustration by Mark S. Winn, defines the contents well enough. The message of *Prisoner* is perhaps not so immediately obvious. It is the translation of a book which the gallant and loyal Frau Ilse Hess compiled from the letters written to her by her husband, Rudolf Hess, during the years of his imprisonment in England following his epochal peace-making mission, from the prison at Nuremberg and from Spandau prison up to 1951—a period comprising the first ten years of his, now, 42 years of incarceration. There are 23 photographs (eleven pages) in the Hess book, many of which are exclusive to this edition. Some are formal photographs of historical moments but others reveal, as do many of Hess' letters, a warm-hearted, loving family man and a devoted husband and father. These latter qualities have never been denied in him even by his most virulent enemies. Nor have I been able to detect in the correspondence

any signs or symptoms of the alleged mental instability we have heard so much about. There are also letters from Frau Hess to her husband which are, as might be any letters from a wife with the ability to express her feelings, compounded of news of personal matters, expressions of love and anxious concern, and during the proceedings at Nuremberg and the immediately subsequent period, with practical matters of Hess' defense and his attorney's wish to appeal against the sentence. As to that, Hess strenuously objected to any appeal and to his wife he wrote:

I have just sent the following letter to Dr. Seidl (Hess' attorney): "The commandant has informed me that you have sent in a petition for mercy on my behalf to the International Control Committee. Hereby I put it on record that this took place without my knowledge and against my desire. I regard the handing in of such a petition as an act devoid of dignity." (Nuremberg: 13 October 1946).

To this Frau Hess replied:

Your clear and unmistakeable reply to Dr. Seidl has really troubled us! It is true that we, too, were more than horrified about the version published in the Press of his petition for mercy on your behalf, which did not appear to fit in with the pattern of your conduct. In fact these petitions in general—as was obvious from the beginning—were quite pointless since they had no chance of success and they have been unfavorably regarded.

Frau Hess goes on to explain that in fact what Dr. Seidl had submitted was not a petition for mercy but a statement of evidence to the effect that the penalty (of life imprisonment) on the two out of four charges upon which Hess had been condemned was excessive beyond all reason and itself "constituted a flagrant and grievous breach of the law." With this reply, Hess indicated he was satisfied and that Seidl had acted properly. The interchange is somewhat difficult to understand today when it has become so obvious to all but the willfully blind that no "law" or legal precedent was anywhere within a thousand miles of the kangaroo courts of victors' vengeance at Nuremberg and elsewhere. Even that enigma, Winston Churchill, his sense of honor and integrity long since buried under the corpulent accretion of boundless egotism and ruthless ambition, seems to have felt a twinge of shame at the fate of Rudolf Hess. Perhaps war-mongering Winnie who worked so hard to get the war he knew would be his only possible road back to power and who, while proclaiming his commitment to the preservation of the British empire, did more than any other human being recklessly to destroy it, perhaps, I say, he will get a day's remission each century from Hell for this: "Reflecting upon the whole of this story, I am glad not to

be responsible for the way in which Hess has been and is being treated . . . He came to us of his own free will, and so, without authority, had something of the quality of an envoy."

It is my guess that Churchill really meant what he wrote. It is a lot less certain that the pious protests—or proposals—made in recent years by the British, French and American authorities that this man—now 89 years old—should be released from Spandau where he is the lone prisoner remaining and which have been vetoed by the Soviets—are sincere. Honor and humanity would seem to outweigh any breach of diplomatic agreements made in an era of fanatical vengefulness, yet when I personally suggested to one of foreign departments of the three Western powers that Hess should be simply released willy-nilly the next time the guards at Spandau were theirs, I was told that this was impossible because it would constitute a violation of international agreements. Crocodile tears cost nothing. Apparently honor and mercy are too expensive, however. Sheer barbarism aside, it is a lot easier to understand why the Soviet Union is determined that Hess die, silent and confined.

Rudolf Hess was born in Alexandria, Egypt on 26 April 1894 where his father was in business. Alexandria was already a great seat of British naval power and Hess, as a child, developed a life-long affection and admiration for the British, whom he regarded as a kindred Germanic people. That particular sentiment is one which has been shared by many Germans, and at one time, before they became the victims of an irresponsible Press, not a few British. The only three German emperors during the life of the Second Reich felt that kinship and affection as well as, sometimes, frustration and incomprehension that it was so largely unrequited after 1870. This was true of Hitler and to some extent of Bismarck. For a study of the one-sided love affair and the disaster which British unresponsiveness finally made inevitable, I refer the reader to Dr. Peter Peel's excellent book, *British Public Opinion and the Wars of German Unification*, which is available from the IHR. The point is that Hess viewed with horror the prospect, and the eventual realization, of a fratricidal blood-bath between the two great Germanic nations. Hitler shared these views although the impression persists that with Hitler Realpolitik considerations predominated over *Gefuhlpolitik*—or sentimental—considerations whereas with Hess the balance was probably in the other direction.

Hess attended a German school in Alexandria from the ages of six to twelve. Thereafter, he was sent to a Lutheran school in Bad Godesberg. In World War I, he served in the same regiment as Hitler—the 16th Bavarian—although the two never met until after the war. Later in the war, Hess transferred to the Imperial Air Force as an officer pilot. After demobilization, he attended

the University of Munich where he became a close friend of the Famous Dr. Karl Haushofer whose lectures on geopolitics he attended. He remained friends with the Haushofer family for many years, even after "Nuremberg." Hess, like Haushofer, was convinced that a healthy Germany needed "Lebensraum" which could only be gained to the East. That "wicked" word may be more tolerable to Americans if I point out that it is only "Manifest Destiny," German-style. In any case, France has subscribed to the same sentiment, continuously ingesting German lands to her east since 1552. It is the prime imperative of all healthy organisms to expand their breeding grounds and this is always necessarily at the expense of some other organisms. Otiose and satiated powers attempt to sit pat on agreed limits—and soon find only that that is the beginning of degeneration and contraction.

Hess was a participant in the attempted Putsch in November, 1923. He had joined the Nationalist Socialist German Workers Party in June, 1920 as its 16th member (Hitler was its seventh). Hess escaped arrest when Hitler was seized but voluntarily returned to serve eighteen months in Landsberg prison where he became Hitler's unofficial private secretary and assisted in the first commitment to paper of *Mein Kampf*. In 1933 Hitler, now Fuehrer and Reichskanzler, made Hess Stellvertreter, or Deputy Fuehrer, and Minister Without Portfolio. It is probably fair enough to say that Hess worshipped the Fuehrer—as did untold myriads of lesser men—and Hitler certainly regarded Hess with great trust and affection, customarily addressing him, as with only a very few others, as "Du." No one who has seen Leni Riefenstahl's great film *Triumph des Willens* will ever forget the segment in which Hess introduces Hitler to the exuberant audience with these words: "Der Partei ist Hitler. Hitler, aber, ist Deutschland wie Deutschland Hitler ist! Sieg Heil! Sieg Heil! Sieg Heil!"

At Nuremberg, Hess was convicted of conspiracy to wage war and of crimes against peace. Even in the madness of those days there was no way in which he could have been found guilty of the other charges—war crimes and crimes against humanity. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. Nevertheless, the Russian member of the judicial tribunal, General Nikitchenko, dissented and instead demanded the death penalty for Hess.

On 5 May 1941, Stalin made two speeches at a Kremlin banquet given for a large graduating class of staff officers. Apparently the party soon evolved into a rather wild, drunken orgy and some very indiscreet remarks were bandied about including those by Stalin himself. Most of the important members of the Politburo were present as well as several high-ranking service officers. What was said was passed on to Germany by agents and was known in the Wilhelmstrasse within hours. The details were

further confirmed at a later date during the interrogation of two Russian generals and a major who were questioned separately when captured by the Germans and whose reports were almost identical as to the facts. Stalin had boasted that the non-aggression pact he had made with Ribbentrop in August 1939 was "just camouflage." Now that Russia had acquired all the territory possible by diplomatic means (by which he would have meant the eastern half of Poland, Finno-Karelia, Bessarabia, Ruthenia and Northern Bukovina, as well as the three Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), it was time to ready the Russian people for aggressive war. Only by war could more territory be gained. Russian armament production was so satisfactory that a war against Germany could begin any time within the next two months.

Hess flew to Britain on 10 May—five days after the Kremlin bash. Until historians have open access to British papers concerning the epic flight to Scotland and what actually passed between Hess and his interlocutors in Britain, we cannot prove that Hess came to Britain to expose these Russian plans or to attempt to effect an active alliance of the sort Hitler had always wanted between Germany and the British Empire. Some of the peace proposals are now public knowledge but much is still "classified." In such circumstances, intelligent speculation is not only admissible but desirable. At all events, as we know all too well today and to the loss of the whole White world, Hess' mission failed and his proposals were never seriously entertained. Years of propaganda had successfully incensed the British public against National Socialist Germany and it was far too late to reverse the course—or so it seemed. Besides, such a reversal would have ended the vainglorious career of Winston Churchill, whose insatiable ambition it was to be a great war-leader and whose mistaken conviction it was that he was a gifted strategian. And so the last chance was muffed. The sun has set forever on the British empire. Half of Europe is under the heel of the USSR. The United States and every country of northern and western Europe is being swamped with the brown, black and yellow masses of the Third World. What is left of the once proud Aryans is a race of guilt-ridden, apologetic, spineless helots of Israel lacking the will not only to expand and increase its breeding grounds, but even to defend its own national borders against aggressive alien invaders. *Rudolf Hess: Prisoner of Peace* is thus important as a record of its eponymous hero's thoughts and feelings and as an affirmation against his slanderers that his ideas were sane—saner than almost anyone else's in the context of the European civil war.

As a footnote, it is interesting to note that Air Commodore Oddie who wrote the foreword was one of those hundreds of

gallant servicemen who had fought with great distinction in World War I and received many decorations but who, only because they opposed the war with Germany, not because of any crime they had committed, were imprisoned without charge or trial under the infamous "Regulation 18b" throughout most of the Second World War. Admiral Sir Barry Domvile was another such, and Sir Oswald Mosley and his wife. Another was the ex-Coldstream Guards officer and member of parliament, Captain A.H.M. Ramsay. There were nearly two thousand less well known. The powers that made and wanted World War II—not only men like Churchill and Roosevelt but those far more ancient, sinister and powerful forces behind them—were determined to allow not the least expression of opposition to their malevolent plans.

Something remains to be said about *Failure at Nuremberg*. It is a very small, very lucid and readable book—a mere 42 pages. It is therefore the ideal introduction to a new understanding of the true nature of recent history for the hitherto innocent and uninitiated. As such, I recommend that those who can afford to do so buy a number of copies for distribution to those whose tenebrous condition should be illuminated. Publishing *Failure* in Britain in 1947 was undoubtedly an act of courage and a gesture of honor—a *beau geste*, in fact. Beyond that, I cannot praise too highly the succinct form in which it explains and condemns the whole chicanery and hypocritical cant of "Nuremberg." Finally, one should always remember that there were a few gallant souls who, often at the cost of their careers, openly condemned the Nuremberg "trials" (sometimes referred to as "Trial by Jewry"). Outstanding among those sturdy figures who defied the sadistic *zeitgeist* were men such as Senator Robert Taft in the United States and in England the Dean of St. Pauls, the Very Reverend William Inge. And I cannot do better than conclude this review by quoting some words of noted authoress Taylor Caldwell which appear on the back cover of *Failure*:

I have been boiling mad for years over the "war crimes trials," which I think were despicable and contemptible and smack more of ancient Rome's barbarism than of a so-called civilized country. Our country's hands are not free of blood and crime, in spite of our vaunted "democracy" and "noble aspirations," etc., etc., *ad nau-seum*.

. . . It is outrageous that a man serving his country in all honesty and patriotism should be considered a "criminal" by a country which has its own share of criminals, and not honest and patriotic ones, either. . . .

—Wayland D. Smith, Ph.D

FEUERZEICHEN: DIE "REICHSKRASTALLNACHT," ANSTIFTER UND BRANDSTIFTER—OPFER UND NUTZNIESSER (FIRE SIGN: "REICH CRYSTAL NIGHT," INCITERS AND INCENDIARIES, VICTIMS AND BENEFICIARIES), by Ingrid Weckert, Grabert Verlag, Tuebingen, 1981, 281pp with appendix, annotated bibliography, index, clothbound, 29.80 DM, ISBN 3-87847-052-5.

No single event so drastically changed relations between Germans and Jews in modern times than the so-called "Night of Broken Glass" or Reichskristallnacht. On the night of 9-10 November 1938, Jewish homes, businesses and synagogues across Germany were attacked by inflamed mobs. Fire consumed many buildings. Several dozen Jews (the exact number is still unclear) lost their lives in the tumult. Ever since, countless films, books, articles and so forth have sought to impress the horror of the "Crystal Night" into the minds of millions. It is cited *ad nauseum* as a major milestone in the German program to exterminate the Jews of Europe.

In Feuerzeichen (Fire Sign), Ingrid Weckert tackles this crucial chapter of contemporary history with sobriety, critical objectivity, and careful attention to detail. Her analysis is a welcome relief from the usually maudlin and highly tendentious treatments all too common in books dealing with modern Jewish history. Furthermore, this fascinating book never fails to keep the reader's attention. It is easy to understand why the first printing sold out within a few months.

A few days before the Crystal Night, a young Polish Jew named Herschel Grynszpan visited the German embassy in Paris, pulled out a pistol, and shot a Legation Secretary named Ernst vom Rath. Doctors were unable to save the mortally wounded young official. His death on the afternoon of 9 November 1938 could not have come on a more fateful day. All Germany was observing the "Memorial Day for the Fallen of the Movement," probably the most auspicious National Socialist anniversary. (On that day in 1923, 14 followers of the fledgling movement fell before the fire of government soldiers during an ill-fated attempt to overthrow the Weimar regime by force.)

What happened next is unclear. And despite all the words in recent decades, the most important question about the Crystal Night remains unanswered: Who was responsible?

The standard story is that Joseph Goebbels, the Reich Propaganda Minister, incited or ordered the assembled party leaders in Munich to organize a pogrom-like campaign of violence and destruction against the Jews in revenge for Grynszpan's murder of vom Rath. Anyway, that's the story.

Some facts about the Crystal Night are beyond dispute. It is clear, for example, that some party leaders and stormtroopers

did take part in the mob action. It is likewise a fact that when Hitler learned about the outbreak of violence, he immediately ordered an end to the lawlessness. An urgent telex message to all party district leaders was followed by a letter repeating the directive.

Frau Weckert shows that, contrary to the standard version, Dr. Goebbels could not have initiated or incited the Crystal Night. He in any case lacked the authority to secretly "order" a pogrom. When he learned the next morning about the extent of the lawlessness, Dr. Gobbels was outraged. He quickly issued a strongly worded official statement which called upon the population to immediately refrain from further actions or demonstrations of any kind against the Jews.

Who benefited from the Crystal Night? Certainly not the National Socialist government or the German nation. Hitler complained bitterly in private: "It is terrible. They have destroyed everything for me like elephants in a china shop—and much worse. I had the great hope that I was about to come to an understanding with France. And now that!" The exclusive beneficiaries were those powerful Jewish organizations headquartered in New York, Paris and London which had proclaimed a state of war between Germany and international Jewry shortly after Hitler assumed power in early 1933. The Crystal Night brought a worldwide wave of intense anti-German atrocity propaganda, much of it completely untrue or wildly exaggerated. At one stroke, German prestige was dealt a crippling blow. The damage to relations with America was especially severe. President Roosevelt recalled the U.S. Ambassador from Berlin and left only a Charge d'Afaires at the post.

At a time when Jewish leaders were loudly calling for a "holy war" of destruction against Germany, Hitler's government was working for the peaceful emigration of the Jews from the Reich. Consistent with the Zionist view that the Jews of the world constitute a distinct nation all their own, the National Socialist government actively aided the Zionist movement. In fact, the Jewish Agency for Palestine (the "shadow government" of the future Zionist state) had a treaty with Germany known as the Haavara Agreement to expedite the settlement of Jews to Palestine. This little-known treaty remained in force from 1933 until the outbreak of war in 1939.

Frau Weckert's greatest achievement is probably her careful but devastating analysis of what passes today for "history writing." She exposes the superficiality, sloppiness and plain dishonesty of various prominent contemporary writers who have made names for themselves as specialists in modern Jewish history. She demonstrates that several key Crystal Night "documents" pre-

sented at the Nuremberg trial by the Allies to incriminate the German leaders are undoubtedly forgeries. This charge, with its staggering implications, dare not be made lightly. Frau Weckert has opened the door on a subject that deserves much more detailed attention. My own research at the National Archives confirms her observation that the originals of many widely cited Nuremberg trial "documents" are now "unavailable" and seem to have disappeared completely—if they ever existed at all.

This book is not and cannot yet be the final word about the Crystal Night. Many questions unavoidably remain unanswered. Frau Weckert herself never fully answers the most important question of all: Who organized the Crystal Night? But the evidence she presents points to the shadowy but important role played by the Paris-based "International League Against Anti-Semitism" (SICA) in the events leading up to the fateful night.

A word about the author: Ingrid Weckert was a teenager in war-ravished Berlin when the Second World War came to an end. She left the occupied German capital to study Catholic theology in Switzerland. Living and working in Israel for a time enabled her to deepen her understanding of the character and nature of the Jewish people. She speaks Hebrew and English fluently. A librarian by profession, she now lives in Munich.

This book is a valuable contribution to contemporary historiography. I hope that an English-language version will become available soon and that Frau Weckert will be producing other works as good as this one. *Feuerzeichen* is essential reading for anyone interested in this particular subject. But more than that, it deserves careful consideration by anyone who wants to understand the true origins of the world we have inherited.

—Mark Weber

About the Contributors

JAMES B. WHISKER holds a Ph.D. in government and politics from the University of Maryland. He is currently an Associate Professor of Political Science at West Virginia University. He is the author of *Essays in Political Science* (with H.N. Kim), *The Social, Political, and Religious Thought of Alfred Rosenberg*, and *National Socialist Ideology: Concepts and Ideas*.

L.A. ROLLINS received his B.A. in Philosophy from California State College at Los Angeles in 1970. He is a free-lance writer and has contributed to such publications as *Reason*, *New Libertarian*, *Critique*, *Outlook*, *The Personalist*, and *Grump*. He has been researching the "Holocaust" and related matters for several years.

SAMI HADAWI is a prize-winning lecturer and writer on Middle Eastern politics and history. From 1920 to 1948 he served in the Palestine Government. Since then he has served in various informational and advisory capacities on behalf of Arab states, including a stint as a Land Specialist at the United Nations, 1952-1955. He is the co-author, with Robert John, of *Palestine Diary*, and the author of *Bitter Harvest: Palestine 1914-1979*, which will soon be issued in a new edition by the IHR.

FRANK H. HANKINS (1877-1970) received his Ph.D. from Columbia University in 1909, thereupon embarking on a long and distinguished career as a professional sociologist, historian, and demographer. He was Professor of Sociology at Smith College from 1922 to 1946, with many visiting professorships during and after that time. He was a president of the American Sociological Society (1938) and editor of the *American Sociological Review* (1936-1937).

JAMES J. MARTIN received his M.A. (1945) and Ph.D. (1949) degrees in History from the University of Michigan. For over 25 years he taught History and the History of Ideas at educational institutions from coast to coast, including Southern Illinois State University, Deep Springs College, and Rampart College. He has authored over 200 articles, reviews, and notes in about 40 papers and journals, as well as several books, including the two-volume classic of American intellectual history, *American Liberalism and World Politics, 1931-1941*. Currently he serves as the director of Ralph Myles Publishers, and as general editor of its "Libertarian Broadsides" series.

WAYLAND D. SMITH is the pseudonym of a well-known science fiction writer who, after service as an officer in the Korean War, obtained his Ph.D. in History from an Ivy League university. He has written extensively under this name on historical and political themes.

MARK WEBER was born and raised in Portland, Oregon, where he graduated from Jesuit High School. He studied at the University of Illinois (Chicago Circle), the University of Munich (Germany) and Portland State University, where he received his B.A. with high honors in 1976. He received his M.A. in modern European history from Indiana University in 1977. He now works in Washington, D.C. as a writer, researcher and translator.

DAVID IRVING

British Historian, Author of *The War Path*, *Hitler's War*,
The Destruction of Dresden and *Uprising!*

DR. ROBERT FAURISSON

French Specialist in Texts and Documents, Author of
Three Books and Numerous Articles on "Holocaust" Revisionism

H. KEITH THOMPSON

Editor of *Doenitz at Nuremberg: A Re-Appraisal*
on The Doenitz Case: The Succession Government, Nuremberg

DR. WILLIAM B. LINDSEY

on the British "War Crimes" Trial of Dr. Bruno Tesch
In Light of What is Known About the Properties of Zyklon B

And Several Other Prominent Revisionist Scholars will Speak at

THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL REVISIONIST CONFERENCE

September 3-5 (Labor Day weekend) '83

HOSTED BY THE

INSTITUTE FOR HISTORICAL REVIEW

- Reserve these dates on your calendar now.
- Hear and meet the men who are in the forefront of the new history.
- Spend an event-filled weekend with revisionists from around the world.
- This year in the Los Angeles area. Food, lodging and local transportation all to be arranged by the IHR.

Write for details and attendance fees.
Reservations limited to space available.

— INSTITUTE FOR HISTORICAL REVIEW —

POST OFFICE BOX 1306

TORRANCE, CALIFORNIA 90505 • U.S.A.

The Journal of Historical Review

William B. Lindsey

Zyklon B, Auschwitz, and the
Trial of Dr. Bruno Tesch

H. Keith Thompson

Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz:
Last President of a United Germany

James B. Whisker

Gnostic Origins of
Alfred Rosenberg's Thought

L.A. Rollins

Yehuda Bauer and the
'Polemical and Apologetic Bias'
of Jewish Historiography

— Book Reviews —
— News and Comment —

The Journal of Historical Review

VOLUME FOUR, NUMBER THREE / FALL 1983

Zyklon B, Auschwitz, and the Trial of
Dr. Bruno Tesch by William B. Lindsey

Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz: Last President
of a United Germany by H. Keith Thompson

Gnostic Origins of Alfred Rosenberg's
Thought by James B. Whisker

BOOK REVIEWS: L.A. Rollins on *A History of the Holocaust* •
Mark Weber on *Das Hossbach-'Protokoll': Die Zerstoerung Einer
Legende* • Charles Lutton on *Paris in the Third Reich: A History
of the German Occupation, 1940-1944*

The *Journal of Historical Review*
is published quarterly by the
INSTITUTE FOR HISTORICAL REVIEW

Thomas J. Marcellus, Director

Keith Stimely, Editor

EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

WALTER B. ALLENDE, Ph.D.
University of Buenos Aires

Buenos Aires, Argentina

AUSTIN J. APP, Ph.D.
La Salle College (Ret.)

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

GEORGE ASHLEY, Ph.D.

Los Angeles Unified School District
History Instructor

JOHN BENNETT

Victoria Council for Civil Liberties
Melbourne, Australia

ARTHUR R. BUTZ, Ph.D.
Northwestern University
Evanston, Illinois

ROBERT FAURISSON, Ph.D.
University of Lyon-2

Lyon, France

DITLIEB FELDERER

Revisionist History Magazine
Taby, Sweden

PERCY L. GREAVES, Jr.
Free Market Books
Dobbs Ferry, New York

ANDREAS R. WESSERLE, Ph.D.
Marquette University (Ret.)
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

SAMUEL E. KONKIN III
The New Libertarian

Long Beach, California

MARTIN A. LARSON, Ph.D.
The Spotlight

Washington, D.C.

WILLIAM B. LINDSEY, Ph.D.
Research Chemist

JAMES J. MARTIN, Ph.D.
Ralph Myles Publishers

Colorado Springs, Colorado

REVILO P. OLIVER, Ph.D.
University of Illinois (Ret.)
Urbana, Illinois

WILHELM STAEGLICH, Dr. Jur. (Ret.)
Badenweiler, West Germany

UDO WAENDY, Diplo. Pol.
Verlag fuer Volkstum und

Zeitgeschichtsforschung
Vlotho/Weser, West Germany

CHARLES E. WEBER, Ph.D.
University of Tulsa (Ret.)
Tulsa, Oklahoma

The Journal of Historical Review is published quarterly by the Institute for Historical Review, P.O. Box 1306, Torrance, California 90505, United States of America. Subscription prices are as follows: One year, \$30; two years, \$50; three years, \$70—or the equivalent in foreign currency. Foreign subscribers must add \$5 if paying by remittance drawn on a foreign bank. For domestic first class delivery add \$5 per year. For overseas air delivery add \$12 per year. Quantity subscription and bulk issue rates available on request. Appropriate manuscripts are welcomed by the editor, but must be accompanied by return postage.

Listed:

Library of Congress
British Library
Encyclopedia of Associations
Writers Market 1983
PTLA Catalog
EBSCO Librarians Handbook

ISSN: 0195-6752

Institute for Historical Review
P.O. Box 1306, Torrance, California 90505, U.S.A.

Permission is hereby granted for reprints of any article contained herein, providing that no changes or alterations are made prior to printing, and also providing that the following attribution appears with the article:

Reprinted by permission of *The Journal of Historical Review*, P.O. Box 1306, Torrance, California 90505, United States of America.
Subscription rate: \$30 per year.

Two copies of each printing should be submitted to the Editor of *The Journal of Historical Review*.

Contents

Zyklon B, Auschwitz, and the Trial of Dr. Bruno Tesch William B. Lindsey	261
Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz: Last President of a United Germany H. Keith Thompson	305
Gnostic Origins of Alfred Rosenberg's Thought James B. Whisker	335
Review Article Yehuda Bauer and the 'Polemical and Apologetic Bias' of Jewish Historiography L.A. Rollins	357
Book Reviews	372
News and Comment	378
About the Contributors	384

A Note From The Editor

One of the first, most predictable reactions to be counted on by revisionist historians of World War II and of National Socialist Germany as they regale the uninited with their views is: "But what about the *trials*—Nuremberg, and the others? Have they not left a record of ample proof of German crime and barbarity—thus vindicating the Allied struggle as a moral one that had to be waged?"

The trials of the Germans have indeed left quite a record. And though real historians and historical thinkers (there remained a few even after the intellectual straightjacket descended on the West for the duration) have always expressed the most extreme skepticism at, even contempt for, the idea that the true history of an epoch can be established by the evidence generated in politically motivated, rigged and farcical show-trials of the conquered by those who had beaten them down and had to keep them down, nevertheless it would be wrong to dismiss the historical value of such trials out of hand. Above all these trials did indeed generate *evidence*—of whatever kind and quality. And the historian is interested in *any* evidence. For him nothing is out of bounds. Unlike the judge or jury in a legal proceeding, he cannot be foresworn or constrained to totally dismiss or ignore any point of evidence because it was not obtained by-the-book-properly, because the source is tainted or compromised, or even because it might have been manufactured out of whole cloth. The rules of evidence in matters of justice do vary—sometimes they reflect a traditional and independent legality which stands with scrupulously blind eye, sometimes they reflect nothing but politics and dominance in blatant disregard of any real legality. (In a political trial the judges may even operate on the effectual premise that to be ignored is any evidence *not* tainted, coerced, or invented.) In any case rules of evidence for courts are different from rules of evidence for historians. A court wishes to determine guilt or innocence; a historian may or may not care about this, but if he does he is not so limited as a court—any court—in considering what evidences and factors are relevant. And he may be looking for a "whole truth" beyond the bounds of an indictment. Ultimately, he should want to know "what happened," not just "who is guilty." In answering the one it is sometimes possible to answer the other; not always. There are causes for everything, but there is not always "guilt." The historian looks beyond the lawyer and judge—and sometimes he looks *at* them. It can be a searching look, especially when the *any and all* that he must get his hands on in order to find out "what happened" includes unsubstantiated, coerced, doctored, or otherwise specious evidence from the records of political trials. This evidence will indeed be considered, but perhaps in a different light than that which its generators intended. Yes, even the kind of trial justice that hops and punches can be useful to the historian; reaching into its pouch he might withdraw many interesting things. He might do what no lawyer can do: judge the judges. Time and *the record* allow this to happen.

Unfortunate and despicable as were the trials of the Germans from the standpoints of traditional Western justice and humanity, their records and *their verdicts* nonetheless do help us to determine the history of an epoch. But this is true in spite of, not because of, the bold and foolish announcements by their conveners that a large part of the purpose of the trials was to establish a *historical*, not just legal, verdict—and one meant to stand for all time. By looking carefully at the verdicts of these trials and at the evidence used to secure them, we gain at the very least an idea of the temper and methods of the times. Far more important, we can also draw a critical eye on the very issues the trials were meant to "settle." Have they been settled? In our lead article this issue we look at one case.

William B. Lindsey's examination of the trial of Dr. Bruno Tesch is a milestone in revisionism as it relates to war crimes trials. Whereas cases in the famous IMT and NMT trials at Nuremberg have received abundant attention, the lesser-known series of British Military Tribunals which were convened with summary haste right after the war have not been so well plumbed. Because in many cases these were trials of technical specialists, not political or military figures, historians might have hesitated to delve into areas that would require technical competence in their details. Especially so revisionist historians, who have always believed in getting down to *detail*. It is no surprise, then, that the first critical study of the great Zyklon B trial—"evidence" from which has been and is one of the prime props of the devolved "Holocaust" legend—

Zyklon B, Auschwitz, and the Trial of Dr. Bruno Tesch

WILLIAM B. LINDSEY

We still have judgement here, that we but teach Bloody instructions, which being taught return To plague th'inventor. This even handed justice Commends th'ingredience of our poison'd chalice To our own lips.

—Shakespeare, *Macbeth*

The Prelude to "Justice"

Toward the end of World War II, the designated legal representatives of the United Nations,¹ meeting in London with Lord Wright, Chairman of the United Nations War Crimes Commission, established the London Agreements to implement earlier agreements by the United Nations at Yalta and other war conferences, and to finally concretize numerous threats and warnings made by the United Nations to the Axis nations during the course of the war. Their intention was to impeach, prosecute and punish the vanquished Germans and Japanese for crimes newly defined and delineated by the victors themselves, and to do this with tribunals created by them for that single purpose.

The most atrocious crime of which the Germans were accused by the victors was that they had planned to kill all of the Jews of Europe; of the six million they allegedly succeeded in killing, four million were allegedly killed in gas chambers constructed for that purpose at Auschwitz-Birkenau.

To place these United Nations tribunals in their proper perspective, it is necessary to appreciate the attitude and temper of the United Nations allies toward Germany before and during these trials. Beginning at least as early as 1940, Germany's enemies—who later, on 2 January 1942, were to take the collective name of the "United Nations"—subjected their citizenry to an incessant bombardment of dire, doleful predictions and frightful allegations of the most horrible atrocities allegedly committed or

about to be committed by Germany. But a few of the many separate sources of these allegations were: Dr. Nahum Goldman, the Polish Government-in-exile, Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, Rabbi J.H. Herz, U.S. Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles, former Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinoff, the British Broadcasting Corporation, Mr. H. Wickham Steed (A British journalist who was active in anti-German propaganda during World War I and prior to World War II), and the U.S. War Refugee Board, organized and fully supported by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Although presenting no concrete evidence and identifying no "eye witnesses" (allegedly for reasons of wartime security), these charges were, as were the similar charges in World War I, generally accepted by Germany's enemies as valid—with the largely implied pledge that the ultimate proof of these allegations would be presented at the end of the war.

As the end of the war approached, almost every news release seemed to support these early accusations. With the discoveries made near the end of the war by the advancing United Nations armies of the heaps of corpses at Bergen-Belsen, Dachau, Buchenwald, Nordhausen, etc.—corpses, incidentally, predominantly Gentile,² and caused by disease, hunger, etc.—the self-righteous indignation of Germany's conquerors mounted to rage. The German Government itself, now headed by Grand Admiral Doenitz, was equally appalled and vowed to see justice done. Doenitz's Flensburg regime was aghast that after the fiasco of Allied accusations against Germany in World War I and the necessity of their subsequent refutation and withdrawal under fire after the war, charges of a similar type would again be brought seriously and again believed by the same enemies only thirty years later, this time as before without thorough prior investigation.

Viewing themselves quite early in the war, however, as avenging angels and anointed crusaders, expurgating and exterminating murderers and blasphemers, the United Nations conquerors thereupon reconsecrated themselves, as they had already sworn they would do, to fast and merciless punishment for anyone they deemed associated even remotely with these apparent crimes. Many United Nations protagonists, the older ones perhaps still smarting from their rebuff and rejection as a result of their false World War I charges, were certain in their own minds that this time Germany was obviously guilty of all allegations as charged—certain without even bothering to wait for the promised proof of these allegations. In their haste, the only questions they were concerned with were when and how far the victors should go in meting out the "new" justice. The London Agreements obviously had not solved all the problems. Stalin was suggesting, as he had been for some time, the summary killing of

50,000 German "war criminals," and the Americans were to learn later that Roosevelt had, at the 1943 Teheran conference, failed to take any umbrage whatever at this proposal. Missouri Representative Marion T. Bennett, in Europe with other U.S. Congressmen at General Eisenhower's special invitation, probably expressed the general, although not unanimous, feeling by saying: "I left Buchenwald convinced that every German must be killed." Joseph Pulitzer of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch advocated killing 1,500,000 "Nazis." Equally ominous for those Germans left alive (out of a nation originally comprising 80 million) was the announcement that four to six million of them faced trial by the United Nations as "war criminals"—presumably under the newly decreed *ex post facto* fiats of the United Nations London Agreements.

On 14 May 1945, the last legitimate German Government was completely dismantled by Germany's new masters and its members arrested pending trial and execution or imprisonment. The last possible source of even a whimper of protest against any abuse of Germans was thus adroitly silenced forever. The Allies had been cheated of their German "hanging bee" in 1918, but now as the "United Nations" they were determined to be neither cheated nor thwarted. Thus was the stage craftily set in Germany for a series of trials by unique military or "international" tribunals, artfully conceived, contrived and convened by the victors for the sole purpose of trying and punishing only the vanquished Germans, at the victors' pleasure, for "Crimes Against Humanity" and such other "crimes" recently enunciated or to be later unilaterally enunciated by the rationalizing, legalizing apologists of the victorious United Nations.

Dr. Bruno Tesch and his business manager-proxy ("Prokurist") Karl Weinbacher, who had never been members of the German Government or the German Armed Forces, were two of the first unfortunate Germans to become enmeshed in this newly-woven web of United Nations "new international justice."³ It was their lot to be accused by the United Nations Occupation Authorities of having recommended the use of, and knowingly supplied, the poisonous Zyklon B for the purpose of killing the 4-4½ million Jews allegedly gassed at Auschwitz-Birkenau. This paper will discuss the official transcript of the British Military Tribunal which tried them and condemned them to death by hanging.

Of the numerous tribunals established by the United Nations for their multifaceted motives, the first Nuremberg Tribunal—the International Military Tribunal or IMT (also known as the Trial of Major War Criminals or TMWC), which was constituted to try the famous "first string" National Socialists—occupied center stage as intended, often eclipsing the events of other tribunals sitting at the same time. As a result of this, one fails often to

realize that these less-publicized "side" tribunals usually provided the Nuremberg Tribunals (both the IMT and the series of American-run Nuremberg Military Tribunals, or NMT) with much of the basic material used to formulate the concepts and support the arguments advanced by Robert H. Jackson, Telford Taylor and other United Nations prosecutors in their assignments at Nuremberg. In time, these concepts and arguments have, with some modifications necessitated already then by early revisionist research, congealed into what has become the monolithic corpus of the "Holocaust" gospel.

Pre-eminent in these side tribunals was the British Lueneburg Tribunal which undertook the trial of the Birkenau SS staff, whom the British Army had captured at the Bergen-Belsen Jewish transit camp. (See note 2.) This tribunal sat from 17 September 1945 to 17 November 1945, and at times its sensational headlines jeopardized the intended place of the Nuremberg IMT show on the front pages of the world's newspapers. It was at this British Military Tribunal that much of the "Holocaust" dogma and wartime tales of German bestiality were chiseled into the United Nations "Behistan Rock" to justify forever the United Nations acts vis-a-vis Germany. This was done by parading before the Tribunal a nondescript chorus of Yiddish voices, each chorus member seeking to gain for himself, for varied reasons, the prestigious role of a latter-day Judith or Esther, a Samson or Mordecai, and each seeking to outdo his predecessor on the witness stand with a horror tale of abuse and privation—naturally all unsubstantiated. It was here that the first United Nations prosecutor sought to establish legal credence and respectability for the earlier rumors of German bestiality and particularly the unsubstantiated allegations that 4,000,000 Jews had been killed at Auschwitz-Birkenau. It was here that physicians Ada Bimko and Charles Bendel made their bows on the front pages of the world's newspapers before figuring in the tribunal trying Dr. Tesch and Herr Weinbacher—and after that disappearing, but leaving behind a legacy of falsehood and confusion which became, nevertheless, a part of the unquestioned, unchallengeable litany of the "Holocaust" credo.

A British officer serving the Defense at Lueneburg described these many witnesses as the dregs of eastern European ghettos; for this he was forced by the Tribunal to apologize. The British Tribunal at Lueneburg was described by Dr. Eberhard Kolb⁴ in his book *Bergen-Belsen* as having carried out its work with "vorbildicher" (typical or exemplary) "Fairness" (fairness)—an opinion typical of a "new" or "reconstructed" German acceptable to the United Nations conquerors. What really concerned the British Tribunal and nearly everyone else at the time was not "Fairness," not facts, not justice but: "How will you kill

Kremer?"⁵ The real trials had long since been completed in the newspapers, in the information bureaus and in the numerous conferences of the United Nations.

Among the United Nations, there was the almost universal desire to see as many Germans as possible put to ignominious death, and these United Nations Tribunals appeared to be useful vehicles for achieving this extirpation. Others openly favored summary execution of large numbers of Germans with no trial whatever.

The Bergen-Belsen Tribunal at Lueneburg and the trial of Dr. Tesch and Herr Weinbacher are to some extent unique, since they represent some of the first and last vain attempts of the accused to tell the truth and thereby clear up the multitude of preposterous wartime charges disseminated by the United Nations for obvious propaganda objectives. After the trials began, however, it soon became apparent that telling the truth was a fatal strategic error for the accused. To deny that Jews had been maliciously killed en masse by Germany in a tribunal whose very existence was based upon the intent to establish without doubt that Jews had been killed was as fatal to the defendant in 1946 as it would have been to an accused medieval heretic who before his inquisitors guaranteed his condemnation on whatever charge by throwing in for the hell of it a denial of the existence of the Trinity and the Divinity of Jesus.

From the standpoint of survival, it was necessary for a witness to testify that Jews were certainly gassed, while attempting to save himself by protesting that his presence at that location or in that position entailed no responsibility and only incidental or accidental knowledge of the killings which, if observed, he was powerless to prevent.⁶

Such were the deplorable circumstances on 1 March 1946, when Dr. Tesch and Herr Weinbacher were indicted and brought before the British Military Tribunal at Curiohaus, Hamburg.

Tesch und Stabenow

Dr. Tesch's association with Zyklon-B, the product whose sale was to result in his and Herr Weinbacher's execution, began long before the war. As a gifted graduate in chemistry, physics and mathematics at the University of Berlin, he had attained the position of assistant at the world-venerated Kaiser Wilhelm Institut. Here, he became interested in hydrogen cyanide as a fumigating agent. It was effective, but quite hazardous to use since it was a liquid and was chemically unstable. In addition, it was a deadly poison for humans. But it was this very deadliness to all animals which made it a nearly ideal fumigant. It killed not

only warm-blooded vermin quickly but also any eggs, larvae, pupa or adult insects which might be on the vermin or in the area being fumigated.⁷

With the support of the I.G. Farbenindustrie, Dr. Tesch, in conjunction with Dr. Gerhard Peters, initiated research which to a great extent, circumvented the problems which previously had long prevented the widespread use of hydrogen cyanide as a fumigating agent.

These problems were solved as follows: An irritant tear gas was mixed with the liquid hydrogen cyanide so as to "warn" anyone of the poison's presence.⁸ After adding a chemical stabilizer, one part of this liquid was soaked into two parts of a porous, highly absorbant material so that the resulting mixture was not a liquid but solid, free-flowing granules. This product was named "Zyklon B,"⁹ and the deadly fumes which evaporated slowly from the granules were called "Zyklon B gas." Chemically, this fumigating gas was nearly pure hydrogen cyanide diluted with air.

Zyklon B held such promise that it was patented by the I.G. Farbenindustrie and the patent assigned to the DEGESCH, the DEutsche GEellschaft fuer SCHaedlingsbekaempfung (German Society for Pest Control), and it was they who were designated by the German Government to set the safety rules and standards for its use, necessarily stringent, because of the product's extreme lethal character. The DEGESCH also authorized shipment of the product to the user from the factory only after the Government regulations had been met. These regulations for using hydrogen cyanide for fumigation were relaxed only in specific instances deemed essential to the German Government. For purposes of fumigation, the German Military Forces in both World Wars were granted such a relaxation in regulations.¹⁰

With Herr Paul Stabenow, Dr. Tesch established the company in 1923 which later became fully his: Tesch und Stabenow. Dr. Peters accepted a leading position in the DEGESCH. Tesch und Stabenow was a pest-control company much like those in this country or in England. It sold primarily its pest-exterminating services and know-how. It did not manufacture Zyklon B nor the other chemicals it used in its fumigation service, but purchased them from the factories which produced them in volume.¹¹

Prior to the war, Dr. Tesch's business grew rapidly, since with Zyklon B it was possible to fumigate entire ships, buildings, dwellings, mess halls, barracks, flour mills, grain elevators, railroad cars, etc.¹² successfully without damaging their contents. So long as these contents remained dry, Zyklon B gas did not harm them, and so long as the fumigated area was properly aired out after fumigation and the safety practices were followed faith-

fully, Zyklon B could be used satisfactorily and without danger to humans.

At the same time, similar operations were being carried out in the United States by domestic companies.¹³ As Tesch und Stabenow prospered, at least six other similar firms sprang up in Germany. Of all pest-control firms, Tesch und Stabenow was an international leader, if not in fact the international leader. This was a result of Dr. Tesch's careful personal training of his employees in fumigation techniques and his uncompromising refusal to relax safety regulations.

In war, fumigation was even more important to Germany than in peace. Besides the many pressing needs of the Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe, and the Navy, there were additional civilian needs. Any dwelling or building which was vacated for any reason might require fumigation before new tenants could occupy it. In addition, the camps established for the huge numbers of foreign workers and repatriated Germans from the east—all under the care of the SS—required frequent fumigation. The importance of these fumigation operations can further be gaged by the fact that men employed as fumigators were exempt from military draft. Of the 50 or so employees of Tesch und Stabenow at the start of the war, thirty-five were involved with fumigation operations. Herr Weinbacher himself had begun work at the company as a fumigator and had, through hard work, become Dr. Tesch's assistant.

Although the fumigation / pest-control business was profitable, in war it was not without headaches. Besides the shortages of personnel, materials, equipment, etc., Tesch und Stabenow, because of the acute German manpower shortages, was assigned the additional task of assisting the DEGESCH in processing orders from those seeking to use Zyklon B. The German Government made this arbitrary assignment since Tesch und Stabenow already placed regular, large orders for Zyklon B through the DEGESCH, and this simplified the Government's role in policing compliance with existing Government regulations and reduced the work load on the DEGESCH. As a condition of continuing as a licensed fumigator, Dr. Tesch was legally obligated to receive and process all Zyklon B orders from users east of the Elbe River. This unwelcome additional task represented a division of the paper work associated with ordering rather than of manufacturing or supplying. In a similar arrangement, areas west of the Elbe River had their orders initially processed by Hirt und Linkler before they were submitted to the DEGESCH.

After checking the orders to see if potential buyers were authorized users of Zyklon B, the orders were forwarded by Tesch und Stabenow to the DEGESCH¹⁴ where the buyer's Government authorization and compliance with regulations were rechecked.

Then, they were allocated whatever percentage of their order Dr. Peters¹⁵ and his allocation committee at the DEGESCH decided upon, and the order was finally placed with the factory. Allocation was necessary since Zyklon B, like all other chemicals, was always in short supply.¹⁶ Military orders were always given preference over civilian usage, and these orders were filled from wherever supplies might be available at the time—east or west of the Elbe River.

In performing this order-processing function, Dr. Tesch was required to pay cash immediately when an order processed by him was placed at the factory, and he received his money back plus a small commission three to four months later when the Zyklon B was delivered.

For German Government orders, Tesch und Stabenow received initially a fee of 10% of the gross amount of the order. This fee was set by the Government. After May 1943, this fee was cut to 2½%, and after 1943, the service of Tesch und Stabenow was dispensed with entirely by virtue of the Government's assignment solely to the Wehrmacht Hauptsanitaetspark (Wehrmacht Main Sanitary Depot), Berlin, the function of supplying Zyklon B to all Government users.

Interrogation and Charge

Dr. Tesch first became aware of his impending ordeal with the United Nations Occupation Authorities when a British Captain, Anton W. Freud,¹⁷ visited him in his office with Emil Sehm, one of his former bookkeepers, and interrogated him in German. At this meeting, Sehm accused his former employer of supplying Zyklon B to kill Jews. Dr. Tesch denied the accusation emphatically, and accused Sehm of knowing full well that Zyklon B was used only in pest-control. Dr. Tesch was left in peace for a few days, but on 3 September 1945, he was arrested and interrogated further before being released on 1 October 1945. On 6 October 1945, he was re-arrested by the British and remained thereafter in their custody until his execution. On 31 October 1945, Dr. Tesch signed a deposition. It was taken in the standard British manner with oral translation from German into English. These on-the-spot oral translations were written down and became the official—and only—record. Afterward, Captain Freud said that the deposition was signed voluntarily and Dr. Tesch had signed after only minor changes. But Dr. Tesch testified later that he had signed only because he "felt under some pressure" and after receiving an indication that later, other explanatory changes in the deposition would be made. It is not difficult to believe that any German being interrogated at this time on this subject by a

British officer named "Freud" might, indeed, feel "under some pressure."

The Tribunal

On the basis of Captain Freud's interrogations, the British War Crimes officials decided to prosecute Dr. Tesch, Herr Weinbacher and Dr. Joachim Drosihn.¹⁸ A British Military Tribunal was accordingly ordered convened by Sir Henry MacGeagh. C.L. Stirling, who already had served as Judge Advocate at the British trial of the Birkenau SS staff at Lueneburg was again named Judge Advocate. R.B.L. Persee was named President and Lt. Col. Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Major S.M. Johnson were named as members of the Tribunal. Capt. H.S. Marshall was designated as a waiting member.

On Friday, 1 March 1946, the Tribunal convened in Curiohaus, Hamburg. It was a trial which had to be held if the "Holocaust" allegations were ever to be anything more than malevolent tales conjured up by imaginative, vengeful inmates, escapees, war propagandists, and so forth, all with sinister, self-serving motivations and intents. It was a time during which Germany's recent conquerors were frantically scrambling to find the bricks with which to erect the all-absolving "Holocaust" edifice they needed so desperately. It was a desperation born of a compelling urgency to justify their own past and future acts in Germany and elsewhere throughout the world as world powers, and to secure permanently the undisputed mastery¹⁹ of Germany and Central Europe which they enjoyed in 1945 as a result of the bloody conflagration.

It must be pointed out that, regarding anything said in German (or French) at the Tribunal, we at this later date are at the mercy of the three translators and the three court reporters as to the accuracy of the translations and of the record. All Tribunal records were kept in English.

In accordance with decrees of the United Nations Occupation Forces, no former members of the NSDAP might practice law. Therefore all defense attorneys had to be free—in the minds of the prosecuting victors at least—of the slightest hint of NSDAP taint. In practice, potential difficulties were usually avoided by the tribunals' allowing only attorneys with actual anti-NSDAP histories to defend the accused. The defense attorneys were therefore from the beginning politically and ideologically hostile to those they were to defend!²⁰ Alternatively, the accused could have elected to be defended by a British officer as was done in Lueneburg at the trial of the Birkenau SS staff. (With the result that most of these were executed!) Civilian English attorneys

were at this time strongly discouraged if not forbidden from acting in defense of German nationals in United Nations war crimes tribunals.

The German (anti-NSDAP) Defense personnel, many of whom did not comprehend English fully, were required to follow British court procedure which was totally foreign to them. Their handicap was often so apparent that Major G.I.D. Draper, the British prosecutor, and even the British Judge Advocate, C.L. Stirling, felt compelled at times to ask the Defense if they did not have questions at particular points. This was a strange trial indeed. It should also be borne in mind that in the German Law of the Third Reich, the Prosecution was obligated by law to present any evidence in its possession which was favorable to the defendant. In the post-World War II War Crimes Trials in Germany, this was emphatically not the case. When queried on this point at Nuremberg by the German Defense, the American Prosecutor, Robert H. Jackson, stated that so allowing would entail the Prosecution's "serving two masters"!²¹ The realistic objective of the United Nations prosecutors was not one of finding facts and arriving at verdicts justified by those facts but that of obtaining, by whatever means necessary, the testimony and evidence vital to support a preordained verdict. The well-known precepts of the Vishinsky-Moscow Trials were thus brought from the banks of the Moskva to the banks of the Regnitz.

From beginning to end, the Tribunal assumed the timbre of a dialog between victor and vanquished, between judge and culprit. And although after a period in which he would show characteristic British disdain and contempt for his anti-NSDAP German adversaries, Major Draper might refer to them as "my learned friends of the German Bar," there was never, ever, any question as to whose hand held the gun. (And the scales.) Draper could lecture the German Defense as much as he pleased on the awful burden placed upon the Prosecution by British Law in requiring proof of the charges beyond all reasonable doubt, but there was never the slightest challenge to his continual statements that four million Jews were wantonly and purposefully killed by Germany at Auschwitz, that the alleged Gestapo and SS excesses were common and well-known practices, that foreign workers who came to Germany were in fact "slaves," and so on. Actually, the British Judge Advocate Stirling, having performed his appointed task at Lueneburg so well, sometimes joined in the accusations himself. These allegations were already being accepted by the Tribunal as incontrovertible fact, with only Dr. Charles Sigismund Bendel (a self-declared authority on Auschwitz-Birkenau who had testified previously at Lueneburg) and SS-Rottenfuehrer Perry Broad giving anything approaching actu-

al supporting, eye-witness evidence for the alleged mass murder at Auschwitz and Birkenau.

The interpreters were in continual difficulty. Providing accurate, instantaneous, oral translations—in a situation where a man's life may depend on the proper evaluation of a voice inflection, choice of the proper word, etc.,—will always pose insurmountable technical difficulties. The interpreters had the further infuriating habit of using the word "gassing" whenever they obviously meant "fumigation" or "gassing" in the sense alleged in the "Holocaust" allegations. The stratagem achieved its desired effect in the United Nations press, but here and in numerous other places, had records also been kept in German, I am certain there would have been numerous conflicts in the trial records.

Testimony

Of the witnesses called by the British Prosecution, Emil Sehm presented the testimony which was most deadly to Dr. Tesch and Herr Weinbacher. Sehm had been a bookkeeper at Tesch und Stabenow. It may actually have been he who initially contacted the British and denounced Dr. Tesch. Such actions were openly solicited by the United Nations. Sehm testified that in the Fall of 1942, while looking in the firm files for something entirely different, he came across a pink or red copy of a trip report which implicated Dr. Tesch and Herr Weinbacher, as Tesch's proxy, in mass murder. In testifying to the alleged typed report, Sehm swore:

Dr. Tesch speaks about an interview he had with leading personalities of the German Wehrmacht. I remember a phrase saying that "Herr . . ."—I do not remember the name—"told me that the shooting of Jews is growing more and more frequent and the burial of the great number is proving to be more and more unhygienic. To change this, it is proposed that the extermination of the Jews should be done now through the efforts of the prussic acid." Dr. Tesch, asked to give, concerning this idea some propositions "I, Dr. Tesch proposed to use prussic acid just as it is used for the elimination of vermin, to use it for the above mentioned purpose."

Then, it is explained that those to be exterminated should be put into a previously prepared barracks, prepared in the same way as for the extermination of vermin. During the night some expert in this prussic acid gas method prepares the barracks, which are then later closed against intruding air. The next morning those who have been exterminated through this gas can be got rid of. I must add that in the beginning of the report it was mentioned that the Jews need not be buried, but they would be burned. Dr. Tesch takes these orders to train SS personnel in these matters concerning prussic acid gas.

Much of Sehm's testimony can be challenged for accuracy and consistency. It describes only very vaguely the basic killing procedure accepted and preached by the "Holocaust" high priesthood, and some of it even conflicts with or refutes their accepted stories. Nevertheless, it contains the fertile seeds necessary for gestating the "Holocaust" tales. These were:

- Identification of Dr. Tesch as the person who recommended as early as 1942 the use of Zyklon B in gas chambers as a more effective means of killing as opposed to shooting (or as opposed to the use of carbon monoxide, *a la* the testimony of Auschwitz Commandant Rudolf Hoess).
- Equation of Jews with vermin, with the implication that both were to be exterminated as pests by pest-control procedures.
- Identification of the SS as the agency responsible for killing Jews (although he also seems to attempt to implicate the Wehrmacht!).
- Disposal of Jewish corpses by cremation ("more hygienic").

The criteria for evaluating the acceptability of Sehm's testimony must be to judge his personal reliability and honesty, to check for unquestionable verification by reliable witnesses, and finally to judge its credibility and cohesiveness.

The pink copy of the alleged travel report supposedly written in the Fall of 1942 and allegedly seen by Sehm was, according to him, burned purposely along with a white original and a second pink copy—both of which no one ever saw—when the firm files were destroyed in a bombing attack on 20 March 1945. Prior to the bombing, these files were open to everyone in the office and were locked only at night. If he had so wished, Sehm could easily have removed an entire copy even easier than he alleges he made notes from the copy he swore he saw. No one would have been wiser.

All the steno-typists of Tesch und Stabenow were questioned. If such a travel report had ever existed, one of them would have had to have taken it down in dictation and then type it in triplicate. All testified, however, that they had never seen nor typed such a report. One typist, Frau Anna Uenzelmann, testified that she had once understood Dr. Tesch to have said after a dictation session that he'd heard in Berlin that people were killed by Zyklon B, but there was no elaboration on his part as to whether this was accidental or not. Dr. Tesch did not even remember the incident. Another typist, Frl. Eliza Biagini, testified that she had once read in a travel report of human beings being killed by

Zyklon B at Sachsenhausen-Oranienburg. This event was poorly recalled and may have been actually a question put to Dr. Tesch during one of his classes at this camp. This testimony may also have been the result of an attempt by Sehm to intimidate the witness during her pre-trial interrogation by the British. At this interrogation, Sehm, obviously playing a leading role, falsely alleged that he had the missing, incriminating travel document from Dr. Tesch in his pocket.

The importance of the testimony from these two typists, however, is that neither corroborates Sehm's testimony. For that matter, they do not even support each other. All three testimonies clearly involve entirely separate and different places and events, uncorroborated by any other testimony!

"Substantiation" of Sehm's testimony rested completely on the testimony of three of his close, old friends: Wilhelm and Kate Pook and Bernhard Frahm. Sehm alleged that he showed to the Pooks the notes he made from the red or pink file copy at Tesch und Stabenow. He visited both regularly to discuss religion, politics, National Socialism, and other subjects, and they testified that they remembered "seeing" the notes. Under oath, Frau Pook testified first that she had seen the actual travel report itself. But when questioned further, she could say with certainty only that she had seen a "document," and excused her mistake by blaming the passage of four years for her uncertainty. On the advice of Wilhelm Pook, Sehm had allegedly burned his notes in an ash tray on the Pook's table.

Wilhelm Pook testified that Sehm had told him that Dr. Tesch was profiting in the range of RM20,000 to RM25,000 per quarter on Zyklon B sales alone.²²

Even more remarkable and pertinent to the reliability of Sehm's testimony was the fact that both the Pooks, when first interrogated by the British, had forgotten completely to even mention the all-important incriminating "notes" or "travel report." Thereafter, after Sehm's first appearance before the military tribunal, the Pooks had discussed with him his testimony prior to their appearance before the Tribunal. When questioned closely, Frau Pook admitted that she didn't remember who had reminded whom (she Sehm, or Sehm her) that the "document" had been burned in an ash tray on her table. After such a discrediting group of admissions by witnesses called by the British military prosecutor to give credence to Sehm's testimony, all Major Draper could do was ask Wilhelm Pook if he had told the truth, to which he answered "Yes." Both Pooks were then hurried out of the Tribunal.

Draper sought further to establish the credibility of Sehm's testimony by calling another of the latter's close friends, Bernhard Frahm.²³ Sehm alleged that several months after he burned his notes at the Pook's dwelling, he told Frahm of what he had found in the Tesch und Stabenow files. Herr Frahm professed to remember the occasion, but admitted he himself had not seen the incriminating notes written by Sehm. He added, however—certainly to the gratification of the Tribunal—that the Nazis considered anyone who opposed them to be "vermin"²⁴ or "Schaedlinger." He said that Sehm had told him Tesch und Stabenow were delivering gas and "stoves"²⁵ to kill humans.

This was the flimsy substance of Emil Sehm's testimony against Dr. Tesch und Herr Weinbacher. No more substantial—rather less so—was the testimony of those called to substantiate it. Of four bookkeepers at Tesch und Stabenow, Sehm was the least important. He was a short-term employee and was quite dissatisfied with his position. Accordingly, he had requested to be released by his employer so that he might return to Koenigsberg, East Prussia, his native city, where he hoped to start a tax consulting business. Dr. Tesch, who was having difficulty finding employees in wartime, refused to release him, incurring as a result his hatred and wrath. In addition to being anti-NSDAP as were his friends, the Pooks and Frahm, Sehm already had cause to dislike if not hate Dr. Tesch, who was a Party member. Although he professed no ill will toward Dr. Tesch for refusing to release him, he described his former employer as an "intellectual sadist."

Of the witnesses who knew Dr. Tesch, however, only Sehm and Dr. Drosihn—the latter only after some prodding by Major Draper—spoke ill of him. It is difficult to escape the feeling that this was just one more instance where the end of the war, with its confusion and its bloody tribunals, was seized upon, as it must have been by many, as an opportunity to settle old, long-standing scores in those parts of Europe overrun by United Nations forces.

It seems quite obvious that the incriminating parts of Sehm's testimony are monstrous fabrications. Sensing the completely irresponsible character of this testimony, Dr. Zippel, who defended Dr. Tesch, lost no time in denouncing Sehm as a liar, and after offering examples to the Tribunal in which he had certainly lied under oath, proceeded to deal with the other testimony, believing that of Sehm to have been completely discredited. In the end, however, it was Sehm's incredible accusations in the hands of the British prosecutor, Draper, which provided all the substance the Military Tribunal wanted to tie Dr. Tesch and Herr Weinbacher to the "Holocaust" juggernaut.

The next "witness" was Dr. Rudolf Diels who, because of his on-going interrogations for the Nuremberg Tribunal, could not be present at the Curiohaus Tribunal. His affidavit—also in English—was submitted in lieu of his appearance. This maneuver was used over and over again by those dedicated to the unquestioning service to "one master,"²⁶ because of its efficacy in shielding from cross-examination by the Defense those witnesses deemed weak or unreliable by the Prosecution. It was only much later that the Defense could force the appearances of such "witnesses" for cross-examination.

Dr. Diels's affidavit appears to be the German origin of the famous expression, "You'd better watch out or you'll go up the chimney!" This related to threats of death followed by cremation made to inmates by concentration camp guards. Diels swore that "in his opinion," gassing operations (presumably killing humans) were being talked about practically everywhere in Germany. His revelation that Zyklon B was manufactured in Hamburg was news to Dr. Tesch who, as a user, would have been happy to know of a nearby supplier. (There was, of course, no such factory in Hamburg.)

Before being arrested by the Gestapo, first in March and again in August 1944, Dr. Diels had been President of Koeln und Hannover and then Chief of the Shipping Division of the Hermann Goering Works. His deposition, like that of Wilhelm Hoettl, fairly reeks of his desire to provide his captors with the evidence they so ardently sought. It is a curious mixture of what the occupation authorities already knew or believed they knew and what is little better than common gossip—so much so that Stirling, the British Judge Advocate, protested at having to hear all of it. Dr. Diels's affidavit was useful to the British Military Tribunal, however, in "establishing" the point that Germans such as Dr. Tesch and Herr Weinbacher (neither of whom Diels knew) could not but have helped knowing that Jews were being killed with Zyklon B gas.

Far from it being common knowledge in Germany that people were being gassed, as Diels alleged, the vast majority of Germans were horrified by the United Nations accusations and they protested that they had never heard of such acts until after the cessation of hostilities when they had begun listening to United Nations broadcasts. They were, as mentioned previously, even more horrified to learn that the same enemies could after a mere thirty years again believe them capable of such deeds. Since the British Broadcasting Corporation had been broadcasting these accusations regularly for many months before the end of the war, those Germans who had "common knowledge" of the gassing before the war's end most likely got this "knowledge" from the BBC! This may explain at least a part of Dr. Diels's difficulties

with the Gestapo, since the German authorities, who regularly recorded and monitored the United Nations propaganda broadcasts,²⁷ checking them for accuracy if deemed necessary, usually equated knowledge of the contents of these broadcasts with having listened illegally to them, or having associated with persons who had.

Diels's affidavit was followed by testimony from a number of Tesch und Stabenow employees. Among these were Frl. Biagini and Frau Uenzelmann, mentioned previously in connection with Sehm's testimony. The other steno-typists were also questioned about the travel report allegedly seen by Sehm, but none had typed or seen or heard of it. Besides office workers, field workers who had done contract fumigations at Auschwitz and other camps supervised by the SS were heard. No evidence was given, however, which supported the view that Tesch und Stabenow was anything other than a respected, reliable, busy, well-run pest-control firm.

The testimony of Wilhelm Bahr is of interest since, as an SS sanitation orderly from Neuengamme concentration camp, he, with nineteen others, had taken Dr. Tesch's short three-day course in fumigation with Zyklon B, using for training the fumigation chambers for clothing articles at the SS hospital at Oranienburg. These standard fumigation chambers had a volume of ten cubic meters and held from 40 to 50 pieces of clothing per charge.²⁸ This was the clothing normally from about 25 to 30 people. A fumigation chamber of this size required one 200 gram can²⁹ of Zyklon B to give the required gas concentration of 20 grams of Zyklon B gas per cubic meter of air.³⁰

Bahr testified that Dr. Tesch did not train him and his colleagues specifically in killing humans, but he, Bahr, acting on orders from a Dr. von Bergmann (presumably a physician), killed 200 Russian prisoners-of-war with Zyklon B gas at Neuengamme once in 1942 by pouring five or six tins of Zyklon B (presumably 200 gram tins) into a barrack from a hole in its roof. In addition, he stated that he had seen the name of Tesch und Stabenow on the labels of cans of Zyklon B which he used at Neuengamme apparently for both fumigation operations and for the single admitted killing of Russian POW's.³¹ Bahr was the single witness who definitely placed Zyklon B ordered through Tesch und Stabenow at the site of an alleged mass killing operation. This site, however, was at Neuengamme, not Auschwitz.

It is a tortured reasoning indeed which holds Dr. Tesch (and even more illogically, Herr Weinbacher) responsible for the alleged murders of 200 Russians killed by a man who confesses to the murder but testifies that a Dr. Von Bergmann ordered him to do it and that Dr. Tesch didn't train him to do it. If one believes

that Bahr did in fact kill the Russians, Dr. Tesch and Herr Weinbacher certainly had no responsibility. But, again, it was all the British Military Tribunal needed to establish firmly in the minds of the "Holocaust" disciples the mental picture of the sadistic SS sanitation orderly fiendishly dumping Zyklon B, ordered through Tesch und Stabenow, through openings in the ceiling into a chamber packed with pitiful, unsuspecting, for once Russian victims! (An occasional later variation on this main theme alleges that Zyklon B was added through wall ports.)

Unterscharfuehrer (Corporal) Wilhelm Friedrich Bahr was himself awaiting trial for war crimes before a later British Military Tribunal.³² Doubtless, he had been made aware of the seriousness of the charges against him and that his only possible chance of survival lay in accomodating his captors. As yet I have not discovered his subsequent fate.

The testimony of Rottenfuehrer (Lance-corporal) Perry (Pery) Broad at Dr. Tesch's trial constitutes one of the most oft-cited and relied-upon supports for the charges of mass murder of Jews by Germans at Auschwitz-Zasole and Auschwitz-Birkenau. Along with his "Report"³³ and his testimony, he is responsible for the establishment of several concepts essential to the vivification and sustained vigor of the "Holocaust" tales. Broad testified that already in 1942 he had heard rumors that gassing was being carried out "on a bigger scale" at Auschwitz-Zasole. He stated that he observed an actual "gassing" from the Truppenrevier (troop quarters) at a distance of 40-45 meters. This was in July of 1942. Several people in gas masks were on the roof of the old crematorium. They hammered open tins (presumably of Zyklon B) and poured the contents into six holes each ten centimeters (four inches) in diameter³⁴ leading apparently through the roof to a chamber underneath. Broad alleged that 300 to 500 people were in the "Old Crematorium." After 2-3 minutes, the screaming ended. He assumed that people were killed in this manner once or twice a month, but stated that he actually witnessed only one "gassing" this closely. He testified that in the Fall of 1944, he had observed "gassing" at Auschwitz-Birkenau but from a much greater distance. At Birkenau, he testified, there were four crematories,³⁵ and in March and April of 1944, 19,000 persons a day were killed with Zyklon B from tin cans. He said he was certain tin cans were used because he saw the cans in a car driven by a disinfector who had given him a ride. But he could not identify the labels on the cans as identifying material ordered through Tesch und Stabenow.

Broad estimated that a total of 2½ to 3 million Jews from Belgium, Holland, France, Northern Italy, Czechoslovakia and Poland, as well as Gypsies and German deportees, had been

killed at Auschwitz-Birkenau. These victims included babies and the elderly. Broad's testimony supported the notion that "selection" meant instant death in a gas chamber upon arrival without registration at the camp.³⁶ Cremation allegedly followed.

The capacities of the crematory/gas-chambers, according to Broad who admitted he was never in one, were as follows: Birkenau crematories I and II—3,000 to 4,000 people each in underground rooms. Birkenau crematories III and IV—2,000 each at ground level. Birkenau crematory V had a capacity, he said, of 800 to 1,200 people but contained only a gas stove. He asserted that his detailed information came from guards and from the fact that he had witnessed barrack fumigations and assumed that procedure to be the same as that used in killing. (See Bendel's testimony, below.) Broad continued that the killing was actually done by the fumigators or disinfectors who fumigated clothing. He testified that in 1942 and 1943, the bodies, so far as possible, were cremated in crematories.³⁷ Thereafter, they were burned on pyres in the open air, since the crematories had insufficient capacities. Broad declared that the clothing from the victims was sent to the Volksdeutschemittelstelle. The killing was allegedly carried out using two of the larger (1 kilogram) tins.³⁸ Broad testified that in March and April of 1944, trains were lined up at Birkenau waiting to make their deliveries of humans to the gas chambers. Three hours were allegedly required to process a load of victims through the gas chambers and the crematories.

What Perry Broad's testimony, as a former member of the SS, accomplished was to give vital muscle and life to the feeble, anemic statements of Sehm and to what previously had only been suspect, irresponsible, and disconnected allegations by United Nations propagandists. An argumentatively supportable, although admittedly far-fetched, killing operation was described in which nameless, faceless, unidentifiable millions were marched unrecognized, uncounted, and unregistered en masse from countless trains straightaway into waiting gas chambers, and there killed with Zyklon B and cremated—passing from illusory, allegedly uncontested existence into the dusty oblivion of "Holocaust" immortality in the short space of three hours. This testimony must have removed any lingering hesitation from the "searching" minds of the British Military Tribunal, straining to substantiate the wartime propaganda allegations and upon whose verdict Dr. Tesch's and Herr Weinbacher's lives unfortunately depended. The Tribunal must now have felt absolutely secure in declaring that "German monsters" had "gassed" six million helpless Jews. Broad had provided them with a position which, although admittedly controversial, was argumentatively supportable in that it probably could not be disproved unequivocally.

cally in minds eager to believe it and, therefore, all other facts could and would be fitted somehow into this overall, general picture, distorted though it might be in some particulars.

Rottenfuehrer Perry Broad was himself in jeopardy on at least two counts. As a Brazilian citizen serving as an SS volunteer, he could have been executed for treason in time of war. As a member of the SS detachment at Auschwitz he, having already miraculously escaped death at capture, was a prime candidate for at least a Soviet labor camp for an undetermined number of years—if he was ever surrendered to Soviet control. Unless he mollified his captors, a train trip to Vienna via the U.S.-run concentration camp at Eppensee³⁹ and finally to Russia, a trip many others in the SS had taken, was a strong probability. Broad did what he deemed necessary for his survival.

A close study of his testimony and his "Report" discloses many fallacies and contradictions, many of which must have been apparent to the British Tribunal. Suspicion of that small remainder of his evidence was justified by the fact that at the Frankfurt "Auschwitz Trial" in 1964-1965, he did exactly what numerous other witnesses did who had had testimony exacted from them by threats, coercion, or promises. (Those, that is, who were afterward allowed to live.) At a later date, feeling no longer the danger of imminent death, imprisonment or deportation at the hands of enraged, unrestrained captors, he denounced large portions of his earlier, life-saving testimony as being based upon what he had heard rather than upon what he had witnessed. This about-face led Hannah Arendt and others at the time of the "Auschwitz Trial"⁴⁰ to describe Broad in terms much less complimentary than those used by Major Draper at the Curiohaus proceedings.⁴¹

Of the accusing cacophony heard at the British Lueneburg Tribunal, only two witnesses, on reflection by the Prosecution, were chosen to give testimony at the trial of Dr. Tesch and Herr Weinbacher. The first of these was Dr. Charles Sigismund Bendel. In general, he supported the gross allegations made by Broad, although tending to conflict with him on specific points. Declaring himself an authority on Birkenau, he seemed to imply that he, as a physician, obtained his information either from being part of, or in charge of, the 900-man "Sonderkommando" which allegedly operated the crematories. From his testimony, it appears that the German term for this commando unit may have been "Hilflinger," or "helpers." He asserted that during the almost twelve months he was at Birkenau, the Germans killed one million people with Zyklon B, and that he performed post mortems on some of these victims. May, June, and July of 1944, he asserted, were the months of greatest killing activity. At the peak, in June,

25,000 persons were killed each day. Between May and June of 1944, he declared, 400,000 were killed, and a further 80,000 between 15 July and 1 September 1944. Dr. Bendel alleged that he witnessed the killing process itself, which, he said, was carried out by SS volunteers. Transports of 300 or fewer persons were shot; larger groups were "gassed" in the crematories or the "Bunker." In contrast to Broad, Dr. Bendel placed the capacities of Birkenau's crematory-gas chambers I and II at 2,000 each. Birkenau crematories III and IV⁴² allegedly held 1,000 each, while a "Bunker"—not Broad's "crematory V"—held 1,000.

Bendel testified that both underground chambers in crematories I and II were used for gassing and said the gas was added "from the roof, and it came straight down until it touched the floor." The 2,000 victims were packed naked into these two 10 meter by 4 meter by 1.72 meter chambers, their clothes having previously been taken from them for fumigation at Auschwitz-Zasole in a facility known to him. After killing, Bendel alleged, the hair was cut off the victims and the gold was taken from their dental work. He testified that the yield of gold during the lifetime of the camp was 17 tons (17,000 kg.) from four million victims.

Further, Dr. Bendel stated that during the entire two years of his imprisonment by the Germans, he observed only one⁴³ fumigation of a barracks with Zyklon B. "Lisoform," (apparently a cresol derivative similar to "Lysol") was the material used by the Germans for disinfection, he said. Zyklon B was used solely for killing people, and two 1 kilogram tin canisters were used in each of the underground chambers. He stated that a 1 kilogram can of Zyklon B was capable of killing 500 people,⁴⁴ so at a rate of 25,000 killings per day, fifty 1 kilogram tins of the material were required per day. The bodies of the victims were thrown into cremation pits where, after one hour, they had become ashes and disappeared.⁴⁵ Finally, Dr. Bendel testified that the Zyklon B was brought into the camp in a Red Cross van but was not delivered by the Red Cross itself.

Dr. Bendel was a Rumanian-Jewish physician who had been arrested in Paris on 4 November 1943, and sent to Drancy. On 10 December 1943, as a result of his not having French citizenship and as a result of his anti-German activities, he was shipped "east" to Auschwitz as a danger to the German war effort. He was an inmate in Auschwitz-Zasole, Auschwitz-Buna (Monowitz) and Auschwitz-Birkenau before evacuation to Mauthausen. He was at Birkenau from 27 February 1943 until January 1944. As a physician at Birkenau and a member of—perhaps even a leader of—the crematory "Sonderkommando" or "Hilflinger," he held a position envied by the other inmates, since he had special privileges (special quarters, special food, etc.) and was always sus-

pected of collaboration with the Germans. This collaboration indeed seems probable, since he admitted at Lueneburg that he had obtained his position at Birkenau through the efforts of Dr. Mengele. Quite possibly, with all the disease in the camp and the eternal shortage of physicians—and considering that he claimed to have done post mortem examinations—he may have been one of Dr. Mengele's helpers or "Hilfslinger."

Bendel's fantastic testimony can be challenged for many factual transgressions. He professed to know a lot about the killing operation, but he limits his details to the operation of Birkenau crematories I and II and completely omits any detail of the operations in crematories III and IV⁴⁶ and the ever-elusive "Bunker." He does not even betray the "Bunker's" location. His allegations that both underground rooms in each of crematories I and II were gas chambers conflicts totally with the process described by the Auschwitz Museum authorities who aver that only one room which had one small entry door served this purpose.⁴⁷ It is the Auschwitz Museum version which is supported by the OSS/CIA pictures released in 1979 showing single "gas chambers" each with four "gas shafts" attached to crematories I and II.

Inconsistencies and impossibilities, however, apparently did not bother Dr. Bendel. His additional statements under cross-examination that 1,000 naked bodies could be crammed into some 64 cubic meters "by the German technique" and that "four million people who were gassed at Auschwitz are the witnesses" completely cowed and intimidated the German Defense. The Defense on precisely these points, and on numerous others, should have then and there ripped his testimony to shreds. Instead, at one point when it appeared that Bendel might be backed into a corner by the anti-NSDAP German Defense and forced to give a detailed answer to a question about a previous accusation, he was allowed to make another horrendous accusation, and thereby avoided giving a detailed explanation of either accusation. As it was, his statements were a series of gratifying bonuses for the British Military Tribunal with its predestined objective, and "Chutzpah" triumphed again!⁴⁸

Dr. Sigismund Bendel, who gave his testimony in French, hoping perhaps thereby to eventually gain French citizenship, gave testimony generally much less believable than that of Broad. The use of three languages obviously increased translation difficulties, but such difficulties could not possibly result in the gross error and fantastic physical impossibilities brazenly stated in his testimony.⁴⁹

The very effective United Nations practice of introducing affidavits in lieu of witnesses who could be cross-examined was again resorted to in the case of the second "witness" from the

British Military Tribunal at Lueneburg, Dr. Ada Bimko. Being indisposed because of "acute angina pectorum," she could not parade before the Curiohaus Tribunal as she had done at Lueneburg, but her testimony was presented in the form of the two affidavits which she had already presented at Lueneburg. One of these affidavits stated that Zyklon B gas from a cylinder was run through pipes into and out of shower heads to kill the unsuspecting victims, who were expecting a shower bath.⁵⁰ Dr. Bimko was quite certain of herself, since she had observed no floor drains in the shower rooms, thus making them without question "gas chambers." She swore that records of the camp, secretly kept by the inmates themselves, and which she had examined, showed that about 4,000,000 persons had been cremated. She also swore that an SS Unterscharfuehrer whose name she had forgotten but who was a member of the camp medical staff had shown her the "crematory-gas chamber." She also referred to five crematories at Birkenau.

Dr. Ada Bimko was a Jewish physician from Sosnowitz, Poland, who had been at Auschwitz. Her depositions are freely sprinkled with "I was told's" and "They said's." On the sixth day of the Lueneburg Tribunal, she admitted that before her transfer to the Bergen-Belsen transit camp, she had been in charge of the Birkenau inmate hospital in Section B-3 ("Mexiko"), a fairly responsible job. Quite likely, she was in the same precarious position as Dr. Bendel—attempting to do sufficient penance with services rendered to placate the wrath of her co-religionists—and she went on obligingly from addendum to addendum in her depositions. There are four addenda in one deposition! This penance maneuver worked in many, perhaps even in most, cases. Thus it was all the more noteworthy when it occasionally failed, as it did in the case of Dr. Rezsoe (Rudolf) Kastner of the Budapest Zionist Relief Committee.

In her haste and eagerness to satisfy her interrogators, Dr. Bimko had unwittingly performed a service for the later historical revisionists. She actually described not Birkenau crematories I and II, which without question were crematories, but the buildings which the Germans described as "Badeanstalt fuer Sonderaktion," commonly referred to by the "Holocaust" historians as Birkenau crematoriums III and IV. The description given by Dr. Bimko sounds, for those who have seen it, very similar to a description of the shower installation at Dachau⁵¹—a concrete ceiling with rows of spray fittings, i.e., a shower bath!

The testimony of Alfred Zaun, the head bookkeeper at Tesch und Stabenow, established the quantities of Zyklon B ordered through them for various users (Tables I-III). Figures were available for 1942 and 1943, since, as has been noted, after 1943 all

German Government users drew their supplies of Zyklon B from the Wehrmacht Hauptsanitaetspark in Berlin. This new supply arrangement started, therefore, some two months before Dr. Bendel arrived at Birkenau!

In 1942, Tesch und Stabenow ordered a grand total of 79,069.9 kg. of Zyklon B; in 1943, 119,458.4 kg. This involved a total of 9,131.6 kg. to all camps in 1942 and 18,302.9 kg. in 1943. The Auschwitz complex received 7,500 kg. in 1942 and 12,000 kg. in 1943. At the same time, the Wehrmacht Hauptsanitaetspark in Berlin,⁵² which after 1943 supplied all Government users, received 11,232.0 kg. in 1942 and 19,982.0 kg. in 1943—a larger quantity in both years than the combined total for the concentration camps. These German Government orders had taken precedence over other orders from Norway for 5,794 kg. in 1942 and 12,004 kg. in 1943 as well as orders from the Finnish Army for 7,052.5 kg. in 1942 and 10,000.5 kg. in 1943.

Enormous as these quantities are in light of their unquestioned capacity to kill humans,⁵³ they are insufficiently small when considered in light of the huge fumigation⁵⁴ and delousing job that had to be accomplished just to keep epidemics at bay. Since Zyklon B could always be used to good advantage, much more of the material was normally ordered than could possibly be delivered. It simply was impossible to get more of it in wartime, shortage-ridden Germany regardless of the need. An idea of the degree of this shortage can be gained from the Finnish Army order in 1942. They ordered 15,000 kg. and received a mere 7,052.5 kg. As the war continued, the shortages grew more acute.

The profit realized by Tesch und Stabenow from the sale of Zyklon B to the combined Auschwitz Complex was RM4,500 in 1942 and RM5,000 in 1943 (Table III). This was about 1/18th the amount that Wilhelm Pook testified Sehm had told him Dr. Tesch and Herr Weinbacher were making from such sales. In 1942 Tesch und Stabenow made a total net profit of RM 113,000 and the next year RM 143,000. The gross profits from sales of Zyklon B purchased for the Auschwitz camps was less than 4% of the company's yearly net profits. In U.S. dollars at that time, these gross profits represented about \$1,000 in 1942 and \$1,250 in 1943. Zyklon B sales to Auschwitz were, therefore, hardly a factor in the enrichment of Dr. Tesch and Herr Weinbacher. The Prosecution, as true warriors in "class warfare,"⁵⁵ alleged that Dr. Tesch and Herr Weinbacher were typically so rapacious that they would do anything for a few more Reichsmarks!

The Defense

In presenting its case, the German Defense could do little more than place the defendants on the witness stand, calling in addi-

tion persons who had known them and their work and having these persons testify under oath as to the characters of Dr. Tesch and Herr Weinbacher. In a situation all too characteristic of the post-World War II United Nations Military Tribunals, it was obvious from the beginning of the proceedings that the burden of proof lay heaviest upon the Defense, and that burden was one of disproving beyond a doubt the accusations made frivolously and without restraint by the Prosecution—all this quite contrary to Major Draper's pious declamations (of the defendants being innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt) otherwise. Stirling, the British Judge Advocate at Lueneburg, had already ruled that 4½ million Jews had been killed with Zyklon B. Was he now likely to reverse his judgement as a result of any evidence presented in Dr. Tesch's case? By this time, the die was cast! Someone logically had to have recommended the use of the poison and also furnished it for that purpose.

Dr. Tesch admitted his connection with Zyklon B and its commercial development, as a result of his efforts, into a useful, effective fumigant. He discussed its use in fumigation chambers to fumigate clothing and the necessity of simultaneous bathing to kill body lice if people were being deloused⁵⁶ to prevent typhus epidemics. In this regard, he pointed out that Gentiles and Jews from the eastern regions were equally afflicted with typhus-carrying lice. He denied vehemently, however, every time he was questioned about it, ever having recommended or known of the use of Zyklon B to purposely kill humans. On the contrary, he emphasized, his efforts had always been, rather, to protect humans and save their lives! In spite of all safety precautions, there had been regrettable accidents while using the lethal material, but in no way had there ever been, to his knowledge, intentional killings. If he had learned Zyklon B was being misused to kill people, he would have stopped ordering the material for the offending user immediately.

His firm had contracted to fumigate barracks in several camps. Auschwitz camps were included in these, but the SS on their own responsibility also fumigated barracks. Because of the known size of the Auschwitz complex with its many sub-camps (Table IV) and the known high level of louse infestation in that area, the amount of Zyklon B ordered for Auschwitz through his firm prior to 1944 was not considered excessive. Rather, Auschwitz probably could have used much more Zyklon B in its fumigation operations had it been available, and thus reduced further the many deaths resulting from typhus.⁵⁷

In his cross-examination, the British Military Prosecutor, Major Draper, was obviously more interested in the political implications of the trial rather than in whether Dr. Tesch actually was

guilty of the charge as stated in the indictment. Draper's manner was abusive, and his questions were usually "loaded."

All Draper's questions Dr. Tesch attempted to answer fully. He had joined the NSDAP on 1 May 1933, but was not an active member. His wife was also a Party member. Yes, for RM2.00 per month,⁵⁸ he was also a "supporting member" of the SS, but for this he received no favors and might not wear a uniform. He would not agree that the SS was the most ferocious anti-Jewish Party group. No, he did not believe the Jews should be persecuted, but he believed they should leave public life and lead their own lives. No, there had never been persecution of Jews in Germany comparable to that in (Czarist) Russia. He had read inflammatory articles against the Jews and had heard of synagogue burnings, but these acts were openly criticized by most Germans. Goebbels had triggered these excesses, but Hitler had stopped them. He had not heard of the destruction of Jewish property. Draper asked him: "Is it now clear, do you agree with me that your gas helped to exterminate four million people in one concentration camp?" To this rather complex, loaded question, Dr. Tesch answered, according to the translator: "That I did not know; if it was my gas I did not know it."

The translators do not quote Dr. Tesch as saying that Bendel lied, although there are numerous examples during the trial in which Bendel obviously did just that. Rather, Dr. Tesch is placed in the much weaker position of saying that Bendel "passed the truth" and "exaggerated." Because the record is in English, we will never know whether Dr. Tesch could not bring himself to believe that an educated man, such as he considered Bendel to be, would blatantly and glibly lie knowing that he was sending innocent men to their deaths, or whether it was a fluke in the interpreters' choices of words. Might it have been the intent of the translators to leave the impression that as a result of guilt, Dr. Tesch didn't have the nerve to accuse his antagonist of lying?

Dr. Tesch found Broad's testimony much more believable, but pointed out that Broad had not identified the Zyklon B he saw at Auschwitz as having been ordered through Tesch und Stabenow, and that he had revealed that a manufacturer of Zyklon B was located near Auschwitz. As a scientific man accustomed to reason in word and thought, Dr. Tesch pointed out that if humans were ever packed into any space as tightly as Dr. Bendel testified, they would promptly suffocate, making the use of poison gas quite superfluous. He had heard that in Riga, Latvia, a group containing a few Jews had been shot for crimes they had committed in wartime. He could not understand how Dr. Diels could say what he did in his affidavit with no evidence to support his charges. He was unaware that the SS were a law unto them-

selves and not subject to ordinary courts, as Draper averred. Nor had he known that the Gestapo used methods different from ordinary police; he had had no reason to doubt their integrity. He had not heard of four million people going "up the chimney" (as smoke) at Auschwitz.

Yes, he still believed that Zyklon B was used only for fumigation. Responding to this, Draper asked: "Did you feel the SS were more reliable than the Allied [United Nations] authorities, as a matter of information?" Dr. Tesch answered with honesty and great perception (again according to the interpreter): "I cannot say because during the war I did not hear anything else. Today, I think that something might be true but probably there are exaggerations or misunderstandings." Draper replied: "Were you aware that the murder of the four million was partly arranged by the Reicharzt SS?" Dr. Tesch answered: "This is quite news to me. I have never thought of that."

Dr. Tesch then proceeded to say that during his visit to the Sachsenhausen-Oranienburg concentration camp, the inmates in striped suits looked well-fed, healthy and "quite happy." He had heard Hitler say in a speech that a Jewish Zone was being set up in the eastern provinces, and he believed him. Further, he had no reason to believe that Hitler had lied to the Germans. He believed that Hitler and the SS had been perfectly correct in their behavior. He believed Sehm and Bendel to be incorrect in their testimony. Sehm had probably misinterpreted an unimportant remark and invented the remainder; his testimony was "quite impossible." The thought of killing Jews with Zyklon B had never occurred to Dr. Tesch, who believed also that the other witnesses misunderstood something they saw or heard. He did not believe that concentration camps were a natural consequence of the NSDAP but that they were originated to contain persons considered dangerous to the state. Dr. Tesch ended his testimony by saying: "I was not a militant member of the Nazi [sic] Party but I was always loyal to the German State."

With these honest, forthright statements, Dr. Tesch had more or less sealed his own doom and dragged his unfortunate business associate, Herr Weinbacher, into the maelstrom along with him.

Major Draper had failed to prove that either Dr. Tesch or Herr Weinbacher was involved in any alleged plot to kill Jews (or Russians, or anyone else) with Zyklon B or even that the Zyklon B allegedly seen at Auschwitz by Broad had without question been ordered through Tesch und Stabenow. What Draper had done was to produce warm, live bodies to fill roles which had been conjured up deductively and rationalistically to conform to and support the war-time "Holocaust" allegations of Germany's ac-

cusers. One of these was an apparently repentant SS man who, for whatever reasons he might have had, testified under oath⁵⁹ that what the United Nations propaganda mills had been screaming about for years was true. That, along with the rabid testimonials at the Lueneburg Bergen-Belsen Tribunal, provided a tale which, if not examined too closely for accuracy and cohesiveness, could be used to calm and reassure those United Nations nationals who had been waiting uneasily for the revelations at war's end which would justify the many self-serving allegations disseminated by propagandists in the prosecution of the war. Many were doubtless fearful of another post-war investigation of such charges, *à la* that which followed World War I, and of what might occur if the people of the United Nations should discover that they had been monstrously deceived a second time by anti-German propagandists.

To the drama created by Broad's testimony, Draper added Dr. Bruno Tesch, cast in the role of a brazen, diabolical, unrepentant, unrehabilitable "Nazi," a "member" of the "infamous" SS, the developer of the iniquitous Zyklon B, an obvious German heretic and fanatic who, even after seeing the many bloated corpses of Bergen-Belsen, Dachau, etc. in the United Nations-sponsored newspapers, still had the effrontery, the unmitigated gall, even as a prisoner before the United Nations Bar of Justice, to doubt and question the "facts" established; to maintain that from what he knew Nazi racial policy did not lead inevitably to concentration camps and gas chambers, that the SS did not purposefully kill at least four million Jews at Auschwitz with Zyklon B developed, recommended and provided by him to the concentration camps for that purpose, and so on.

Most certainly, Dr. Tesch could never become a "born-again German" through any of those quasi-religious, mock-baptismal cleansing rites of intellect cartharsis, called "Denazification" or "Reeducation," which Germany's conquerors were yet to decree for Germans who possessed concepts and values contrary to their own.

The British Military Tribunal was confronted with an elementary problem of logic. If, on the basis of the obviously sullied, unclean testimony presented against Dr. Tesch, they acquitted him and Herr Weinbacher, there would have been no one else apparently at hand against whom could be made the accusation of supplying Zyklon B or initially recommending its use to kill Jews. If, indeed, there was a "Holocaust," SOMEONE had to have carried out these functions.

With no "Holocaust" to take their place in the columns of the world's newspapers, the many surreptitious, undercover activities, plans and responsibilities of Franklin D. Roosevelt and his

proto-United Nations co-conspirators prior to, during and after the war—today still too-little publicized—would have come under immediate, murderous, and lasting scrutiny. This would have resulted in the United Nations wartime charges and the (still-vulnerable) “integrity” of this organization being ripped asunder in a manner which would have made the revelations about Allied lies found in the World War I Bryce Committee Report on propaganda charges look by comparison like reports on a love feast. If the many plans already formulated diplomatically and formally or informally in war conferences were to be fully, irreversibly implemented as the planners wished, the “New” United Nations organization would have to have the full support of those who might otherwise strongly oppose it. The wartime “atrocities propaganda” charges made by the victors to inflame their soldiers and citizenry, and to justify and condone their own use of progressively more violent, ruthless measures against Germany and Japan, simply had to be sustained after the war. There was emphatically to be no “Peace Without Victory” this time, no “Forgive and Forget.” And—no “coming clean” about wartime propaganda charges.⁶⁰

C.L. Stirling, who had already functioned as Judge Advocate at the Lueneburg British Military Tribunal regarding the Birkenau SS staff must have pondered his personal position were Dr. Tesch to be freed. A large number of Germans—some of them women—had already been killed by the British because they had allegedly killed all those people at Auschwitz. Any decision in the Tesch/Weinbacher trial simply had to conform to this fact. An acquittal would have been most embarrassing, given what had already been “decided” about Auschwitz—and already done (executions) about it. Stirling was doubtless chosen for both his offices—as were the others—on the basis of his dedication and adaptability to the goals and the great “New” postwar world envisioned by the founding fathers of the United Nations, the Illuminati of the impending Utopian Millenium! Any doubts or stirrings of conscience cannot, therefore, have posed a problem insurmountable to Stirling. The loss of Dr. Tesch and Herr Weinbacher, even if innocent, would be no loss at all to the “New Germany” in the “New World Order” envisioned by the United Nations.

Verdict, Sentence, Execution

The verdict was short. Both Dr. Tesch and Herr Weinbacher were declared “Guilty.” Dr. Drosihn was acquitted. The Tribunal’s sentence: Dr. Tesch and Herr Weinbacher must hang! Another British Military Tribunal (there were to be 216 such tribunals) had cut a swath through Germans.

There were still attempts to avoid execution of the sentence. Both condemned men protested their innocence in appeals to the Commander of the 8th Corps District of the British Army of the Rhine. Briefs from their defense attorneys were attached outlining and documenting more fully the unreliable character of the testimonies of Sehm, Broad, Bendel, and the others. The appeals were denied. A subsequent appeal for a pardon for both men was made by the employees of Tesch und Stabenow, and yet another for a pardon for Herr Weinbacher was made by his stepsister. These appeals were similarly refused.

On 26 April 1946, Montgomery of Alamein, Commander-in-Chief, BAOR, issued death warrants to the Director or Officer-in-Charge of the Hamburg Prison to execute Dr. Tesch and Herr Weinbacher within 24 hours after receipt of the writ. Both warrants were executed at 11:23 AM on 16 May 1946, at Hameln Zuchthaus (prison). Dr. Bruno Tesch and Herr Karl Weinbacher were dead.

Both these honorable, innocent men died, probably aghast that such a monster masquerading as "Justice," which had previously raged east of the Bug River, now stalked purposefully with unchecked violence east of the Maas River.

For Dr. Tesch and Herr Weinbacher, the ordeal was ended. But for those Germans still alive out of what had been a Nation of 80 million⁶¹ before the war, it had barely begun. An ordeal of far greater magnitude was about to be unleashed upon them with deadly, methodical, Cromwellian-puritan efficiency and fury, with the "Holocaust" tales associated with Zyklon B and, principally, the Auschwitz camp, cited over and over again—to this day—as the ostensible "moral" justification. The trial of Dr. Bruno Tesch and his associates was of no small importance to the firm establishment of these tales. We have seen how that trial was conducted, and on what bases it reached its conclusions. From this some conclusions of our own about how to approach and examine one of the most astounding and incredible collections of tales in not only recent, but all, history, must naturally follow.

Table I

Zyklon B Users Ordering Through Tesch und Stabenow*

- I. German Government Users (Before 1944)
 - A. Concentration Camps
 - 1. Auschwitz Complex
 - 2. Gross Rosen
 - 3. Majdanek-Lublin
 - 4. Neuengamme-Hamburg
 - 5. Ravensbrueck
 - 6. Sachsenhausen-Oranienburg
 - B. Wehrmacht Hauptsanitaetspark, Berlin
 - C. SS Voransalon** (Including Waffen SS)
- II. German Non-Government, Non-Military Users
 - A. Disinfection Institute of City of Guthafen
 - B. German Hygiene Institute, Riga
 - C. City Police, Stettin
 - D. Burgomeister's Office, Danzig
 - E. German Railway Repair Works, Posen
- III. Foreign Users
 - A. Finnish Army, Helsinki
 - B. Norsk Fumigating Company, Oslo

* This list is not intended to be a comprehensive list of all Zyklon B users who had their orders processed by Tesch und Stabenow. Rather, the institutions given are those specifically mentioned in the trial transcript.

** Main SS (possibly Purchasing) Office

Table II

Quantities of Zyklon B Ordered Through or by
Tesch und Stabenow for Various Users in 1942 and 1943*

	<u>1942</u>	<u>1943</u>	<u>Incremental Increase 1942-43</u>
Total Zyklon B Ordered Through or by Tesch und Stabenow (kg.)	79,069.9	119,458.4	151%
Total Zyklon B Ordered for All German Government Users (kg.)	20,363.6	38,284.9	188%
Percentage Represented of Total Tesch und Stabenow Orders	25.75%	32.05%	
Total Zyklon B Ordered for Wehrmacht Hauptsanitaetspark, Berlin (kg.)	11,232.0	19,982.0	178%
Percentage Represented of Total Tesch und Stabenow Orders	14.21%	16.73%	
Total Zyklon B Ordered for ALL Concentration Camps (kg.)	9,131.6	18,302.9	200%
Percentage Represented of Total Tesch und Stabenow Orders	11.55%	15.32%	
Total Zyklon B Ordered for AUSCHWITZ CAMPS (kg.)	7,500	12,000	160%
Percentage Represented of Total Tesch und Stabenow Orders	9.48%	10.05%	
Total Zyklon B Ordered for Other (Non-German) Users	-		
Finnish Army, Helsinki, Finland (kg.)	7,052.5	10,000	142%
Norsk Fumigating Company, Oslo, Norway (kg.)	5,794.8	12,004	207%

* After December, 1943, all German Government users of Zyklon B obtained their supplies from the Wehrmacht Hauptsanitaetspark, Berlin.

Table III

**Tesch und Stabenow Profits for Years 1942 and 1943
and Their Dependence Upon Zyklon B Orders***
(All Figures in Reichsmarks)

<u>1942</u>	Tesch und Stabenow	<u>1943</u>
113,000	Total Net Profit	143,000
	Total Value Of Zyklon B Ordered By or Through	
425,000	Tesch und Stabenow	396,000
	Total Gross Profit From Zyklon B	
	Ordered by or Through	
92,000	Tesch und Stabenow	127,000
	Total Gross Profit From Processing	
	Orders for Zyklon B	
12,096	for Government Users	12,900**
	Total Gross Profits From Processing	
	Orders for Zyklon B	
5,424	for All Camps	6,167**
	Total Gross Profits From Orders	
	Processed By	
	Tesch und Stabenow	
	for the	
4,500 (4%)***	Auschwitz Camps	5,000 (3.5%)***

After 31 December 1943, all German Government users of Zyklon B were supplied by the Wehrmacht Hauptsanitaetspark, Berlin.

* The tally sheets used in the trial which were prepared by Alfred Zaun, Chief Bookkeeper for Tesch und Stabenow, were lost along with the other Exhibits used in the trial proceedings. The above chart is a reconstruction from data given in the trial transcript. In some cases, where indicated, the values are prorated.

**These values were calculated by using 10% of the gross value for the first five months of 1943 and 2½% thereafter. These fees were set by the German Government.

***The values in parentheses for the Auschwitz Camps represent the percentage of the total Tesch und Stabenow net profit. The Auschwitz profit is actually a gross value from which overhead, freight, etc. must still be deducted to obtain the true profit. The true per cent net profit is therefore even smaller than the percentage given in parentheses!

Table IV

The Camps Associated With the Auschwitz Complex*	
Auschwitz I—Auschwitz-Zasole (The "Stammlager"—Original Camp, Headquarters for the entire complex)	
Auschwitz II—Auschwitz-Birkenau ("Birkenau")	
Auschwitz III—Auschwitz-Buna ("Monowitz" [I.G. Farbenindustrie])	
Babice	Ledziny-Lawki
Blachowinia Slaska	Libiaz Maly
Brobek	Lagiewniki
Budy	Lagisza Cmentarna
Bruenn (Czechoslovakia)	Plawy
Chelmek	Prudnik
Chorzow	Rajsko
Czechowice-Dziedzice	Rydułtowy
Czernia	Rybnik
Gleiwitz (4 Camps)	Siemianowice
Goleszow	Sosnowiec
Hajduki	Stara Kuznia
Harmenze	Swietochlowice
Huta Ksiazeca	Trachy
Jawoszpwoce	Trzebinia
Jaworzno	Trzebionka
Kobior	Zabrze

*Taken from Datner, et. al., *Genocide*, Warsaw, 1962, p. 96. Auschwitz-Zasole remained the Administrative Headquarters of the entire system until November 1943 (NO-021), when the entire administrative system was reorganized on orders from Reichsfuehrer-SS Heinrich Himmler. The Auschwitz Complex, like its smaller counter-parts Buchenwald, Dachau, Mauthausen, etc., and their sub-camps, reported to SS Headquarters in Oranienburg.

Notes

1. Robert H. Jackson, United States; I. Nikitchenko and A. Trainin, USSR; Viscount (William Allen) Jowitt, United Kingdom; Robert Falco, France. *Trial of the Major War Criminals* (hereafter cited as TMWC), Vol. 1, p. 8.
2. The "Durchgangslager" (transit camp) Bergen-Belsen was a camp primarily for Jews destined to leave Europe, usually via Spain. Here, the dead were primarily Jewish. In other camps, the dead were overwhelmingly Polish.
3. See statements by Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence, TMWC, Vol. IX, pp. 33-34.
4. In view of the recent happenings involving Dr. Wilhelm Staeglich, who because of his authorship of the book *Der Auschwitz Mythos: Legende oder Wirklichkeit?* (Tuebingen: Grabert Verlag, 1979) suffered the "withdrawl" or "revocation" by the Georg-August University in Goettingen of the doctoral title awarded him there in 1951 (presumably for academic excellence), it is of interest to observe that Dr. Kolb—who was awarded his title (Dr. phil.) in 1959—has apparently done quite well since 1960 as "Assistant am Historischen Seminar der Universitaet Goettingen" by hawking the version of history deemed "kosher" by the occupation authorities. For years, some have looked derisively upon the social studies as disciplines being no more than exercises in remembering and "regurgitating" dogma solemnly pronounced in lecture. Without the active questioning, searching and testing provided by the historical revisionists, it is difficult to see how the study of history could be much more!
5. *New York Times*, 22 April 1945, p. 12.
6. It is the detailed study of the individual mental gymnastics of these witnesses in the various cases, each struggling to save his own life with stories of his own invention, mingled with just enough truth to deceive the unwary, striving to support the thesis of the Prosecution and yet leave himself guiltless, which has been most fruitful for the historical revisionist. With concentrated, in-depth study, the "Holocaust" accusations become a tangled mass of conflicting, even self-refuting charges, clearly tailored at the time to support the general charges preordained and demanded by the United Nations prosecutors.
7. Besides being very destructive to foods and other goods, vermin and insects are dangerous carriers of diseases harmful to humans.
8. As wartime shortages grew more acute, the lachrymator or "warning agent" was omitted, this change and the attendant danger being duly noted on the billing and on the can label.
9. Because of its deadliness, Zyklon B was always sold in sheet steel cans which had been soldered shut at the factory. They were opened by placing a special circular cutter on the can and hitting it once sharply with a hammer. Once the can-top was cut out in this manner, all the material contained in the can was to be used. The

can could not be resealed. Zyklon B was sold and priced according to the amount (by weight) of hydrogen cyanide contained in the can (RM5.00/kg.), and this weight was always printed clearly on the label. The can sizes in Germany were: 100g., 200g., 500g., 1,000g., and 1,500g.—the weights referring to contained hydrogen cyanide. The corresponding total can weights were about three times these given weights because of the weight of the absorbant material and the can itself.

The fatal dosage of hydrogen cyanide for a normal-sized man varies, but Puntigam, Breymesser and Bernfus (*Blausaeuregas-kammern zur Fleckfieberabwehr*, p. 200), give this dosage as about 70 milligrams.

A hydrogen cyanide concentration of 50 parts per million (0.005%) in air is considered dangerous to human life. At 200ppm. (0.02%), loss of consciousness may be rapid, following by death if medical treatment is not promptly administered.

At higher concentrations, hydrogen cyanide forms explosive mixtures with air. The explosive range is from 6-41% (vol.) of hydrogen cyanide in air.

There was also a "Zyklon A." Chemically, it was methyl cyanoformate. It also was highly toxic and was a good fumigating agent, but since it was potentially useful as a war gas and as a chemical intermediate for war gases, Germany was forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles to manufacture it. It could have anyway, but didn't.

10. Hydrogen cyanide gas was used by the German Army in World War I for fumigation before Zyklon B was developed.
11. Other fumigating gases used by Tesch und Stabenow were "Tritox" (trichloroacetonitrile), "T-Gas" (a mixture of ethylene oxide and carbon dioxide), and "Original Gas" (a mixture of methal and ether).
12. Where large quantities of hydrogen cyanide (Zyklon B gas) were regularly required, they were most often generated at the site by reacting sulfuric acid with sodium cyanide. Hydrogen cyanide made in this manner was much cheaper than the RM5.00 per kilogram paid for it as Zyklon B.
13. In the United States, one hydrogen cyanide supplier for fumigating firms was the American Cyanamid and Chemical Corporation. See their *Military Fumigation Manual*, 1944. For other uses of Zyklon B for fumigation in the U.S., see U.S. Public Health Service, *Public Health Reports*, Vol. 46, No. 27 (3 July 1931), pp. 1572-1578, and No. 38 (10 July 1931), pp. 1633-1636.
14. Because of a patent dispute, relations between the DEGESCH and Tesch und Stabenow were not cordial. This dispute resulted among other things in Tesch und Stabenow's insisting on its own special label on all cans of Zyklon B ordered through them after 1942.
15. Dr. Gerhard Peter's decision was final. After the war he was arrested on charges similar to those brought against Dr. Tesch and Herr Weinbacher. He was released from United Nations custody after serving a total of about five years in prison including time awaiting trial. (Gerald Reitlinger, *The Final Solution* [London: Val-

- lentine, Mitchell, 1968], p. 148.) As of 1983, the DEGESCH was still doing business in Germany and internationally.
16. The use of hydrogen cyanide for fumigation represented a heavy penalty the Germans had to pay in the forfeiture of production of other chemicals they needed desperately. One kilogram of hydrogen cyanide could be converted into 3.7kg. of methyl methacrylate or 1.96kg. of acrylonitrile. Both chemicals were and still are essential ingredients in the plastics industry. Acrylonitrile was in addition a component of Buna N synthetic rubber which the Germans could never produce in sufficient quantity.
- Hydrogen cyanide remains to this day an almost indispensable "heavy" chemical. Most of it is "captive" production used in "on-site" industrial synthesis. A single plant may make enough hydrogen cyanide in a 24-hour period every day which, if properly distributed, would kill the entire population of the United States! The use of highly toxic chemicals in heavy industry is nothing new, nor is it alarming. In addition to hydrogen cyanide, large quantities of phosgene are made for use in the plastics industry and large quantities of liquid hydrogen fluoride are used in the refining industry. The extent of production of carbon monoxide each day in the United States by all sources in which it is an intermediate chemical reactant confounds the imagination.
17. British Army Number 328165.
18. Dr. Joachim Drosihn was a zoologist employed by Tesch und Stabenow.
19. This mastery, an unstated goal of American international adventurers and their allies, had not been accomplished in 1918, as a result of an embarrassing number of fateful circumstances. As advantageous as the "idealistic" Wilsonian "Fourteen Points" might have been to achieving an Allied propaganda victory, they were still an abomination, an albatross around the necks of the victors at the end of the war when they were eager to divide the spoils. Their general and open refusal to adhere to these stated principles—also the sheer bloodiness of the conflict just ended—led to early disillusionment and resulted in an unexpectedly short re-education/occupation/"reconstruction" period.
- As a means to insure that this situation would not be repeated in World War II, the Roosevelt-Churchill propaganda instrument finally and finely called the "Atlantic Charter" was published. Objectively appraised, the "Atlantic Charter" was a minor public relations issue of the Argentia (Newfoundland) conference. The conference itself was really the first of a number of United Nations war conferences. It was unique only from the standpoint that the United States at the time was officially (though not actually) a "Neutral."
20. This did not invariably work to the advantage of the United Nations prosecutors. As it became apparent (from statements such as that of Robert H. Jackson—see p. 270) that they were expected to become parties to a monstrous legal atrocity and historical fraud, they sometimes—even at the cost of placing themselves in jeopardy—fought with the "strength of ten" against verdicts they knew to

be unjust, preordained, and inevitable. "Anti-NSDAP" though they might have been, they could nevertheless easily recognize injustice in the form of a legalized lynching, and would fight it to the bitter end! Little wonder that in Berlin in 1945-46, many who had opposed Hitler but had finally seen the form German "reconstruction" by the United Nations was to take, said privately: "Herr Gott schenkt uns das Fuenfte Reich. Das Vierte ist dem Dritten Gleich!" (Lord God give us the Fifth Reich. The Fourth is unto the Third like!)

21. TMWC, Vol. III, p. 551.
22. The later testimony of Alfred Zaun, Tesch und Stabenow's chief bookkeeper, showed this statement to be completely false. (See pp. 282-83.)
23. Full name: Bernhard Detlev Friedrich Carl Frahm.
24. Vermin is properly translated into German as *das Ungeziefer* (preferred), *die Brut*, *das Gesindel*, or *das Geschmeiss*.
25. Tesch und Stabenow furnished heating elements to vaporize Zyklon B gas, and pipes for the circulation system, both for use in standard fumigation chambers. (See note 30.)
26. TMWC, Vol. III, p. 551.
27. German Federal Archives (*Bundesarkiv*), Koblenz, West Germany.
28. In his appeal attempting to save Herr Weinbacher's life, Dr. Stumme showed that on the basis of testimony given during the trial, 1,000kg. of Zyklon B gas would have been necessary to fumigate 200,000 uniforms once!
29. The larger can sizes (see note 9) were intended for larger fumigation chambers or for the fumigation of barracks.
30. The development of the Zyklon B fumigation chamber spanned the two World Wars, and depended almost entirely upon the danger of epidemics from lice-carried spotted typhus. These chambers were therefore known and referred to as "hydrogen cyanide delousing chambers" ("Blausaeure-Entlausungs-kammer"). Faced with the absolute necessity of such chambers and a lethal fumigating agent (always in short supply) in wartime, the DEGESCH delousing chamber was designed. It provided for the safe introduction of the sealed Zyklon B can of the required size for the volume of the fumigating chamber. The entry port was sealed airtight and the can opened by an externally-operated screw which pierced the soldered can inside the sealed chamber, allowing the Zyklon B granules to fall onto a heated surface (the "Vergasergeraet" ["Gasifier"] or "stove," in the jargon of the "Holocaust" disciples), assuring the evaporation of the liquid hydrogen cyanide from the granules. A circulatory fan circulated the air / Zyklon B mixture within the chamber to mix the gases. This prevented gas stratification, since Zyklon B gas is lighter than air (not heavier, as so often erroneously stated or implied by the "Holocaust" propagandists), and made certain that the required mixture of 20g. of Zyklon B per cubic meter of air penetrated throughout the entire fumigation chamber, including the clothing articles to be deloused. With the circulation fan, the fumigation could be completed in one hour. Without such a system, the entire procedure required at least 16 hours—preferably 24 hours. After fumigation, the circulation sys-

tem exhausted the poisonous mixture up a stack and aired the fumigated clothing before the airtight doors to the chamber were opened and the deloused, fumigated clothing removed to be reclaimed by its owners.

The advantages of such chambers were obvious and substantial. By the Summer of 1943, 552 Zyklon B fumigation or delousing chambers with circulation systems had been constructed at 226 different sites. One hundred more had been constructed without circulation systems and were being used despite the longer fumigation time. Almost half these delousing chambers were constructed between January 1942 and April 1943. The munitions industry had 249 such chambers either in regular operation or under construction, since in the Summer of 1943 it became obligatory to inspect foreign workers regularly for the duration of the war to insure that they were and remained free from vermin. (Emil Wuestinger, "Vermehrter Einsatz von Blausaeure-Entlausungskammern," ["Increased Usage of Hydrogen Cyanide Delousing Chambers"], *Gesundheits-Ingenieur*, Jahrgang 67, Heft 7, pp. 179-80.)

31. Tesch und Stabenow began using its own distinctive labels on Zyklon B ordered through its offices in 1942.
32. WO 235/165, Case 145, Vols. I-VII, January-March 1946.
33. Bernd Naumann, *Auschwitz* (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 162-82.
34. The existing crematory at Auschwitz-Zasole has three ventilators (ventilator openings) on top—one of which was allegedly used in the killing operation. All ventilators are square, about 8" long on a side. This crematory is the result of the addition of a second furnace containing two muffles (two cremation positions) to the "Old Crematorium," giving a total of four cremation positions (four muffles) at this site.
35. The numbering system for the crematories at the Auschwitz complex can cause confusion. In the German usage, crematory I was at Auschwitz-Zasole. Crematories II and III were at Auschwitz-Birkenau, as were the buildings referred to in the "Holocaust" literature as crematories IV and V, but by the Germans as "Badeanstalt(en) fuer Sonderaktion." This paper refers to crematories II and III (at Birkenau—German usage) as Nos. I and II, respectively.
36. This concept is one of several which must be true without question if the "Holocaust" intent of the Germans and the figures of 4-4½ million Jews allegedly killed at Auschwitz-Birkenau is to be accepted as credible. After what is presumed to have been a detailed search, the Auschwitz Museum revealed (cf. Danuta Czech, *Hefte Aus Auschwitz*) in 1959-1964 that only 202,499 inmate numbers were given out at Auschwitz. Number 202,499 was given to a German habitual criminal from Mauthausen only ten days before the camp was captured by the Russians.
The International Red Cross, in published data which, on the basis of United Nations allegations, is admitted by them to be grossly incomplete because data from numerous satellite camps is missing, lists 50,923 persons dead in Auschwitz-Zasole, Auschwitz-Birkenau and Auschwitz-Buna (Monowitz). The first two camps are sup-

posed to have been the "murder camps." Their data is based upon the "Totenbuch" which the Germans themselves kept in each camp. This "incomplete" data represents those records kept by the Germans of inmates who died of any and all causes in the three main Auschwitz camps. (A. de Cocatrix [Director of the International Tracing Service, Arolsen, Germany], "The Number of Victims of the National Socialist Persecution" [see bibliography].)

37. Reitlinger says (p. 150) that the first crematory built at Auschwitz-Birkenau (No. I) began service on 13 March 1943, and as late as 13 June 1943 it was still the only one operational. Up to this time, the crematory at Auschwitz-Zasole was used. I have found no German document which indicates that crematory II at Birkenau ever became functional. On the other hand, many documents exist which deal with the construction and operation of crematory I at Birkenau. The alleged dates of service above are "estimated" by "Holocaust" historians.
38. Exhibit 2 in the trial (picture missing).
39. A concentration camp formerly in the Mauthausen system.
40. Naumann, pp. xi-xxx.
41. Some may say that Perry Broad had not played honorably, but it must be said of him that he had correctly assessed the nature of the deadly game being played with him and the others, and by his adept—albeit deceitful—playing with his tormentors, he won his life from them while many others in being honest had lost theirs. In 1945 in conquered, occupied Germany, that in many persons' minds was all that still mattered!
- ✓ 42. See note 35.
43. Perry Broad's testimony (pp. 277-78) indicates a much greater frequency of barrack fumigation with Zyklon B.
44. Dr. Bendel's value of the lethal dosage of 1,000g. per 500 people (2g. per person) conflicts sharply with the value given in the literature: 70 mg. per person, which is 0.07g. per person (see note 9). Any reasonable killing procedure might have been expected to contain a "safety factor" of perhaps five times the estimated lethal dosage—but hardly a factor 28 times greater than necessary!
45. Although flesh can rapidly be converted by fire into unrecognizable ash, bone cannot. Even the alleged grinding up of these bones would leave microscopic residue recognizable as bone, if not human bone. The one small ball mill ordered by SS Standartenfuehrer Blobel from Schriever & Co. in 1942 (NO 4467) could hardly have dealt with the multitude of corpses alleged to have been incinerated in the crematories, much less those allegedly cremated in open trenches (supposedly "disappearing" in the flames). Had the pond at Birkenau been used as alleged (the disposal site for human ashes) it would be today a mound containing many millions of pieces of calcined bone still recognizable as human bone! If the Vistula had been so used, its bed would have been strewn with tell-tale pieces of burnt bone all the way to Warsaw, if not Danzig!
46. All official German reference to these buildings identified them as "Badeanstalt(en) fuer Sonderaktion"—bathhouse(s) for special action (or special purpose).

47. The original German plans described these rooms, one each for crematories I and II, as "Leichenkeller"—mortuaries for corpses awaiting cremation. Work by Dr. Robert Faurisson supports this description completely.
48. Both Bendel and Broad alleged that in the killing procedure, two one-kilogram cans of Zyklon B were used in each chamber. One may note with some interest that the Zyklon B purchase orders from the DEGESCH for the Oranienburg (Sachsenhausen) and Auschwitz camps, dated from February to April 1944 and allegedly surrendered by Kurt Gerstein at his capture by United Nations troops, dealt exclusively with 500g. cans. In case of shortages, of course, two 500g. cans would replace a 1kg. can, but it appears that only the 500g. cans were shipped, indicating that the need was for the smaller can. The question obviously arises: What use was there for a 500g. can of Zyklon B at the Auschwitz and Sachsenhausen-Oranienburg disinfection and decontagion stations ("Entwesung und Entseuchung Station")? The standard fumigation chamber was 10 cubic meters in volume and required only a 200g. can of Zyklon B to obtain the required concentration of 20g. Zyklon B gas per cubic meter of air. Consequently, one is led to believe that both these sites and/or their sub-camps had fumigation chambers with some 25 cubic meters of volume. Where were they located? A good bet might be the "Sauna" (closed to the public now) at Birkenau for new arrivals, and the buildings designated by the Germans as "Badeanstalt(en) fuer Sonderaktion" (now completely destroyed), also at Birkenau, which probably functioned as the recurrent delousing stations for the personnel permanently interned there.
49. In examining the entire testimony given by Dr. Bendel, I could not help but notice the extreme similarity of parts of it with the alleged experiences of the legendary Dr. Miklos Nyszli. (For an interesting discussion of Nyszli, see Paul Rassinier, Debunking the Genocide Myth [Torrance, Calif.: Noontide Press, 1978], pp. 244-50.)
50. From 30 August 1944, when W.H. Lawrence described in the New York Times (pp. 1,9) the "River Rouge" killing installation at the Lublin, Poland, Majdanek camp which was "almost identical with those pictured in American motion pictures," the preferred Allied propaganda line as to the method of killing had been that it was the introduction of hydrogen cyanide gas from cylinders through pipes into the chambers disguised as baths. Dr. Bimko sought to give support to this allegation and was successful at the British Lueneburg Tribunal. At Dr. Tesch's trial, it became obvious that the claim of this method had to be abandoned, since Zyklon B was a solid and would not flow through pipes! Also, it was stored in relatively small cans and not in gas cylinders. Hydrogen cyanide is a liquid at room temperature and vaporizes only slowly unless heated. (See note 30.)
Professor Karl Schwartz testified that so far as he knew, liquid hydrogen cyanide in cylinders was available only in the United States. At this time, the Germans still made all their hydrogen cyanide, an essential chemical intermediate, by reacting sodium

cyanide with sulfuric acid. (See note 16.) This was done at the location where and as it was needed. One is tempted to wonder about the nationality of Dr. Bimko's interrogators and also about the story by Kurt Gerstein regarding the cylinders of hydrogen cyanide he buried in Poland rather than deliver to Majdanek for alleged killing experiments.

After the trial of Dr. Tesch and Herr Weinbacher, the story that Zyklon B gas (hydrogen cyanide) was administered from a compressed gas cylinder through pipes into and out of a showerhead to kill people was allowed to die of neglect!

51. At the time of Dr. Bimko's testimony, it was stoutly maintained by Germany's accusers that the shower at Dachau was a "gas chamber" used to kill thousands of Jews. Subsequent investigation of this installation—visible to this day—has proved beyond the slightest doubt that it was what the Germans had said all along—a shower bath! (It is not today claimed even by "Holocaust" historians that people were gassed at Dachau.) This shower is similar in design to those types of rooms recommended by Puntigam, et al., for delousing operations.

With such findings, Dachau's wartime and immediate postwar reputation as the worst camp of all was no longer viable for use by the United Nations propagandists, and their eyes of necessity turned eastward.

52. The Wehrmacht maintained a literal "cordon sanitaire" in Poland to protect its troops against typhus. Personnel crossing this line east to west were required to bathe and be examined while their clothing was being fumigated with Zyklon B gas if it was available. This decontamination procedure was essentially the same as that used for camp inmates.

53. 70mg. (0.07g.) of Zyklon B gas per average-sized human. (See note 9.)

54. See note 30.

55. In this tribunal as at Nuremberg, there were frequent references to the rapaciousness of German capitalists and the evil resulting from their devotion to the profit motive. (The implication seemed to have been that even American capitalists were similarly devoted!) One is left with the feeling that these gentlemen of the prosecution were as certain in their own minds that the profit incentive in capitalism leads as inevitably to human exploitation and acts such as selling Zyklon B to kill Jews as they were that National Socialism led inevitably to concentration camps and gas chambers!

56. Puntigam and Pichler, "Raumloesung von Entlausungsanlagen," *Gesundheits-Ingenieur*, Jahrgang 67, Heft 6 (Juni 1944), p. 139.

57. See note 16. One is tempted to believe that if the Germans had intended to kill any large group of people by poisoning them, they would not have chosen to use so valuable a chemical intermediate as hydrogen cyanide. Much more virulent poisons were and are available, some much cheaper, and none requiring rather cumbersome gas chambers and other apparatus for administration to the intended victims.

58. Dr. Tesch explained that this relatively small sum (about 50 cents

- in U.S. equivalent at the time) was essentially a welfare donation.
59. But later at the Frankfurt "Auschwitz Trial," he denounced and disavowed large portions of this testimony. See p. 279.
60. See Friedrich Grimm, *Politische Justize: Die Krankheit unserer Zeit* (Bonn: Bonner Universitaets-Buchdruckerei, gebr. Scheur GmbH., 1953), pp. 146-48. The interviewer mentioned in this passage was none other than British "black" propagandist Sefton Delmer, masquerading as a "university professor."
61. A rough review of certain native populations in 1914, 1939, and 1960, a quick glance at the present map of the world and a knowledge of the destruction visited upon certain nations, their populations, cities, universities, churches—their whole cultural life—all which were to be rebuilt as nearly as possible in the images of, and at the pleasure of, their conquerors, will give the best insight as to where and against whom were visited the true twentieth-century "holocausts"—and who was responsible for them.

Bibliography

I. Documents

Cocatrix, A. de. "The Number of Victims of the National Socialist Persecution: Exposé presented on the Occasion of the International Conference of the Comite International des Camps, 22-25 April 1977." Arolsen International Tracing Service, International Red Cross.

Nuremberg War Crimes Documents:

NO-021
NO-4467
1553-PS

British Public Record Office, Judge Advocate General's Office. War of 1939-45: War Crimes Papers (WO 235).

WO 235-12, Case 12, Bergen-Belsen and Auschwitz Concentration Camps Case (Lueneburg Tribunal), 11 vols.

WO 235-83, Case 71, Bruno Tesch, Karl Weinbacher, & Joachim Drosihn (Hamburg Tribunal).

II. Books

American Cyanamid and Chemical Corporation. *Military Fumigation Manual: Zyklon Discoids for Insect Control*. 1944.

Datner, et. al. *Genocide*. Warsaw: 1962.

International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg. *Trial of the Major War Criminals*. (TMWC), Vols. I, III & IX.

Kolb, Eberhard. *Bergen-Belsen: Geschichte des "Aufenthaltslagers" 1943-1945*. Hannover: Verlag fuer Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, GmbH., 1962.

Naumann, Bernd. [Translation by Jean Steinberg.] *Auschwitz*. New York: Praeger, 1966.

Puntigam, Franz; Breymesser, Hermann; and Erich Bernfus. *Blausaeuregaskammern zur Fleckfieberabwehr*. Berlin: Sonderveroeffentlicheung des Reichsarbeitsblattes, Reichsarbeitsministerium, 1943.

Reitlinger, Gerald. *The Final Solution: The Attempt To Exterminate The Jews Of Europe, 1939-1945*. New York: A.S. Barnes & Co., 1961.

III. Periodicals and Newspapers

Czech, Danuta. "Kalendarium Der Ereignisse im Konzentrationslager Auschwitz-Birkenau." *Hefte Aus Auschwitz*, [Issued by the State Museum at Auschwitz, Poland], 1962.

"Kremer's Fate Is Main Topic—'How Will You Kill Kremer?'" *New York Times*. 22 April 1945, p. 12.

Lawrence, W.H. "Nazi Mass Killings Laid Bare In (Majdanek) Camp." *New York Times*. 30 August 1944, pp. 1, 9.

Puntigam, F. und Pichler, H. "Raumloesung von Enlausungsanlagen." *Gesundheits-Ingenieur*. Jahrgang 67, Juni 1944, Heft 6, p. 139.

U.S. Public Health Service. "Public Health Reports." Vol. 46, No. 27 (July 3, 1931), pp. 1572-1578; No. 38 (July 10, 1931), pp. 1633-1636.

Wuestinger, Emil. "Vermehrter Einsatz von Blausaeure-Entlausungskammern." *Gesundheits-Ingenieur*. Jahrgang 67, 1944, Heft 7, pp. 179-180.

Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz: Last President of a United Germany

HIS SUCCESSION, HIS GOVERNMENT,
THE NUERMBERG PROCEEDINGS, THE AFTERMATH—
SOME PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS AND EXPERIENCES

H. KEITH THOMPSON

On the afternoon of 30 April 1945, with Berlin engulfed in flames and besieged by the Russians, the Hero of the Second World War¹ took his own life in his cement bunker beneath the chancellery complex. This courageous act, perhaps the ultimate act of courage, represented the termination of the heroic last stand of Western Civilization, a civilization and culture nurtured and developed in Europe for many prior centuries. The tragic death of this last natural leader of Europe represented a military-political victory for the forces of Asiatic Communism and Russian Nationalism on the one hand, and Jewish Bolshevism (as exemplified by the United States, England, France and their multitude of last-minute vassals and hangers-on) on the other. The so-called "victors" of World War II were already at each other's throats, and would enter into a politico-military struggle, beginning in 1945, and continuing unabated even today. But at that moment in April of 1945, the so-called Allies, jubilant in their economic-military victory, were not much concerned with the future and made their first political error in failing to be magnanimous towards the defeated Axis powers. The fruitless and self-defeating spirit of Hebraic revenge would motivate their every action in the days and years ahead, a spirit so effectively demonstrated in the doctrine of "unconditional surrender," which cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of citizens and soldiers, Axis and Allied as well.

For a few brief weeks during late April and May of 1945, another leader of Europe came to power, an honorable man, respected even within the military councils of the Allies. That man was Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz, commander-in-chief of the German Navy, in overall command of German military forces in the north, and at that tense moment engaged in arranging sea and other transportation for the masses of refugees fleeing from the eastern areas.² To his overwhelming astonishment, Doenitz had been designated by Hitler as his successor and head of state. In his last political testament executed at 4:00 a.m. on 29 April 1945, and witnessed by Dr. Joseph Goebbels, Reichsleiter Martin Bormann, and Generals Wilhelm Burgdorf and Hans Krebs, Adolf Hitler appointed Grand Admiral Doenitz as "President of the Reich and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces . . . by virtue of my statement in the Reichstag on September 1st, 1939 . . ."³ To capture the spirit of Hitler's political testament, I cite the following excerpts:

. . . I die with a happy heart, aware of the immeasurable deeds and achievements of our soldiers at the front, our women at home, the achievements of our farmers and workers and the work, unique in history, of our youth who bear my name. . . . From the sacrifice of our soldiers and from my own unity with them unto death, will in any case spring up in the history of Germany, the seed of a radiant renaissance of the National Socialist movement and thus of the realization of a true community of nations. . . . I beg the heads of the Armies, the Navy and the Air Force to strengthen by all possible means the spirit of resistance of our soldiers in the National Socialist sense . . . our task, that of continuing the building of a National Socialist State, represents the work of the coming centuries, which places every single person under an obligation always to serve the common interest and to subordinate his own advantage to this end. I demand of all Germans, all National Socialists, men, women and all the men of the Armed Forces, that they be faithful and obedient unto death to the new government and its President . . .⁴

At Ploen on the evening of 30 April 1945, Doenitz received only the following message: "The Fuehrer has appointed you, Herr Admiral, as his successor in place of Reichsmarschall Goering. Confirmation in writing follows. You are hereby authorized to take any measures which the situation demands.—Bormann."⁵ In his Memoirs, Doenitz describes his reactions:

. . . This took me completely by surprise. Since July 20, 1944, I had not spoken to Hitler at all except at some large gathering. . . . I had never received any hint on the subject from anyone else. . . . I assumed that Hitler had nominated me because he wished to clear the way to enable an officer of the Armed Forces to put an end to

the war. That this assumption was incorrect I did not find out until the winter of 1945-46 in Nuremberg, when for the first time I heard the provisions of Hitler's will. . . . When I read the signal I did not for a moment doubt that it was my duty to accept the task . . . it had been my constant fear that the absence of any central authority would lead to chaos and the senseless and purposeless sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of lives . . . I realized . . . that the darkest moment in any fighting man's life, the moment when he must surrender unconditionally, was at hand. I realized, too, that my name would remain forever associated with the act and that hatred and distortion of facts would continue to try and besmirch my honor. But duty demanded that I pay no attention to any such considerations. My policy was simple—to try and save as many lives as I could . . .⁶

Doenitz moved forcefully. He met with Heinrich Himmler at Ploen and politely declined Himmler's offer to become the "second man" in the Doenitz government. Doenitz ordered Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodl to come to Ploen so that the military situation could be assessed.⁷

On the morning of 1 May, Doenitz received the following radio message, classified "Secret and Personal," from Bormann at the chancellery: "Will now in force. Coming to you as quickly as possible. Pending my arrival you should in my opinion refrain from public statement."⁸ Doenitz was left to presume from the text that Hitler was dead but he knew none of the circumstances. Some public position had to be taken and immediately. He relates in his *Memoirs* that he felt that the announcement of Hitler's death should be couched in respectful terms: ". . . To denigrate him . . . as, I felt, many around me would have liked me to do, would, in my opinion, have been a mean and cheap thing to do . . . I believed that decency demanded that I should word my announcement in the manner in which it was, in fact, worded. Nor, I think, would I do otherwise today . . ."⁹ Consequently, on 1 May 1945 Doenitz made the following announcement on North German radio:

The Fuehrer has nominated me as his successor. In full consciousness of my responsibilities I therefore assume the leadership of the German people at this fateful hour. My first task is to save German men and women from destruction by the advancing Bolshevik enemy. It is to serve this purpose alone that the military struggle continues. For as long as the British and the Americans continue to impede the accomplishments of this task, we must also continue to fight and defend ourselves against them. The British and the Americans in that case will not be fighting in the interests of their own peoples, but solely for the expansion of Bolshevism in Europe.¹⁰

Doenitz also issued his Order of the Day to the Armed Forces on 1 May, covering the same points in slightly different language. And, to counter a growing lack of discipline in the armed forces, he issued the following declaration to the military services: "I expect discipline and obedience. Chaos and ruin can be prevented only by the swift and unreserved execution of my orders. Anyone who at this juncture fails in his duty and condemns German women and children to slavery and death is a traitor and a coward. The oath of allegiance which you took to the Fuehrer now binds each and every one of you to me, whom he himself appointed as his successor."¹¹ It worked. As Doenitz relates: "The next few days showed that the German Armed Forces had accepted my authority; and that was all that mattered."¹²

On 1 May 1945, Doenitz received a third and final radio message from the Berlin chancellery, with the same "Personal and Secret" classification but signed this time by Goebbels and Bormann:

Fuehrer died yesterday, 1530 hours. In his will dated April 29 he appoints you as President of the Reich, Goebbels as Reich Chancellor, Bormann as Party Minister, Seyss-Inquart as Foreign Minister. The will, by order of the Fuehrer, is being sent to you and to Field Marshal Schoerner and out of Berlin for safe custody. Bormann will try to reach you today to explain the situation. Form and timing of announcement to the Armed Forces and the public is left to your discretion. Acknowledge.¹³

In a melodramatic series of events, Martin Bormann was killed in Berlin en route to Admiral Doenitz, other ranking officials failed to arrive, and no copies of the pertinent documents ever reached Doenitz. Apparently it never occurred to the officials in the beleaguered chancellery that the entire texts of the pertinent documents could have been radioed to Doenitz. At this point, he did not even know of the subsequent suicide of Goebbels on 1 May. Doenitz correctly felt that he must make his own governmental appointments in order to function at all. He could not logically appoint officials whose whereabouts he did not know (he did not in fact know whether they were alive or dead), or whose prominence in the Hitler government might prejudice negotiations with the Allies. Of this fateful date, 1 May 1945, Doenitz summarized the situation in his *Memoirs*: ". . . while out at sea transports filled with wounded, with refugees and with troops hurried westward, the columns of refugees fleeing overland pressed on towards their salvation and the armies in Pomerania, in Brandenburg and in Silesia continued to retire in the direction of the Anglo-American demarcation line."¹⁴

It was the plan of Admiral Doenitz to accomplish a partial surrender in the west. For this purpose, the officer commanding

at Hamburg was ordered to dispatch an officer with flag of truce to the British on 3 May, to offer the surrender of Hamburg and to inform them that a general delegation under Admiral von Friedeburg was en route to confer with them.¹⁵ Meanwhile, because of British advances, Doenitz moved his headquarters and seat of government to Muerwik near Flensburg. There he conferred with representatives of the German forces still in being and advised them to take such action as would enable them to surrender to American rather than Russian forces. He had developed a healthy respect for the American Navy, and it for him. But the American ground forces were something else again, their officer corps consisting in large part of Jews, white trash, and blacks. Doenitz had not yet met political generals of the Eisenhower stamp.

There were many acts of heroism at this difficult time. I cite but one here. As Doenitz relates in his *Memoirs*, Dr. Karl Hermann Frank, Protector of Bohemia-Moravia, concerned with Czech worries over the political fate of their nation should it fall into Russian hands, sought the agreement of Doenitz to make an offer to surrender to the Americans. Doenitz thought it unlikely to succeed but worth trying, and he comments: "... That Frank, regardless of his own personal safety and with but the slenderest chance of success, should have been willing to return to a country which he knew to be on the brink of revolt in order to secure for it a more humane solution of its problems should be noted to his credit."¹⁶

On 4 May, Doenitz gave to Admiral von Friedeburg the full authorization to accept various terms of surrender offered by Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery, and von Friedeburg was flown to British headquarters with the further instructions to then proceed to General Eisenhower at Rheims to offer a German surrender in the American sector. As Doenitz put it, "The first step towards a separate surrender to the West had been accomplished without our having been forced to abandon German soldiers and civilians to the mercy of the Russians."¹⁷

Eisenhower proved to be contentious and difficult. On 6 May, Doenitz sent Col. Gen. Alfred Jodl to negotiate with the American martinet, who rejected any separate surrender and informed Jodl that the Americans would be ordered to fire upon any German troops approaching American lines with the intention of surrender, even if unarmed. This, of course, was a direct breach of the Geneva Convention but that did not concern Eisenhower, who took his political orders from the Washington regime. Eisenhower demanded unconditional surrender on 7 May, but Jodl was able to win the concession of 9 May as the date for the termination of hostilities, thus enabling Doenitz to continue moving troops and refugees out of the eastern areas. The history of the formal

signing of the instrument of surrender at Rheims on 7 May 1945 is well known. Jodl and von Friedeburg signed for Germany on the first capitulation document. Doenitz authorized the German delegates—Field Marshal Keitel, Admiral von Friedeburg, and General Stumpff—to sign for the German Armed Forces. The ceremonies were repeated in Berlin-Karlhorst on 8 May at the demand of the Russians. As it turned out, in the course of the surrender negotiations the German representatives were treated courteously by the British and the Russians, but with hostility and child-like contempt by the Americans. This conduct was exemplified by Eisenhower himself, who later censured and otherwise hounded an American brigadier general, Robert J. Stack, for having treated Goering with courtesy on his arrest, and who rebuked General Patch, commander of the U.S. 7th Army, for treating German prisoners of war decently. See Leonard Mosley's book, *The Reich Marshal*, pp320-322.

The final order of the German Armed Forces, issued on 9 May 1945, stated in part:

... By command of Admiral Doenitz the Armed Forces have given up the hopeless struggle. A heroic fight that has lasted for nearly six years thus comes to an end ... the German Armed Forces have succumbed to overwhelming superior strength ... Every German soldier, sailor and airman can therefore lay aside his arms with justifiable pride and turn to the task of ensuring the everlasting life of our nation ... To show obedience, discipline and absolute loyalty to our Fatherland, bleeding from innumerable wounds, is the sacred duty our dead impose upon us all.¹⁸

As noted by Doenitz in his Memoirs: "I thought then, and I still think, that those words are both appropriate and just."¹⁹

The surrender accomplished, and the cessation of hostilities being secured at even the most distant outposts, Doenitz turned his efforts to the processes of the government which he headed, a regime which had obtained *de facto* status from the Allies by their dealings with it. The legal complexities of the succession are dealt with in *Regierung Doenitz*, by W. Luedde-Neurath, a work published in 1950, but even that work must be read in the light of the repressive political conditions in the western zone of Germany in 1950. The author held that Hitler's nomination of Doenitz as Head of State was unquestionably legal, and that its legality was in no way affected by the loss of German sovereignty occasioned by Allied occupation. Under German law, the resignation of a head of state is possible only when a successor is named at the same time. This would, of course, apply to a self-termination by a head of state (i.e., suicide). When this measure is not taken, the office devolves upon the president of the Reich Supreme Court

(Article 51 of the Weimar Constitution). An extinction of the function of head of state is therefore legally excluded.

The Act (law) of 1 August 1934 combined the offices of president and chancellor in the person of Adolf Hitler, and the German people gave its electoral approval to this in the plebiscite of 18 August 1934. Subsequently, Hitler found general recognition as head of state both in his domestic and international dealings. Furthermore, the same law expressly gave to Hitler the right to name his successor. This he did—without any opposition—in his Reichstag declaration of 1 September 1939, naming Goering and Hess in that order. Subsequent events and instruments eliminated Hess (following his flight to England) and Goering (by Hitler's interpretation of Goering's attempt to take over Hitler's leadership in late April of 1945). Therefore, Hitler's political testament of 29 April 1945 (naming Doenitz as president and Goebbels as chancellor) took precedence and was the governing authority for the Doenitz government. (See special note p. 333)

To his everlasting credit, Eamon De Valera, Prime Minister (later President) of Eire (Ireland), called personally on the German ambassador to Ireland to offer his condolences on the death of Hitler and his recognition of the new government headed by Doenitz. There is no doubt that, had time permitted, the exchange of diplomatic representatives with neutral nations could have been achieved. Doenitz headed what he felt was, and should be, a new German government in every sense of the term. He wrote: ". . . it was essential that we should create the requisite state departments within the framework of a central government. It was, however, also essential that we should gather together all our best experts in these various spheres, in order to be able to offer their cooperation to the occupying powers. Our primary task was to ensure for the German people the essentials for bare survival . . ."²⁰

The Doenitz government took form, then, to prevent famine; to restore communications, business and industry; to rebuild housing and obtain temporary quarters for the homeless; to try to hold the value of the currency and re-establish banking systems, and to aid the refugees and absorb the additional millions of Germans and non-Germans fleeing the Russian-occupied areas. The Doenitz Cabinet took office: Graf Lutz von Schwerin-Krosigk (Foreign Minister, Minister of Finance, and presiding officer of the Cabinet), Dr. Wilhelm Stuckart (Minister of the Interior and Minister of Culture), Albert Speer (Minister of Industry and Production), Dr. Herbert Backe (Minister of Food, Agriculture and Forests), Dr. Franz Seldte (Minister of Labor and Social Affairs), and Dr. Dorpmueller (Minister of Posts and Communications). All had held secondary posts in the Hitler government but all were es-

sentially non-political men with bureaucratic experience and technical knowledge in their fields. The choice of Speer was an unfortunate one as the man was a self-seeking chameleon and opportunist, although able in his technical fields. Speer at once initiated an internal campaign to convince the Doenitz government to resign. As Doenitz put it: "Speer was emphatic in his opinion that we [the government] should resign. But he thought that, as far as he himself was concerned, the Americans would continue to cooperate with him."²¹ Schwerin-Krosigk took a sounder view—that only the Armed Forces had surrendered, the German state continuing to exist with Doenitz as its legal head. As Doenitz remarks: ". . . The enemy themselves had recognized the fact when they insisted on my conferring plenipotentiary powers on the Chiefs of the three services, who were to sign the instrument of surrender . . . I and my provisional government could not voluntarily resign. If we did, the victors could say with justification: since the properly constituted Government . . . had run away, we have no option but to set up independent German governments in the individual zones and to allow our military government to exercise authority over all of them . . . I should stay until I was removed by force. Had I not done so, then . . . I should have supplied the political pretext for the division of Germany that exists today . . . "²²

An Allied Control Commission under the American Major General Lowell W. Rooks and British Brigadier R.L.S. Foord arrived on the scene shortly after the capitulation, and they were later joined by Soviet Major General Nikolai Trusov. This commission conferred with the Doenitz government but gave little response to its proposals and less cooperation. Doenitz observed: "The attitude of the Allied representatives at these meetings was reserved, but correct. The courtesies of normal international usage were observed, but that I and the members of my government should have shown a like reserve and reticence was only natural."²³ Meanwhile, some progress was made regardless of the non-cooperation of the Allied representatives, particularly in the areas of food procurement and communications. The Cabinet met regularly and worked hard. Interestingly, bureaucracy often lives a life of its own, and some of the administrative offices of the Hitler government moved to the area and continued their work. An SS "think tank," engaged in producing reports on world political affairs, was still in business as of August 1945, and some Nazi intelligence operations were taken over intact by intelligence services of the Allies, notably that of General Reinhardt Gehlen, who had specialized in gathering intelligence concerning the Russians.

Next, a campaign against the Doenitz government was orches-

trated in the Allied nations, an ominous sign. As Doenitz observed:

The enemy press and particularly the Russian radio began to get busy about "the Doenitz Government" . . . The cooperation between the provisional government and the British and American representatives in Muerwik had aroused their envy . . . Churchill at first opposed my removal. He wanted to use me as a "useful tool" . . . if I proved to be useful, that would have to be reckoned against my "war atrocities in command of submarines" [Churchill, Vol. VI, p646]. This was exactly the coldly calculating attitude that I expected of British policy . . . Then . . . on May 15 Eisenhower demanded my removal in the interests of friendship with Russia . . .²⁴

The arrest of the Doenitz government is described in a cynical article by one Corporal Howard Katzander, staff correspondent, in Yank, "The Army Weekly," terming the Doenitz government "a grandiose bluff to persuade the Allied command to permit him [Doenitz] to attend to the interior reorganization of the nation's economy," coupled with the disarming of German forces under the very direction of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), to "keep intact the nucleus of a new Wehrmacht and a new war-minded government."²⁵ On 23 May 1945, Doenitz, Jodl, von Friedeburg and others were summoned aboard the steamship *Patria*, whereupon General Rooks, wasting no time on protocol or courtesy, communicated Eisenhower's decision that, ". . . in concert with the Soviet High Command . . . today the acting German government and the German high command, with the several of its members, shall be taken into custody as prisoners of war. Thereby, the acting German government is dissolved . . . Troops of the 21st Army Group are taking the several members, civilian and military, and certain records, into custody . . ."²⁶ Asked by Rooks for any comment, Doenitz replied, "Any words would be superfluous."²⁷ The members of the Doenitz government and the high command were gathered and marched off, hands behind their heads and at machine-gun point, to a prisoner of war cage. Admiral von Friedeburg chose suicide over Allied detention.

I have discussed at some length the brief tenure of the Doenitz government because of its historical significance. The opposition of the Soviet Union was to be expected. Had the western Allies, however, exhibited some foresight, the history of Europe might have followed a quite different course. A legitimate government cannot be "dissolved" by military order of an external enemy, nor by taking its members forcibly under arrest. Having come legally into power, and having been recognized by the very forces which were to order its "dissolution," the Doenitz government remains in history as the last *de jure* and *de facto* government of

a United Germany. The establishment by the Allies of their own puppet regimes in West Germany (the so-called Federal Republic) and in Central Germany (the so-called German Democratic Republic) merely underscores the continuing zonal occupation of the German nation almost 40 years after the military conclusion of World War II. This is well pointed up by the maintenance of the prison at Spandau in West Berlin, containing one solitary nonagenarian prisoner (Rudolf Hess), and administered in rotation by the governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the USSR. Despite some opposition exhibited by the Western puppet regime to its masters, any claim to genuine independence by either the western or eastern puppet regime is ludicrous in view of the continuing military presence in both those countries of the forces of the former Allies.

Grand Admiral Doenitz then, on 23 May 1945, became another prisoner of war, and the staggering burden of responsibilities for the German nation was taken from his shoulders by jailkeepers. Treated correctly at first in the Allied detention center at Bad Mondorf, Luxemburg, Doenitz had time to reflect on his long career and the events which had brought him to the situation which then faced him.

Doenitz, not born into the class which then provided officers, joined the Imperial German Navy and served on the light cruiser *Breslau* in the Near East, 1914-1916. Thereafter he entered the submarine service, serving as senior lieutenant on U-39 and in command of U-68. After the sinking of his submarine off Malta, he was a British prisoner of war until 1919. He continued to serve in the navy of the Weimar Republic, such as it was, and continued to rise through the grades as a surface officer. Bound by the chains of the Versailles Treaty, Germany had no submarines again until 1935. Doenitz commanded a destroyer, a destroyer flotilla, served on the staff of the Baltic naval forces, and commanded the cruiser *Emden* in the South Atlantic (1934) and the Indian Ocean. In 1935, he was selected to build the new submarine service. He became senior officer of submarines, and was an expert on strategy, developing the tactics used by the U-Boats in World War II, notably the "wolf pack" system which devastated Allied shipping early in the war. He rose through the flag ranks of commodore, rear admiral, vice admiral, and, in 1942, became a full admiral. On 30 July 1943, Doenitz was named a grand admiral (German equivalent of fleet admiral, a five-star rank), and became commander-in-chief of the navy, replacing Grand Admiral Erich Raeder. This has been an extremely abbreviated summary of the naval service of Doenitz. Suffice it to say that he was, without a doubt, the most brilliant U-Boat tactician of all time. Submarines will never again play the major naval role

they played in World War II. The American Admiral Thomas C. Hart (commander of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet at the outbreak of World War II, and later a U.S. Senator) wrote:

I rate Admiral Doenitz as the best of them all, land or sea. He was unique in his handling of the German submarines and they were our most dangerous enemy. His performance with them—and he did most of it himself—was the most outstanding Axis performance of the war. Then he succeeded to command all German Navy Forces. It was too late for real accomplishment, but he made no mistakes and no one could have done better. Then he succeeded the Fuehrer himself, and his performance from there on seems to me to have been perfect. So I think Doenitz was the best.²⁸

Karl Doenitz was never a political man, and he took but little interest in the wearisome struggles of German political parties during the Weimar era. But he was an anti-Communist, a conservative, a nationalist, and, above all, a patriot. The principles of National Socialism were bound to appeal to him. According to the Doenitz biography in *Encyclopedia of The Third Reich*, "Doenitz was one of the few convinced National Socialists among high officers in the Navy. He praised Hitler in speeches to his sailors: 'Heaven has sent us the leadership of the Fuehrer!' On one occasion he told a cheering crowd in Berlin that Hitler foresaw everything and made no misjudgments . . . Hitler, on his side, had the utmost confidence in Doenitz . . ."²⁹ Doenitz wrote that his relations with Hitler were always formal and courteous: "I myself never thought about receiving presents or money from Hitler . . . he only called me 'Herr Grossadmiral,' and never by any other name. I welcomed it that way."³⁰ In his Memoirs, Doenitz discusses Hitler's influence on other people, pro and con.

I myself had often been conscious of this influence, and after spending even a few days at his headquarters, I generally had the feeling that I would have to get away from Hitler's suggestive influence if I were to free myself from it. Further, to me he was not only the legitimate and legally appointed Head of the State, the man to whom I owed obedience, the statesman as distinct from the fighting man, but also a man of high intelligence and great energy . . .³¹

What was Admiral Doenitz like as a person? A gentleman of the old school, he was extremely reserved, a man of few words. He would reply to questions directly but briefly, and seldom expressed his personal feelings. He had a wry sense of humor, but was far from jocular. He had the ability to immediately see the crux of any problem and deal with it, without preliminaries. It was his natural tendency to find only good things to say about others, and in the absence of such, to say nothing. Doenitz was a

family man who did not care for mixing in society, and he often expressed his fondness for dogs and children. His submariners, officers and enlisted men, were the apple of his eye, and he felt closely bound to them. He knew personally as many of them as possible, particularly his U-Boat commanders. Naval personnel uniformly respected him and referred to him as "Der Loewe" ("The Lion"). British Admiral of the Fleet Sir George E. Creasy wrote of him: ". . . As a submarine Admiral whom I knew to be held in the deepest admiration and respect by Officers and Men of the U-Boat Fleet, I held Admiral Doenitz in respect myself, and there is no doubt that he handled his U-Boat arm with masterly skill and efficiency. In return he was served with great loyalty."³²

Doenitz, with the members of his government and other high-ranking members of the Hitler regime, was held at Bad Mondorf until mid-August of 1945. Conditions there were far from luxurious, but acceptable. As noted by the German historian Werner Maser, in his book *Nuremberg: A Nation On Trial*, many of the ranking prisoners of war at Bad Mondorf were under the misapprehension that any trials for "war crimes" would be trivial and insignificant, and that defendants would surely be protected by the fact that they had carried out directives of legally-constituted superiors in a chain of command. Only after their transfer to prison at the so-called Nuremberg "Palace of Justice" did they learn that Chapter VIII of the governing Charter stated: "The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determine that justice so requires."³³ Needless to say, the tribunal never made any such determination. An all-encompassing indictment was formulated, charging, as criminals, not only virtually every official of any rank in the Hitler government, military and civil, but also every party and military organization of consequence, including the Cabinet, Leadership Corps, SA, SS, SD, and even the General Staff and High Command of the Armed Forces. With the serving of the individual indictments, the status of the prisoners of war became that of accused criminals and they were confined under severe conditions, without any provisions for bail, even though unconvicted, and without any consideration for rank.

Before touching on the Doenitz case at Nuremberg, some general evaluation of the proceedings is necessary. For this purpose, I quote from an analysis of the trials in general written by a distinguished American jurist, Hon. William L. Hart, Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio (1939-1957) and lecturer on international law:

... The tribunal involved was created . . . by what is known as the London Charter entered into on August 8, 1945 by and between four nations—The United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France—victor nations of World War II, for the purpose of designating and defining certain acts committed in the course of the war as war crimes and the prosecution of certain officials of conquered Germany charged with the commission of such crimes.

The Charter designated and defined three classes of crimes. Class A under which most of the defendants were charged and tried, defined the crime as follows: "The planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing" . . . Under the heading of "Aggressor Nations," the Chicago Tribune, under date of October 2, 1946 . . . carried an editorial which said: "The truth of the matter is that no one of the victors was free of the guilt which its judges attributed to the vanquished." Measured by the Code and standards applied in these trials, it is disturbing to contemplate how the officers of our American forces might have fared had they been tried for their conduct in letting loose the devastation which practically wiped out Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and Nagasaki on August 9, 1945, the former two days before and the latter the next day after the adoption of the London Charter to which the United States was a party.

In my judgment, the procedure by which the Nuremberg Tribunal was created and the criminal trials thereunder conducted, was completely fraught with illegality . . . American authorities have invariably taken the position that an individual forming a part of a nationally organized army or navy and acting under the authority of his government, cannot be held answerable as a private trespasser or criminal for acts committed under such authority. Such acts are considered acts of the state and not those of the individual . . ."³⁴

Here, Justice Hart discusses in some detail the legal precedents, notably *Dow v. Johnson*, 100 U.S. 158, 163, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that an officer of the U.S. Army serving in an enemy country could not be held liable for injuries resulting from acts ordered by him in his military capacity. Also the famous *McLeod Case* (1840), in which Daniel Webster (then Secretary of State) held that an individual acting under the authority of his government could not be held answerable as an individual for acts performed in governmental capacity, it being "a principle of public law sanctioned by all civilized nations, and which the Government of the United States has no inclination to dispute."³⁵ Justice Hart also deals at length with the attempts, after World War I, to try Kaiser Wilhelm II for alleged "war crimes," and the opposition thereto by U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, and

Dr. James Brown Scott, an eminent American authority on international law. Also the holding of Charles Cherry Hyde in his work on international law that no demands may be made for the surrender of individuals "to be punished criminally on account of acts which were not internationally illegal."³⁶ Justice Hart continues:

Furthermore, these four national powers instituting the Nuremberg Trials did not separately or jointly possess any sovereign power to create a special court to try alleged criminal offenses committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of any one of them—a sovereignty necessary under all systems of law to exercise authority over the life and liberty of its subjects within its territorial jurisdiction. Nor did it possess sovereign authority to convict officers of the German forces of so-called criminal offenses not committed within such jurisdiction. It is true that some claim was made that under international law there exists certain "common law" crimes, not specifically created by legal enactment, which crimes existed and were recognized and prosecuted by the Nuremberg Tribunal. But this position was belied by the fact that the powers in question deemed it necessary to specifically define the crimes in the same joint charter which created the tribunal. The London Charter defined the offenses for which the defendants were tried in specific language heretofore quoted.

It has been generally conceded that there is no recognition of sovereign power which is the creation of or operates within the jurisdiction of international law. That none exists is to be inferred from the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, Article 13 of which provides that the General Assembly may "initiate studies and make recommendations—for the purpose *inter alia*—of encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification." The wording of the provision makes it clear that the Assembly itself is not empowered to create or codify international law, but to encourage the development and codification of such rules by the constituent nations or by international tribunals yet to be created.

There was also much valid criticism expressed in this country at the time of the trials, and since, to the effect that the nations involved in the prosecutions had seen fit to submit the matter of guilt and punishment to a make-shift court created by the prosecuting nations for the one special purpose and which went out of existence immediately upon securing the convictions for which it was organized. From a legal standpoint, there is no answer to this criticism. It was completely justified. The fact is that there does not exist and never has existed any international court or tribunal having jurisdiction to try offenses such as those named in the London Charter.

The designation and definition by the London Charter of the so-called crimes with which the defendants were charged, after such so-called offenses were committed, clearly violated the well-

established rule against *ex post facto* legislation in criminal matters. The generally accepted doctrine is expressed in the adage: "*Nullum Crimen Sine Lege*"—a person cannot be sentenced to punishment for a crime unless he had infringed a law in force at the time he committed the offense and unless that law prescribed the penalty. Courts in passing on this proposition had declared that: "It is to be observed that this maxim is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is a general principle of justice adhered to by all civilized nations."

In my opinion, there was no legal justification for the trial, conviction or sentence of the so-called "war criminals" by the Nuremberg Tribunal. We have set a bad precedent. It should not be followed in the future.³⁷

There are many other valid reasons, not touched upon by Justice Hart, why the "trials" in general were as illegal as they were improper. To enumerate only a few: day-to-day changing of the "rules of evidence," so as to effectively deny to the accused the right of cross-examination guaranteed to them in the Charter; the manufacturing of evidence by the prosecution through the use of forged and/or unverifiable documents; admission into evidence by the prosecution of testimony known by them to be perjured; hindering access of the defendants to their counsel through delays and pettifogging; physical and psychological maltreatment of the defendants, and demoralization through the systematic looting of their personal effects, extending even to tooth powder; denial of a permissible defense in citing similar acts of Allied nations, etc.³⁸

Revisionist historians have made some headway in arguments which may hopefully lead to a general repudiation of the entire Nuremberg process. But it is at best an upstream fight against an entrenched establishment, manifest most particularly in the occupation of academia by marauding leftist Jews and shabbos-goyim, and of the mainstream publishing industry operated head-to-toe by the enemy. It is therefore particularly pleasing to see an establishment historian come to reason on the subject and successfully sneak it into print. The British journalist-historian, Leonard Mosely, no friend of Germany or National Socialism, has authored 21 books, largely concerning World War II. In his biography of Hermann Goering, he writes:

The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was not a trial in the sense that is normally accepted in civilized countries. It had been officially announced before the proceedings began that it would generally follow the practices of British and American courts of law, giving the defendants the right to speak and to cross-examine. But even though the presiding judge, Lord Justice Lawrence, was a venerable British jurist renowned for the impar-

tiality of his judgments, both he and his American, French, and Russian colleagues knew what was expected of them, and that there could be no question of the principal accused winning acquittal. The defendants were doomed before the trial started, no matter what case they made for themselves in court . . . It is true that three out of the twenty defendants were, in fact, acquitted. But most reporters at the trial could have guessed their number and names from the start [author's note: they were anti-Nazis] . . . The purpose of the tribunal was not to give the accused a fair trial to the extent that they could introduce all kinds of relevant evidence in justification of their actions. That would have proved embarrassing . . . their lawyers were warned that all attempts to implicate the Soviet Union would be disallowed . . . There are some jurists who still maintain that Nuremberg was a perfectly valid legal process . . . But in fact it was just as much a political trial as any which had taken place in Russia . . .³⁹

Some "liberal" elements in the U.S. continue to attempt to justify the Nuremberg process, imagining that they are thereby defending and asserting the so-called "rights of humanity." But the Nuremberg "trials," as well as the efforts to justify them, will someday be looked upon by historians and the more literate elements of the general population with the contempt which they so richly deserve. Nuremberg will come to be regarded as a monstrous error, similar in degree to the fateful intervention of the United States on the wrong side in two world wars. The World War I intervention was supposedly to "make the world safe for democracy" and to "end all wars." The first premise was undesirable, the second impossible. The equally evil intervention in World War II, a surrender to the agitation of the British, the Jews, and "internationalistic eggheads," in that order, began with "lend lease," "Bundles For Britain," and military-economic give-aways long before any formal declaration of war. It, too, was accomplished by fulsome slogans about defending the rights of humanity, saving oppressed mankind, and similar garbage. After all that saving and crusading, a new dawn of universal peace and brotherhood was supposed to follow. Take a look around you. The Nuremberg "trials" were primarily the result of neurotic hysteria, hatred, and hypocrisy. Yet there was a small, secondary, contributing element which purported to believe that "humanity" would somehow be nobly and idealistically served by the holding of such trials.

A study of recent U.S. government and Amnesty International reports on political killings should give those "humanists" some food for thought. Half a million people have been exterminated by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, another half a million in Indonesia, and millions more in various African "states." In the name of religious idealism, executions multiply in Iran. And in the name

of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—the three-headed beast—the killing continues in that unholiest of lands, crazily called the "Holy" Land. Meanwhile, on the domestic U.S. legal front, liberals, "humanitarians," and so-called lovers of democracy are zealous in their endeavors to protect the "rights" of real criminals, such as murderers, rapists, and thieves. These same liberal elements continually agitate for more "war crimes trials," for more hounding and hunting of alleged Nazis in this country and throughout the world, many of them refugees from Communist tyranny in Eastern Europe. These same "anti-Fascist" liberals, anxious to pursue and punish "Nazis," fail to show the same zeal for domestic criminals, real criminals, the perpetrators of violent crimes. On the contrary, they are opposed to capital punishment and obsessed with the rights of criminals.

Why this discrepancy? Something in the Jewish psyche requires that their media pots be kept boiling with constantly renewed stories of more and more "Nazis" being hunted and brought to "justice." Jewish persecution mania requires constant feeding to keep it in bloom. An Eichmann trial, a Nuremberg lynching, or a Barbie proceeding every year would amply suit the professional, fund-raising Jews.

The Nuremberg "trials" and the numerous "war crimes," "de-Nazification," and similar proceedings which followed them, are ideologically as ludicrous and deserving of contempt as America's intervention in two world wars to "make the world safe for democracy" and to "save oppressed humanity." What is not ludicrous, however, is the massive human suffering caused by the pernicious meddling of the United States of America in the affairs of its betters.

What were the real origins of the Nuremberg proceedings? How did the U.S. fall into this quagmire of hypocrisy and lend its offices and personnel to a victors' tribunal falsely represented as some sort of noble experiment in international law? Some of the sinister background is well developed in the book *The Road to Nuremberg* by Professor Bradley F. Smith. Certainly no friend of Germany or of revisionism (which he attacks), Prof. Smith, knowingly or not, reveals the Jewish origins of the "trials" and shows that they were essentially an American production. Among the "cast of characters" in Smith's book are Henry Morgenthau Jr., Murray C. Bernays, Sidney Alderman, Bernard Bernstein, Felix Frankfurter, Sheldon Gluck, Hersch Lauterpacht, William Malkin, Sam I. Rosenman (adviser to F.D. Roosevelt), Herbert Wechsler, Frederick Bernays Weiner, and Harry Dexter White (Weiss, the Russian agent), as well as the American Jewish Conference, to name but a few. The struggle of Henry L. Stimson against the malicious influences of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., is interestingly

recorded. Of Stimson, Smith writes, ". . . Stimson was a social anti-Semite. . . . His diary entries include references to Morgenthau's 'race' and his 'Semitic' characteristics. . . . Stimson decried the fact that Morgenthau had taken the lead in advocating harsh peace terms. Specifically, he believed that this could rebound and provide ammunition for those who would attribute all stringent controls on Germany to a mere 'Jewish' desire for revenge."⁴⁰

In discussing the trials of Nazi organizations, Smith notes: "For the system to work as intended, the prosecution had to convince a court, which was trying to appear legally respectable, that it should overlook shaky evidence, as well as its scruples, and condemn millions of organization members on the basis of collective guilt . . ."⁴¹ As a clue to the Americanization of the entire Nuremberg process, Smith writes, "After carping at American planning—filling the hallways with snide remarks—even most British officials ultimately admitted that American energy and determination had beaten the odds and turned Nuremberg into a more successful enterprise than had been thought possible."⁴²

The influence of Morgenthau and his ilk in promoting the ill-conceived doctrines of unconditional surrender, harsh occupation terms, and trials of the defeated German leadership, in fact prolonged the war. Admiral Doenitz was well aware of this:

We knew of American Treasury Secretary Morgenthau's plan which, after victory, would have destroyed Germany to make it pasture land and an agricultural nation. If his plan would have succeeded, millions of Germans would have starved. For reasons decided at the Casablanca Conference, the Allies would have made peace with Germany but only under the condition that we surrendered completely. That would have meant that German troops would stay where they stood at that time, lay down their weapons, and become prisoners of the enemy. That would have been three-and-one-half million soldiers on the Eastern Front which, in 1944 and 1945, stood far inside Russia, and it would have been impossible to provide these troops with food and shelter, even with the best organization . . . These were the reasons why we did not surrender. The decision to ask for unconditional surrender at Casablanca was a political mistake.⁴³

Doenitz was magnificently defended at Nuremberg by Flottenrichter Captain Otto Kranzbuehler, a naval judge advocate. In a chapter on Doenitz in his book on Nuremberg, Werner Maser furnishes a lengthy account of the Doenitz defense, recommended for those interested in the details. Despite a remarkable defense supported even by American Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Doenitz was convicted and sentenced to ten years imprisonment, a light sentence compared to others meted out, but not light for an

innocent man who had to serve every day of it, and more. Of what precisely the Grand Admiral was convicted, we shall never know. The legal authority H.A. Smith, Professor of International Law in the University of London, held that ". . . The clumsiness and obscurity of this language [findings in the Doenitz case] perhaps indicate the embarrassment which the members of the Tribunal felt in dealing with the case of Doenitz, and it is not easy to ascertain from the rest of the judgment the precise facts upon which he was condemned."⁴⁴ Hon. S.A. Rahman, Chief Justice of Pakistan, wrote: ". . . apart from the question of the validity or desirability of the Nuremberg trials, the guilt of Doenitz . . . could not be said to have been established beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of the material before the Special Tribunal."⁴⁵ Rear Admiral Dan V. Gallery, U.S. Navy, summed it up:

The outstanding example of barefaced hypocrisy at Nuremberg was the trial of Admiral Doenitz. We tried him on three charges: (1) Conspiring to wage aggressive war; (2) Waging aggressive war; and (3) Violation of the laws of war at sea. Even the loaded court at Nuremberg acquitted him of the first charge, but convicted him of the other two. How in the name of common sense a military officer can wage any kind of war except an aggressive one without being a traitor to his country, I'll never know. . . . Doenitz's conviction on charge three . . . was an insult to our own submarine men. . . . The only crime he committed was that of almost beating us in a bloody but "legal" fight. . . . The Nuremberg trials placed a solemn stamp of approval on a code of war at sea which we not only didn't follow ourselves in World War II but which may embarrass us in the future . . ."⁴⁶

Here it should be noted that Admiral Gallery has employed the layman's definition of "aggressive," rather than that of the international lawyer—which is absolutely permissible because the Nuremberg Tribunal failed to offer any definition of "aggressive war" whatsoever. Doenitz himself covered the legal point in an interview with William Buchanan in *The Boston Sunday Globe*, 8 December 1963:

. . . The newly created principle of law does not define clearly what an aggressive war is. Because whether a war is an aggressive one or not is purely a political question. Politics of every country will try to prove that the other is the aggressor or that one's own country must feel so threatened that it was compelled to act in self-defense. So if . . . the participation of an individual soldier in an aggressive war will be punishable in future by this new Nuremberg proposition of law, every single soldier of every nation would have to be accorded the right at the outbreak of hostilities to ask his government to account for its actions and to grant him access to all political documents so that he may form his

own judgment as to whether he will be taking part in a war of aggression or not.⁴⁷

Following his sentencing on 1 October 1946, Admiral Doenitz served his time, bravely and without complaint, at the old Spandau prison in West Berlin. Under any Western system, the conditions of imprisonment would have constituted "cruel and unusual punishment," and would have been ameliorated by courts. The German leadership was ill-treated, ill-fed, and ill-clothed, under monstrous conditions, with every manner of petty torture and indignity imposed upon the elderly prisoners. They knew little of the events of the outer world, had only a very limited and highly supervised contact with their families, and had but little contact with each other. Doenitz maintained his dignity through his inner strength, and he never wrote of his prison experiences in books or articles, unlike the little rodent, Albert Speer, who twisted facts and altered "reminiscences" to obtain fat contracts from the establishment publishers for his confessionals. Speer, anxious to "confess" to anything which the prosecutors might suggest, sought at Nuremberg to assume "moral responsibility" for anything which had transpired in Hitler Germany, even what the travelling salesman did to the farmer's daughter. He maligned those defendants who stood up to the court, including Doenitz. In his Spandau diaries (18 March 1948), Speer noted, however: "... Doenitz abruptly and aggressively says to me that the Nuremberg verdict made a mockery of all justice. . . . I cannot deny that Doenitz is partially right in his rejection of the Nuremberg verdicts."⁴⁸ and on 10 December 1947, Speer recorded, "... For all his personal integrity and dependability on the human plane, Doenitz has in no way revised his view of Hitler. To this day, Hitler is still his commander in chief."⁴⁹ In an entry on 3 February 1949, Speer complained: "Schirach, Raeder and Doenitz are distinctly cool toward me. . . . They disapprove of my consistent and basic rejection of the Third Reich."⁵⁰ Of special interest is a Speer diary entry of 20 January 1953, in which he quotes the reaction of Doenitz to the election of Theodor Heuss as President of puppet West Germany: "... He [Heuss] was installed under pressure from the occupying powers. Until all political parties, including the National Socialists, are permitted to function and until they elect someone else, my legitimacy remains. Nothing can change that one iota. Even if I wanted it changed. . . . Even if I renounced the office I would remain chief of state, because I cannot renounce it until I have appointed a successor . . ."⁵¹

During 1952-1953, a remarkable and fascinating plan was developed in West Germany, with roots extending to Spain, Argentina, and even the United States, for the liberation of the Spandau prisoners by commando-type military action, and the setting up of

the Doenitz government elsewhere as a legitimate government-in-exile. Although the financing was available, and many dedicated men were involved, security was compromised in Germany and the matter became a field day for Allied journalism, resulting in a number of arrests. The full facts were never known and never will be, even though most of those involved are now deceased. Just a few years ago, I had the pleasure of burning a file on the subject which had been eagerly sought by at least four intelligence agencies for many years.

Rather, more legal attempts were made to secure the release of Grand Admiral Doenitz. On 19 May 1955, Dr. Kranzbuehler requested the intervention of the West German regime with its Allied masters to secure the deletion from his sentence of 16 months spent in incarceration before and during trial.⁵² Under most Western systems of jurisprudence, this is a routine procedure. On 27 May the Allies denied the request.⁵³ They were to make Doenitz serve every day of the Nuremberg sentence. The Allies regarded him as unrepentant and they feared political repercussions should Doenitz attempt to resume his function as Head of State, for which, by then, no small amount of support existed in West Germany among rightist groups, patriotic organizations, and the large associations of World War II veterans, with their growing economic and political clout.

On 1 October 1956, Doenitz was released, and the event was widely heralded in the world press. On the scene, there were altercations between the police and the press. Various newsmen were clubbed in an effort to keep them from the Grand Admiral. "Police told newsmen they were acting on Western orders. The Western Allies, in a first reaction, either disclaimed knowledge of the incidents or attempted to lay the blame elsewhere."⁵⁴ The *New York Herald Tribune*, terming Doenitz as the "Least Repentant War Criminal," claimed that the Bonn regime "exercised pressure behind the scenes to discourage demonstrations on his behalf," and cited with alarm not only the political popularity of Doenitz with "Right-wing groups," but claimed that Mrs. Karl Doenitz "is reported to have maintained contact in recent years with active neo-Nazi elements."⁵⁵ The Grand Admiral himself commented sensibly: "You must remember I have been isolated and cut off from the world for eleven and a half years. Therefore I am not in any position to pass any judgment or have any opinions . . . My only task is to be silent. I must feel my way back in the world."⁵⁶

Time magazine, on 24 September 1956, in an article headed "The Lion Is Out," repeated old smears of Doenitz, attributing to him remarks which he never made. On 22 October 1956, Time published my rebuttal. Terming their article "so much hogwash,"

I stated that "Doenitz, a capable professional naval officer, was 'convicted' by the illegal Nuremberg tribunal for exactly the same 'ruthless' acts committed by U.S. and British admirals. The only difference is that Germany lost the war."⁵⁷

There were many other voices. The Chicago Tribune, in its editorial of October 6, 1956, summed it up capably:

Grand Adm. Karl Doenitz . . . has completed his 10 year sentence as a "war criminal" and has been released from Spandau prison in Berlin. He was sentenced by an international tribunal at Nuremberg, acting under *ex post facto* "law" invented for the occasion. The penalties prescribed were never legislated by any lawmakers, but by representatives of the victor countries who then took over the prosecution. The presence of Adm. Doenitz among the defendants presented the victors with an unforeseen embarrassment. He was charged with having conducted unrestricted submarine warfare. The tribunal reluctantly admitted that, in assessing this charge, an order of the British admiralty, dated May 8, 1940, directing that all vessels in the Skagerrak should be sunk without warning, could not be disregarded. The tribunal was also obliged to take cognizance of the undisputed fact that the United States, from the first day of the war, had also waged unrestricted submarine warfare . . . Nevertheless, the blanket charges against the defendants of planning, preparing, initiating, or conducting aggressive war were sufficiently broad to produce a finding that Adm. Doenitz was guilty of something—probably the crime of fighting, as a professional officer, in the service of his country. He got 10 years—a verdict proving once again that might makes right, and that hypocrisy can surmount all obstacles.⁵⁸

My own involvement with Admiral Doenitz was continuing and considerable. During his incarceration I maintained contact with Mrs. Inga Doenitz, a magnificent, patriotic woman whose two sons had been lost in World War II naval service. The nullification of the Nuremberg verdict in the Doenitz case—and all the others—and the refurbishing of the Grand Admiral's reputation in world opinion were among my objectives. Long before the release of Doenitz, an *ad hoc* committee had been formed in the United States under the direction of myself and Professor Henry Strutz, with the active assistance of a group of retired U.S. Navy admirals of high World War II rank, including T.C. Hart and Charles A. Lockwood, for the purpose of compiling testimonials for Admiral Doenitz from military and other world leaders. Despite the active hostility of the U.S. government, its intelligence and secret police agencies, Jewish pressure groups, the so-called American Legion, the Bonn puppet, and others, the project was a notable success. The compilation of endorsements of Doenitz enabled his lawyers to force the Bonn regime to pay him a retirement pension commensurate with his rank, whereas they

had tried to pension him off as a lower-ranking officer, claiming that he owed his promotions to Hitler. Leather-bound volumes of the letters and documents were presented to Doenitz and used by him in various ways. Even in *The Encyclopedia of the Third Reich*, it is noted that "He [Doenitz] always kept with him a file of letters from Allied naval officers who had written to him expressing their sympathy and understanding."⁵⁹

The public relations campaign for Doenitz gradually took root. On 28 August 1958, in a *New York Times* article captioned "Doenitz Gaining in Public Prestige," it was noted that just 22 months after his release from Spandau, "Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz has emerged as a nostalgic public figure in West Germany . . . the benign ghost of Germany's old spartan naval tradition. This role, modestly played, has restored Doenitz' prestige in German naval circles . . ."⁶⁰

While it had never been so intended, part of the Doenitz testimonial collection was published as a book, *Doenitz at Nuremberg: A Re-Appraisal*, the first edition appearing in 1976 and the second, expanded edition appearing in 1983 under the imprint of the Institute For Historical Review. I would like to cite merely two contributions to the work which I consider particularly significant. Field Marshal Lord Henry Maitland Wilson of Libya, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean theatre, wrote: "During my period of Command in the Middle East and Mediterranean Theatres, there were no breaches of International Maritime Law by the Axis Powers reported to me. . . . the Nuremberg Trials were staged as a political stunt."⁶¹ And Tom C. Clark, Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (1949-1967) and U.S. Attorney-General at the time of the Nuremberg proceedings, wrote of the book: ". . . The series of opinions expressed by executives, legislators, jurists, militarists, writers, diplomats and royalty run the gamut of concerned leaders of our time. These learned minds not only isolate the Nuremberg 'principle,' placing it in right perspective, but at the same time cite the able and devoted Admiral as a victim of the precept. I hail this anthology as required reading for all who are interested in equal justice under law for the defeated as well as the victorious."⁶²

Following his release from Spandau, Admiral Doenitz promptly went to work on his memoirs, the German edition of which (*10 Jahre und 21 Tage*) appeared in 1958, to be followed by an English and an American edition (see bibliography). Getting the memoirs of Doenitz into print in Germany in 1958 was a major problem. It would have been better to wait for some years, but of course the Grand Admiral did not know how long he would live. It was necessary to make undesired concessions. Thus the memoirs are largely concerned with the naval war and submarine strategy.

There is no discussion of the Spandau years (which, in any case, Doenitz would not discuss), criticism of the Allies is limited, and any discussion of the Nuremberg proceedings is confined to specific issues, largely concerning the conduct of the naval war. There is some criticism of National Socialism, largely confined to the "leadership principle," with a bone thrown to "democracy," and some criticism of the camps, which Doenitz opposed in principle. He was of the opinion that the concentration camp concept had first been employed by the British against the Boers in South Africa, and was amused to learn from me that "concentration camps" were originated by the American patriarch, General George Washington, to handle the troublesome Quakers during the American Revolution. Because of their opposition to war, he rounded them up and herded them into camps where he left them to starve unless fed by other Quaker sympathizers. The concept flowered again in the sinister mind of Franklin D. Roosevelt, who herded Americans of Japanese ancestry into such camps in the World War II era. All nations have had their share of detention and labor camps, even the Nazis, but it was an American concept pure and simple.

The Doenitz Memoirs, in their various editions, were generally well received. In reviewing the English edition, H.R.G. Whates, in an article captioned "A Formidable Antagonist of Britain," in *The Birmingham Post* of 9 May 1959, wrote:

... From it emerges a picture of an upright, non-political naval officer with brilliant and original ideas on the employment of U-Boats as destroyers of shipping. A man who might have won the war for Germany if he had been given the three hundred U-boats for which he asked. . . . Sadly, Doenitz quotes Nelson: "Only numbers can annihilate." He never had the numbers.⁶³

In 1962, Mrs. Doenitz died at age 69, and the Grand Admiral moved into a small bachelor's apartment in Aumuehle, a suburb of Hamburg where, surrounded by his naval prints and silver, he continued to write books and professional articles, receive old comrades, and correspond extensively with historians who sought his views. The navy of the Bonn puppet ignored him in the main, but Doenitz took pleasure in addressing groups of former servicemen, who always received him enthusiastically. By old navy tradition, commanding officers of foreign naval vessels visiting the port of Hamburg called on Doenitz as they would on the senior officer present, much to the consternation of Bonn. Doenitz also remained active in aiding the cause of so-called "war criminals" still in Allied custody. I remained in close contact with the Grand Admiral, assisting him wherever and whenever I could.

On 27 July 1980, I received a warm letter from Doenitz, signed with an aged, shaking hand, expressing the hope that we might meet again. This was not to be. On 24 December 1980, he died peacefully in his 89th year. The jackals went quickly to work. The Bonn regime denied him military honors and ordered no wearing of uniforms at his services, which were crowded with former servicemen of high and low rank, seeking to pay their last respects. The obituaries were varied, generally favorable in Germany (with notable exceptions), respectful in England, and nasty, semi-literate hack jobs in the United States. As one might expect, the wire services went right to the old World War II propaganda files and the Nuremberg garbage, with no attempt whatever to bring matters up to date. The New York Times was among the worst, which did not surprise me. I have always referred to that so-called newspaper as "the Zionist rag." H.L. Mencken, I believe, called it, "a pompously sterile sheet." At any rate, the story was over. Karl Doenitz passed into history.

With the death of the Grand Admiral, the controversy over his legitimacy as Head of State passed into limbo. During the late 1970's the matter had been revived in an unfortunate way. A right-wing radical in Germany, one Manfred Roeder, sought to proclaim himself "Regent of the Reich" and issued, through a collaborator in Buffalo, N.Y., a formal protocol bearing the forged signature of Admiral Doenitz, implying his agreement to this ludicrous proposition. On 22 September 1978, an editorial in the *Deutsche National Zeitung*, a right-wing newspaper in Germany, stated: "Errant spirits who pass themselves off as 'right-wingers' have recently tried to create the impression that they were acting on behalf of Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz when they claim for themselves the function of a 'Regency of the Reich.' The Grand Admiral has expressed himself as follows on the subject . . ."⁶⁴ There followed a lengthy statement dated at Aumuehle on 2 July 1975, in which Doenitz pointed out that, after the passage of then some 30 years, the serious possibility of his claiming the office of President of the Reich had to be ruled out. He continued:

In my statement of May 1, 1945, I did in fact very consciously characterize myself not as President of the Reich but as Head of State. I did so in order not to render more difficult the purely factual process of the exercise of the supreme power of government by complicating it with constitutional-legal problems. This *de facto* exercise of the supreme governmental power most certainly came to an end decades ago. In this connection, I leave it to historians to determine the precise moment when. After my release from Spandau jail in 1956, when theoretically I might have done so, I never declared that I continued to regard myself as

President of the German Reich. Because of the political circumstances which have since developed, such a declaration would not only have been of no consequence legally, but also politically unwise . . . [it] . . . could only have had a deleterious effect on the will to re-unification of the entire German people.⁶⁵

There was disagreement among those who advised Doenitz as to the wisdom of his statement. I for one, would sooner have seen a successor nominated, but, as Doenitz argued, who would be suitable? (My suggestion was Generalmajor Otto Ernst Remer, the exemplary patriot who had put down the cowardly 20 July 1944 plot.) The German radical who backed Doenitz into this corner now languishes in a West German jail—on other grounds to be sure, but the Bonn puppet has a long arm and no sense whatever of law or of individual rights. One thing seems certain: no future government of a United Germany can take office without a claim of continuity based on the Doenitz government, the last government of the Reich.

When Admiral Doenitz emerged from Spandau prison in 1956, he re-entered an alien world, the events of the prior ten years and more having in the main been withheld from him. He thought that the German people were the same people he knew in the 1930s and 1940s. But they were not. By 1960, the youth had been almost totally Americanized. The Coca-Cola culture had taken root, with its "hippies," its negroid music, its militant labor unions, its put-down of patriotism, its rejection of race, of family and of cultural values. These were the fruits of the American "re-education" policy in Germany. Like the American, the German no longer wished to work but merely to receive pay. Gone were quality and craftsmanship, gone were German energy and creativity. The German woman had become "too good" to perform household tasks, for which Eastern Europeans, Asians and Africans were and are imported. Within a few decades, statisticians tell us, Germany will cease to be German, and will be dominated by alien races, run by leftist labor union combines. Admiral Doenitz lived to see these changes. He came to regret any favorable words written in support of "democracy," and, in the end, found solace in the strength of his own National Socialist spirit.

In conclusion, I would like to recall a line in Adolf Hitler's last political testament in which he invoked the faith of "all Germans, all National Socialists." Little can be expected from Germany or from Germans in the years ahead. But Hitler knew well that all National Socialists were not Germans. The doctrines will survive and the movement will take root, grow and flower among generations not yet born, in nations where it might least be expected. This would please a man like Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz. Criticizing Doenitz, a hostile West German obituary cited a recent

statement by him that he had nothing to apologize for and that, if he had the opportunity to relive his life, he would have done everything the same way. Such men are rare in history. Upon the release of Doenitz in 1956, I joined with the writer and historian, George Sylvester Viereck, in a telegram to the Grand Admiral:

On the day of the triumph of your steeled will over the plans of your vengeful persecutors, your American friends congratulate you and wish you a long, healthy life. Throughout the entire despicable Nuremberg proceedings—brought about by the criminal co-guilt of the U.S.A. and world Jewry, your soldierly honor shone forth as the sole hope of those who wished to rebuild the collapsing Western World.

Through your personal courage, you have triumphed over the calculated plans of the destroyers of Western Culture, and you stand today as the personification of Honor, Loyalty and Faith. Let no considerations dissuade you from this position. You are unique in history! ⁶⁶

Notes

1. Ulick Varange [Francis Parker Yockey], *Imperium* (London: Westropa Press, 1948), dedication page.
2. Karl Doenitz, *Memoirs* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1959), p. 438.
3. Louis L. Snyder, *Encyclopedia of the Third Reich* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 165-66 [translation into English of the basic document].
4. *Ibid.*
5. Doenitz, p. 441.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 442.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 444.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*, p. 445.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*, p. 451.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*, p. 452.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*, p. 453.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 455.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 459.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*, p. 470.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 471.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 472.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 473.
24. *Ibid.*
25. Howard Katzander [staff correspondent], in *Yank: The Army Weekly* (May 1945).
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*
28. Hart quote in [Lieutenant] R.M. Ancell, Jr., "Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz: Reflections at 80," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (March 1973), p. 120.
29. Snyder, p. 71.
30. Ancell, p. 121.
31. Doenitz, pp. 476-77.
32. H. Keith Thompson and Henry Strutz (eds.), *Doenitz at Nuremberg: A Re-Appraisal* (New York: Amber, 1976; second, revised ed. Torrance, Calif.: Institute for Historical Review, 1983), p. 115.
33. Werner Maser, *Nuremberg: A Nation on Trial* (New York: Scribners 1979), p. 35.
34. Thompson and Strutz, pp. xvii-xx.
35. *Ibid.*
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Ibid* [editor's introduction].
39. Leonard Mosley, *The Reich Marshal* (New York: Doubleday, 1974), pp. 335-36.
40. Bradley F. Smith, *The Road to Nuremberg* (New York: Basic Books, 1981), p. 31.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 249-50.
42. *Ibid.*
43. Ancell, p. 120.
44. H.A. Smith, *The Law and Custom of the Sea* (London: Stevens & Sons, second ed. 1954), p. 176.
45. Handwritten letter to H. Keith Thompson, possession of the author.
46. Dan V. Gallery [Rear Admiral, U.S.N.], *Twenty Million Tons Under the Sea* (Chicago: Regnery, 1957), from the epilogue.
47. Doenitz's comments in *Boston Sunday Globe* (8 December 1963), p. A-11.
48. Albert Speer, *Spandau: The Secret Diaries* (New York: Macmillan, 1976), p. 45.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 220.
52. Reuters dispatch, *New York Times* (19 May 1955).
53. *New York Daily News* (27 May 1955). *Time* (6 June 1955).
54. Joseph Fleming [United Press dispatch] in *New York World Telegram and Sun* (1 October 1956).
55. Gaston Coblenz in *New York Herald Tribune* (1 October 1956).
56. *New York World Telegram and Sun* (1 October 1956).
57. H. Keith Thompson in *Time* (22 October 1956).
58. *Chicago Tribune* (6 October 1956), lead editorial.
59. Fisher, p. 72.
60. Arthur J. Olsen in *New York Times* (28 August 1958).

61. Thompson and Strutz, p. 48.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 196.
63. H.R.G. Whates, "A Formidable Antagonist of Britain," *Birmingham Post* [Birmingham, England] (9 May 1959).
64. Doenitz, statement prompted by the Roeder affair [with editorial comment], *Deutsche National-Zeitung* No. 39 (22 September 1978).
65. *Ibid.*
66. Joint telegram of George Sylvester Viereck and H. Keith Thompson to Grand Admiral Doenitz, 1 October 1956; transmission copy in the Viereck-Thompson Collection, University of Iowa.

Special Note (ref. p. 311): On 26 April 1942, the Reichstag voted absolute wartime powers to Hitler, suspending any laws to the contrary, similar to the powers conferred on President Abraham Lincoln during the American Civil War.

Select Bibliography

Ancell, R.M., Jr. "Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz: Reflections at 80," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (March 1973).

Belgion, Montgomery. *Victors' Justice*. Hinsdale, Ill.: Regnery, 1949.

Bosch, William J. (ed.). *Judgement on Nuremberg*. Raleigh, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1970.

Busch, Harald. *So War der U-Boot Krieg*. Bielefeld: Deutscher Heimat Verlag, 1952.

Doenitz, Karl. Extensive original correspondence with H. Keith Thompson, 1938-1980, in possession of the author.

—. *Zehn Jahre und Zwanzig Tage*. Bonn: Athenaeum-Verlag, 1958.

—. *Memoirs*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1959. (English translation by R.H. Stevens.)

—. "Die Schlacht im Atlantik in der deutschen Strategie des Zweiten Weltkrieges," *Marine Rundschau* [Frankfurt: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn] 61 Jahrgang, Heft 2 (April 1964).

—. *Mein wechselvolles Leben*. Goettingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1968.

—. *La Guerre en 40 Questions*. Paris: La Table Ronde, 1969. (French translation by Bernard George.)

Esser, Hermann. *Die juedische Weltpest*. Munich: Franz Eher Verlag, 1939.

Fells, Maximilian. *Doenitz in Nuernberg und Danach*. Privately published in honor of Doenitz's 75th birthday, 1972.

Fishman, Jack. *The Seven Men of Spandau*. New York: Rinehard & Co., 1954.

Hitler, Adolf (Francois Genoud, ed.). *The Testament of Adolf Hitler: The Hitler-Bormann Documents February-April 1945*. London: Cassell & Co., 1959.

Goerlitz, Walter. *Karl Doenitz der Grossadmiral*. Goettingen: Muster-schmidt-Verlag, 1972.

Luedde-Neurath, Walter. *Regierung Doenitz*. Goettingen: Muster-schmidt-Verlag, 1955.

- Martienssen, Anthony. *Hitler and His Admirals*. London: Secker & Warburg, 1948.
- (ed.). *Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs*. London: Admiralty series.
- Maser, Werner. *Nuremberg: A Nation on Trial*. New York: Scribners, 1979. (English translation by Richard Barry.)
- Moll, Otto E. *Die Deutschen Generalfeld-Marschaele 1935-1945*. Rastatt: Erich Pabel Verlag, 1961.
- Mosley, Leonard. *The Reich Marshal*. New York: Doubleday, 1974.
- von der Porten, Edward P. *The German Navy in World War II*. New York: Crowell, 1969. (Foreword by Grand Admiral Doenitz.)
- Reel, A. Frank. *The Case of General Yamashita*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949.
- Smith, Bradley F. *The Road to Nuremberg*. New York: Basic Books, 1981.
- Smith, H.A. *The Law and Custom of the Sea*. London: Stevens & Sons, 1954.
- Speer, Albert. *Inside the Third Reich*. New York: Bonanza Books, 1970. (English translation by Richard and Clara Winston.)
- . *Spandau: The Secret Diaries*. New York: Macmillan, 1976. (English translation by Richard and Clara Winston.)
- Stockhorst, Erich. *Fuenftausend Koepfe*. Blick und Bild Verlag, 1967.
- Thompson, H. Keith, and Strutz, Henry (eds.). *Doenitz at Nuremberg: A Re-Appraisal*. New York: Amber, 1976; 2nd, revised ed. Torrance, Calif.: Institute for Historical Review, 1983.
- Toland, John. *Adolf Hitler*. New York: Doubleday, 1976.
- Jurist, A. [Veale, F.J.P.]. *Advance to Barbarism*. London: Thomson & Smith, 1948; New York: Devin-Adair, 1953, 1968; Torrance, Calif.: Institute for Historical Review, 1979.
- Veale, F.J.P. *War Crimes Discreetly Veiled*. London: Cooper Book Co., 1958; Torrance, Calif.: Institute for Historical Review, 1979.

Gnostic Origins of Alfred Rosenberg's Thought

JAMES B. WHISKER

It has been said that the Christian opponent of Judaism has but two alternatives: to de-Judaize Christ or to deny Him. Houston Stewart Chamberlain, following many theologians of middle Europe in the 19th Century, attempted to prove that Jesus was an Aryan living in an isolated area of Gallilee, and separated racially from the rest of the peoples of the region. The author of *Foundations of the 19th Century* attempted to show that an isolated group of Nordics had been cut off from the mainstream of the nation, and that Christ was descended from such people. Field Marshal Ludendorf and others merely denied the relevance of Jesus, and were anti-Christian as well as anti-Hebrew. These two traditions accepted in common the idea that the Bible, Old and New Testaments alike, was literal history.

A third possibility underlies Rosenberg's thought. The origins are rooted in pre-Christian ideas and practices commonly known in the West as gnosticism. Like many other generic terms, gnosticism is used by many to cover a wide variety of philosophical-theological ideas. Because of the success of the Western church, including its more recent Protestant forms, the systems which were vanquished in the long struggle for religious supremacy in Christendom are thought of in a totally negative context. Such names as Marcionite, gnostic, Manichaean, and Bogomilite, are pejoratives. Most of what was known about them was either

secretly guarded or was learned from reading the refutations of opponents or the accounts of one or another Inquisition, including the interrogations (most often of unlearned members under torture) of those who were accused of heresy.

In the 20th Century there have been two major developments which have changed what we know about the various "heresies." One is the discovery of major documents and treatises either by leading gnostics or by their closest disciples and followers. The other development is the interest shown by leaders of the Third Reich in these movements, and the subsequent study of the ideology in terms of such thought. Among the major works to appear reinterpreting the National Socialist movement in such terms are Pauwels and Bergiers' *The Morning of the Magician* (in French, and translated into many languages), Ravenscroft's *The Spear of Destiny* and *The Cup of Destiny* and Angebert's *The Occult and the Third Reich*.

Most of the authors who have rediscovered the gnostics and their influence on the Third Reich have assumed that the leaders kept the bases of knowledge secret, usually in the SS shrines and rituals, and that this special knowledge was never intended for mass distribution. Only the few specially selected SS types could be entrusted with the age-old secrets. Even in the pre-Third Reich State, Rosenberg had distributed his essay on the origins of Nazi ideology (actually written before the NSDAP was formed). His *Myth of the 20th Century* discussed one particularly gnostic sect, the Cathars (Holy or Purified Ones), in great detail, but stopped short of offering a simplified version of the Cathar religion-philosophy as the new religion (or reinstated religion) of Germany.

It is my contention here that Alfred Rosenberg's *Myth of the 20th Century* is quintessentially a gnostic work which attempted to set the stage for subsequent works which would have taken Germany back in time to a stage in which a simplified, anti-Jewish religion was the common practice in the West among the common peoples. It was designed not as a final statement on the New Nordic Religion, but was to serve as a trial balloon, a precursor of what was to come. In the early 1920s Rosenberg was not prepared to offer a final statement of this philosophy. The research necessary to the full creation had not yet been completed. It was a promise of things to come. It was a quest which may, in his terms, be likened unto King Arthur's setting the Knights of the Round Table on the quest for the Holy Grail.

The Grail Legend

Every German schoolboy knew the great folk tale of the Grail

by heart. Wolfram von Eschenbach's *Parzival* was one of the greatest works of literature in the German (or any other) language. On the surface it is a familiar tale of a pure knight's search for perfect love and redemption. It had been popularized in the late 19th Century by the composer Richard Wagner, in operatic form. Few pieces of heroic literature had more impact on the nation-conscious Germans than *Parzival*.

Wagner's opera opens with the aged Knight, Gurnemanz, recalling the legend of the Grail. Titurel had been fighting the pagans without success when, suddenly, he was visited by a band of angels. They gave unto his keeping the Holy Grail, which Christ drank from at the Last Supper; and the Spear of Longinus, the lance used by the Roman centurion to pierce the side of Jesus as he lay in agony upon the cross. Titurel had built a great stronghold at Monsalvat to house these treasures, and had gathered around him those knights who were pure in heart wherewith to guard these great talismans of heavenly power. These knights rode forth to fight injustice and tyranny throughout the world.

Klingsor was an applicant, but he could not vanquish lust and passion from his heart, and so was rejected for membership. He then built a great garden of evil in which, through enticements of the flesh provided by a variety of beautiful women, he lured the pure ones from their stronghold, and enslaved them in his evil service. Amfortas was sent forth by Titurel to carry the sacred lance into the evil place and end its temptations. Klingsor sent the lovely Kundry to tempt Amfortas. She seduced him and delivered the sacred spear to Klingsor. The evil sorcerer wounded Amfortas with it, and although Amfortas escaped, his wound would not heal. Amfortas believed that he was condemned for his sin of the flesh.

An Innocent Fool, Parsifal, appears on the scene, seeking his identity and destiny. After a brief scene in which the Holy Grail is unveiled, he goes to Klingsor's castle. Kundry is sent to seduce him, but, suddenly, Parsifal has a vision and is transfixed. He is told that should he fall to Kundry's seduction there can be no healing of Amfortas' wound and no salvation for him or the Grail Knights. He rejects Kundry and leaves. Klingsor attempts to kill him with the spear, but it hovers over the youth's head. The sensual paradise collapses and Klingsor vanishes.

After many years Parsifal returns from his wanderings throughout the world. He finds that Kundry has taken the robes of a penitent and that Gurnemanz has become a hermit. It is Good Friday. He is told that Titurel has died and that Amfortas still lies wounded and unable to consecrate Holy Communion. Parsifal goes to Monsalvat, touches Amfortas' wound with the sacred

spear and revives the knight. The spear and the Grail are replaced in the sanctuary.

The Grail legend is interpreted in two ways. Generally, it is viewed as a story of Christian love and the redemption of mankind. The second is the mythical interpretation. The Grail is said to contain a coded message known only to a few, and understood by a tiny number. It is this interpretation which is accepted by Ravenscroft in *The Cup of Destiny* (1981) and Angebert in *The Occult and the Third Reich* (1974).

Lucifer was a Prince of Heaven before his sin prompted God to cast him to Hell. On the descent to the Underworld his crown fell to earth, and from it a huge emerald. This was used by men of antiquity to fashion a drinking cup to be used in occult rituals. Here we find the most ancient relic accepted by both Christians and gnostics. The cup was ringed with the usual special signs, symbols, runes and the like, all depicting the ascent of man through various stages to a final state of blessedness. The Grail had become the sacred vessel of Initiate Knowledge. It contained on its exterior the great trove of primordial knowledge and tradition which linked the past to the future. That primordial knowledge can bring man back into the natural and only true condition for him, the primordial state of consciousness.

Within Germany many regarded the Grail as the lost, secret book of the Aryan race. It had been entrusted to them since eons past, and was lost and recovered on occasion. What precisely it contained was unknown, and since it was written in symbols, the interpretation given these runes may have differed from age to age. It was the one great treasure of all Aryans, at all times. From age to age it had been the uniting factor, the one artifact that provided a rationale for the existence of the race.

The recent movie *Excalibur* has given a similar highly secularized interpretation of the Grail myth. The Grail is presented as being a sort of intermediary between ruler and ruled, a magic transmitter that guarantees that the king and the land are one, and that each will serve the other in a wholly natural relationship. Yet it is the spiritual dimension of the Grail that allows for this mythical union.

The Grail predated Christianity. This is an absolute whose acceptance is necessary for understanding the importance of it as an artifact to the NSDAP and its leaders, notably the SS. In Alfred Rosenberg's *Myth of the 20th Century* the Grail may be viewed as the cause of German objection to some aspects of Christianity, notably to Roman Catholicism. It may be viewed as having provided direction to the German people, or at least a significant portion of it, when the people were confronted by orthodox Western church teachings which were alien to them.

While the authors of the recent studies, notably Angebert and Ravenscroft, and to a lesser degree Pauwels and Bergier, have noted the importance of the Cathars of the 11th through the 14th centuries, they have not gone far enough in their research. It is true, as we shall see below, that the "Pure Ones" did preserve, for a time, the Grail and other related artifacts, but they were relative latecomers, both doctrinally and in terms of interest in and preservation of the Grail.

The Marcionite Heresy

We must return to the 2nd century A.D., to Marcion of Sinope in Pontus, to see the development of the whole body of literature surrounding the Grail. The greater portion of what stood in contradistinction to both Western Catholicism and the later Orthodox schism from that Church, can be seen at least germinally in Marcion. He, like many, had struggled with the great problem of evil. The Church had not as of that time decided its own explanation of evil in the world. The question was far from settled when Marcion was writing.

The Marcionites believed that evil was a truly real force, not merely the privation of some good. One may, for simplification, regard that evil power as the Devil, Satan, or the Lord of the Flies. He is a power to be reckoned with. The world was the source of sin and corruption, and was to be avoided. It had been created just as the Old Testament had said, but not by God. There was a lesser being, or beings, much like the classic Greek "world artificers." Sometimes known as a Demiurge, that creator had a spark of divinity, for he was a son of God, an emanation from the Most High. Man naturally longs for his true home, but that is unknown to him. He is trapped in a world of corruption and ruination: in matter, the material world, which is not God's creation.

To Marcion, the Old Testament was lie because it was the story of a false god, a deceiver: Jehovah. It and most, if not all, of its various characters were a deceit, and must be rejected. The Jews he considered to be the people of Jehovah, that is, a race dedicated to the false god. He agreed with the Jews on one point: their messiah had not yet come. Jesus Christ was not their redeemer; he had come to liberate men from the false religion of Jehovah. In his anti-cosmic dualism, Marcion put the unknown God in opposition to the inferior creator-god, Jehovah. The salvation of mankind meant, in a word, liberation from Jehovah.

The contrast between the two worlds and their respective gods is very great. Jehovah is presented by Marcion as a warrior-avenger, interested in perpetuating a world of retribution. The

gentle Jesus is the agent of the unknown (alien) God, and he is merciful and filled with love. One cannot know the unknown (alien) God directly, and though he may have been suspected by men, he was not revealed to exist until Jesus came into the world. Jehovah was at home in the material world because it was his mirror image, made in his (not the alien-God's) image and likeness. The true God could not exist in this world, for he is pure spirit and is in direct opposition to the conflict and disorder which is inherent in matter.

The Marcionites rejected any and all things which tied one to the material world, or which seemed to tie one there, or which seemed to suggest physical redemption or conversion of material things. Thus they rejected baptism, except as a manifestation of their disdain for the material world. Holy Communion was a great contradiction, for it had as its primary content the transfixion of material things into the realm of the spirit and of the unknown God. All earthly pleasures were to be avoided as distractions which tie one to the temporal world. Sexual contact was another more serious tie to the visible world. Procreation of children meant that more sparks of the spirit were to be entrapped in the world of tears and deceit.

Because he is pure goodness and mercy, the unknown God adopted mankind, or at least that portion which was his own and to whom he could come, and who would accept and love him. God gave us grace quite freely to aid in our salvation, not because we as lowly beings could not merit it, but because he loved us although he did not know us. This is the doctrine of "pure grace," a quintessential part of Marcionite theology. That, in a sense, is the whole of the religion. God so loved the world that, although unknown to him, he chose to bring men to live with him so that he and men could come to know one another in a world far removed from the corruption of the present one.

Morality was not regarded as conformity to some law of Nature; nature was physical, and thus corrupt. God was not in the world. Natural laws were the embodiment of the demi-urge, Satan, not the Unknown God. One ought to avoid contact with nature in all its visible forms, for it leads one away from the true God.

While it is faith, not knowledge, that leads us toward God, we must have access to and know the special knowledge that much of what passes as religion is false. We must know, in Marcion's schema, that the Unknown God is God, and that the creator of the world is only an eon, an evil emanation from God. Christ the Son of God came to bring us to know that which we cannot know directly, in and of ourselves. That we are trapped in matter without hope of redemption unless we know the correct faith is a

matter of special, or gnostic, revelation. That God invites us strangers into his home without any knowledge of us, or we of him, is a canon of faith which can be known only through this special knowledge.

Marcion dropped elements of the New Testament that he did not like. What remained were expurgated portions of the Gospels (notably Luke), some of Paul's letters, and bits of the Acts of the Apostles. It is noteworthy that the Western church had not, as of this time, codified the New Testament. Marcion was more restrictive than most of the priests of the time in his choice of acceptable materials for the services. He rejected the Old Testament entirely, although one deviation of the time, possibly not Marcionite, devolved into snake worship, based on the Old Testament tale of the snake tempting Eve. Presumably, the snake was a good symbol for it was set in contradistinction to the ones Marcion had made evil characters. The snake was believed to be bringing certain knowledge of Satan, the creator of Adam and Eve.

In censoring the New Testament, Marcion excised those references made to an early childhood of Christ. Since Jesus was the messenger of the Most High, the Unknown God, he could not have been immersed in matter. Without having to materialize, Jesus had appeared to men to have a body and then only at Capernaum. He came to save those who would reject Judaism and Jehovah. What his precious blood purchased, in a metaphorical sense, was the freedom from the false god, Jehovah. He offered a baptism which would reject the world and all its material evils. One was to be "married" only to Christ so that child-bearing was avoided and man could escape the material world. While the material world would continue to exist, Christ had come to destroy, as an idea, the world of Jehovah.

The Manichaeian Heresy

Few religious deviations in the Western church had greater impact or longer-lasting effect than Manichaeanism. Founded by Mani in Mesopotania about 242 A.D., it was a major rival to orthodox Christianity. Mani was martyred by the Western Church in 276 A.D. Among the early adherents was the great apologist for the Catholic Church, St. Augustine, who practiced its tenets from about 373 to 382. His City of God has strong Manichaeian tendencies in its absolute dichotomy between good and evil, and between the city of man (visible world) and the City of God (realm of the spirit).

Mani reflected the gnostic background of the area and the times. The origin of evil lay in the nature of matter itself. Its

multiplicity is radically opposed to the spirituality of God. Matter is an evil which can never be redeemed; it is eternally evil. The soul is divine, or like unto the divine, for it is immaterial and simple. Man's body is but a prison in which the soul is entrapped. Redemption is found only in death.

The Demiurge, or lesser creator, created the visible world out of particles which belonged to the powers of darkness. These powers are opposed to God and the whole realm of the spirit. They are forever entrapped in the world of matter. They entice man to use his sexual powers to continually procreate so that bits of the spirit are trapped in the bodies of men. Otherwise the bodies would be lifeless, hollow shells, and there would be no one for the powers of darkness to control.

The dichotomy is called anti-cosmic dualism. It underlies all of the major works of gnosticism, but especially Manichaeanism. Sin is concomitant with life itself in the material world. Only the spark of life, the human spirit, is fit for godly action or thoughts, and for redemption. Necessarily this dualism concluded that whatever is merely finite (hence limited in time) is evil; whatever is eternal is good, and the spirit of man is a spark of the eternal fire of God.

Manichaeanism had a rigid ethic. Mankind was forbidden to kill animals or otherwise to shed blood. Sex was condemned for reasons noted above. One was to reject Satan, the world, all material things, and all happiness based on the enjoyment of material goods. The elect or perfects travelled begging for food. They ignored secular laws which were in any way antithetical to their religion, and openly sought martyrdom for their beliefs. A significant portion of the community was devoted to prayer and fasting, and was dependent on the lodging and hospitality of the common believers.

Strictly speaking, the Manichaeans were not Christians. They did accept Christ as having been a divine being, or, at least, a being who was guided by the Holy Spirit. But so too did they accept all of the major religious leaders: Buddha, Lao-tzu and others. They did reject the idea of incarnation that is the cornerstone of Christianity. Jesus only appeared to be a man. He was not hung on one cross; he was, at all times, omnipresent. Some of the critics of Manichaeanism accused the cult of pantheism. It is true that the Manichaeans had no special use for many of the Christian beliefs. They rejected Holy Communion on the ground that it was worthless because of the omnipresence of Jesus. They rejected the relics, such as the cross, partly because the artifacts were material and partly because they had no more relevance than any other physical item, since God was everywhere.

The term Manichaeanism has come to represent any and all varieties of dualism in which matter and spirit are necessarily and essentially opposed. The movement died out probably for two reasons. It was too anti-social in its rejection of sex and its exclusiveness. It went too far in rejecting war, violence and bloodshed in an age that was far too tempted to war in both conquest and defense. But the term and many of the ideas lingered on, the vital spark carried by others.

Agapius (c. 450 A.D.) attempted a fusion of Manichaeanism and true Christianity. He continued the belief in an Evil One, a self-subsistent force that is both eternal and opposed to God. He urged rejection of the whole of the Old Testament on the grounds that it was filled with lies and deceit. He, too, condemned earthly pleasures, sex included. Yet he believed in the doctrine of the Trinity, the Incarnation, baptism for the remission of sins, the Crucifixion, Resurrection and Final Judgment, and the resurrection of the material and glorified body. His fusion, while intriguing, had only its role as a link in the time chain to commend it.

The Paulicians are quite another matter, for they served as a link between Manichaeanism and the Cathars, from about 668 A.D. when the cult was organized, until after 1200. In 869, Peter of Sicily wrote a blistering attack on the Paulicians in his *Historia Manichaeorum*.

The origins of Paulicanism are obscure. The teachings are traced by some authorities to Paul and John of Samosota. The name may have been derived from that Paul, or it may refer to the sect's devotion to ten letters of St. Paul (Saul). Others have traced it to an attempt to belittle the movement as the "petty disciples of Paul."

Publicly, the Paulicians rejected Manichaeanism, but privately they adopted the gnostic dualism and many other of its teachings. They rejected the Old Testament as a work of deception. They stated that it had been written by a race of thieves and deceivers, and was inspired by the worship of the false god, a demiurge, Jehovah. They hated the Jews on a second ground, as Christ judges and condemners. They stopped short of condemning them as Christ killers because they viewed the Crucifixion as an illusion. They viewed Peter as a typical Jew who, under pressure and in danger, had betrayed Christ and denied him.

They attacked the traditional church on several grounds. They viewed clerical garb as the costume of Satan. They despised the emphasis placed on Christ's Passion and Crucifixion as these were either illusions or deliberate lies. Christ had no physical body made of the corrupt matter of this world. His "body" was an illusion offered to men as a convenient point of reference. Communion was an offering of material things, water or wine and

bread, and thus could not be holy. The true Eucharist, they taught, was in Christ's words and thoughts.

On the surface they appeared to be orthodox Christians, for they made a distinction between things done on the surface without meaning and those done privately with special meaning. The Bible, even the hated Old Testament, was accepted for esoteric use, while the initiates used esoteric rites in private. They believed that faith was the great guiding factor in attaining salvation (hence their love for Paul). But they also believed that there were certain hidden meanings and revealed words that the initiates must know in order to escape the material world. These they held in secret, in their clandestine services.

In one area they did differ from Manichaeanism. They were willing to fight and die. Much of their success came in opposing the armies of the Byzantine and, later, the Bulgarian empires. They spread the word with the sword as well as with the Bible. Perhaps their impact on history is greater because of their fighting prowess than because of their ideas. While they did not usually force conversion, the mere sight of their powerful armies in the field must have had a significant impact on the local population. Their power peaked under Tychicus, c. 801-835 A.D., although remnants remained active until at least 1200.

Paulican and Manichaeian ideas were fused in an otherwise quite original movement which appeared in Bulgaria about 950 A.D. Our only true point of reference is a notation that they were first studied while Tsar Peter reigned in Bulgaria. Peter died in 969. The Bogomili were a group of initiates possessed of secret writings and ideas, whose name indicates "God have mercy" or "Mercy of God" or "Beloved of God."

Their highly original position in theology begins with the gnostic dualism of matter as evil and spirit as good. In the story of the Prodigal Son (Luke 15:11-32) they found an allegory. Christ is the good son who remained with the father and the devil is the son who goes off to do evil. The devil (Satanel as the Bogomili called him) was the son of God and the brother of Christ. One later tale which tells us of the Bogomili is as follows. The devil made the body of Adam. He tried to animate it with a spark of the eternal (soul) which he had stolen from God, but the soul would not remain in place. The soul continually exited through the anus. Eventually the devil was able to dam it up and the soul was sufficient to animate the body. The devil made the body from water and earth.

In a second version of the story the water flowed out of Adam's toe and formed a stream, which appeared to Adam as a snake. The snake tried to warn Adam of the deceit of Satanel, and was thus cursed by him. Eventually, God and his prodigal son reached

an accord; each would rule a part of man. God was to govern what had been stolen from him, the spirit of man; the devil would govern the body.

To prevent the end of mankind, and thus end Satanel's control over man through his body, the devil must continue the human race. He could accomplish that only by continually entrapping the spirit in matter. He thus uses sex as the primary instrument of control. Without sex and procreation there would be no future subjects for Satanel's control. Thus, marriage was to be rejected by the true believer.

The esoteric portion of the Bogomile cult taught that messages were hidden in the gospels, acts of the apostles, and letters of Paul. One had to have a certain key to unlock the secrets. For reasons that are not clear, but perhaps out of fear of the Jews, the messages were presented in riddles, allegories and metaphors. The correct interpretation of the materials was vital to salvation.

The Bogomili rejected the cross—it was a symbol of evil. On it the Jews had really or symbolically crucified Christ. Even if one attempts to reconcile the dualism which precludes Christ from having a body with the hatred of the Jews as "Christ killers" one is left with the idea in Bogomilism that they condemned Christ and his teaching. The Cross may be symbolically interpreted as representing that condemnation and rejection.

The Bogomili made no distinction between priests and laity. It was a democratically-run organization with no hierarchy until about 1200. They were more contemplative than the Paulicians, less given to action, and apparently non-violent. Had they been more active militarily their organizational structure may have been greater. They did not attempt to create a temporal regime.

The usual rejection of the sacraments marked Bogomilism. Marriage leads to continued creation of material bodies. Communion is an attempt to do the impossible: sanctify matter which is evil and cannot be blessed. Relics are rejected, and formal churches for the same reason.

The Phundagiagitae may be regarded as a form or application of Bogomilism and, to a degree, Paulicanism. It was probably founded by John Tzurillas in Bulgaria about 1050, and spread through Bulgaria and Byzantium. It was more willing than the Bogomili to pay lip service to those things of organized Orthodox Christianity. Its adherents were hard to discover during the many persecutions of non-Orthodox Christians in both Bulgaria and Byzantium.

The Phundagiagitae were accused of being devil worshipers, and of having a developed satanology. The accusation comes from a misreading of their interest in Satanel as a son of God

and as the creator of this world. God created six heavens, and Satanel the remaining one. Satanel had tricked the other devils into rebelling against God; realizing that they had been tricked, these other fallen angels set about to create a race of helpers for mankind. This they did by fathering a race of giants by the daughters of men.

Moses had led the Jews astray, the Phundagiagitate argued, by worshiping only Satanel, and in offering men the law which was written by Satanel, not by God. Other men rebelled, urged on by the giants who had been instructed by their fathers. In retaliation, Satanel caused the Universal Deluge which killed all but Noah who had remained loyal to him. In this cult, very few of the Old Testament figures were worthy of other than eternal damnation.

Satanel had stolen the spark from God which became the spirit of man. This was represented metaphorically as the light of the sun set against the eternal darkness of Satanel's realm. The spirit of man cried out for redemption so God sent his son Jesus Christ to the rescue. After having saved men, or that portion to whom he came and who received him, Jesus returned to heaven. On the ascent he bound Satanel, and removed from him his godliness, after which the devil became Satan, the "el" having been appropriately dropped. (The "el" indicated "of God.") The teaching of Jesus was designed exclusively to liberate men from Satanel and his servants on earth, the Jews, followers of Moses and Noah.

The Pure Ones - the Cathars.

In the Myth of the 20th Century Alfred Rosenberg spends much time discussing the Cathars, also known as the Albigensians or Pure Ones. He clearly preferred their brand of Christianity to the Roman Catholic version. They were the carriers of the Manichaeian tradition, as influenced by the Bogomili, Paulicians and others, into Central Europe, in the years prior to the Reformation. Had the Cathars been more militarily active and adept it is they, not Luther and Calvin, who might have won a place in history as the reformers of Christianity and the successful rebels against the Church. As it was, they were successfully contained by the Catholic Church and allied princes.

We find the Cathars emerging by about 1025 A.D., in Germany, Italy and France, also spreading to England and Flanders. Originally they were simply "the new Manichaeans," and were so labeled by those whom the Church sent to weed out the recurrent heresy. There are many legends about the founders of the Cathar heresy, but no single figure or small, identifiable group can be credited. Gerbert of Aurillac, Archbishop of Reims, for example,

in 991 made a declaration of principles which were decidedly gnostic and Manichaean, but he cannot be said to have led or encouraged the spread of Cathar religion. In 1028 William V, Duke of Aquitaine, summoned a council of bishops to deal with the heresy, and there it was held that it had spread northward from Italy. Ademar of Chabannes believed that a woman and another peasant had carried the doctrine into France, perhaps from Italy. Modern scholarship suggests that a portion of it, at least, came from Bulgaria, Armenia, and/or the Byzantine Empire, with another portion coming out of the Moslem Empire, where there was an unusual tolerance for strange gnostic sects.

Their doctrines are learned by and large from Roman Catholic sources, mostly records kept of the inquisition of prisoners. No book similar to the (ancient Armenian?) Key to Truth had to date been discovered, translated and disseminated to explain the Cathar side of the controversy over their doctrines. Most modern scholarship begins with a stern warning that the records of the Inquisition, even if accurate, were gleaned from those under torture, and thus those questioned were prone to say what the torturer wished to hear. Also, the records were obtained from unlearned peasants whose ideas of theology contradict one another, and none may be accurate in their recounts of the theology. Last, we must note that the Cathar heresy existed clearly for more than two centuries and it had no central authority similar to the papacy to set doctrine universally.

The Cathars were clearly dualists in the classical Manichaeian sense. The earliest references to them state that there was a new outbreak of the Church's old nemesis, Manichaeanism. Intermittently thereafter the Cathars were called Manichaeans. Authorities have not decided, based on the available testimony, whether the Cathar dualism was of traditionally opposed eternal gods, or whether it was of the monarchical type. There may have been shades of each heresy existing simultaneously. The monarchical dualism suggests that the power of evil is a being in all ways inferior to God, and that evil force will disappear when the material world ends. Traditional dualism, based in some part on the teachings of the Persian sage Zarathustra (Zoroaster) suggests that there are two equally eternal and powerful beings, one good and one evil.

The Cathars accepted the usual limited scriptural writings, and excluded the bulk of the Old Testament. Several books, to which the New Testament referred often, were retained, notably the Psalms. Jehovah of the Jews was dismissed as being either an incarnation or form of Satan, or as being merely a world artificer and not God. They gave esoteric interpretations to Scripture, including proscription of eating meat. The portions of the New

Testament which did not suit their purposes were removed, usually with the justification that these had been added by the Jews to confuse or confound the faithful.

There was a significant distinction made between the Perfects and the laity within Catharism. The laity were those who were learning the true Christianity. They could marry, or continue to live in wedlock, if they wished. The initiates who had taken the final vows of the cult could not have sexual intercourse or live in a family environment. The training period often lasted several years or even a decade or more. Many Cathars held off taking the vows until they were near death, so that they were not obliged to follow the much stricter moral code required of the Perfects.

The great sacrament of the Cathar religion was the Consolamentum. It was held in the home of a Perfect or a sympathizer. It began with a communal confession of sins and failures called the Servitium. All those present, Perfects or followers, participated. A senior Perfect held aloft a copy of the excised Scripture. The transcriptions of what the ceremony consisted of have come down to us, and as reported contain nothing that is shocking to, or antithetical to, orthodox Christianity. The closest it came to heresy was the stress laid on the sins one could commit of a material type, notably the sins of the flesh.

The candidate's initiation into the final rite of the Perfects was reasonably simple. It was flavored with writings from the accepted Church fathers and the excised Scripture, but mostly consisted of the rejection of things which were offensive to the Cathars. One pledged not to eat meat, engage in worldly vanities, lie, cheat, swear, and the like. The Roman Catholic Church alleged that it was at this point that the rejection of all things Catholic took place. The catechumen was reminded that here, before God, he swore eternal allegiance to his religion. Doubtless, he was required to renounce the Sacraments, since these were tied to the material world, and several canons of faith.

The Cathars drank no wine, and they objected to Holy Communion on the ground that nothing material could be made holy or purified in the sight of God. This, as we have seen before, is standard in anti-cosmic and gnostic dualism. Confession was an open affair, and not made to the priesthood. The cross was most objectionable, on the traditional ground that it was the symbol of the passion, even though they generally believed that Christ had no body and only appeared to suffer. The fact that the Jews had sought to crucify and condemn Jesus was sufficient reason to hate the cross, even if Christ was not actually crucified.

Some Cathars appeared to be Adoptionists. Here, they believed that a man like any of us—but a non-Jew—had been born, out of the flesh of Mary, fathered probably by Joseph, but not born of a

virgin, and not born of one eternally exempted from sin (Immaculate Conception). At the time of the baptism by John, when God spoke the words "This is my beloved son in whom I am well pleased," Jesus was transfixed or possessed by God. The "adoption" remained through the crucifixion, and possibly God removed himself from the man either at the Garden of Gethsemane or on the cross ("My God! My God! Why hast thou forsaken me?"). Most among those accepting Adoptionism believed that the man, not the man-God, was crucified.

Probably the mainstream Cathars believed that God had not, and could not, become flesh, because flesh is material and thus corrupt. He only appeared to men to have a body, as a convenience to men to see him. That point of view had a secondary benefit: it precluded having to be concerned with whether Christ was a Jew. That was a problem of some considerable concern for a group which had fully rejected Judaism and the writings, prophets, thoughts, and laws of the Old Testament.

Traditional teachings on Heaven, Hell and Purgatory were unacceptable to the Cathars. Earth, as the material world of the Devil and of corruption, was the Hell. Only those who renounced the flesh and Satan could be assumed into Heaven. The Consolamentum was the purgation of the evil and corruption from man. Thus, there was no need for a second place in which this cleansing could occur. Likewise, there was no need to pray for the dead. Some of the dead had made it to the Heaven above the corruption of the material world, and thus needed no help. Others continued to have their spirits entrapped in the world.

None of the works consulted on Catharism have taken up the question of reincarnation, but it seems to be a logical consequence of the religion. If a soul was not able to escape matter, would it not be forced to return to try again? Or was it that a soul which failed to rise from the material world in that single attempt of the lifetime spent here was eternally trapped in matter in some way? The sources we have are silent on this important point.

One might also ask if it was necessary for the Cathars to believe that all men had this spark of the Eternal God. This is not taken up in the extant sources either. One legend suggested that Satan invaded the celestial abode sufficiently well enough to capture one-third of the spirits and these he entrapped in earthly bodies. However, the legend does not state clearly that this number was sufficient to account for all mankind. This, precisely, is the major problem in the Cathar teachings: they spoke in myths, parables and legends, and not infrequently contradicted themselves.

Except in a highly symbolic sense, Mary had no role in the Cathar teachings. Some held that she was, as a virgin, a symbol

for the Church in its most abstract form. One sidelight held that Mary was a vehicle through which an eon passed on its way to earth; and a variance allowed Christ to have passed through her, but through her ear, not through the usual birth route.

The Inquisition accused the Cathars of being pantheists. In a spiritual sense, something of God may be said to be present in all things. Conversely, nothing material could house God, as in the Cathar rejection of Holy Communion, because God was the anti-thesis of materialist diversity and multiplicity. The Cathars generally responded to questions about God's presence in Church or in Communion by saying that God was no more present there than anywhere else. Some Cathars evidently believed that God, being all-powerful, could enter matter, or take on the appearance of matter, at will, to deceive the Devil and rescue the Men of Light from their material prison. Thus, at any given time, God may be present in any apparently material thing, or appear to all, Satan included, as a material thing.

The list of figures inverted in their moral standing is both long and intriguing. Jehovah, as we have seen, was as the Jewish God both evil and a false god, a form of Satan (or Satan incarnate). Abraham and Moses were said to have been inspired by the Devil. John the Baptist was evil because he baptised in water (i.e., a material thing) instead of baptising in the spirit. The various characters who destroyed, or who had a hand in destroying, others—as in the robbery of the Caananites to obtain the "land of milk and honey"—were condemned.

Rosenberg and Gnosticism

The Cathars served as a highly convenient take-off point for Alfred Rosenberg's attack on both the Catholic Church and on Judaism. It is impossible to show his intellectual development, to say whether his disdain for these two powerful institutions flowed from a general dislike of them, or from his analysis of their doctrine or their history. However, there are many references throughout the *Myth of the 20th Century* to both groups as the corrupters of Christianity and of God's true message, and to these organizations as the persecutors of the Cathars.

One may assume that Rosenberg's constant favorable reference to the Cathars suggests that he believed they possessed the key to true Christianity. Rosenberg insisted throughout his writings and speeches that he was a Christian. He criticized the Roman Church on the usual grounds that one finds throughout post-Reformation Europe. But there was much more to it than that. The Reformation had not gone far enough. Luther and Calvin, and others, had started in the right direction, but had faltered.

One might compare the Protestants to the Waldenses who were the contemporaries of the Cathars. The Waldenses were in no way dogmatic and they spent very little time with questions of esoteric doctrine. They merely wanted to purify the Church, simplify the services, and end the corruption among the clergy. In short, they wanted to reform the Church to conform more to the "simple" Church they believed to have existed during the Acts of the Apostles. These, basically, were the aims and the results of Protestantism. In "simplifying" they wanted to reduce the number and complexity of the sacraments and the stronghold of central authority over matters of faith, morals, and bureaucracy. The doctrinal disputes were minimal, and for the most part no more comprehensible than the difference between Catholic Transubstantiation and Lutheran Consubstantiation. The doctrinal differences were of very little concern to most of the body of the faithful.

Thus, Luther paid great heed to the literal interpretation of the whole of the Bible, and rejected tendencies (latent Catharism?) to excise the Old Testament. The matter of a vernacular Bible was more important than any process of "purifying" the content. The Calvinists paid even greater attention to the Old Testament than did the Catholic Church. The Puritan form even attempted to reinstitute the Rule of Judges and the Old Testament theocracy when they came to power in New England, and many of the True Levellers ("Diggers") attempted to do the same in England.

Luther had the greatest reverence for the literal word of Paul. The Cathars and other gnostics had made great use of Paul, but in a way so highly symbolic that a fair statement of the situation might be that they merely used Paul as a take-off point for their esoteric ideas. It is with Paul, especially a literal interpretation of Paul, that Rosenberg had his greatest problem with Christianity. Rosenberg saw in Paul a conclusive hypocrisy, in that Paul denied the Law, yet paid great attention to the development of the same Law. He had rejected the Mosaic Code under that name as too binding, but had attempted to codify a Law for Christians which, Rosenberg said, was merely the Mosaic Code under a new name.

To Rosenberg, Paul was the grand conspirator. Seeing that the new religion of Christ could not be defeated, that it threatened Judaism, the Jews sent Paul to transform it. Because the New Testament blamed the Jews for the death of Christ ("His blood be upon us. . . .") it would or at least could take on an anti-Jewish character. So the Jews decided, according to Rosenberg, to send one of their own, in effect sacrificing him, to redirect Christianity. It was this simple: Christ had come unto his own, and his own received him not. The Jews were thus outcast. But by redirecting Christianity, Paul made it seem that the Jews were not outcasts.

Had it not been for Paul, Rosenberg argued, Christianity would have been as the "heretics" like the Bogomili, Manichaeans, Paulicians, or Cathars. It would have rejected the Old Testament, removed the Jews and their Jehovah, and founded an anti-Jewish religion.

We are unusually hard-pressed to discover precisely how much of the gnostic anti-cosmic dualistic theology Rosenberg had mastered. We do not know precisely what books he read or discovered. Neither do we know precisely what the "Occult Bureau" of the SS had found.

After the fall of the last Cathar stronghold, in October 1244 A.D. at Montsegur, a few of the group made it through the Roman Catholic lines and carried off the treasures. Among these was reputed to be a Holy Grail, and on it the initiate knowledge the Cathar gnosticism required for salvation. This is the great theme of both Ravenscroft's books, and of Angebert's *The Occult and the Third Reich*. Otto Rahn's *Crusade Against the Grail*, published during the pre-war years, suggests that the location of the greatest of the Cathar treasures was known. Possibly, too, the SS had located long lost books of Cathar theology, or books showing the esoteric Cathar interpretation of the New Testament books they accepted. Also, the SS may have located the Cathar commentaries on books long used by Manichaean sects, including apocryphal books like *The Books of Enoch*, *the Book of Adam and Eve*, *The Gospel of Thomas*, or *The Childhood of Jesus*.

Ravenscroft believed that the spear of Longinus had long before been located, in Vienna, at the treasure-house of the hereditary Austrian kings. The spear, as he calls it in his book title: *The Spear of Destiny*, was to Ravenscroft a talisman of power in and of itself. He suggested, but did not clearly state, that it may be much more.

We may be puzzled, as an aside, by the movie *Raiders of the Lost Ark*. In a sense, it suggests that a small group knew that the National Socialists were hunting for certain symbols, such as the Holy Grail and the Spear of Longinus. In another sense, why was the Ark of the Covenant chosen in that movie? Nothing I have read about Rosenberg or the gnostics suggests that the Ark was remotely of interest.

Other than the miscellaneous writings we have suggested here, and the Grail, of what did the Cathar treasure consist? More to the point in this section of the essay, of what did Rosenberg believe it would consist? And what of that lot did Rosenberg study and consider? Presumably, Ravenscroft and Angebert, in researching their books, spent much time in considering answers to these questions. Both agree that Hitler and the National Socialists possessed the Spear. Neither author is evidently willing to

commit to the Nazis' possession any other specific object or writing. One might even ask if, indeed, the Cathars had a treasure, and, if they did, if any of it has survived.

I strongly suspect that somewhere there exists, or did exist at the end of the war, a substantial amount of very important research on the whole of the Cathar movement and the presumed great treasure taken from Montsegur. It would have been gathered for the express purpose of being made into the basis of the Nordic Christianity that preoccupied both Rosenberg and Hitler.

Angebert's *The Occult and the Third Reich* suggests that a substantial portion of what the SS gathered on religion was put into use by the SS under Heinrich Himmler and that a special stronghold had been provided Himmler for the express purpose of indoctrinating his select SS leaders in the new cult. Pauwels and Bergier, whose work is most noteworthy for its wild statements given with absolutely no documentation, say in the *Morning of the Magician* that a whole black ritual devoted to Satan worship was offered selected SS officers. The Black Order was to be devoted to black magic, demonology and all sorts of evil things. Ravenscroft believed that Hitler was a black magician and a master of many of the occult sciences.

One might point out that similar charges had been brought against the Cathars. They had offered a whole new interpretation of Christianity and had suffered burning at the stake and other painful martyrdoms. Until the documents which still may exist are released, we can only say that it is within the context of Rosenberg's published works that he studied what was available on the Cathars, and perhaps other medieval Manichaeans (in a very broad definition of Manichaeanism), and that the ideas as he understood them were to be the basis for a reconstituted Christianity.

It is noteworthy that the Roman Catholic Church acted swiftly, and for the first time in many centuries attacked a specific work, Rosenberg's *Myth of the 20th Century*, in an encyclical entitled *Mit Brennender Sorge*. The issuance of an encyclical in the vernacular (German here) was itself more than slightly irregular and noteworthy. The Roman Catholic Church has also taken the position of exonerating the Jews for especial guilt in the death of Christ, placing the blame more universally on all men. That action has taken place since the *Myth of the 20th Century* was written and, to some considerable degree, the encyclical may be viewed as a reaction to Rosenberg and the National Socialist position.

Surely, nothing fitted in better with the prevailing thinking of the Third Reich than the Manichaean position on the Jews and the Old Testament. That it was quite possible to be anti-Jewish

and a good Christian at the same time was a cornerstone of the Nordic approach to Christian doctrine. It was also important that the medieval Manichaeans could allow that there was a race of cosmic men who were corrupt and materialistic and ruled by a false, materialistic god that stood in opposition to a race of pure men, steeped in rejection of the material world and deeply immersed in the realm of the spark of the Creator. The statement of the medieval Manichaeans on the race and the anti-race sounds like a passage plucked from the Nazi Primer.

Bibliographic Essay

Probably the best single-volume introduction to the various "heresies" is Steven Runciman, *The Medieval Manichee* (Cambridge, 1955). It gives a simplified overview and a reasonable statement of the times. E. Broeckx's *Le Catharisme* (Hoogstraten, 1916) is an excellent source on this particular religion. Hans Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion* (Beacon, 1963) is an excellent coverage of all the major Manichaeian religions and gnosticism generally. Dmitri Obolensky, *The Bogomils* (Cambridge, 1948) is authoritative on its subject. F.C. Conybeare discovered and translated an intriguing book based in Manichaeian doctrine, *The Key of Truth* (Oxford, 1898). The book is as yet undated, but is clearly quite ancient. Modern authors disagree with Conybeare's introduction. F. Cumont's *Recherches sur le manicheisme* (Paris, 1908) is another excellent source on the subject. J. Guiraud has written an excellent *Histoire de l'inquisition au moyen age* (Paris, 1935-38). A. Borst's *Die Katharer* is one of the few works in German published since the war (Stuttgart, 1953). Recent and quite good is H. Soderberg, *La Religion des Cathars* (Uppsala, 1949). An old standard is C. Schmidt's *Histoire des Cathars et Albigeois* (Paris, 1849). On Rosenberg, I used the only English language edition, published in 1982 by Noontide Press, of *The Myth of the 20th Century*, while checking the original German text. A summary of Rosenberg's other works can be found in my *The Social, Political and Religious Thought of Alfred Rosenberg* (University Press of America, 1982).

The other books noted are: Trevor Ravenscroft, *The Cup of Destiny* (York Beach, Maine: Weiser, 1982) and *The Spear of Destiny* (New York: Putnam, 1973); Jean-Michel Angebert, *The Occult and the Third Reich* (New York: MacMillan, 1974); and Louis Pauwels and Jacques Bergier, *Morning of the Magician* (Paris: Gallimard, 1960).

On the Parsifal legend, one good edition is Jessie L. Weston, editor, *Parzival: A Knightly Legend by Wolfram von Eschenbach*, 2 volumes (London: Nutt, 1894). One might also see Helen M. Mustard and Charles E. Passage, *Parzival: A Romance of the Middle Ages* (New York: Vintage, 1961).

There has been a new wave of interest in the Cathars shown in France. Among the more interesting, but not necessarily always scientific, studies are: Pierre Durban, *Actualite du catharisme* (Toulouse: Bible d'or, 1968); Simone Hannedouche, *Manicheisme et catharisme* (*Cahiers d'études cathares*, 1967); Serge Hutin, *Les gnostiques* (Paris: P.U.F., 1958) and *Les societes secrètes* (Paris: P.U.F., 1952); Rene Nelli, *Le phénomène cathare* (Toulouse: Privat, 1964), *Le musée du catharisme* (Toulouse: Privat, 1966) and *Écritures cathares* (Paris: Planète, 1968); Fernand Niel, *Albigois et cathares* (Paris: P.U.F., 1965) and *Montsegur, la montagne inspirée* (Grenoble: Allier, 1967); S. Petrement, *Le dualisme chez Platon: les gnostiques et les manichées* (Paris: P.U.F., 1947); Henri-Charles Peuch, *Le manicheisme* (Paris: S.A.E.P., 1949) and *La quête du Graal* (Paris: Stock, 1934); Edouard Schure, *Les grands inités* (Paris: L.A.P., 1960); Gerard de Sede, *Le trésor cathare* (Paris: Julliard, 1966); and Christine Thouzellier, *Catharisme et valdeisme en Languedoc à la fin du XII^e et au début XIII^e siècle* (Paris: P.U.F., 1967).

Otto Rahn's story of the initial search for the Grail is told in his *La Croisade contre le Graal* (Paris: Stock, 1934).

10.345, 345, 346, 347, 350, 351

REVIEW ARTICLE

Yehuda Bauer and the 'Polemical and Apologetic Bias' of Jewish Historiography

L.A. ROLLINS

**A HISTORY OF THE HOLOCAUST by Yehuda Bauer. New York:
Franklin Watts, 1982, 398pp, \$15.95, ISBN 0-531-098621**

Hannah Arendt once pointed out the "strong polemical and apologetic bias" of Jewish historiography. Yehuda Bauer is Professor of Holocaust Studies at Jerusalem's Hebrew University. And, according to Dr. Franklin H. Littell, Bauer is "one of the world's top authorities on the Holocaust." But *A History of the Holocaust*, Yehuda Bauer's latest contribution to Jewish historiography, is no exception to Hannah Arendt's observation.

The book begins with a fairly lengthy overview of Jewish history. (We do not even reach the beginning of the Third Reich until page 93.) Bauer's bias is already apparent by page 4, where he tells us:

In the ancient world, as well as later, the concept of one God meant that all humans were His children—that all men are equal, a revolutionary idea indeed.

The laws that bear the imprint of the Mosaic tradition include the provision of liberating slaves after seven years (Ex. 21:2), of freeing all slaves who are maltreated (Ex. 21:26-27), of equality before the law (Ex. 21:20, 23-25), of the prohibition of murder and theft, and of the absolute sanctity of human life—all ideas or concepts logically connected to the idea of monotheism.

Thus does Bauer expound what Hannah Arendt called the "self-deceiving theory" of Jewish historians that "Judaism had always been superior to other religions in that it believed in human

equality and tolerance." But while the concept of one God might be taken to mean that all humans are His children and, therefore, are all brothers, it does not necessarily mean that all men are equal. Logically, the idea that two people, or all people, have the same father, or Father, simply does not imply that those people are therefore equal. And as a matter of fact, the idea of one God did not mean to the Israelites that all men were equal. Somewhat more accurately than Bauer, Joan Comay writes, "The concept of the covenant between God and his chosen people implied that all Israelites were equal in God's eyes, and that the human dignity and welfare of each had to be safeguarded." (The World's Greatest Story, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, pp. 220-221.) That Israelites (God's chosen people) and non-Israelites were not considered to be equal or entitled to equal treatment is easily demonstrated. For one thing, the liberation of slaves after seven years, which Bauer mentions, applied only to Israelite slaves. As Milton Meltzer admits:

The Hebrew code assigned the full condition of slavery to "the heathen that are round about you, of them shall ye buy bondmen and bondmaids." And for them there was no prospect of liberation: "They shall be your bondmen forever." (Slavery: From the Rise of Western Civilization to Today, Laurel-Leaf Library, pp33-34. Meltzer quoted Leviticus 25:44, 46.)

The Mosaic code similarly discriminates between Israelite and non-Israelite in prohibiting usury.

Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother; usury of money, usury of victuals, usury of anything that is lent upon usury.

Unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury; but unto thy brother thou shalt not lend upon usury. . . . (Deuteronomy 23:19-20.)

And the provision for periodically releasing debtors from indebtedness likewise discriminates between Israelite and non-Israelite.

At the end of every seven years thou shalt make a release.

And this is the manner of the release: Every creditor that lendeth ought unto his neighbour shall release it; he shall not exact it of his neighbour, or of his brother, because it is called the LORD's release.

Of a foreigner thou mayest exact it again: but that which is thine with thy brother thine hand shall release. . . . (Deuteronomy 15:1-3.)

Thus, Yehuda Bauer's claim that monotheism implies egalitarianism is merely pious balderdash.

Bauer also claims (p4) that, "The laws that bear the imprint of the Mosaic tradition include the provision . . . of the prohibition of murder and theft, and of the absolute sanctity of human life . . ." The absolute sanctity of human life? Because the Mosaic code prohibits murder? But, of course, the Mosaic law also prescribes the death penalty for murder. Is killing a murderer consistent with "the absolute sanctity of human life?" In any case, consider some of the other capital crimes under the Mosaic law: smiting either of one's parents (Exodus 21:15), cursing either of one's parents (Exodus 21:17), bestiality (Exodus 22:19), sacrificing to any god other than "the Lord" (Exodus 22:20), adultery (Leviticus 20:10), incest (Leviticus 20:11-12), homosexual acts (Leviticus 20:13), having a familiar spirit (Leviticus 20:27), blaspheming the name of "the Lord" (Leviticus 24:16), working on "the Sabbath"—at this very moment I am working on "the Sabbath"—(Numbers 15:32-36), serving gods other than "the Lord" (Deuteronomy 13:12-18), saying "Let us go serve other gods" (Deuteronomy 13:6-10), and being a rebellious or stubborn son (Deuteronomy 21:18-21). If "the laws that bear the imprint of the Mosaic tradition include the provision of . . . the absolute sanctity of human life," then Yehuda Bauer is a ham sandwich. (Incidentally, a few pages later, on page 10, Bauer asserts that "the Jews" had ". . . elevated the sanctity of human life to a near absolute. . . ." Thus, between pages 4 and 10 Bauer reduces "the absolute sanctity of human life" to merely a near absolute. A very slight concession to reality by Yehuda Bauer.)

Another manifestation of the "polemical and apologetic bias" of Yehuda Bauer's Jewish historiography is his expurgated version of Messianism. According to Bauer (p15), ". . . in Jewish belief, the Messiah would come to lead the Jews back to their ancestral home in Israel and thus end their troubles and wanderings." But is this really all there was (is?) to the Messiah myth? Not according to Jewish anthropologist Raphael Patai and the Jewish writings he has brought together in his book *The Messiah Texts* (Avon). For example, Patai mentions (p xxxvii) ". . . the global upheaval and havoc [the Messiah] was expected to wreak among the Gentiles. . . ." Patai also mentions (p189) ". . . the time of triumph, in which all the nations of the world recognize him as their spiritual leader and ruler, and he becomes a veritable pantocrator, world ruler—always, of course, in his capacity as the faithful servant of God." On page 193 Patai quotes from pages 162 a-b of *Pesiqta Rabbati*:

"In that hour [in which King Messiah reveals himself] the Holy One, blessed be He, lets shine the light of the Messiah and of Israel, and all of the nations of the world will be in darkness and

blackness, and all will walk in the light of the Messiah and of Israel . . . and they will come and lick the dust under the feet of King Messiah. . . . And all will come and fall upon their faces before the Messiah and before Israel, and will say to him: "Let us be servants to you and to Israel!" And each one of Israel will have 2,800 servants. . . .

According to Isaiah 49:22-23, the Gentiles would also lick the dust under the feet of "Israel," that is, the Jews. As Patai explains (p xxxvii):

Living as they did in a state of dispersion among the nations and of oppression by the Gentiles, the Jews nevertheless remained firmly convinced of the centrality of the Jewish people in the divine scheme with all this meant in imaginary privileges and onerous obligations. Thus the Redemption in the End of Days, too, could not but be centered on the Jewish people, whose role, however, was conceived as that of divine instrument in imposing God's rule over the entire world.

Along the same lines, Patai also says (p xxvi), "For many centuries, in the midst of persecutions, massacres, expulsions, and humiliations, while living the life of hated and despised pariahs, the Jews in their fantasy saw themselves as kings of the World to Come, enjoying great pleasures of the palate, exquisite luxuries of housing and clothing, wading ankle-deep in floods of diamonds and pearls, studying the new Tora of the Messiah taught to them directly by God, and being entertained by dances performed by God himself to the music of angels and the heavenly spheres."

Yehuda Bauer gives not the slightest hint of the Messiah as "world ruler," of the Jewish people as "divine instrument in imposing God's rule over the whole world," of all the Gentile nations of the world coming to Jerusalem to lick the dust from the feet of the Messiah and "Israel" (the Jews), or of each Jew having 2,800 Gentile servants. Of course, if Bauer had mentioned these amazing ingredients of Messianism, then he wouldn't have been able to blithely dismiss the idea of "a Jewish desire to control the world" as nothing but a "false myth" (p45). But Bauer is not willing to admit even the possibility that some Jews might desire to control the world. And so he disingenuously attributes the idea of a Jewish desire to control the world to the "Satanic image" of "the Jew." "Just as Satan is out to control the world, so the Jew, possessed by the Devil, must be." (p44) But I do not see "the Jew" as possessed by "the Devil," yet it seems entirely plausible to me that some Jews might well wish to control the world. As Mark Twain said, "The Jews are members of the human race—worse I can say of no man." Jews are human beings. And some human beings desire power over others. And for some human beings the

lust for power is so all-consuming that they actually desire to control the world. For example, Cecil Rhodes. (See *The Anglo-American Establishment* by Carroll Quigley, Books in Focus.) I see no reason for ignoring the evidence to the contrary and assuming that Jews are inherently incapable of such a lust for power.

But in Yehuda Bauer's biased world-view, it is only Gentiles who are capable of lusting for world power. While Bauer dismisses the idea of a Jewish desire to control the world as a "false myth," he approvingly quotes (p84) Robert Payne's characterization of *Mein Kampf* as ". . . a blueprint for the total destruction of bourgeois society and the conquest of the world. . ." As a matter of fact, there were a few passages in *Mein Kampf* that envisioned, in the distant future, a world ruled by an "Aryan" master race. See pages 383-384 of the Sentry edition, for example. But, contrary to the "false myth" perpetuated by Robert Payne and Yehuda Bauer, there was no blueprint, no detailed plan for world conquest.

Bauer finally gets down to the real nitty-gritty in his ninth chapter, "The 'Final Solution.'" He begins by discussing (p193) the various conditions which supposedly led to a decision to kill all European Jews. But then he says the crucial factor "was the desire to murder the Jews inherent in Nazi antisemitism." Amazingly, however, "Up until early 1941, the Nazis—with the possible exception of Hitler himself—were not conscious of the murderous ingredient of their own ideology because the practical possibilities of implementing it were not apparent." So the Nazis really wanted to kill the Jews all along; they just didn't realize that they wanted to kill them until early 1941 when it became possible to do so. Does Yehuda Bauer really expect anyone to take this quasi-Freudian humbuggery seriously?

In any case, like his fellow "authorities on the Holocaust," Bauer does not prove, but merely assumes, that Hitler, at some indefinite date, gave an order to Himmler "to destroy European Jewry." Bauer says (p194), "Himmler himself hinted at such an order in various communications." Among such communications which Bauer cites in a footnote on page 362 is Himmler's circular memorandum of 9 October 1942. Here is Bauer's version of that memorandum:

After executing the less useful Jews, the remaining Jews, who were to become laborers, were to be sent to concentration camps "in the eastern part of the General Gouvernement [German-occupied central Poland], if possible. Even from there, however, the Jews are someday to disappear, in accordance with the Fuehrer's wishes."

But here is the full text of the memorandum, as translated into English by Elizabeth Wiskemann on pages 110-111 of *Anatomy of the SS State* by Helmut Krausnick et al. (Walker and Company):

1. I have issued instructions that all so-called armament workers employed merely in boot and shoe factories, timber yards and clothing workshops in Warsaw and Lublin will be removed under the direction of SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger and SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl to concentration camps. The Wehrmacht should transfer any orders outstanding to us and we will guarantee delivery of the clothing required. I have also ordered that steps be ruthlessly taken against all those who think they can use the interests of the war industry to cloak their real intention to protect the Jews and their own business affairs.

2. Jews who are directly employed in the war industry—that is to say, in armament or vehicle workshops and so forth—are to be released gradually. As a first step they are to be assembled on one floor of the factory. Subsequently all the hands on this floor are to be transferred—on an exchange basis if possible—to a "secure" undertaking, so that all we shall have in the Government General will be a number of "secure" concentration camp undertakings.

3. Our next endeavour will be to replace this Jewish labour force with Poles and to amalgamate the great majority of the Jewish concentration camp enterprises with one or two large, not wholly Jewish, concentration camp undertakings—if possible in the eastern part of the Government General. In due course these will also be cleared of Jews in accordance with the wishes of the Fuehrer.

As you can see, Himmler's memorandum said nothing about "executing the less useful Jews." Nor did it say "the remaining Jews . . . were to become laborers." The memorandum dealt exclusively with Jews who already were laborers. As for the final statement of the memorandum, that eventually the concentration camps would be "cleared of Jews in accordance with the wishes of the Fuehrer," this could have been a hint at a Hitler order for the destruction of European Jewry only if there was such an order. But, as I've said, Bauer never proves, he merely assumes there was such an order.

Bauer's chapter on "the Final Solution," like the other chapters of his book, is replete with assertions for which he cites no supporting source(s). For example, after discussing Einsatzgruppen massacres in Russia, Bauer asserts (p200), "Mass killings also occurred in Odessa in the Crimea, at Rumanian hands, where 144,000 civilians were murdered, largely by drowning." Since this struck me as a bit far-fetched, especially the part about drowning, I looked for Bauer's source for this assertion. But Bauer cites no source for it. I then checked, but found no confirmation of this assertion in any of the "standard" works on the Holocaust, not in Hilberg's *The Destruction of the European Jews*,

not in Reitlinger's *The Final Solution*, not in Dawidowicz's *The War Against the Jews*, not in Levin's *The Holocaust*, not in Poliakov's *Harvest of Hate*, not in Manvell and Frankel's *The Incomparable Crime*. What I did find is that a few of these books claim a massacre of either 19,000 Jews (both Hilberg and Levin—who cites Hilberg) or 26,000 Jews (Reitlinger) in Odessa in October of 1941 as a "reprisal" for the deaths of several dozen Romanian soldiers resulting from the explosion of a delayed-action landmine left behind in what had been NKVD headquarters. These "authorities on the Holocaust" agree that these Jews were shot. Hilberg, and Levin, citing Hilberg, also claim that another 40,000 Jews were subsequently taken out of Odessa and shot in anti-tank ditches, bringing the total of Odessa Jews allegedly killed by the Romanians to about 60,000. So where, pray tell, did Yehuda Bauer come up with 144,000 civilians murdered at Odessa, "largely by drowning?"

On page 209 Bauer makes the offhand remark that "... no gassings took place at Mauthausen...." However, he gives no inkling of how he arrived at this revisionist conclusion regarding Mauthausen. But if Bauer is right, the implications are interesting. Consider: In his 1966 book, *The Trial of the Germans*, Eugene Davidson discussed, and dismissed, Ernst Kaltenbrunner's defense at Nuremberg (p323):

Kaltenbrunner admitted to none of these charges despite all the witnesses and the overwhelming evidence against him. On the stand, under the searching questioning of British prosecutor Colonel Amen, he could only deny the authenticity of his own signature and declare that the witnesses were lying who said they had seen him in Mauthausen when killings were staged in his honor by gas, hanging, and shooting.

Davidson found it inconceivable that witnesses might have lied about Kaltenbrunner attending a gassing at Mauthausen. But Yehuda Bauer implies such witnesses were lying when he asserts that "no gassings took place at Mauthausen." In fact, Bauer's statement implies that *all* the testimonies about gassings at Mauthausen are false, including those of ex-inmate Johann Kanduth, ex-SS-guard Alois Hoellriegel and camp commandant Franz Ziereis. For the deposition of Hoellriegel, which implicated Kaltenbrunner, see *The Case Against Adolf Eichmann*, edited by Henry A. Zeiger, Signet, pages 141-143. This book also contains excerpts from the interrogation of Kanduth, also implicating Kaltenbrunner, on pages 143-145. Regarding "the deathbed confession" of Ziereis, see Appendix 2 of Germaine Tillion's *Ravensbrueck* (Anchor Books). And see page 8 of Simon Wiesenthal's memoirs, *The Murderers Among Us* (Bantam), for a passing ref-

erence to "the horrors of the gas chambers" of Mauthausen. Yehuda Bauer did not mention these testimonies, let alone explain why he rejects them as incredible. Perhaps he feared that had he done so some of his readers might have wondered why he accepts as credible the similar testimonies about gassings at Polish "extermination camps."

In any case, it certainly is possible to raise questions about the credibility of Bauer's star witnesses about gassing. Kurt Gerstein, Rudolf Hoess and Filip Mueller. On pages 210-211, Bauer quotes excerpts from the Gerstein "report" on a mass gassing of Jews at Belzec. Bauer, however, has omitted most of the blatant absurdities of the Gerstein "report," such as the claim that the Nazis gassed a total of 25 million people. And Bauer gives a calculatedly misleading account of the adventures of Jan Karski, another self-proclaimed Belzec eyewitness whose testimony raises questions about Gerstein's story of mass gassings of Jews at Belzec. According to Bauer (p300):

To see for himself what was happening, Jan Karski (a pseudonym), a Polish patriot and a Catholic humanitarian, visited the Warsaw ghetto after the summer 1942 deportation. Disguised as a guard, he then managed to enter Belzec death camp for one day where he witnessed mass murder.

So Jan Karski (a pseudonym) witnessed "mass murder" at Belzec. Bauer does not elaborate on Karski's witnessing of "mass murder," allowing naive readers to incorrectly assume that Karski witnessed the operation of the infamous "gas chambers" of Belzec described by Gerstein. But, assuming Karski accurately recounted real experiences at Belzec, the only mass murder he saw was the killing of perhaps "a few score" Jews in the process of brutally herding more than 5,000 Jews into the cars of a train which then left the Belzec camp. (See Karski's 1944 book, *The Story of a Secret State*, Houghton Mifflin, Chapter 30.) Karski, who supposedly was at Belzec not quite two months after Kurt Gerstein supposedly witnessed a gassing at Belzec, did not even see any gas chambers, let alone witness a gassing.

It is true that Karski claimed that Jews were herded into railroad cars at Belzec as part of a process of mass extermination. According to Karski,

The floors of the car had been covered with a thick, white powder. It was quicklime. Quicklime is simply unslaked lime or calcium oxide that has been dehydrated. Anyone who has seen cement being mixed knows what occurs when water is poured on lime. The mixture bubbles and steams as the powder combines with the water, generating a large amount of heat.

. . . The moist flesh coming in contact with the lime is rapidly

dehydrated and burned. The occupants of the cars would be literally burned to death before long, the flesh eaten from their bones. (pp349-350)

Karski, however, did not claim to have seen the occupants of the cars being "literally burned to death, . . . the flesh eaten from their bones." And Karski's assumptions about this are implicitly challenged by Bergen Evans in his book, *The Natural History of Nonsense* (Vintage). According to Evans,

That quicklime will "eat" a dead body is an old delusion that has brought several murderers to the noose, for, actually, it is a preservative that instead of removing the evidence keeps it fresh for the coroner's eye. . . . Oscar Wilde, who poetically asserted that quicklime ate the flesh by day and the bones by night, served to refute his own assertion, for he was himself buried in quicklime, and on his exhumation two years later was found to be well preserved. (pp132-133)

If, as Evans said, quicklime does not "eat" the flesh of a dead body, then would it have "eaten" the flesh from the bones of the living Jews shipped out of Belzec as Karski said it would?

In any case, it so happens that Karski was not alone in "proving" Nazi atrocities by exploiting the supposed power of quicklime to "eat" flesh. According to Bergen Evans,

. . . when the resourceful Mr. W.A.S. Douglas, of the Paris Bureau of the Chicago Sun, was confronted with an empty internment camp, Fort de Romainville, deserted by the retreating Germans, he was quick to perceive that it was actually a "death factory" for "the martyred heroines of France." No heroines or fragments of heroines were found, but that only added to the horror of it all: they had obviously been "buried in quicklime." (p133)

Whatever the truth may be about the alleged mass extermination of Jews with quicklime, Yehuda Bauer was clearly delinquent in asserting—without explaining and justifying the assertion—that Jan Karski witnessed "mass murder" at Belzec. And he was also delinquent in not even attempting to reconcile Karski's testimony with that of Kurt Gerstein.

Another of Bauer's star witnesses to mass extermination of Jews by gassing is Rudolf Hoess. Hoess gave a number of confessions to his various postwar captors and interrogators. Bauer cites only one of these confessions, the autobiography written in prison in Communist Poland and published in an English translation as *Commandant of Auschwitz*. Robert Faurisson, however, has identified some significant anomalies in that confession. (See "The Gas Chambers of Auschwitz Appear to be Physically Incon-

ceivable" and "The Gas Chambers: Truth or Lie?," *The Journal of Historical Review*, Winter 1981.) And Arthur Butz has pointed out numerous anomalies in another Hoess confession, an affidavit of 5 April 1946. (See *The Hoax of the Twentieth Century*, Chapter IV.) Rather than repeat the criticisms of Faurisson and Butz, I will simply point out a few additional anomalies to be found in Hoess's various confessions.

In a portion of the autobiography quoted by Yehuda Bauer (p214), Hoess described an experimental gassing.

Protected by a gas-mask I watched the killing myself. In the crowded cells death came instantaneously the moment the cyclon B was thrown in. A short, almost smothered cry, and it was all over. . . .

But is Zyklon B capable of killing "instantaneously?" To do so, Zyklon B crystals, when exposed to open air, would have to release lethal quantities of hydrogen cyanide gas instantaneously. Is that possible? I don't know for certain, but it seems unlikely. In any case, it seems pretty certain that hydrogen cyanide gas, once released, does not kill instantaneously. According to page 53 of *Treatment of War Injuries*, a booklet published in 1942 by Merck & Co., manufacturing chemists, "The poison inhibits oxidation in the body and may cause extremely rapid death by paralysis of the respiratory center." The booklet then describes the symptoms of hydrogen cyanide poisoning. "There may be rapid development of vertigo, headache, palpitation and dyspnea [i.e., labored breathing], followed by coma, convulsions and death." Thus, although inhalation of air containing sufficient hydrogen cyanide gas may cause "extremely rapid death," it apparently does not cause instantaneous death. (If it caused death instantaneously, how would there be time for the development of the various symptoms described above?)

In "The Gas Chambers: Truth or Lie?," Robert Faurisson has summarized the procedure of gassing condemned prisoners by hydrogen cyanide gas in American prisons. According to Faurisson, "Within approximately 40 seconds [after the release of the gas], the prisoner dozes off, and in a few minutes he dies." Although Bauer, on page 214, uncritically quotes Hoess's story about instantaneous death caused by Zyklon B, on the very next page he describes the standard gassing procedure at Auschwitz and says, "After a few minutes of intense suffering, the victims died." Thus Bauer agrees with Faurisson that gassing by hydrogen cyanide causes death after a few minutes. So why does Bauer approvingly quote Hoess's tale about a gassing in which the victims died instantaneously?

In any case, if Faurisson is right that the victim of a hydrogen

cyanide gassing "dozes off" after about 40 seconds, then Bauer is presumably wrong about the victim dying after a few minutes "of intense suffering." Although it doesn't say when, the Merck & Co. booklet does say that the victim of hydrogen cyanide goes into a coma before dying. This is at least a partial confirmation of Faurisson's assertion. At any rate, the information that the victim of hydrogen cyanide gas goes into a coma before dying renders quite dubious another statement from Hoess's 5 April 1946 affidavit, to wit, "We knew when the people were dead because their screaming stopped." Can someone in a coma scream?

In addition to Hoess's autobiography, *Commandant of Auschwitz* includes a statement on "the Final Solution" made by Hoess in Cracow, Poland in November of 1946. Yehuda Bauer does not quote these passages from that statement:

When I went to Budapest in the summer of 1943 and called on Eichmann, he told me about the further actions which had been planned in connection with the Jews.

At that period there were more than 200,000 Jews from the Carpatho-Ukraine, who were detained there and housed in some brickworks, while awaiting transport to Auschwitz.

Eichmann expected to receive from Hungary, according to the estimate of the Hungarian police, who had carried out the arrests, about 3,000,000 Jews.

The arrests and transportation should have been completed by 1943, but because of the Hungarian government's political difficulties, the date was always being postponed.

In particular the Hungarian army, or rather the senior officers, were opposed to the extradition of these people and gave most of the male Jews a refuge in the labor companies of the front-line divisions, thus keeping them out of the clutches of the police. When in the autumn of 1944, an action was started in Budapest itself, the only male Jews left were the old and the sick.

Altogether there were probably not more than half a million Jews transported out of Hungary.

The next country on the list was Romania. According to the reports from his representative in Bucharest, Eichmann expected to get about 4,000,000 Jews from there.

... In the meantime Bulgaria was to follow with an estimated two and a half million Jews. The authorities there were agreeable to the transport, but wanted to await the result of the negotiations with Romania.

... The course taken by the war destroyed these plans and saved the lives of millions of Jews. (*Commandant of Auschwitz*, Popular Library, pp189-190.)

Indeed, if the estimates supposedly given to Hoess by Eichmann were accurate, then "the course taken by the war" saved the lives of about 9 million Jews in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria! Since, according to Bauer (p334), there were only 9 million Jews

in all of Europe before the war, it's no wonder he doesn't mention this inconvenient testimony from one of his star witnesses. You don't become "one of the world's top authorities on the Holocaust" by dwelling on the absurdities of Rudolf Hoess's confessions.

On page 215, Yehuda Bauer quotes from Hoess's testimony regarding cremations at Birkenau: "The two large crematoria I and II . . . had five three-retort ovens and could cremate about 2,000 bodies in less than 24 hours." Hoess never explained how such numbers of cremations were possible, nor does Bauer explain this. However, another of Bauer's star witnesses is Filip Mueller, supposedly a member of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Sonderkommando, who has said of crematorium I at Birkenau, "Its fifteen huge ovens, working non-stop, could cremate more than 3,000 corpses daily." (*Eyewitness Auschwitz: Three Years in the Gas Chambers*, Stein and Day, p59.) How was it possible to cremate such numbers? According to Mueller, 3 bodies were cremated simultaneously in each oven and each cremation took only 20 minutes.

To judge from a recent *Los Angeles Times* article by Carol McGraw ("Cremation: Boom Brings Controversy," 13 April 1983), Mueller's claim about cremating 3 corpses simultaneously in each oven is within the realm of possibility. McGraw quotes the head of a cremation company:

You can tell in 30 seconds if a crematory is legitimate, he said. They [i.e., consumers] should look at the product—ashes should be pure white. If several bodies are cremated together, they won't burn uniformly and the ashes come out very dark.

But to judge from the same article, Mueller's claim about cremating 3 corpses together in 20 minutes is not within the realm of possibility. As McGraw reported, "In the cremation process, a body is placed in a furnace and subjected to temperatures of up to 2,000 degrees for two or three hours." If it takes 2 or 3 hours to cremate a body in a present-day crematory, is it possible that the crematoria of Birkenau could have done so in 20 minutes? As Mueller himself says (p61), "These were, of course, not modern or technically advanced crematoria." If one assumes that cremations at Birkenau took 2 hours, then, even if 3 bodies were cremated simultaneously in each oven, crematorium I's 15 ovens, working non-stop, could have cremated no more than 540 bodies in 24 hours. That's a far cry from Hoess's "2,000 bodies in less than 24 hours" or Mueller's "3,000 corpses daily." And, of course, if cremations at Birkenau took longer than 2 hours, as seems quite possible if 3 bodies were being cremated simultaneously in each oven, then crematorium I at Birkenau could not

have cremated even as many as 540 bodies in 24 hours. Thus, it appears that Rudolf Hoess and Filip Mueller have grossly exaggerated the capacity of the Birkenau crematoria. However, Yehuda Bauer, "one of the world's top authorities on the Holocaust," swallows their gross exaggerations as eagerly as if they were lox and cream cheese.

According to Bauer (p215), "Between 1.5 and 3.5 million Jews died at Auschwitz." Bauer cites no source for these figures, nor does he provide any explanation of how they were arrived at or of how they could possibly be true. And, strangely, although he can't be any more precise than this about Auschwitz, nevertheless, on page 334 he states that, "During the Holocaust, 5.8 million Jewish people died. . . ." Thus, according to Bauer, 5.8 million Jews died in the Holocaust regardless of how many Jews died at Auschwitz. For Bauer, whether 1.5 million Jews died at Auschwitz or 3.5 million Jews died at Auschwitz, in either case 5.8 million Jews died during the Holocaust. Could it be that Yehuda Bauer wants to believe, no matter what, that 5.8 million Jews, i.e., about 6 million Jews, died during the Holocaust?

In a chapter on "The Last Years of the Holocaust, 1943-1945," Yehuda Bauer reports (p326), "When Majdanek was liberated in July 1944, the Russian reports on what they found there were viewed with disbelief in the West." Indeed Richard E. Lauterbach, one of the journalists who parroted those "Russian reports" in the Western press, complained about such disbelief in his 1945 book, *These Are the Russians* (Book Find Club, p326): "The story of Maidanek was printed in American newspapers and magazines. But millions of Americans have never heard of it, and many who have do not believe it." But what did the "Russian [i.e., Soviet] reports" on Maidanek say? Yehuda Bauer does not spell out for his readers the actual contents of those "reports," perhaps because he does not want his readers to realize that he himself does not completely believe them. The Soviet "reports" on Maidanek included the allegation that ". . . one and a half million people were in one way or another put to death in this camp, about half of them Jews." (See *Newsweek*, 11 September 1944, page 64.) But according to Bauer (p209), "[Majdanek] accommodated 50,000 inmates, and in the course of its history, 200,000 died there." Thus Yehuda Bauer implies that the Soviet "reports" exaggerated the number of deaths at Maidanek by 1,300,000! Thereby Bauer himself vindicates those who, as Lauterbach complained in 1945, were already saying "these reports are untrue or exaggerated."

Interestingly enough, Lauterbach also complained about disbelief of other Soviet atrocity "reports," including the "report" that, "At Tremblyanka [sic] in Poland, an estimated 2,764,000

Jews were annihilated." By comparison, Bauer claims (p209) that 840,000 Jews were killed at Treblinka. Of course, even Bauer's (unsupported) claim may be a gross exaggeration.

Before concluding this review, I want to mention a few miscellaneous items of interest in *A History of the Holocaust*. On page 18 Bauer says, "Jewish tribes for a time controlled the Yemen. . . ." It would be interesting to know more about this historical episode, but Bauer does not elaborate.

On page 61 Bauer makes the following assertion: "Against a background of economic crisis which hit everyone, not only the Jews, one-third of Polish Jewry in the thirties was on the verge of starvation or beyond it." Bauer returns to this theme on pages 143-144, quoting Sholem Asch, who wrote in October of 1936 that the Polish Jews seemed to be "buried alive. Every second person was undernourished, skeletons of skin and bones, crippled, candidates for the grave." But if, as Bauer says, one-third of Polish Jews, about a million Polish Jews, were already "on the verge of starvation or beyond it" before the war, then is it really surprising that many Jews (perhaps even hundreds of thousands) would have died of starvation and starvation-related diseases during nearly six years of war and military occupation? Is the explanation for such deaths Nazi diabolism or rather the deleterious effects of a prolonged war on the situation of about one million already-impoverished Polish Jews?

In this regard it is interesting to note the contents of chapter 4 of Reb Moshe Schonfeld's book *The Holocaust Victims Accuse* (Neturei Karta of U.S.A.). According to Schonfeld, the Committee to Boycott Germany of the World Jewish Congress in 1941 demanded, in the name of Zionist bigwig Stephen Wise, that Zeirei Agudas Israel stop sending food parcels to Polish Jewry, because this was a breach of Britain's boycott regulations against Germany. When the demand was rejected, another Zionist honcho, Joseph Tennenbaum, organized the picketing of Zeirei Agudas Israel's office. According to Schonfeld, Zeirei Agudas Israel did not yield to this pressure, but "a majority of naive New York Jews became confused and the sending of packages sharply declined." If Schonfeld's account is accurate, then it would appear that the Zionists were actually prepared to starve Polish Jewry as a means of starving Nazi Germany.

In a section on "Jewish-Gentile Relations in Eastern Europe," Bauer relates the following (pp284-285):

The accusation of Jewish-Soviet cooperation in Eastern Polish areas occupied by the Soviets in 1939 was leveled by the Poles throughout the war. There was some truth to this. Soviet occupation was better than Nazi rule, and the Soviets abolished the restrictions that had prevented Jews in Poland from entering uni-

versities, the administration, and some trades. However, the fact that Jewish attitudes changed as the Soviets restricted religious life, abolished all Jewish institutions, and confiscated property, was ignored by Polish public opinion. According to Polish figures, 264,000 Jews were deported into Soviet exile or Soviet camps, or between 17 and 20 percent of the Jews in Soviet-occupied Eastern Poland. During the war itself, in the absence of any substantial help extended by Poles or Ukrainians, the Soviet army and the return of the Soviet regime were seen by the Jews as the only hope for rescue. Jewish forest and ghetto fighters sought aid from the Soviets. The Poles, who feared Soviet rule no less than they hated the Nazi conquerors, could not identify with the Jewish attitude.

Another item of interest is an appendix in which Bauer gives the text of Himmler's 28 May 1940 secret memorandum, "Reflections on the Treatment of Peoples of Alien Races in the East." Some revisionists have cited this memorandum's reference to "the Bolshevik method of physical extermination of a people" as "un-German and impossible." But it is useful to have the full text of the memorandum.

In an interview given to *Conspiracy Digest* and reprinted in his book *The Illuminati Papers* (And/Or Press), Robert Anton Wilson opined (p43), "Those who make a career out of spreading unproven accusations against other humans can only be forgiven if they really are so ignorant and stupid that they don't know the difference between an assertion and an evidential demonstration." Yehuda Bauer, Professor of Holocaust Studies and author of seven books, seems to be making just such a career out of spreading unproven accusations against other humans, specifically unproven accusations against Hitler and his henchmen. I doubt that Bauer is really so ignorant and stupid that he doesn't know the difference between an assertion and an evidential demonstration. But, on second thought, maybe he is that ignorant and stupid. After all, he is "one of the world's top authorities on the Holocaust."

Book Reviews

DAS HOSSBACH-'PROTOKOLL': DIE ZERSTOERUNG EINER LEGENDE (THE HOSSBACH 'PROTOCOL': THE DESTRUCTION OF A LEGEND) by Dankwart Kluge. Leoni am Starnberger See: Druffel Verlag [D-8131], 1980, 168pp, DM 19.80, ISBN 3-8061-1003-4.

Hitler, we're told over and over again, set out to conquer the world, or at least Europe. At the great postwar Nuremberg Tribunal the victorious Allies sought to prove that Hitler and his "henchmen" had engaged in a sinister "Conspiracy to Wage Aggressive War." The most important piece of evidence produced to sustain this charge was and is a document known as the "Hossbach Protocol" or "Hossbach Memorandum."

On 5 November 1937, Hitler called a few high officials together for a conference in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin: War Minister Werner von Blomberg, Army Commander Werner von Fritsch, Navy Commander Erich Raeder, Air Force Commander Hermann Goering, and Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath. Also present was Hitler's Army adjutant, Colonel Count Friedrich Hossbach.

Five days later, Hossbach wrote up an unauthorized record of the meeting based on memory. He did not take notes during the conference. Hossbach claimed after the war that he twice asked Hitler to read the memorandum, but the Chancellor replied that he had no time. Apparently none of the other participants even knew of the existence of the Colonel's conference record. Nor did they consider the meeting particularly important.

A few months after the conference, Hossbach was transferred to another position. His manuscript was filed away with many other papers and forgotten. In 1943 German general staff officer Colonel Count Kirchbach found the manuscript while going through the file and made a copy for himself. Kirchbach left the Hossbach original in the file and gave his copy to his brother-in-law, Victor von Martin, for safe keeping. Shortly after the end of the war, Martin turned over this copy to the Allied occupation authorities, who used it to produce a substantially altered version for use as incriminating evidence at Nuremberg. Sentences such as those quoting Hitler as saying that "The German question can only be solved by force" were invented and inserted. But over all, the document presented at Nuremberg is less than half the length of the original Hossbach manuscript. Both the original written by Hossbach and the Kirchbach/Martin copy have completely (and conveniently) disappeared.

According to the Hossbach document presented at Nuremberg and widely quoted ever since, Hitler told those present that his remarks were to be regarded as a "final testament" in case of his death. The most incriminating section quotes Hitler as saying that the armed forces would have to act by 1943-45 at the latest to secure the "living space" ("Lebensraum") Germany needed. However, if France became weakened by internal crisis before that time, Germany should take action against Czechia (Bohemia and Moravia). Or if France became so embroiled in war (probably with Italy) that she could not take action against Germany, then Germany should seize Czechia and Austria simultaneously. Hitler's alleged references to German "living space" refer only to Austria and Czechia.

When Hitler came to power in 1933, Germany was militarily at the mercy of hostile foreign states. Rearmament had begun slowly, and in early 1937, because of a raw materials shortage, the three armed service branches had to cut back. A furious dispute broke out between the branches for the remaining allocation.

Contrary to what the Hossbach protocol suggests, Hitler called the conference of 5 November 1937 partially to reconcile the squabbling heads of the military branches and partially to revive the German rearmament program. Foreign policy was only a subsidiary issue. Hitler sought to justify the need for rebuilding German armed strength by presenting several exaggerated and hypothetical foreign crisis cases which would require military action, none of which ever occurred. Hitler announced no new course in German foreign policy, much less a plan for aggressive war.

At Nuremberg Goering testified that Hitler told him privately just before the conference that the main purpose in calling the meeting was "to put pressure on General von Fritsch, since he [Hitler] was dissatisfied with the rearmament of the army." Raeder confirmed Goering's statement.

Like some other aristocratic and traditionalist conservatives, Hossbach became a bitter opponent of Hitler and the National Socialist regime. He was an intimate friend of General Ludwig Beck, who was executed in 1944 for his leading role in the conspiracy which tried to assassinate Hitler and overthrow the government. Despite his postwar denial, it is virtually certain that Hossbach prepared his slanted version of the conference at Beck's urging for possible use in discrediting the Hitler regime following a coup d'état. Hossbach was also close to Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, head of military intelligence, and General Ziehlberg, both of whom were also executed for their roles in the 1944 assassination plot. Even in early 1938 Hossbach, Beck and Canaris were in favor of a coup to forcibly overthrow Hitler.

The Hossbach memorandum is frequently cited in popular historical works as conclusive proof of Hitler's plans for aggressive war. A good example is William Shirer's best-selling but unreliable *Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, which alleged that the protocol recorded "the decisive turning point in the life of the Third Reich." At this critical conference, Shirer wrote, ". . . the die was cast. Hitler had communicated his irrevocable decision to go to war. To the handful of men who would have to direct it there could no longer by any doubt." Like many other Germanophobe publicists, Shirer deceptively cites the Hossbach memorandum as a reliable record. He even distorts the actual wartime importance of the conference participants. Of the five top officials present, three (Blomberg, Fritsch, Neurath) lost their high positions within months of the meeting. Raeder was replaced as Navy Commander in January 1943. Only Goering was really close to Hitler.

The important role of the fraudulent Hossbach protocol at the Nuremberg Tribunal is another damning confirmation of the illegitimate, show-trial character of this most extravagant judicial undertaking in history. On the basis of the protocol, which became Nuremberg document 386-PS, the Tribunal indictment declared: "An influential group of the Nazi conspirators met together with Hitler on 5 November 1937 to discuss the situation. Once again it was emphasized that Germany must have living space in Central Europe. They recognized that such a conquest would probably meet resistance that would have to be beaten down with force, and that their decision would probably lead to a general war." U.S. prosecutor Sidney Alderman told the Tribunal that the memorandum ("one of the most striking and revealing of all the captured documents") removed any remaining doubts about the guilt of the German leaders for their crimes against peace. It was also the basis for the conclusion of the Nuremberg judges that the German "Conspiracy to Wage Aggressive War" began at the conference of 5 November 1937. The document was crucial in condemning Goering, Neurath and Raeder for their roles in the "criminal conspiracy." The spurious Hossbach protocol is all too typical of the kind of evidence used by the victorious Allies at Nuremberg to legitimize their judicial imprisonment and murder of defeated Germany's leaders.

There is now no doubt that the Hossbach protocol is worthless as a historical document. After the war both Hossbach and Kirchbach declared that the U.S. prosecution version is quite different than the document manuscript they recalled. Hossbach also testified at Nuremberg that he could not confirm that the prosecution version corresponded completely with the manuscript he wrote in 1937. And in his memoirs, he admitted that in

any case, Hitler did not outline any kind of "war plan" at the meeting. At Nuremberg, Goering, Raeder, Blomberg and Neurath all denounced the Hossbach protocol as a gross misrepresentation of the conference. (Fritsch was dead.) The protocol deals only with the first half of the meeting, thereby distorting its true character. The memorandum concludes with the simple sentence: "The second half of the conference dealt with material armaments questions." No details are given. In 1968 Victor von Martin characterized the memorandum with these words: "The protocol presented at the Nuremberg court was put together in such a way as to totally change the meaning [of the original] and can therefore be characterized only as a crude forgery."

When he wrote his path-breaking study, *The Origins of the Second World War*, A.J.P. Taylor accepted the Hossbach memorandum as a faithful record of the meeting of 5 November 1937. However, in a supplementary "Second Thoughts" added to later editions, the renowned British historian admitted that he had initially been "taken in" by the "legend" of the document. The allegedly significant conference was actually "a maneuver in domestic affairs." The protocol itself, Taylor noted, "contains no directives for action beyond a wish for increased armaments." He ruefully observed that "those who believe in political trials may go on quoting the Hossbach memorandum." H.W. Koch, a Lecturer at the University of York (England), further dismantled the legend in a 1968 article which concluded that the infamous protocol would be "inadmissible in any other court except the Nuremberg tribunal."

Dankwart Kluge has made a valuable contribution to our understanding of the origins of the Second World War. His study will stand for many years as the most authoritative dissection of a great documentary fraud. This attractive work includes the complete text of the Hossbach protocol as an appendix, four photos, and a comprehensive bibliography. The author was born in 1944 in Breslau (Wroclaw), Silesia. Since 1974 he has worked as an attorney in West Berlin. Kluge has done an admirable job of assembling his material, which is drawn not only from all the available published and documentary sources, but also from numerous private interviews and correspondence with key witnesses. Kluge argues his case compellingly, although the narrative style is somewhat weak. This important study leaves no doubt that the highly touted protocol is actually a forged revision of an uncertified copy of an unauthorized original, which has disappeared. Harry Elmer Barnes, to whom the work is dedicated, would have welcomed it heartily.

—Mark Weber

PARIS IN THE THIRD REICH: A HISTORY OF THE GERMAN OCCUPATION, 1940-1944 by David Pryce-Jones. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981, x + 294 pages, 116 photographs, \$25.00, ISBN 0-03-045621-5.

The claim that thousands of Parisians were members of the anti-Nazi "Resistance"** is an aspect of the Second World War that has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years. As British historian David Pryce-Jones explains in his study of *Paris in the Third Reich*, there was little actual resistance activity in the French capital. Indeed, during the German occupation life in Paris went on much as it had before the war.

A striking point is the contrast between the behavior of the victorious German occupiers of France in 1940 and that of the Allied troops who overran Germany in 1945. Unlike what happened in Germany and Central Europe in 1945, when the Germans took Paris there were no scenes of mass pillage, rape, and murder. The French mass circulation weekly *L'Illustration* described the German soldiers as "handsome boys, decent, helpful, above all correct." Hitler even cancelled a huge victory parade that had been planned by the military, so as not to alienate the Parisians. Within a few days after the onset of the German occupation, the schools, restaurants, theaters, trains, newspapers, and other public services were back in operation on a near-normal basis. The Paris police, who outnumbered the Germans, remained on duty throughout the occupation.

Nor did the Germans round up large numbers of political opponents and suspects. Jean-Paul Sartre, Coco Chanel, Dior, Yves Montand, Maurice Chevalier, Picasso, and Albert Camus were among those who lived and worked—very productively—in Paris during the German occupation. One French writer, Louis-Ferdinand Celine, expressed surprise that the Germans were "not shooting, hanging, exterminating the Jews . . . stupified that anyone with a bayonet would not be using it all the time. 'If the Bolsheviks were in Paris, they'd show you how to set about it, they'd show you how to purge a population, district by district, house by house. If I had a bayonet, I'd know my business.' "

As noted above, Pryce-Jones sheds additional light on the so-called "Resistance." Many Frenchmen intensely disliked the Partisans, who did not go into action against the Germans until after

*Casting a wry eye at the superabundance of exaggerated post-war claims, made when it was safe to do so—indeed, rather unsafe not to—the historian James J. Martin has remarked on "the undoubted fraction of one percent of the residents of France who were not involved in the 'Resistance.' "

Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941. The Communist Partisans, large numbers of whom were not native-born Frenchmen, hoped to provoke German reprisals which would then alienate the French populace. In this they succeeded. But Germans were not their only targets: throughout the occupation, other Communists, assorted leftists, and rightists were murdered by the Partisans.

Once the Germans were forced to withdraw from France in the summer of 1944, a new "Reign of Terror" commenced. Pryce-Jones estimates that there were 105,000 summary executions in France between June 1944 and February 1945. "The number of Frenchmen killed by other Frenchmen, whether through summary execution or rigged tribunals akin to lynch mobs or court martials and High Court trials, equalled or even exceeded the number of those sent to their death by the Germans as hostages, deportees, and slave-laborers." (The fullest treatment in English of the bloodbath that accompanied "liberation" is found in Sisley Huddleston's 1955 book *France: The Tragic Years, 1939-1947*.)

Often, Frenchmen could not understand the logic involved in these reprisals. One women remarked at the time, after her daughter's head was shaved: "My little Josiane, it's too horrible. Her hair has been cut off, monsieur. Poor little Josiane! If she went to bed with Germans, it was because she's seventeen, monsieur, you follow me? But why ever cut off her hair for it? It's a crying shame, monsieur. She's just as willing to go to bed with Americans!"

Paris in the Third Reich includes excerpts from some of the interviews the author conducted with former collaborators, German veterans, and other observers. Over a hundred photographs, some in color, supplement the text. Those interested in this chapter of contemporary history will find the book useful.

—Charles Lutton

Swiss Historian Exposes Anti-Hitler Rauschning Memoir as Fraudulent

Virtually every major biography of Adolf Hitler or history of the Third Reich quotes from the memoir of Hermann Rauschning, a former National Socialist Senate President of Danzig. In the book published in Britain as *Hitler Speaks* (London, 1939) and in America as *The Voice of Destruction* (New York, 1940) Rauschning presents page after page of what are purported to be Hitler's most intimate views and plans for the future. They are allegedly based on a hundred or so private conversations between the two men.

Now, after more than forty years, a Swiss historian has thoroughly exposed this supposed document of Hitler's madness as completely fraudulent. Wolfgang Haenel presented the results of his research to the annual conference in May 1983 of the Ingolstadt Contemporary History Research Center in West Germany.

Rauschning's Hitler is nothing more than a nihilistic revolutionary utterly lacking in ideas, goals, principles or systematic ideology who demagogically exploited words and men to accumulate power for its own sake. He was a clever but completely unscrupulous opportunist who believed nothing of what he said. His National Socialism, according to Rauschning, was just a "Revolution of Nihilism." He was allegedly preoccupied with war. His numerous disarmament proposals and peace offers were just hypocritical rhetoric designed to mislead his future victims.

Of the man who unified Germany, Hitler is supposed to have said: "Bismarck was stupid. He was just a Protestant." He allegedly rebuked Rauschning for his qualms: "Why do you babble about brutality and get upset over suffering. The masses want that. They need some cruelty." "I want a violent, masterful, fearless, cruel youth," he is quoted as saying. On another occasion, Hitler reportedly declared: "Yes, we are barbarians. We want to be barbarians. It is an honorable title."

Wolfgang Haenel spent many years in detailed research, text comparison and interviewing contemporary witnesses. He found that instead of "about a hundred conversations" with Hitler, Rauschning actually met with the German leader only four or five times. And these few meetings were neither private nor lengthy, but always in the company of high ranking officials while visiting Hitler in Berlin or Obersalzberg. Rauschning never had the opportunity to hear Hitler's intimate views or secret plans for the future, as he boasted in his spurious "memoir."

Wolfgang Haenel's long overdue debunking of the Rauschning "memoir" is a welcome contribution to the slow and painful process of clarification in an age of historical obfuscation.

—Mark Weber

Sebastian Haffner's 1942 Call for Mass Murder

One of postwar Germany's most influential writers has been Sebastian Haffner. This successful wordsmith has written half a dozen books on political and historical issues, several of which have been translated into English. His most recent is a highly critical review of Adolf Hitler's life and place in history. The American edition, *The Meaning of Hitler*, received very favorable reviews in the American press. For many years Haffner contributed a regular column of political commentary to West Germany's leading general-circulation illustrated weekly, *Stern*.

Haffner's persuasiveness lies in his ability to present liberal-democratic, egalitarian ideas in apparently detached and objective prose. His sober and confident style reassures many otherwise skeptical readers.

But Haffner's real character came through in an extraordinary article published during the Second World War while he was living as an emigré in Britain. In the August 1942 issue of the reputable London monthly *World Review*, Haffner called for the mass murder of at least half a million young Germans by the victorious Allies at the end of the war. According to his article "The Reintegration of Germany into Europe," the National Socialist revolution of 1933 had divorced Germany from Christian European civilization. An Allied victory in the World War would make it possible to restore the prewar order.

Fortunately, Haffner wrote, the "hard core" of Nazi revolutionaries were concentrated in the SS and could therefore be easily liquidated. The SS had become "for all practical purposes the human integration of Nazism. It is Nazism incarnate. With its elimination Nazism may not yet be dead as an idea, but it will be dead as an active political force for the decisive next ten years. Thus the road will be clear for the reconstruction of a Europe embracing Germany. But it must be eliminated first."

Haffner did not shrink from spelling out just how that would be accomplished. "Now this is a stark and gruesome matter. In all probability it amounts to the killing of upwards of 500,000 young men, whether by summary court-martial (no such mass-justice

can be other than summary) or without even that ceremony. Even if one wants to avoid the actual killing and instead to convert the SS into a number of life-serving mobile forced-labor divisions for international use, it would mean not much more than a living death."

The mass killing, Haffner exclaimed, would be "a resounding act of international justice." After all, "it would be criminal sentimentality to leave the terrorists alive and abroad when dearly-bought victory at last makes it possible to dispose of them."

A comprehensive "re-education" program would also be necessary to make sure that defeated Germany stayed in line permanently. But since the vast majority of the German people obviously backed its National Socialist leadership, only a small group of anti-Nazi Protestant clergy and Roman Catholic priests could be entrusted with this important task. "Thank God Christianity is still a very vital supranational force in Europe, a nucleus not only of spiritual but even of structural unity." A network of Christian schools would be responsible for "re-educating German youth—eradicating Nazism as an idea—making Germany a Christian country again and reintegrating Germany into Europe."

Haffner's article is not the first call for genocide in the name of Christianity made in history.

Haffner's murderous proposal was only partially implemented. Many tens of thousands of young SS men, not only from Germany but from across Europe, were in fact murdered by the victorious Allies in both the East and West.

I learned about Haffner's article by accident while going through back issues of the leading German National Socialist newspaper, the *Voelkischer Beobachter*, on a microfilm machine at the Library of Congress. A lengthy front page report in the 11 December 1942 issue publicized the bloody Allied proposal for "pacifying" Europe. It was hard for me to believe that one of West Germany's most influential political writers could have once authored such a plan. But it didn't take long to locate the original article in a bound volume on an obscure, dusty shelf of the world's largest library.

A year before the appearance of Haffner's article, American Jewish attorney Theodore Kaufman proposed a similar final solution to the German problem. In *Germany Must Perish*, Kaufman called for the sterilization of all fertile adult Germans, and the total partitioning-off of Germany among neighboring countries. But unlike Kaufman, who fell into obscurity after the war, Haffner's star rose to great heights. He was able to play a major role in re-educating and remaking defeated Germany into the kind of tractable, "civilized" country he wanted.

In 1946, the victorious Allies executed newspaper publisher and former Nazi party district leader Julius Streicher at Nuremberg for "crimes against humanity." He had been found "guilty" of disseminating anti-Jewish writings, particularly in his monthly paper *Der Stuermer*. That is, Streicher was killed for actions which were illegal neither under German nor U.S. law at the time they were carried out. And at no time did Streicher ever call for the killing of Jews or anyone else on the basis of race, religion or membership in an organization.

Sebastian Haffner, in contrast, openly called for the killing of at least half a million young men simply on the basis of membership in an organization—an act which he conceded would be a "stark and gruesome matter." If Haffner were to be judged according to the standards applied by the Allies at Nuremberg, he would be punished for "crimes against humanity."

But Haffner has never been called to account for his genocidal call. To the contrary, he has been richly rewarded in postwar democratic Germany. How many of Sebastian Haffner's millions of readers would think differently of him and his views if they knew about his wartime call for mass murder?

—Mark Weber

Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski and the 'Holocaust'

During the Second World War, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski was an SS Obergruppenfuehrer, Higher SS and Police Chief for the center section of the Eastern front, and Chief of the Anti-Partisan Units.

He testified for the prosecution at the postwar Nuremberg Tribunal as part of a deal struck with the Allied authorities. Probably the most devastating part of his testimony dealt with the activities of the Einsatzgruppen.

In 1951 he was sentenced to ten years' arrest by a Munich denazification court. In 1952 he publicly denounced himself as a mass murderer. In February 1961 he was sentenced by a Nuremberg court to four and a half years' imprisonment for a 1934 murder. At that 1961 trial he declared: "I am still an absolute Hitler man." (New York Times, 21 March 1972, p. 44.) In August 1962 he was sentenced to life imprisonment for the 1933 murders of some communists. (New York Times, 4 August 1962, p. 4.)

On 24 July 1964, Bach-Zelewski reportedly testified at the trial of SS Obergruppenfuehrer Karl Wolff that "Hitler knew nothing

of the mass destruction of the Jews" and that "the entire thing began with Himmler." (David Irving, *Hitler's War*, p. 946, note for pp. 428-429, Viking two-volume ed.)

Bach-Zelewski died in a suburban Munich hospital on 8 March 1972, but his death was not publicly announced until 20 March. Newspaper reports of his passing appeared in the editions of 21 March. *Die Welt*, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, and the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* each carried the same, short Associated Press dispatch. The *Times* of London report was also very short. The *New York Times* published a much more complete obituary. (21 March 1972, pp. 44, col. 1.) The *Washington Post* and the *Washington Star* reported nothing.

In the book *The Myth of the Six Million*, the author (David L. Hoggan, as "Anonymous") states on page 80 that: "Bach-Zelewski in April, 1959, publicly repudiated his Nuremberg testimony before a West German court, and he admitted with great courage that his earlier statements, which had no foundation in fact, had been made for reasons of expediency and survival."

Despite extensive searching in numerous daily newspapers and periodicals, I have not been able to find any confirmation of Hoggan's statement that Bach-Zelewski repudiated his Nuremberg testimony. It would be very useful to find confirmation in a reputable publication of this alleged repudiation.

—Mark Weber

A Note from the Editor, continued from p. 260

should be made by a professional chemist. Dr. Lindsey's sympathy with his erstwhile colleague is manifest and unapologetic. The story he tells is of a man doing his job, perfecting his science in all innocence and being caught up in the massive wave of hatred and sheer lunacy that swept over Europe after World War II. Dr. Tesch paid with his life the price the victors demanded for the sanctification of their atrocity propaganda. Reading this account of his conviction before the bar of Allied "justice," one will perhaps understand why the revisionist may, in answer to that eternal question of the uninformed: "What about the *trials*?" smile while rolling up his sleeves, and say:

"The *trials*? I'm really glad you asked that question. You're absolutely right about their importance. Let's do take a *good look* at those trials . . ."

—Keith Stimely

About the Contributors

WILLIAM B. LINDSEY received his B.Sc. degree from the University of Texas and his Ph.D. in Chemistry from Indiana University. He has been a professional research chemist with a major corporation for 31 years. As a chemist he has for some years been interested in the question of the alleged role of the chemical fumigant Zyklon B in the "Holocaust" story.

H. KEITH THOMPSON is a New York City corporate executive. He received his B.A. degree in History and Naval Science from Yale University in 1946. As a former naval officer and expert in naval law, he has maintained an active interest in the post-World War II "war crimes" trials particularly as they related to military personnel.

JAMES B. WHISKER holds a Ph.D. in government and politics from the University of Maryland. He is currently an Associate Professor of Political Science at West Virginia University. He is the author of *Essays in Political Science* (with H.N. Kim), *The Social, Political, and Religious Thought of Alfred Rosenberg*, and *National Socialist Ideology: Concepts and Ideas*.

L.A. ROLLINS, 35, received a B.A. degree in Philosophy from California State College at Los Angeles in 1970. He is a freelance writer who has written material for a stand-up comic and has contributed to various publications, including *The Personalist*, *Books for Libertarians*, *Reason*, *New Libertarian*, *Critique* and *Grump*. He is the author of *The Myth of Natural Rights*, forthcoming from Loompanics Unlimited. For several years he has been researching the "Holocaust" and related matters.

MARK WEBER is a frequent contributor to The JHR. He received his M.A. in modern European History from Indiana University in 1977. He now works in Washington D.C. as a writer, researcher and translator.

CHARLES LUTTON, Ph.D., holds degrees in History and International Relations. He teaches courses on the political and military history of the 20th Century, is associated with a leading think-tank, and is widely published in both scholarly and popular journals.

The Journal of Historical Review

Special Issue

ROOSEVELT AND WAR IN EUROPE 1938-40

Origins and Interventions

Mark Weber

*President Roosevelt's Campaign
To Incite War in Europe:
The Secret Polish Documents*

Tyler Kent

*The Roosevelt Legacy
and The Kent Case*

David L. Hoggan

*President Roosevelt and
The Origins of The 1939 War*

The Journal of Historical Review

VOLUME FOUR, NUMBER TWO / SUMMER 1983

—Special Issue—

ROOSEVELT AND WAR IN EUROPE 1938-40 Origins and Interventions

President Roosevelt's Campaign To Incite War In Europe:
The Secret Polish Documents by Mark Weber

The Roosevelt Legacy and The Kent Case by Tyler Kent

President Roosevelt and The Origins of
The 1939 War by David L. Hoggan

The *Journal of Historical Review*
is published quarterly by the
INSTITUTE FOR HISTORICAL REVIEW

Thomas J. Marcellus, Director

Keith Stimely, Editor

EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

DR. WALTER B. ALLENDE
University of Buenos Aires

DR. AUSTIN J. APP
La Salle College, Phila. (Ret.)

DR. GEORGE ASHLEY
History Instructor
Los Angeles Unified School District

JOHN BENNETT
Victorian Council for Civil Liberties
Melbourne, Australia

DR. ARTHUR R. BUTZ
Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.

DR. ROBERT FAURISSON
University of Lyon-2, France

DITLIEB FELDERER
Revisionist History Magazine
Taby, Sweden

PERCY L. GREAVES, Jr.
Free Market Economist

SAMUEL E. KONKIN III
The New Libertarian, Long Beach, Cal.

DR. MARTIN A. LARSON
The Spotlight, Washington, D.C.

DR. WILLIAM B. LINDSEY

DR. JAMES J. MARTIN
Institute for Historical Review

DR. REVILO P. OLIVER
University of Illinois, Urbana

DR. WILHELM STAEGLICH
Retired Judge, West Germany

UDO WALENDY
Verlag fur Volkstum and
Zeitgeschichtsforschung
Vlotho/Weser, West Germany

DR. CHARLES E. WEBER
Former Head, Department of
Modern Languages
University of Tulsa, Oklahoma

DR. ANDREAS R. WESSERLE
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Ret.)

The *Journal of Historical Review* is published quarterly by the Institute for Historical Review, P.O. Box 1306, Torrance, California 90505, United States of America. Subscription prices are as follows: One year, \$30; two years, \$50; three years, \$70—or the equivalent in foreign currency. Foreign subscribers must add \$5 if paying by remittance drawn on a foreign bank. For domestic first class delivery add \$5 per year. For overseas air delivery add \$12 per year. Quantity subscription and bulk issue rates available on request. Appropriate manuscripts are welcomed by the editor, but must be accompanied by return postage.

Listed:

Library of Congress
British Library
Encyclopedia of Associations
Writers Market 1983
PTLA Catalog
EBSCO Librarians Handbook

ISSN: 0195-6752

Institute for Historical Review
P.O. Box 1306, Torrance, California 90505, U.S.A.

Permission is hereby granted for reprints of any article contained herein, providing that no changes or alterations are made prior to printing, and also providing that the following attribution appears with the article:

Reprinted by permission of The *Journal of Historical Review*, P.O. Box 1306, Torrance, California 90505, United States of America.
Subscription rate: \$30 per year.

Two copies of each printing should be submitted to the Editor of The *Journal of Historical Review*.

Contents

President Roosevelt's Campaign To Incite War in Europe: The Secret Polish Documents <i>Mark Weber</i>	135
The Roosevelt Legacy and The Kent Case <i>Tyler Kent</i>	173
President Roosevelt and The Origins of the 1939 War <i>David L. Hoggan</i>	205
About the Contributors	256

A Note From The Editor

Few discussions of the specific topic "Roosevelt and the Origins of World War II" pay much attention to events before 1 September 1939. At most some preliminary words are uttered about the development of Roosevelt's thoughts and policy in the 1930s: his increasing concern, once the New Deal became firmly ensconced and especially after he was re-elected in 1936, with events in Europe and Asia as crisis followed crisis; his worries about the rise of "the dictatorships" (non-Soviet variety only); his somewhat hesitant public switch beginning in 1937 away from neutrality of sentiment and toward a more activist consideration of America's role in the world; his efforts thereafter to "educate" a rather unreceptive American public into appreciating this role and its possible future consequences. If Roosevelt's difficult position in the late 1930s of trying to push along public opinion on international affairs faster than it wanted to go could be termed, as one pro-Roosevelt historian has put it, "leadership in isolation," then the events in Europe leading toward war could be described, in the standard view, as "crisis in isolation"—from America; the war just happened, a European affair which Roosevelt could not appreciably influence, though he had certainly seen it coming, doing his best to warn both his own people and European leaders.

It remains the case that for most historians, thus for their students and the history-reading public at large, the real story and starting point of the origins of the war relative to Roosevelt must be that of America's involvement in the war: how this country got in once the conflict in Europe began. This story, actually three stories—of the 1939-41 "Battle against Isolation" within; of the "undeclared war" of navies on the Atlantic as Roosevelt did his best to evade neutrality and help out England (and, after June 1941, Russia) even to the point of intervening militarily to frustrate German attempts at interception, and of the deterioration of Japanese-American relations in the Pacific leading to Pearl Harbor—has received a considerable amount of treatment from both mainstream and revisionist historians. So too has the more generalized story of German-American and Japanese-American relations in the decade preceding 1941. But, with a few exceptions, it is just toward 1941—precisely, 7 December and 11 December 1941—that such studies aim, including those claimed specifically to be about Roosevelt's role in the origins of World War II. This—the full-fledged, declared shooting war for America—is the war that is meant. With what started in Europe two years earlier, and the prelude to it, there was—so the consensus goes—not much, if any, real Roosevelt involvement. It is not an issue.

So the dearth of treatment has made it seem. In fact, the issue of President Roosevelt's active part in the origins and partial responsibility for the outbreak of European war in 1939 is very real, very much alive, and very interesting. And it is not new, though it has been suppressed. Several early post-war studies—the exceptions mentioned above—written mostly in the decade after 1945 and either singular essays or parts of larger works, focused on just this question. That these were exclusively revisionist in nature says something about the nature of the issue. It has not been one that mainstream, pro-Roosevelt, historians are too enthused about. For them, there is either no story here—or one they would not feel comfortable telling. Since the appearance of the early revision-

ist efforts, which slipped easily and not accidentally into obscurity, this subject has been ignored and allowed to disappear into the murky backwaters of a forgotten branch of the stream of history.

We hope to begin remediying this situation with this, the first "theme" issue of *The JHR*. The subjects of the three essays presented here have long deserved careful consideration. It is hoped that they will help to stimulate more interest and new research in this particular topic. It is certain that their importance cannot be ignored by honest and curious historiography.

Mark Weber in "President Roosevelt's Campaign To Incite War in Europe" explores the meaning and historical importance of Polish diplomatic documents which were captured by the Germans in Warsaw, selections from which were published in the German press, in a White Book and in other official or semi-official editions. These documents, which bear heavily on the roles of Roosevelt and his ambassador-at-large William C. Bullitt in encouraging strident Anglo-French-Polish defiance of Germany's program for a peaceful revision of the unfair Versailles territorial/ethnological provisions, are of the utmost importance in understanding what Roosevelt was thinking, doing and trying to do in Europe in the prelude to war. What emerges is a Roosevelt who was no innocent bystander merely sending private, occasionally public, messages of concern to European leaders from time to time, all in the quest for peace. Instead the documents make clear the picture of a Roosevelt actively meddling in European affairs at every turn, promising, cajoling, threatening—all toward the vigorous promotion of an anti-German front, ultimately toward war. Though well known and readily available, the documents have been ignored, downplayed, or rejected by all mainstream historians, largely on account of their published origination as a German propagandistic "colored book." Decried by American officials immediately upon release as inauthentic—forgeries concocted by the Germans—most historians have not seen fit to question the official denials and look for themselves, with the aid of much relevant evidence made available since the war, into the matter of their authenticity. It is the signal contribution of Mark Weber that he has uncovered and here marshals for the first time all the evidence which points toward the documents being, in fact, authentic; in his words, the question is now "beyond doubt." He goes beyond merely demonstrating this, presenting lengthy selections from the documents newly translated by himself (including some parts never before translated into English), and fitting their significance in to the overall context of Roosevelt's policy. The conclusions presented in this well-rounded and pathbreaking essay are clearly ones that historians of Roosevelt foreign policy will not be able to ignore.

In "President Roosevelt and the Origins of the 1939 War," excerpted from *Der erzwungene Krieg* by David L. Hoggan, we present for the first time in English the pertinent conclusions reached in what after 22 years remains the most thorough—and most radically revisionist—volume ever published on the general subject of the war's origins. Dr. Hoggan's treatment of Roosevelt in the book is incidental to his main theme, which is German-Polish and Anglo-German relations and how and why these led to war in 1939; his explication of Roosevelt's role in the crucial years

1938-39 nevertheless constitutes the most formidable (and formidably documented) narrative presentation on the subject ever to appear. It is an excellent companion piece to Charles C. Tansill's early essay "The United States and the Road to War in Europe" (which appeared in Harry Elmer Barnes's anthology *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace*), heretofore the standard treatment in English. Dr. Hoggan's treatment, with its in-depth emphasis on the last year before war, and its use of many sources not available to Tansill, effectively expands upon and updates the earlier work. It is our regret that space considerations prevent publication here of the extensive footnotes. These will, however, appear in the complete published edition of *Der erzwungene Krieg* as *The Forced War*, forthcoming from the Institute for Historical Review. Should any monograph reprint of Dr. Hoggan's article be produced—and if the reception justifies it the entire contents of this issue will be published in an expanded book format—the notes for the article will also of course appear therein.

The Weber and Hoggan essays deal with Roosevelt and secret origins of European war, 1938-39; the third essay here deals with Roosevelt's secret interventions in European war, 1940. Until recently these have not been well-known—though they have been hinted at, sometimes luridly, ever since the *New York Times* published in June 1940 a terse announcement from the American embassy in London to the effect that an employee of the embassy had been arrested and detained by the British on the grounds of (British) national security. Tyler Gatewood Kent, code-clerk, was caught with approximately 1,500 documents in his possession which had been copied or abstracted from highly secret communications passing through the embassy. A fervent anti-interventionist, Kent became convinced by what he saw coming across his desk that President Roosevelt was lying to the American people about commitments to Britain and other commitments relative to the war. He determined to collect the evidence—which included communications between Roosevelt and Winston Churchill (at a time when Churchill was merely First Lord of the Admiralty)—so that it could be presented to certain anti-interventionist senators and expose Roosevelt's secret operations to the light of day. As more details became public, the "Kent Case" became a *cause celebre* among certain anti-Roosevelt publicists and historians. Kent himself was released and returned to America in 1945. Once the facts of the "Case" were well-established with the passing of wartime secrecy, attention focused on the contents of the "Kent Documents" which had been seized from him at the time of his arrest. Not until 1972 were they released, an event which prompted a number of historical monographs on the subject (see the bibliography on p. 203). Not until 1983 has Tyler Kent himself written his own account of what he saw, what he did, why he did it, what happened to him, and what he thinks about it all in retrospect. His essay was written especially for *The JHR*. Mark Weber provides a concise introduction, highlighting the most important revelations contained in the documents, which he examined at the National Archives.

— Keith Stimely

President Roosevelt's Campaign To Incite War in Europe:

THE SECRET POLISH DOCUMENTS

MARK WEBER

Major ceremonies were held in 1982 to mark the one hundredth anniversary of the birth of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. With the exceptions of Washington and Lincoln, he was glorified and eulogized as no other president in American history. Even conservative President Ronald Reagan joined the chorus of applause. In early 1983, newspapers and television networks remembered the fiftieth anniversary of Roosevelt's inauguration with numerous laudatory tributes.

And yet, with each passing year more and more new evidence comes to light which contradicts the glowing image of Roosevelt portrayed by the mass media and politicians.

Much has already been written about Roosevelt's campaign of deception and outright lies in getting the United States to intervene in the Second World War prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Roosevelt's aid to Britain and the Soviet Union in violation of American neutrality and international law, his acts of war against Germany in the Atlantic in an effort to provoke a German declaration of war against the United States, his authorization of a vast "dirty tricks" campaign against U.S. citizens by British intelligence agents in violation of the Constitution, and his provocations and ultimatums against Japan which brought on the attack against Pearl Harbor—all this is extensively documented and reasonably well known.¹

Not so well known is the story of Roosevelt's enormous responsibility for the outbreak of the Second World War itself. This essay focuses on Roosevelt's secret campaign to provoke war in Europe prior to the outbreak of hostilities in September 1939. It deals particularly with his efforts to pressure Britain, France and Poland into war against Germany in 1938 and 1939.

Franklin Roosevelt not only criminally involved America in a war which had already engulfed Europe. He bears a grave responsibility before history for the outbreak of the most destructive war of all time.

This paper relies heavily on a little-known collection of secret Polish documents which fell into German hands when Warsaw was captured in September 1939. These documents clearly establish Roosevelt's crucial role in bringing on the Second World War. They also reveal the forces behind the President which pushed for war.

While a few historians have quoted sentences and even paragraphs from these documents, their importance has not been fully appreciated. There are three reasons for this, I believe. First, for many years their authenticity was not indisputably established. Second, a complete collection of the documents has not been available in English. And third, the translation of those documents which has been available in English until now is deficient and unacceptably bad.

When the Germans took Warsaw in late September 1939, they seized a mass of documents from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a letter of 8 April 1983, Dr. Karl Otto Braun of Munich informed me that the documents were captured by an SS brigade led by Freiherr von Kuensberg, whom Braun knew personally. In a surprise attack, the brigade captured the center of Warsaw ahead of the regular German army. Von Kuensberg told Braun that his men took control of the Polish Foreign Ministry just as Ministry officials were in the process of burning incriminating documents. Dr. Braun was an official of the German Foreign Office between 1938 and 1945.

The German Foreign Office chose Hans Adolf von Moltke, formerly the Reich's Ambassador in Warsaw, to head a special Archive Commission to examine the collection and sort out those documents which might be suitable for publication. At the end of March 1940, 16 of these were published in book form under the title *Polnische Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges* ["Polish Documents on the Pre-History of the War"]. The Foreign Office edition was subtitled "German White Book No. 3." The book was immediately published in various foreign language editions in Berlin and some other European capitals. An American edition was published in New York by Howell, Soskin and Company as *The German White Paper*. Historian C. Hartley Grattan contributed a remarkably cautious and reserved foreword.²

The translation of the documents for the U.S. White Paper edition was inexcusably bad. Whole sentences and parts of sentences were missing and portions were grossly mistranslated. H. Keith Thompson explained to me why this was so during a conversation on 22 March 1983 and in a letter of 13 May 1983. A poor first draft English-language translation had been prepared in Berlin and sent to America. It was given to George Sylvester Viereck, a prominent pro-German American publicist and literary advisor to the German Library of Information in New York City. Thompson knew Viereck intimately and served as his chief aide and re-writer. Viereck had hurriedly redrafted the translation from Berlin into more readable prose but without any opportunity of comparing it to the original Polish text (which he could not read in any case) or even the official German-language version. In making stylistic changes for the sake of readability, the meaning of the original documents was thereby inadvertently distorted.

The matter was also discussed at a small dinner for Lawrence Dennis hosted by Thompson at Viereck's apartment in the Hotel Belleclaire in New York City in 1956. Viereck explained that he had been a highly paid literary consultant to the German government, responsible for the propaganda effect of publications, and could not be concerned with the translation groundwork normally done by clerks. Even the most careful translation of complicated documents is apt to distort the original meaning, and literary editing is certain to do so, Viereck said. Thompson agreed with that view.

In preparing the English-language text for this essay, I have carefully examined the official German translation and various other translations, and compared them with facsimiles of the original Polish documents.

Media Sensation

The German government considered the captured Polish documents to be of tremendous importance. On Friday, 29 March, the Reich Ministry of Propaganda confidentially informed the daily press of the reason for releasing the documents:

These extraordinary documents, which may be published beginning with the first edition on Saturday, will create a first-class political sensation, since they in fact prove the degree of America's responsibility for the outbreak of the present war. America's responsibility must not, of course, be stressed in commentaries; the documents must be left to speak for themselves, and they speak clearly enough.

The Ministry of Propaganda specifically asks that sufficient space be reserved for the publication of these docu-

ments, which is of supreme importance to the Reich and the German people.

We inform you in confidence that the purpose of publishing these documents is to strengthen the American isolationists and to place Roosevelt in an untenable position, especially in view of the fact that he is standing for re-election. It is however not at all necessary for us to point Roosevelt's responsibility; his enemies in America will take care of that.³

The German Foreign Office made the documents public on Friday, 29 March 1940. In Berlin, journalists from around the world, including the United States, were given facsimile copies of the original Polish documents and translations in German. Journalists were permitted to examine the original documents themselves, along with an enormous pile of other documents from the Polish Foreign Ministry.

The release of the documents was an international media sensation. American newspapers gave the story large front page headline coverage and published lengthy excerpts from the documents. But the impact was much less than the German government had hoped for.

Leading U.S. government officials wasted no time in vehemently denouncing the documents as not authentic. Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated: "I may say most emphatically that neither I nor any of my associates in the Department of State have ever heard of any such conversations as those alleged, nor do we give them the slightest credence. The statements alleged have not represented in any way at any time the thought or the policy of the American government." William Bullitt, the U.S. Ambassador to Paris who was particularly incriminated by the documents, announced: "I have never made to anyone the statements attributed to me." And Count Jerzy Potocki, the Polish Ambassador in Washington whose confidential reports to Warsaw were the most revealing, declared: "I deny the allegations attributed to my reports. I never had any conversations with Ambassador Bullitt on America's participation in war."⁴

These categorical public denials by the highest officials had the effect of almost completely undercutting the anticipated impact of the documents. It must be remembered that this was several decades before the experiences of the Vietnam war and Watergate had taught another generation of Americans to be highly skeptical of such official denials. In 1940, the vast majority of the American people trusted their political leaders to tell them the truth.

After all, if the documents made public to the world by the German government were in fact authentic and genuine, it would mean that the great leader of the American democracy was a

man who lied to his own people and broke his own country's laws, while the German government told the truth. To accept that would be quite a lot to expect of any nation, but especially of the trusting American public.

Comment from Capitol Hill generally echoed the official government view. Senator Key Pittman, the Democratic Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, called the documents "unmitigated falsehood designed to create dissension in the United States." Senator Claude Peper, Democrat of Florida, declared: "It's German propaganda and shouldn't affect our policies in the least." Only a few were not impressed with the official denials. Representative Hamilton Fish of New York, the ranking Republican member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, called for a Congressional investigation and declared in a radio address: "If these charges were true, it would constitute a treasonable act. If President Roosevelt has entered into secret understandings or commitments with foreign governments to involve us in war, he should be impeached."⁵

American newspapers stressed the high-level denials in reporting the release of the documents. The New York Times headline read: U.S. BRANDS AS FALSE NAZI DOCUMENTS CHARGING WE FOSTERED WAR IN EUROPE AND PROMISED TO JOIN ALLIES IF NEEDED. The Baltimore Sun headlined: NAZI DOCUMENTS LAYING WAR BLAME ON U.S. ARE ASSAILED IN WASHINGTON.⁶

Although the book of Polish documents was labeled "first series," no further volumes ever appeared. From time to time the German government would make public additional documents from the Polish archives. These were published in book form in 1943 along with numerous other documents captured by the Germans from the French Foreign Ministry and other European archives, under the title *Roosevelts Weg in den Krieg: Geheimdokumente zur Kriegspolitik des Praesidenten der Vereinigten Staaten* ["Roosevelt's Way Into War: Secret Documents on the War Policy of the President of the United States"].⁷

A very important unanswered question is: Where are the original Polish documents today? Unless they were destroyed in the conflagration of the war, they presumably fell into either American or Soviet hands in 1945. In view of recent U.S. government policy on secret archival material, it is very unlikely that they would still be secret today if they had been acquired by the United States. My guess is that if they were not destroyed, they are now either in Moscow or at the East German Central State Archives in Potsdam.

It is particularly important to keep in mind that these secret reports were written by top level Polish ambassadors, that is, by men who though not at all friendly to Germany nonetheless un-

derstood the realities of European politics far better than those who made policy in the United States.

For example, the Polish ambassadors realized that behind all their rhetoric about democracy and human rights, and expressions of love for the United States, the Jews who agitated for war against Germany were actually doing nothing other than ruthlessly furthering their own purely sectarian interests. Many centuries of experience in living closely with the Jews had made the Poles far more aware than most nationalities of the special character of this people.

The Poles viewed the Munich Settlement of 1938 very differently than did Roosevelt and his circle. The President bitterly attacked the Munich agreement, which gave self-determination to the three and a half million Germans of Czechoslovakia and settled a major European crisis, as a shameful and humiliating capitulation to German blackmail. Although wary of German might, the Polish government supported the Munich agreement, in part because a small Polish territory which had been a part of Czechoslovakia against the wishes of its inhabitants was united with Poland as a result of the Settlement.

The Polish envoys held the makers of American foreign policy in something approaching contempt. President Roosevelt was considered a master political artist who knew how to mold American public opinion, but very little about the true state of affairs in Europe. As Poland's Ambassador to Washington emphasized in his reports to Warsaw, Roosevelt pushed America into war in order to distract attention from his failures as President in domestic policy.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into the complexities of German-Polish relations between 1933 and 1939 and the reasons for the German attack against Poland at dawn on the first day of September 1939. However, it should be noted that Poland had refused to even negotiate over self-determination for the German city of Danzig and the ethnic German minority in the so-called Polish Corridor. Hitler felt compelled to resort to arms when he did in response to a growing Polish campaign of terror and dispossession against the one and a half million ethnic Germans under Polish rule. In my view, if ever a military action was justified, it was the German campaign against Poland in 1939.

Poland's headstrong refusal to negotiate was made possible because of a fateful blank check guarantee of military backing from Britain—a pledge that ultimately proved completely worthless to the hapless Poles. Considering the lightning swiftness of the victorious German campaign, it is difficult to realize today that the Polish government did not at all fear war with Germany. Poland's leaders foolishly believed that German might was only an illusion. They were convinced that their troops would occupy Berlin itself within a few weeks and add further German terri-

tories to an enlarged Polish state. It is also important to keep in mind that the purely localized conflict between Germany and Poland was only transformed into a Europe-wide conflagration by the British and French declarations of war against Germany.

After the war the Allied-appointed judges at the International Military Tribunal staged at Nuremberg refused to admit the Polish documents as evidence for the German defense. Had these pieces of evidence been admitted, the Nuremberg undertaking might have been less a victors' show trial and more a genuinely impartial court of international justice.

Authenticity Beyond Doubt

There is now absolutely no question that the documents from the Polish Foreign Ministry in Warsaw made public by the German government are genuine and authentic.

Charles C. Tansill, professor of American diplomatic history at Georgetown University, considered them genuine. ". . . I had a long conversation with M. Lipsky, the Polish ambassador in Berlin in the prewar years, and he assured me that the documents in the *German White Paper* are authentic," he wrote.⁸ Historian and sociologist Harry Elmer Barnes confirmed this assessment: "Both Professor Tansill and myself have independently established the thorough authenticity of these documents."⁹ In America's Second Crusade, William H. Chamberlain reported: "I have been privately informed by an extremely reliable source that Potocki, now residing in South America, confirmed the accuracy of the documents, so far as he was concerned."¹⁰

More importantly, Edward Raczyński, the Polish Ambassador in London from 1934 to 1945, confirmed the authenticity of the documents in his diary, which was published in 1963 under the title *In Allied London*. In his entry for 20 June 1940, he wrote:

The Germans published in April a White Book containing documents from the archives of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, consisting of reports from Potocki in Washington, Lukasiewicz in Paris and myself. I do not know where they found them, since we were told that the archives had been destroyed. The documents are certainly genuine, and the facsimiles show that for the most part the Germans got hold of originals and not merely copies.

In this 'First Series' of documents I found three reports from this Embassy, two by myself and the third signed by me but written by Balinski. I read them with some apprehension, but they contained nothing liable to compromise myself or the Embassy or to impair relations with our British hosts.¹¹

In 1970 their authenticity was reconfirmed with the publication of *Diplomat in Paris 1936-1939*. This important work consists of the official papers and memoirs of Juliusz Lukasiewicz, the former Polish Ambassador to Paris who authored several of the secret diplomatic reports made public by the German government. The collection was edited by Waclaw Jedrzejewicz, a former Polish diplomat and cabinet member, and later Professor Emeritus of Wellesley and Ripon colleges. Professor Jedrzejewicz considered the documents made public by the Germans absolutely genuine. He quoted extensively from several of them.

Mr. Tyler G. Kent has also vouched for the authenticity of the documents. He states that while working at the U.S. embassy in London in 1939 and 1940, he saw copies of U.S. diplomatic messages in the files which corresponded to the Polish documents and which confirmed their accuracy.

Two Key Diplomats

Two American diplomats who played especially crucial roles in the European crisis of 1938-1939 are mentioned often in the Polish documents. The first of these was William C. Bullitt. Although his official position was U.S. Ambassador to France, he was in reality much more than that. He was Roosevelt's "super envoy" and personal deputy in Europe.

Like Roosevelt, Bullitt "rose from the rich." He was born into an important Philadelphia banking family, one of the city's wealthiest. His mother's grandfather, Jonathan Horwitz, was a German Jew who had come to the United States from Berlin.¹² In 1919 Bullitt was an assistant to President Wilson at the Versailles peace conference. That same year, Wilson and British Prime Minister Lloyd George sent him to Russia to meet with Lenin and determine if the new Bolshevik government deserved recognition by the Allies. Bullitt met with Lenin and other top Soviet leaders and upon his return urged recognition of the new regime. But he had a falling-out with Wilson and left diplomatic service. In 1923 he married Louise Bryant Reed, the widow of American Communist leader John Reed. In Europe Bullitt collaborated with Sigmund Freud on a psychoanalytical biography of Wilson. When Roosevelt became President in 1933, he brought Bullitt back into diplomatic life.¹³

In November 1933, Roosevelt sent Bullitt to Moscow as the first U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union. His initial enthusiasm for the Soviet system gave way to a deep distrust of Stalin and Communism. In 1936 the President transferred him to Paris. He served there as Roosevelt's key European diplomat until 1940 when Churchill's assumption of leadership in Britain and the defeat of France made his special role superfluous.

In the Spring of 1938, all U.S. envoys in Europe were subordi-

nated to Bullitt by an internal directive of the State Department.¹⁴ As the European situation worsened in 1939, Roosevelt often spoke with his man in Paris by telephone, sometimes daily, frequently giving him precisely detailed and ultra-confidential instructions on how to conduct America's foreign policy. Not even Secretary of State Cordell Hull was privy to many of the letters and communications between Bullitt and Roosevelt.

In France, the New York Times noted, Bullitt "was acclaimed there as 'the Champagne Ambassador' on account of the lavishness of his parties, but he was far more than the envoy to Paris: He was President Roosevelt's intimate adviser on European affairs, with telephone access to the President at any hour."¹⁵

Bullitt and Roosevelt were fond of each other and saw eye to eye on foreign policy issues. Both were aristocrats and thorough internationalists who shared definite views on how to remake the world and a conviction that they were destined to bring about that grand reorganization.

"Between these teammates," the Saturday Evening Post reported in March 1939,

there is a close, hearty friendship and a strong temperamental affinity. The President is known to rely upon Bullitt's judgment so heavily that the ambassador's mailed and cabled reports from abroad are supplemented several times a week by a chat by transatlantic telephone. In addition, Bullitt returns to the United States several times each year to take part in White House councils, to the displeasure of the State Department, which considers him a prima donna.

In the whole roster of the State Department the President could not have found an adviser who would have been so responsive to his own champagne personality as Bullitt. Both men, born patricians, have the same basic enthusiasm for remolding society . . .¹⁶

In Europe, Bullitt spoke with the voice and the authority of President Roosevelt himself.

The second most important American diplomat in Europe was Joseph P. Kennedy, Roosevelt's Ambassador at the Court of St. James. Like Bullitt he was a wealthy banker. But this Boston Catholic of Irish ancestry was otherwise a very different sort of man. Roosevelt sent Kennedy, an important Democratic party figure and father of a future President, to Britain for purely political reasons. Roosevelt disliked and distrusted Kennedy, and this sentiment grew as Kennedy opposed the President's war policies more and more vehemently. Moreover, Kennedy despised his counterpart in Paris. In a letter to his wife, he wrote: "I talk to Bullitt occasionally. He is more rattlebrained than ever. His judgment is pathetic and I am afraid of his influence on F.D.R. because they think alike on many things."¹⁷

The Documents

Here now are extensive excerpts from the Polish documents themselves. They are given in chronological order. They are remarkably lucid for diplomatic reports and speak eloquently for themselves.

* * * *

On 9 February 1938, the Polish Ambassador in Washington, Count Jerzy Potocki, reported to the Foreign Minister in Warsaw on the Jewish role in making American foreign policy:

The pressure of the Jews on President Roosevelt and on the State Department is becoming ever more powerful . . .

. . . The Jews are right now the leaders in creating a war psychosis which would plunge the entire world into war and bring about general catastrophe. This mood is becoming more and more apparent.

In their definition of democratic states, the Jews have also created real chaos: they have mixed together the idea of democracy and communism and have above all raised the banner of burning hatred against Nazism.

This hatred has become a frenzy. It is propagated everywhere and by every means: in theaters, in the cinema, and in the press. The Germans are portrayed as a nation living under the arrogance of Hitler which wants to conquer the whole world and drown all of humanity in an ocean of blood.

In conversations with Jewish press representatives I have repeatedly come up against the inexorable and convinced view that war is inevitable. This international Jewry exploits every means of propaganda to oppose any tendency towards any kind of consolidation and understanding between nations. In this way, the conviction is growing steadily but surely in public opinion here that the Germans and their satellites, in the form of fascism, are enemies who must be subdued by the 'democratic world.'

On 21 November 1938, Ambassador Potocki sent a report to Warsaw which discussed in some detail a conversation between himself and Bullitt, who happened to be back in Washington:

The day before yesterday I had a long conversation with Ambassador Bullitt, who is here on vacation. He began by remarking that friendly relations existed between himself and [Polish] Ambassador Lukasiewicz in Paris, whose company he greatly enjoyed.

Since Bullitt regularly informs President Roosevelt about the international situation in Europe, and particularly about

President Roosevelt was the first to express hatred against Fascism. In doing so he was serving a double purpose: First, he wanted to divert the attention of the American people from domestic political problems, especially the problem of the struggle between capital and labor. Second, by creating a war psychosis and by spreading rumors about danger threatening Europe, he wanted to get the American people to accept an enormous armament program which exceeds the defense requirements of the United States.

Regarding the first point, it must be said that the internal situation on the labor market is steadily growing worse. The unemployed today already number twelve million. Federal and state expenditures are increasing daily. Only the huge sums, running into billions, which the treasury expends for emergency labor projects, are keeping a certain amount of peace in the country. Thus far there have only been the usual strikes and local unrest. But how long this kind of government aid can be kept up cannot be predicted. The excitement and indignation of public opinion, and the serious conflict between private enterprises and enormous trusts on the one hand, and with labor on the other, have made many enemies for Roosevelt and are causing him many sleepless nights.

As to point two, I can only say that President Roosevelt, as a clever political player and an expert of the American mentality, speedily steered public attention away from the domestic situation to fasten it on foreign policy. The way to achieve this was simple. One needed, on the one hand, to conjure up a war menace hanging over the world because of Chancellor Hitler, and, on the other hand, to create a specter by babbling about an attack of the totalitarian states against the United States. The Munich pact came to President Roosevelt as a godsend. He portrayed it as a capitulation of France and England to bellicose German militarism. As people say here: Hitler compelled Chamberlain at pistol-point. Hence, France and England had no choice and had to conclude a shameful peace.

The prevalent hatred against everything which is in any way connected with German Nazism is further kindled by the brutal policy against the Jews in Germany and by the émigré problem. In this action, various Jewish intellectuals participated: for instance, Bernard Baruch; the Governor of New York State, Lehman; the newly appointed judge of the Supreme Court, Felix Frankfurter; Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau; and others who are personal friends of President Roosevelt. They want the President to become the champion of human rights, freedom of religion and speech,

and the man who in the future will punish trouble-makers. These groups of people who occupy the highest positions in the American government and want to pose as representatives of 'true Americanism' and 'defenders of democracy' are, in the last analysis, connected by unbreakable ties with international Jewry.

For this Jewish international, which above all is concerned with the interests of its race, to portray the President of the United States as the 'idealist' champion on human rights was a very clever move. In this manner they have created a dangerous hotbed for hatred and hostility in this hemisphere and divided the world into two hostile camps. The entire issue is worked out in a masterly manner. Roosevelt has been given the foundation for activating American foreign policy, and simultaneously has been procuring enormous military stocks for the coming war, for which the Jews are striving very consciously. With regard to domestic policy, it is very convenient to divert public attention from anti-Semitism, which is constantly growing in the United States, by talking about the necessity of defending religion and individual liberty against the onslaught of Fascism.

On 16 January 1939, Polish Ambassador Potocki reported to the Warsaw Foreign Ministry on another lengthy conversation he had with Roosevelt's personal envoy, William Bullitt:

The day before yesterday, I had a longer discussion with Ambassador Bullitt in the Embassy where he called on me. Bullitt leaves on the 21st of this month for Paris, from where he has been absent for almost three months. He is sailing with a whole 'trunk' full of instructions, conversations, and directives from President Roosevelt, the State Department and Senators who belong to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

In talking with Bullitt I had the impression that he had received from President Roosevelt a very precise definition of the attitude taken by the United States towards the present European crisis. He will present this material at the Quai d'Orsay [the French Foreign Ministry] and will make use of it in discussions with European statesmen. The contents of these directives, as Bullitt explained them to me in the course of a conversation lasting half an hour, were:

1. The vitalizing of foreign policy under the leadership of President Roosevelt, who severely and unambiguously condemns totalitarian countries.
2. United States preparations for war on sea, land and air will be carried out at an accelerated pace and will consume the colossal sum of 1.25 billion dollars.

3. It is the decided opinion of the President that France and Britain must put an end to any sort of compromise with the totalitarian countries. They must not get into any discussions aiming at any kind of territorial changes.

4. They have the moral assurance that the United States will abandon the policy of isolation and be prepared to intervene actively on the side of Britain and France in case of war. America is ready to place its whole wealth of money and raw materials at their disposal.

The Polish Ambassador to Paris, Juliusz (Jules) Lukasiewicz, sent a top secret report to the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw at the beginning of February 1939 which outlined U.S. policy towards Europe as explained to him by William Bullitt:

A week ago, the Ambassador of the United States, William Bullitt returned to Paris after a three months' leave in America. Meanwhile, I have had two conversations with him which enable me to inform you of his views regarding the European situation and to give a survey of Washington's policy.

The international situation is regarded by official circles as extremely serious and in constant danger of armed conflict. Those in authority are of the opinion that if war should break out between Britain and France on the one hand, and Germany and Italy on the other, and should Britain and France be defeated, the Germans would endanger the real interests of the United States on the American continent. For this reason, one can foresee right from the beginning the participation of the United States in the war on the side of France and Britain, naturally some time after the outbreak of the war. As Ambassador Bullitt expressed it: 'Should war break out we shall certainly not take part in it at the beginning, but we shall finish it.'

On 7 March 1939, Ambassador Potocki sent a remarkably lucid and perceptive report on Roosevelt's foreign policy to his government in Warsaw. This document was first made public when leading German newspapers published it in German translation, along with a facsimile reproduction of the first page of the Polish original, in their editions of 28 October 1940. The main National Socialist party newspaper, the *Voelkischer Beobachter*, published the Ambassador's report with this observation:

The document itself needs no commentary. We do not know, and it does not concern us, whether the internal American situation as reported by the Polish diplomat is correct in every detail. That must be decided by the Amer-

ican people alone. But in the interest of historical truth it is important for us to show that the warmongering activities of American diplomacy, especially in Europe, are once again revealed and proven by this document. It still remains a secret just who, and for what motives, have driven American diplomacy to this course. In any case, the results have been disasterous for both Europe and America. Europe was plunged into war and America has brought upon itself the hostility of great nations which normally have no differences with the American people and, indeed, have not been in conflict but have lived for generations as friends and want to remain so.

This report was not one of the Polish documents which was released in March 1940 and published as part of the "German White Book No. 3" (or the German White Paper). However, it was published in 1943 as part of the collection entitled "Roosevelt's Way Into War." As far as I can determine, this English translation is the first that has ever appeared. Ambassador Potocki's secret report of 7 March 1939 is here given in full:

The foreign policy of the United States right now concerns not only the government, but the entire American public as well. The most important elements are the public statements of President Roosevelt. In almost every public speech he refers more or less explicitly to the necessity of activating foreign policy against the chaos of views and ideologies in Europe. These statements are picked up by the press and then cleverly filtered into the minds of average Americans in such a way as to strengthen their already formed opinions. The same theme is constantly repeated, namely, the danger of war in Europe and saving the democracies from inundation by enemy fascism. In all of these public statements there is normally only a single theme, that is, the danger from Nazism and Nazi Germany to world peace.

As a result of these speeches, the public is called upon to support rearmament and the spending of enormous sums for the navy and the air force. The unmistakable idea behind this is that in case of an armed conflict the United States cannot stay out but must take an active part in the maneuvers. As a result of the effective speeches of President Roosevelt, which are supported by the press, the American public is today being conscientiously manipulated to hate everything that smacks of totalitarianism and fascism. But it is interesting that the USSR is not included in all this. The American public considers Russia more in the camp of the democratic states. This was also the case during the Span-

ish civil war when the so-called Loyalists were regarded as defenders of the democratic idea.

The State Department operates without attracting a great deal of attention, although it is known that Secretary of State [Cordell] Hull and President Roosevelt swear allegiance to the same ideas. However, Hull shows more reserve than Roosevelt, and he loves to make a distinction between Nazism and Chancellor Hitler on the one hand, and the German people on the other. He considers this form of dictatorial government a temporary "necessary evil." In contrast, the State Department is unbelievably interested in the USSR and its internal situation and openly worries itself over its weaknesses and decline. The main reason for United States interest in the Russians is the situation in the Far East. The current government would be glad to see the Red Army emerge as the victor in a conflict with Japan. That's why the sympathies of the government are clearly on the side of China, which recently received considerable financial aid amounting to 25 million dollars.

Eager attention is given to all information from the diplomatic posts as well as to the special emissaries of the President who serve as Ambassadors of the United States. The President frequently calls his representatives from abroad to Washington for personal exchanges of views and to give them special information and instructions. The arrival of the envoys and ambassadors is always shrouded in secrecy and very little surfaces in the press about the results of their visits. The State Department also takes care to avoid giving out any kind of information about the course of these interviews. The practical way in which the President makes foreign policy is most effective. He gives personal instructions to his representatives abroad, most of whom are his personal friends. In this way the United States is led down a dangerous path in world politics with the explicit intention of abandoning the comfortable policy of isolation. The President regards the foreign policy of his country as a means of satisfying his own personal ambition. He listens carefully and happily to his echo in the other capitals of the world. In domestic as well as in foreign policy, the Congress of the United States is the only object that stands in the way of the President and his government in carrying out his decisions quickly and ambitiously. One hundred and fifty years ago, the Constitution of the United States gave the highest prerogatives to the American parliament which may criticize or reject the law of the White House.

The foreign policy of President Roosevelt has recently been the subject of intense discussion in the lower house

and in the Senate, and this has caused excitement. The so-called Isolationists, of whom there are many in both houses, have come out strongly against the President. The representatives and senators were especially upset over the remarks by the President, which were published in the press, in which he said that the borders of the United States lie on the Rhine. But President Roosevelt is a superb political player and understands completely the power of the American parliament. He has his own people there, and he knows how to withdraw from an uncomfortable situation at the right moment.

Very intelligently and cleverly he ties together the question of foreign policy with the issues of American rearment. He particularly stresses the necessity of spending enormous sums in order to maintain a defensive peace. He says specifically that the United States is not arming in order to intervene or to go to the aid of England or France in case of war, but rather because of the need to show strength and military preparedness in case of an armed conflict in Europe. In his view this conflict is becoming ever more acute and is completely unavoidable.

Since the issue is presented this way, the houses of Congress have no cause to object. To the contrary, the houses accepted an armament program of more than one billion dollars. (The normal budget is 550 million, the emergency 552 million dollars.) However, under the cloak of a rearment policy, President Roosevelt continues to push forward his foreign policy, which unofficially shows the world that in case of war the United States will come out on the side of the democratic states with all military and financial power.

In conclusion it can be said that the technical and moral preparation of the American people for participation in a war—if one should break out in Europe—is preceding rapidly. It appears that the United States will come to the aid of France and Great Britain with all its resources right from the beginning. However, I know the American public and the representatives and senators who all have the final word, and I am of the opinion that the possibility that America will enter war as in 1917 is not great. That's because the majority of states in the mid-West and West, where the rural element predominates, want to avoid involvement in European disputes at all costs. They remember the declaration of the Versailles Treaty and the well-known phrase that the war was to save the world for democracy. Neither the Versailles Treaty nor that slogan have reconciled the United States to that war. For millions there remains only a bitter aftertaste because of unpaid billions which the European states still owe America.

Juliusz Lukasiewicz, Poland's Ambassador to France, reported to Warsaw on 29 March 1939 about further conversations with U.S. envoy Bullitt in Paris. Lukasiewicz discussed Roosevelt's efforts to get both Poland and Britain to adopt a totally uncompromising policy towards Germany, even in the face of strong sentiment for peace. The report concludes with these words:

. . . I consider it my duty to inform you of all the aforesaid because I believe that collaboration with Ambassador Bullitt in such difficult and complicated times may prove useful to us. In any case it is absolutely certain that he agrees entirely with our point of view and is prepared for the most extensive friendly collaboration possible.

In order to strengthen the efforts of the American Ambassador in London [Joseph Kennedy], I called the attention of Ambassador Bullitt to the fact that it is not impossible that the British may treat the efforts of the United States with well-concealed contempt. He answered that I am probably right, but that nevertheless the United States has at its disposal the means to really bring pressure on England. He would be giving serious consideration to mobilizing these means.

The Polish Ambassador in London, Count Edward Raczyński, reported to Warsaw on 29 March 1939 on the continuing European crisis and on a conversation he had with Ambassador Joseph Kennedy, his American counterpart. Kennedy's remarks to Raczyński confirmed Bullitt's reputation in diplomatic circles as an indiscreet big mouth:

I asked Mr. Kennedy point blank about the conference which he is supposed to have had recently with [British Prime Minister] Mr. Chamberlain concerning Poland. Kennedy was surprised and declared categorically that a conversation of such special significance never took place. At the same time, and thereby contradicting his own assertion to a certain extent, Kennedy expressed displeasure and surprise that his colleagues in Paris and Warsaw [William Bullitt and Anthony Biddle] 'who are not, as himself, in a position to get a clear picture of conditions in England' should talk so openly about this conversation.

Mr. Kennedy—who made me understand that his views were based on a series of conversations with the most important authorities here—declared that he was convinced that should Poland decide in favor of armed resistance against Germany, especially with regard to Danzig, it would draw England in its wake.

This concludes the excerpts from the Polish reports.



The Path To War

While the Polish documents alone are conclusive proof of Roosevelt's treacherous campaign to bring about world war, it is fortunate for posterity that a substantial body of irrefutable complementary evidence exists which confirms the conspiracy recorded in the dispatches to Warsaw.

The secret policy was confirmed after the war with the release of a confidential diplomatic report by the British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Ronald Lindsay. During his three years of service in Washington, the veteran diplomat had developed little regard for America's leaders. He considered Roosevelt an amiable and impressionable lightweight, and warned the British Foreign Office that it should not tell William Bullitt anything beyond what it wouldn't mind reading later in an American newspaper.¹⁸

On 19 September 1938—that is, a year before the outbreak of war in Europe—Roosevelt called Lindsay to a very secret meeting at the White House. At the beginning of their long conversation, according to Lindsay's confidential dispatch to London, Roosevelt "emphasized the necessity of absolute secrecy. Nobody must know I had seen him and he himself would tell nobody of the interview. I gathered not even the State Department." The two discussed some secondary matters before Roosevelt got to the main point of the conference. "This is the very secret part of his communication and it must not be known to anyone that he has even breathed a suggestion." The President told the Ambassador that if news of the conversation was ever made public, it could mean his impeachment. And no wonder. What Roosevelt proposed was a cynically brazen but harebrained scheme to violate the U.S. Constitution and dupe the American people.

The President said that if Britain and France "would find themselves forced to war" against Germany, the United States would ultimately also join. But this would require some clever maneuvering. Britain and France should impose a total blockade against Germany without actually declaring war and force other states (including neutrals) to abide by it. This would certainly provoke some kind of German military response, but it would also free Britain and France from having to actually declare war. For propaganda purposes, the "blockade must be based on loftiest humanitarian grounds and on the desire to wage hostilities with minimum of suffering and the least possible loss of life and property, and yet bring the enemy to his knees." Roosevelt conceded that this would involve aerial bombardment, but "bombing from the air was not the method of hostilities which caused really great loss of life."

The important point was to "call it defensive measures or

anything plausible but avoid actual declaration of war." That way, Roosevelt believed he could talk the American people into supporting war against Germany, including shipments of weapons to Britain and France, by insisting that the United States was still technically neutral in a non-declared conflict. "This method of conducting war by blockade would in his [Roosevelt's] opinion meet with approval of the United States if its humanitarian purpose were strongly emphasized," Lindsay reported.¹⁹

The American Ambassador to Italy, William Phillips, admitted in his postwar memoirs that the Roosevelt administration was already committed to going to war on the side of Britain and France in late 1938. "On this and many other occasions," Phillips wrote, "I would like to have told him [Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister] frankly that in the event of a European war, the United States would undoubtedly be involved on the side of the Allies. But in view of my official position, I could not properly make such a statement without instructions from Washington, and these I never received."²⁰

Carl J. Burckhardt, the League of Nations High Commissioner to Danzig, reported in his postwar memoirs on a remarkable conversation held at the end of 1938 with Anthony Drexel Biddle, the American Ambassador to Poland. Biddle was a rich banker with close ties to the Morgan financial empire. A thoroughgoing internationalist, he was an ideological colleague of President Roosevelt and a good friend of William Bullitt. Burckhardt, a Swiss professor, served as High Commissioner between 1937 and 1939.

Nine months before the outbreak of armed conflict, on 2 December 1938, Biddle told Burckhardt

with remarkable satisfaction that the Poles were ready to wage war over Danzig. They would counter the motorized strength of the German army with agile maneuverability. 'In April,' he [Biddle] declared, 'a new crisis would break out. Not since the torpedoing of the Lusitania [in 1915] had such a religious hatred against Germany reigned in America as today! Chamberlain and Daladier [the moderate British and French leaders] would be blown away by public opinion. This was a holy war!'²¹

The fateful British pledge to Poland of 31 March 1939 to go to war against Germany in case of a Polish-German conflict would not have been made without strong pressure from the White House.

On 14 March 1939, Slovakia declared itself an independent republic, thereby dissolving the state known as Czechoslovakia. That same day, Czechoslovak President Emil Hacha signed a formal agreement with Hitler establishing a German protectorate

over Bohemia and Moravia, the Czech portion of the federation. The British government initially accepted the new situation, but then Roosevelt intervened.

In their nationally syndicated column of 14 April 1939, the usually very well informed Washington journalists Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen reported that on 16 March 1939 Roosevelt had "sent a virtual ultimatum to Chamberlain" demanding that henceforth the British government strongly oppose Germany. According to Pearson and Allen, who completely supported Roosevelt's move, "the President warned that Britain could expect no more support, moral or material through the sale of airplanes, if the Munich policy continued."²² Chamberlain gave in and the next day, 17 March, ended Britain's policy of cooperation with Germany in a speech at Birmingham bitterly denouncing Hitler. Two weeks later the British government formally pledged itself to war in case of German-Polish hostilities.

Bullitt's response to the creation of the German protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia was to telephone Roosevelt and, in an "almost hysterical" voice, urge him to make a dramatic denunciation of Germany and immediately ask Congress to repeal the Neutrality Act.²³

In a confidential telegram to Washington dated 9 April 1939, Bullitt reported from Paris on another conversation with Ambassador Lukasiewicz. He had told the Polish envoy that although U.S. law prohibited direct financial aid to Poland, it might be possible to circumvent its provisions. The Roosevelt administration might be able to supply war planes to Poland indirectly through Britain. "The Polish Ambassador asked me if it might not be possible for Poland to obtain financial help and aeroplanes from the United States. I replied that I believed the Johnson Act would forbid any loans from the United States to Poland but added that it might be possible for England to purchase planes for cash in the United States and turn them over to Poland."²⁴

On 25 April 1939, four months before the outbreak of war, Bullitt called American newspaper columnist Karl von Wiegand, chief European correspondent of the International News Service, to the U.S. embassy in Paris and told him: "War in Europe has been decided upon. Poland has the assurance of the support of Britain and France, and will yield to no demands from Germany. America will be in the war soon after Britain and France enter it."²⁵

In a lengthy secret conversation at Hyde Park on 28 May 1939, Roosevelt assured the former President of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Edvard Benes, that America would actively intervene on the side of Britain and France in the anticipated European war.²⁶

In June 1939, Roosevelt secretly proposed to the British that the United States should establish "a patrol over the waters of the

Western Atlantic with a view to denying them to the German Navy in the event of war." The British Foreign Office record of this offer noted that "although the proposal was vague and woolly and open to certain objections, we assented informally as the patrol was to be operated in our interests."²⁷

Many years after the war, Georges Bonnet, the French Foreign Minister in 1939, confirmed Bullitt's role as Roosevelt's deputy in pushing his country into war. In a letter to Hamilton Fish dated 26 March 1971, Bonnet wrote: "One thing is certain is that Bullitt in 1939 did everything he could to make France enter the war."²⁸

An important confirmation of the crucial role of Roosevelt and the Jews in pushing Britain into war comes from the diary of James V. Forrestal, the first U.S. Secretary of Defense. In his entry for 27 December 1945, he wrote:

Played golf today with [former Ambassador] Joe Kennedy. I asked him about his conversations with Roosevelt and [British Prime Minister] Neville Chamberlain from 1938 on. He said Chamberlain's position in 1938 was that England had nothing with which to fight and that she could not risk going to war with Hitler. Kennedy's view: That Hitler would have fought Russia without any later conflict with England if it had not been for [William] Bullitt's urging on Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 that the Germans must be faced down about Poland; neither the French nor the British would have made Poland a cause of war if it had not been for the constant needling from Washington. Bullitt, he said, kept telling Roosevelt that the Germans wouldn't fight; Kennedy that they would, and that they would overrun Europe. Chamberlain, he says, stated that America and the world Jews had forced England into the war. In his telephone conversations with Roosevelt in the summer of 1939, the President kept telling him to put some iron up Chamberlain's backside.²⁹

When Ambassador Potocki was back in Warsaw on leave from his post in Washington, he spoke with Count Jan Szembek, the Polish Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary, about the growing danger of war. In his diary entry of 6 July 1939, Szembek recorded Potocki's astonishment at the calm mood in Poland. In comparison with the war psychosis that had gripped the West, Poland seemed like a rest home.

"In the West," the Ambassador told Szembek, "there are all kinds of elements openly pushing for war: the Jews, the super-capitalists, the arms dealers. Today they are all ready for a great business, because they have found a place which can be set on fire: Danzig; and a nation that is ready to fight: Poland. They want to do business on our backs. They are indifferent to the

destruction of our country. Indeed, since everything will have to be rebuilt later on, they can profit from that as well."³⁰

On 24 August 1939, just a week before the outbreak of hostilities, Chamberlain's closest advisor, Sir Horace Wilson, went to Ambassador Kennedy with an urgent appeal from the British Prime Minister for President Roosevelt. Regretting that Britain had unequivocally obligated itself in March to Poland in case of war, Chamberlain now turned in despair to Roosevelt as a last hope for peace. He wanted the American President to "put pressure on the Poles" to change course at this late hour and open negotiations with Germany. By telephone Kennedy told the State Department that the British "felt that they could not, given their obligations, do anything of this sort but that we could." Presented with this extraordinary opportunity to possibly save the peace of Europe, Roosevelt rejected Chamberlain's desperate plea out of hand. At that, Kennedy reported, the Prime Minister lost all hope. "The futility of it all," Chamberlain had told Kennedy, "is the thing that is frightful. After all, we cannot save the Poles. We can merely carry on a war of revenge that will mean the destruction of all Europe."³¹

Roosevelt liked to present himself to the American people and the world as a man of peace. To a considerable degree, that is still his image today. But Roosevelt cynically rejected genuine opportunities to act for peace when they were presented.

In 1938 he refused even to answer requests by French Foreign Minister Bonnet on 8 and 12 September to consider arbitrating the Czech-German dispute.³² And a year later, after the outbreak of war, a melancholy Ambassador Kennedy beseeched Roosevelt to act boldly for peace. "It seems to me that this situation may crystallize to a point where the President can be the savior of the world," Kennedy cabled on 11 September from London. "The British government as such certainly cannot accept any agreement with Hitler, but there may be a point when the President himself may work out plans for world peace. Now this opportunity may never arise, but as a fairly practical fellow all my life, I believe that it is entirely conceivable that the President can get himself in a spot where he can save the world"

But Roosevelt rejected out of hand this chance to save the peace of Europe. To a close political crony, he called Kennedy's plea "the silliest message to me that I have ever received." He complained to Henry Morgenthau that his London Ambassador was nothing but a pain in the neck: "Joe has been an appeaser and will always be an appeaser . . . If Germany and Italy made a good peace offer tomorrow, Joe would start working on the King and his friend the Queen and from there on down to get everybody to accept it."³³

Infuriated at Kennedy's stubborn efforts to restore peace in

Europe or at least limit the conflict that had broken out, Roosevelt instructed his Ambassador with a "personal" and "strictly confidential" telegram on 11 September 1939 that any American peace effort was totally out of the question. The Roosevelt government, it declared, "sees no opportunity nor occasion for any peace move to be initiated by the President of the United States. The people [sic] of the United States would not support any move for peace initiated by this Government that would consolidate or make possible a survival of a regime of force and aggression."³⁴

Hamilton Fish Warns The Nation

In the months before armed conflict broke out in Europe, perhaps the most vigorous and prophetic American voice of warning against President Roosevelt's campaign to incite war was that of Hamilton Fish, a leading Republican congressman from New York. In a series of hard-hitting radio speeches, Fish rallied considerable public opinion against Roosevelt's deceptive war policy. Here are only a few excerpts from some of those addresses.³⁵

On 6 January 1939, Fish told a nationwide radio audience:

The inflammatory and provocative message of the President to Congress and the world [given two days before] has unnecessarily alarmed the American people and created, together with a barrage of propaganda emanating from high New Deal officials, a war hysteria, dangerous to the peace of America and the world. The only logical conclusion to such speeches is another war fought overseas by American soldiers.

All the totalitarian nations referred to by President Roosevelt . . . haven't the faintest thought of making war on us or invading Latin America.

I do not propose to mince words on such an issue, affecting the life, liberty and happiness of our people. The time has come to call a halt to the warmongers of the New Deal, backed by war profiteers, Communists, and hysterical internationalists, who want us to quarantine the world with American blood and money.

He [Roosevelt] evidently desires to whip up a frenzy of hate and war psychosis as a red herring to take the minds of our people off their own unsolved domestic problems. He visualizes hobgoblins and creates in the public mind a fear of foreign invasions that exists only in his own imagination.

On 5 March, Fish spoke to the country over the Columbia radio network:

The people of France and Great Britain want peace but our warmongers are constantly inciting them to disregard the Munich Pact and resort to the arbitrament of arms. If only we would stop meddling in foreign lands the old nations of Europe would compose their own quarrels by arbitration and the processes of peace, but apparently we won't let them.

Fish addressed the listeners of the National Broadcasting Company network on 5 April with these words:

The youth of America are again being prepared for another blood bath in Europe in order to make the world safe for democracy.

If Hitler and the Nazi government regain Memel or Danzig, taken away from Germany by the Versailles Treaty, and where the population is 90 percent German, why is it necessary to issue threats and denunciations and incite our people to war? I would not sacrifice the life of one American soldier for a half dozen Memels or Danzigs. We repudiated the Versailles Treaty because it was based on greed and hatred, and as long as its inequalities and injustices exist there are bound to be wars of liberation.

The sooner certain provisions of the Versailles Treaty are scrapped the better for the peace of the world.

I believe that if the areas that are distinctly German in population are restored to Germany, except Alsace-Lorraine and the Tyrol, there will be no war in western Europe. There may be a war between the Nazis and the Communists, but if there is that is not our war or that of Great Britain or France or any of the democracies.

New Deal spokesmen have stirred up war hysteria into a veritable frenzy. The New Deal propaganda machine is working overtime to prepare the minds of our people for war, who are already suffering from a bad case of war jitters.

President Roosevelt is the number one warmonger in America, and is largely responsible for the fear that pervades the Nation which has given the stock market and the American people a bad case of the jitters.

I accuse the administration of instigating war propaganda and hysteria to cover up the failure and collapse of the New Deal policies, with 12 million unemployed and business confidence destroyed.

I believe we have far more to fear from our enemies from within than we have from without. All the Communists are united in urging us to go to war against Germany and Japan for the benefit of Soviet Russia.

Great Britain still expects every American to do her duty, by preserving the British Empire and her colonies. The war profiteers, munitions makers and international bankers are all set up for our participation in a new world war.

On 21 April, Fish again spoke to the country over nationwide radio:

It is the duty of all those Americans who desire to keep out of foreign entanglements and the rotten mess and war madness of Europe and Asia to openly expose the war hysteria and propaganda that is impelling us to armed conflict.

What we need in America is a stop war crusade, before we are forced into a foreign war by internationalists and interventionists at Washington, who seem to be more interested in solving world problems rather than our own.

In his radio address of 26 May, Fish stated:

He [Roosevelt] should remember that the Congress has the sole power to declare war and formulate the foreign policies of the United States. The President has no such constitutional power. He is merely the official organ to carry out the policies determined by the Congress.

Without knowing even who the combatants will be, we are informed almost daily by the internationalists and interventionists in America that we must participate in the next world war.

On 8 July 1939, Fish declared over the National Broadcasting Company radio network:

If we must go to war, let it be in defense of America, but not in defense of the munitions makers, war profiteers, Communists, to cover up the failures of the New Deal, or to provide an alibi for a third term.

It is well for all nations to know that we do not propose to go to war over Danzig, power politics, foreign colonies, or the imperialistic wars of Europe or anywhere in the world.

Powers Behind The President

President Roosevelt could have done little to incite war in Europe without help from powerful allies. Behind him stood the self-serving international financial and Jewish interests bent on the destruction of Germany.

The principal organization which drummed up public support for U.S. involvement in the European war prior to the Pearl Harbor attack was the cleverly named "Committee to Defend

America by Aiding the Allies." President Roosevelt himself initiated its founding, and top administration officials consulted frequently with Committee leaders.³⁶

Although headed for a time by an elderly small-town Kansas newspaper publisher, William Allen White, the Committee was actually organized by powerful financial interests which stood to profit tremendously from loans to embattled Britain and from shrewd investments in giant war industries in the United States.

At the end of 1940, West Virginia Senator Rush D. Holt issued a detailed examination of the Committee which exposed the base interests behind the idealistic-sounding slogans:

The Committee has powerful connections with banks, insurance companies, financial investing firms, and industrial concerns. These in turn exert influence on college presidents and professors, as well as on newspapers, radio and other means of communication. One of the powerful influences used by the group is the '400' and social set. The story is a sordid picture of betrayal of public interest.

The powerful J.P. Morgan interest with its holdings in the British Empire helped plan the organization and donated its first expense money.

Some of the important figures active in the Committee were revealed by Holt: Frederic R. Coudert, a paid war propagandist for the British government in the U.S. during the First World War; Robert S. Allen of the Pearson and Allen syndicated column; Henry R. Luce, the influential publisher of *Time*, *Life*, and *Fortune* magazines; Fiorella LaGuardia, the fiery half-Jewish Mayor of New York City; Herbert Lehman, the Jewish Governor of New York with important financial holdings in war industries; and Frank Altschul, an officer in the Jewish investment firm of Lazard Freres with extensive holdings in munitions and military supply companies.

If the Committee succeeded in getting the U.S. into war, Holt warned, "American boys will spill their blood for profiteers, politicians and 'paytrials.' If war comes, on the hands of the sponsors of the White Committee will be blood—the blood of Americans killed in a needless war."³⁷

In March 1941 a list of most of the Committee's financial backers was made public. It revealed the nature of the forces eager to bring America into the European war. Powerful international banking interests were well represented. J.P. Morgan, John W. Morgan, Thomas W. Lamont and others of the great Morgan banking house were listed. Other important names from the New York financial world included Mr. and Mrs. Paul Mellon, Felix M. and James F. Warburg, and J. Malcolm Forbes. Chicago department store owner and publisher Marshall Field was a

contributor, as was William Averill Harriman, the railroad and investment millionaire who later served as Roosevelt's ambassador in Moscow.

Of course, Jewish names made up a substantial portion of the long list. Hollywood film czar Samuel Goldwyn of Goldwyn Studios was there, along with David Dubinsky, the head of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union. The William S. Paley Foundation, which had been set up by the head of the giant Columbia Broadcasting System, contributed to the Committee. The name of Mrs. Herbert H. Lehman, wife of the New York Governor, was also on the list.³⁸

Without an understanding of his intimate ties to organized Jewry, Roosevelt's policies make little sense. As Jewish historian Lucy Dawidowicz noted: "Roosevelt himself brought into his immediate circle more Jews than any other President before or after him. Felix Frankfurter, Bernard M. Baruch and Henry Morgenthau were his close advisers. Benjamin V. Cohen, Samuel Rosenman and David K. Niles were his friends and trusted aides."³⁹ This is perhaps not so remarkable in light of Roosevelt's reportedly one-eighth Jewish ancestry.⁴⁰

In his diary entry of 1 May 1941, Charles A. Lindbergh, the American aviator hero and peace leader, nailed the coalition that was pushing the United States into war:

The pressure for war is high and mounting. The people are opposed to it, but the Administration seems to have 'the bit in its teeth' and [is] hell-bent on its way to war. Most of the Jewish interests in the country are behind war, and they control a huge part of our press and radio and most of our motion pictures. There are also the 'intellectuals,' and the 'Anglophiles,' and the British agents who are allowed free rein, the international financial interests, and many others.⁴¹

Joseph Kennedy shared Lindbergh's apprehensions about Jewish power. Before the outbreak of war he privately expressed concerns about "the Jews who dominate our press" and world Jewry in general, which he considered a threat to peace and prosperity. Shortly after the beginning of hostilities, Kennedy lamented "the growing Jewish influence in the press and in Washington demanding continuance of the war . . ."⁴²

Betrayal, Failure, Delusion

Roosevelt's efforts to get Poland, Britain and France into war against Germany succeeded all too well. The result was untold death and misery and destruction. When the fighting began, as Roosevelt had intended and planned, the Polish and French

leaders expected the American president to at least make good on his assurances of backing in case of war. But Roosevelt had not reckoned on the depth of peace sentiment of the vast majority of Americans. So, in addition to deceiving his own people, Roosevelt also let down those in Europe to whom he had promised support.

Seldom in American history were the people as united in their views as they were in late 1939 about staying out of war in Europe. When hostilities began in September 1939, the Gallup poll showed 94 percent of the American people against involvement in war. That figure rose to 96.5 percent in December before it began to decline slowly to about 80 percent in the Fall of 1941. (Today, there is hardly an issue that even 60 or 70 percent of the people agree upon.)⁴³

Roosevelt was, of course, quite aware of the intensity of popular feeling on this issue. That is why he lied repeatedly to the American people about his love of peace and his determination to keep the U.S. out of war, while simultaneously doing everything in his power to plunge Europe and America into war.

In a major 1940 re-election campaign speech, Roosevelt responded to the growing fears of millions of Americans who suspected that their President had secretly pledged United States support to Britain in its war against Germany. These well-founded suspicions were based in part on the publication in March of the captured Polish documents. The speech of 23 October 1940 was broadcast from Philadelphia to the nation on network radio. In the most emphatic language possible, Roosevelt categorically denied that he had

pledged in some way the participation of the United States in some foreign war. I give to you and to the people of this country this most solemn assurance: There is no secret Treaty, no secret understanding in any shape or form, direct or indirect, with any Government or any other nation in any part of the world, to involve this nation in any war or for any other purpose.⁴⁴

We now know, of course, that this pious declaration was just another one of Roosevelt's many brazen, baldfaced lies to the American people.

Roosevelt's policies were more than just dishonest—they were criminal. The Constitution of the United States grants authority only to the Congress to make war and peace. And Congress had passed several major laws to specifically insure U.S. neutrality in case of war in Europe. Roosevelt continually violated his oath as President to uphold the Constitution. If his secret policies had been known, the public demand for his impeachment would very probably have been unstoppable.

The Watergate episode has made many Americans deeply conscious of the fact that their presidents can act criminally. That affair forced Richard Nixon to resign his presidency, and he is still widely regarded as a criminal. No schools are named after him and his name will never receive the respect that normally goes to every American president. But Nixon's crimes pale into insignificance when compared to those of Franklin Roosevelt. What were Nixon's lies compared to those of Roosevelt? What is a burglary cover-up compared to an illegal and secret campaign to bring about a major war?

Those who defend Roosevelt's record argue that he lied to the American people for their own good—that he broke the law for lofty principles. His deceit is considered permissible because the cause was noble, while similar deception by presidents Johnson and Nixon, to name two, is not. This is, of course, a hypocritical double standard. And the argument doesn't speak very well for the democratic system. It implies that the people are too dumb to understand their own best interests. It further suggests that the best form of government is a kind of benevolent liberal-democratic dictatorship.

Roosevelt's hatred for Hitler was deep, vehement, passionate—almost personal. This was due in no small part to an abiding envy and jealousy rooted in the great contrast between the two men, not only in their personal characters but also in their records as national leaders.

Superficially, the public lives of Roosevelt and Hitler were astonishingly similar. Both assumed the leadership of their respective countries at the beginning of 1933. They both faced the enormous challenge of mass unemployment during a catastrophic worldwide economic depression. Each became a powerful leader in a vast military alliance during the most destructive war in history. Both men died while still in office within a few weeks of each other in April 1945, just before the end of the Second World War in Europe. But the enormous contrasts in the lives of these two men are even more remarkable.

Roosevelt was born into one of the wealthiest families in America. His was a life utterly free of material worry. He took part in the First World War from an office in Washington as Under-Secretary of the Navy. Hitler, on the other hand, was born into a modest provincial family. As a young man he worked as an impoverished manual laborer. He served in the First World War as a front line soldier in the hell of the Western battleground. He was wounded many times and decorated for bravery.

In spite of his charming manner and soothing rhetoric, Roosevelt proved unable to master the great challenges facing America. Even after four years of his presidency, millions remained unemployed, undernourished and poorly housed in a vast land

richly endowed with all the resources for incomparable prosperity. The New Deal was plagued with bitter strikes and bloody clashes between labor and capital. Roosevelt did nothing to solve the country's deep, festering racial problems which erupted repeatedly in riots and armed conflict. The story was very different in Germany. Hitler rallied his people behind a radical program that transformed Germany within a few years from an economically ruined land on the edge of civil war into Europe's powerhouse. Germany underwent a social, cultural and economic rebirth without parallel in history. The contrast between the personalities of Roosevelt and Hitler was simultaneously a contrast between two diametrically different social-political systems and ideologies.

And yet, it would be incorrect to characterize Roosevelt as merely a cynical politician and front man for powerful alien interests. Certainly he did not regard himself as an evil man. He sincerely believed that he was doing the right and noble thing in pressuring Britain and France into war against Germany. Like Wilson before him, and others since, Roosevelt felt himself uniquely qualified and called upon by destiny to reshape the world according to his vision of an egalitarian, universalist democracy. He was convinced, as so many American leaders have been, that the world could be saved from itself by remodeling it after the United States.

Presidents like Wilson and Roosevelt view the world not as a complex of different nations, races and cultures which must mutually respect each others' separate collective identities in order to live together in peace, but rather according to a self-righteous missionary perspective that divides the globe into morally good and evil countries. In that scheme of things, America is the providentially permanent leader of the forces of righteousness. Luckily, this view just happens to correspond to the economic and political interests of those who wield power in the United States.

President Roosevelt's War

In April 1941, Senator Gerald Nye of North Dakota prophetically predicted that one day the Second World War would be remembered as Roosevelt's war. "If we are ever involved in this war, it will be called by future historians by only one title, 'the President's War,' because every step of his since his Chicago quarantine speech [of 5 October 1937] has been toward war."⁴⁵

The great American historian, Harry Elmer Barnes, believed that war could probably have been prevented in 1939 if it had not been for Roosevelt's meddling. "Indeed, there is fairly conclusive evidence that, but for Mr. Roosevelt's pressure on Britain, France

and Poland, and his commitments to them before September 1939, especially to Britain, and the irresponsible antics of his agent provocateur, William C. Bullitt, there would probably have been no world war in 1939, or, perhaps, for many years thereafter."⁴⁶

In *Revisionism: A Key to Peace*, Barnes wrote:

President Roosevelt had a major responsibility, both direct and indirect, for the outbreak of war in Europe. He began to exert pressure on France to stand up to Hitler as early as the German reoccupation of the Rhineland in March 1936, months before he was making his strongly isolationist speeches in the campaign of 1936. This pressure on France, and also England, continued right down to the coming of the war in September 1939. It gained volume and momentum after the quarantine speech of October 1937. As the crisis approached between Munich and the outbreak of war, Roosevelt pressed the Poles to stand firm against any demands by Germany, and urged the English and French to back up the Poles unflinchingly.

There is grave doubt that England would have gone to war in September 1939 had it not been for Roosevelt's encouragement and his assurances that, in the event of war, the United States would enter on the side of Britain just as soon as he could swing American public opinion around to support intervention.

Roosevelt had abandoned all semblance of neutrality, even before war broke out in 1939, and moved as speedily as was safe and feasible in the face of anti-interventionist American public opinion to involve this country in the European conflict.⁴⁷

One of the most perceptive verdicts on Franklin Roosevelt's place in history came from the pen of the great Swedish explorer and author, Sven Hedin. During the war he wrote:

The question of the way it came to a new world war is not only to be explained because of the foundation laid by the peace treaties of 1919, or in the suppression of Germany and her allies after the First World War, or in the continuation of the ancient policies of Great Britain and France. The decisive push came from the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.

Roosevelt speaks of democracy and destroys it incessantly. He slanders as undemocratic and un-American those who admonish him in the name of peace and the preservation of the American way of life. He has made democracy into a caricature rather than a model. He talks about freedom of speech and silences those who don't hold his opinion.

He talks about freedom of religion and makes an alliance with Bolshevism.

He talks about freedom from want, but cannot provide ten million of his own people with work, bread or shelter. He talks about freedom from the fear of war while working for war, not only for his own people but for the world, by inciting his country against the Axis powers when it might have united with them, and he thereby drove millions to their deaths.

This war will go down in history as the war of President Roosevelt.⁴⁸

Officially orchestrated praise for Roosevelt as a great man of peace cannot conceal forever his crucial role in pushing Europe into war in 1939.

* * * * *

It is now more than forty years since the events described here took place. For many they are an irrelevant part of a best-forgotten past. But the story of how Franklin Roosevelt engineered war in Europe is very pertinent—particularly for Americans today. The lessons of the past have never been more important than in this nuclear age. For unless at least an aware minority understands how and why wars are made, we will remain powerless to restrain the warmongers of our own era.

Notes

1. See, for example: Charles A. Beard, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948); William Henry Chamberlin, *America's Second Crusade* (Chicago: Regnery, 1952, 1962); Benjamin Colby, *'Twas a Famous Victory* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1979); Frederic R. Sanborn, *Design for War* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1951); William Stevenson, *A Man Called Intrepid* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1980); Charles C. Tansill, *Back Door to War* (Chicago: Regnery, 1952); John Toland, *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath* (New York: Doubleday, 1982).
2. Saul Friedlander, *Prelude to Downfall: Hitler and the United States 1939-1941* (New York: Knopf, 1967), pp. 73-77; U.S., Congress, House, *Special Committee on Investigation of Un-American Activities in the United States*, 1940, Appendix, Part II, pp. 1054-1059.
3. Friedlander, pp. 75-76.
4. *New York Times*, 30 March 1940, p. 1.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 4, and 31 March 1940, p. 1.
6. *New York Times*, 30 March 1940, p. 1. *Baltimore Sun*, 30 March 1940, p. 1.
7. A French-language edition was published in 1944 under the title *Comment Roosevelt est Entre en Guerre*.
8. Tansill, "The United States and the Road to War in Europe," in Harry Elmer Barnes (ed.), *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace* (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton, 1953; reprint eds., New York: Greenwood, 1969 and Torrance, Calif.: Institute for Historical Review [supplemented], 1982), p. 184 (note 292). Tansill also quoted from several of the documents in his *Back Door to War*, pp. 450-51.
9. Harry Elmer Barnes, *The Court Historians Versus Revisionism* (N.p.: privately printed, 1952), p. 10. This booklet is reprinted in Barnes, *Selected Revisionist Pamphlets* (New York: Arno Press & The New York Times, 1972), and in Barnes, *The Barnes Trilogy* (Torrance, Calif.: Institute for Historical Review, 1979).
10. Chamberlin, p. 60.
11. Edward Raczyński, *In Allied London* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963), p. 51.
12. Orville H. Bullitt (ed.), *For the President: Personal and Secret* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), p. xlvi [biographical foreword]. See also *Time*, 26 October 1936, p. 24.
13. *Current Biography 1940*, ed. Maxine Block (New York: H.W. Wilson, 1940), p. 122 ff.
14. Gisleher Wirsing, *Der masslose Kontinent: Roosevelts Kampf um die Weltherrschaft* (Jena: E. Diederichs, 1942), p. 224.
15. Bullitt obituary in *New York Times*, 16 February 1967, p. 44.
16. Jack Alexander, "He Rose From the Rich," *Saturday Evening Post*, 11 March 1939, p. 6. (Also see continuation in issue of 18 March 1939.) Bullitt's public views on the European scene and what should be America's attitude toward it can be found in his *Report to the American People* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin [Cambridge: Riverside Press], 1940), the text of a speech he delivered, with the President's blessing, under the auspices of the American Philosophical Society in Independence Hall in Philadelphia shortly after the fall of France. For sheer, hyperventilated stridency and emotionalist hysterics, this anti-German polemic could hardly be topped, even given the similar propensities of many other interventionists in government and the press in those days.
17. Michael R. Beschloss, *Kennedy and Roosevelt* (New York: Norton, 1980), pp. 203-04.
18. Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy 1932-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 31. See also pp. 164-65.
19. Dispatch No. 349 of 20 September 1938 by Sir. R. Lindsay, *Documents on British Foreign Policy* (ed. Ernest L. Woodward), Third

- series, Vol. VII (London, 1954), pp. 627-29. See also: Joseph P. Lash, *Roosevelt and Churchill 1939-1941* (New York: Norton, 1976), pp. 25-27; Dallek, pp. 164-65; Arnold A. Offner, *America and the Origins of World War II* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), p. 61.
20. William Phillips, *Ventures in Diplomacy* (North Beverly, Mass.: privately published, 1952), pp. 220-21.
 21. Carl Burckhardt, *Meine Danziger Mission 1937-1939* (Munich: Callwey, 1960), p. 225.
 22. Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen, "Washington Daily Merry-Go-Round," *Washington Times-Herald*, 14 April 1939, p. 16. A facsimile reprint of this column appears in Conrad Grieb (ed.), *American Manifest Destiny and The Holocausts* (New York: Examiner Books, 1979), pp. 132-33. See also: Wirsing, pp. 238-41.
 23. Jay P. Moffat, *The Moffat Papers 1919-1943* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 232.
 24. U.S., Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States (Diplomatic Papers)*, 1939, General, Vol. I (Washington: 1956), p. 122.
 25. "Von Wiegand Says—," *Chicago Herald-American*, 8 October 1944, p. 2.
 26. Edvard Benes, *Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Benes* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1954), pp. 79-80.
 27. Lash, p. 64.
 28. Hamilton Fish, *FDR: The Other Side of the Coin* (New York: Vantage, 1976; Torrance, Calif.: Institute for Historical Review, 1980), p. 62.
 29. James V. Forrestal (eds. Walter Millis and E.S. Duffield), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking, 1951), pp. 121-22. I have been privately informed by a colleague who has examined the original manuscript of the Forrestal diaries that many very critical references to the Jews were deleted from the published version.
 30. Jan Szembek, *Journal 1933-1939* (Paris: Plon, 1952), pp. 475-76.
 31. David E. Koskoff, *Joseph P. Kennedy: A Life and Times* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 207; Moffat, p. 253; A.J.P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961; 2nd ed. Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Premier [paperback], 1965), p. 262; U.S., Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1939, General, Vol. I (Washington: 1956), p. 355.
 32. Dallek, p. 164.
 33. Beschloss, pp. 190-91; Lash, p. 75; Koskoff, pp. 212-13.
 34. Hull to Kennedy (No. 905), U.S., Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1939, General, Vol. I (Washington: 1956), p. 424.

35. The radio addresses of Hamilton Fish quoted here were published in the Congressional Record Appendix (Washington) as follows: (6 January 1939) Vol. 84, Part 11, pp. 52-53; (5 March 1939) same, pp. 846-47; (5 April 1939) Vol. 84, Part 12, pp. 1342-43; (21 April 1939) same, pp. 1642-43; (26 May 1939) Vol. 84, Part 13, pp. 2288-89; (8 July 1939) same, pp. 3127-28.
36. Wayne S. Cole, *Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle Against American Intervention in World War II* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), pp. 128, 136-39.
37. Congressional Record Appendix (Washington: 1941), (30 December 1940) Vol. 86, Part 18, pp. 7019-25. See also: Appendix, Vol. 86, Part 17, pp. 5808-14.
38. *New York Times*, 11 March 1941, p. 10.
39. Lucy Dawidowicz, "American Jews and the Holocaust," *The New York Times Magazine*, 18 April 1982, p. 102.
40. "FDR 'had a Jewish great-grandmother,'" *Jewish Chronicle* (London), 5 February 1982, p. 3.
41. Charles A. Lindbergh, *The Wartime Journals of Charles A. Lindbergh* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), p. 481.
42. Koskoff, pp. 282, 212. The role of the American press in fomenting hatred against Germany between 1933 and 1939 is a subject that deserves much more detailed treatment. Charles Tansill provides some useful information on this in *Back Door to War*. The essay by Professor Hans A. Muenster, "Die Kriegsschuld der Presse der USA" in *Kriegsschuld und Presse*, published in 1944 by the German Reichsdozentenfuehrung, is worth consulting.
43. An excellent essay relating and contrasting American public opinion measurements to Roosevelt's foreign policy moves in 1939-41 is Harry Elmer Barnes, *Was Roosevelt Pushed Into War By Popular Demand in 1941?* [N.p.: privately printed, 1951]. It is reprinted in Barnes, *Selected Revisionist Pamphlets*.
44. Lash, p. 240.
45. *New York Times*, 27 April 1941, p. 19.
46. Harry Elmer Barnes, *The Struggle Against the Historical Blackout*, 2nd ed. (N.p.: privately published, ca. 1948), p. 12. See also the 9th, final revised and enlarged edition (N.p.: privately published, ca. 1954), p. 34; this booklet is reprinted in Barnes, *Selected Revisionist Pamphlets*.
47. Harry Elmer Barnes, "Revisionism: A Key to Peace," *Rampart Journal of Individualist Thought* Vol. II, No. 1 (Spring 1966), pp. 29-30. This article was republished in Barnes, *Revisionism: A Key to Peace and Other Essays* (San Francisco: Cato Institute [Cato Paper No. 12], 1980).
48. Sven Hedin, *Amerika im Kampf der Kontinente* (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1943), p. 54.

Bibliography

Listed here are the published editions of the Polish documents, the most important sources touching on the questions of their authenticity and content, and essential recent sources on what President Roosevelt was really—as opposed to publicly—doing and thinking during the prelude to war. Full citations for all references in the article will be found in the notes.

Beschloss, Michael R. *Kennedy and Roosevelt*. New York: Norton, 1980.

Bullitt, Orville H. (ed.). *For the President: Personal and Secret. [Correspondence between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt.]* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972.

Germany. Foreign Office Archive Commission. *Roosevelts Weg in den Krieg: Geheimdokumente zur Kriegspolitik des Praesidenten der Vereinigten Staaten*. Berlin: Deutscher Verlag, 1943.

Germany. Foreign Office. *The German White Paper*. [White Book No. 3.] New York: Howell, Soskin and Co., 1940.

Germany. Foreign Office. *Polnische Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Kriegs*. [White Book No. 3.] Berlin: F. Eher, 1940.

Koskoff, David E. *Joseph P. Kennedy: A Life and Times*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974.

Lukasiewicz, Juliusz (Waclaw Jedrzejewicz, ed.). *Diplomat in Paris 1936-1939*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970.

Wirsing, Giselher. *Der masslose Kontinent: Roosevelts Kampf um die Weltherrschaft*. Jena: E. Diederichs, 1942.

The Roosevelt Legacy and The Kent Case

TYLER KENT

INTRODUCTION

In May 1940, a 29-year-old American code clerk at the U.S. embassy in London was arrested by British authorities in his apartment. Tyler Kent was charged with having violated the British Official Secrets Act. "For a purpose prejudicial to the safety and interests of the state," the charge stated, Kent had "obtained a document which might be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy." He was sentenced to seven years in prison, but was released and returned to the United States after serving five.

Between June 1940 and December 1945, the Kent case was the subject of numerous American newspaper articles. Most were sensational or highly speculative, since reliable information was hard to come by. (At the time, the British press was strictly censored.) Many Americans wanted to know how a foreign government could secretly arrest and put on trial a U.S. citizen who held diplomatic immunity. Congressmen and newspapers speculated as to what the code clerk really knew about rumored secret arrangements between President Roosevelt and British leader Winston Churchill. Many wondered if Kent had been jailed to keep him from talking. But preoccupation with the war and official government statements satisfied the curiosity of all but a handful. When Kent returned to the United States in 1945 from British imprisonment, almost all interest in the case had evaporated in the general euphoria of Allied military victory. For many years the Kent story was virtually forgotten.

The passage of time and a more sober awareness of how American presidents operate have encouraged new interest in

the case. Dramatic revelations of illegal Presidential actions that emerged from the Vietnam war and the Watergate affair shocked Americans into a bitter realization that their Chief Executive could lie and break the law. In recent years the Kent case has been the subject of several scholarly and semi-scholarly articles. Highly acclaimed author John Toland devoted several pages to the affair in his 1982 revisionist book on Pearl Harbor, *Infamy*. In December 1982 the British television program "Newsnight" examined the Kent case. The broadcast included excerpts from an interview with Kent filmed near his Texas home. Several books about the Kent story are reportedly in preparation. All this testifies to a healthy, growing readiness to critically re-examine President Roosevelt's fateful path into the Second World War.

Tyler Gatewood Kent was born on 24 March 1911 in Newchwang (Yingkow), northern China, where his father, William P. Kent, was serving as the American Consul. The family had strong roots in Virginia. Kent's English forebears settled there in 1644. President John Tyler was a distant relative. A grandfather was Speaker of the Virginia Assembly and lieutenant governor.

Tyler Kent attended St. Alban's School in Washington, D.C., and received his higher education at Princeton (AB, 1931), George Washington University, the Paris Sorbonne, and the University of Madrid. From an early age he showed a remarkable aptitude for languages. Eventually he learned numerous ancient and modern languages. Like his father, Kent chose a career in the State Department foreign service.

His first assignment was to the American embassy in Moscow. From 1934 to 1939, Kent learned first-hand in the Soviet capital about life under Communism. His fluent command of the Russian language helped young Kent to know the Russian people and the realities of Soviet life much more intimately than most diplomats. He developed an intense hatred for the Soviet system and for those who had foisted this monstrous tyranny on Russia.

Like many Americans, Kent was appalled at Roosevelt's support for Stalin's cruel and despotic regime. Kent's personal experience and careful study convinced him that Communism represented a mortal danger to the world, and to the West in particular. President Roosevelt, though, considered the Soviet system a rougher but more progressive version of his own New Deal, both motivated by the same lofty humanistic ideals.

From Moscow Kent was transferred to the U.S. embassy in London. From October 1939 until that fateful 20th day of May, 1940, he served as a code clerk. This was an especially important position there because all diplomatic dispatches from American missions across Europe to Washington were routed through the London embassy's code room.

When Kent began work, war had already broken out in Europe. U.S. law and overwhelming public sentiment seemed to insure that America would avoid entanglement in the conflict. But from his special vantage point in London, Kent quickly learned that President Roosevelt was doing everything in his power to subvert the law and deceive the people in order to get America into war.

Kent decided to make copies or summaries of diplomatic dispatches documenting Roosevelt's secret policies and somehow bring them to the attention of sympathetic congressmen and senators. And so he took the course that led to his untimely arrest, briefly made him something of a celebrity, and cost him five years in prison. As he puts it, he got "tangled up in history." In fact he came very close to changing its course.

As code clerk, Kent intercepted hundreds of diplomatic dispatches between the embassies in Europe and the State Department in Washington. He made verbatim copies of most of the messages and paraphrased summaries of the rest. The most important and incriminating of these was the top secret correspondence between Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, which began with a letter from the President dated 11 September 1939.

Until 11 May 1940, Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty (or head of the British navy). Thus, the exchange of communications between him and Roosevelt until that date was highly irregular because it took place behind the back of the head of the British government, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. Officially, heads of state communicate only with their counterpart heads of state, and any communications otherwise are understood to be for the ultimate attention of the counterpart head of state. In the case of the Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence before 11 May 1940, not only was that exchange designed to be kept secret from Prime Minister Chamberlain, it was indeed something of a conspiracy against him. Churchill wanted to supplant Chamberlain, and Roosevelt himself desired this end. For this reason the exchange was kept especially secret. Until he became Prime Minister himself, Churchill signed his messages to Roosevelt simply, "Naval Person."

The public revelation of the mere existence of a secret Churchill-Roosevelt exchange behind Chamberlain's back would have been highly embarrassing to both correspondents. But if Kent had somehow succeeded in making the contents of the exchange known to the American public, there would have been loud demands for Roosevelt's impeachment.

Kent intercepted and made a complete copy of Churchill's message to Roosevelt of 25 December 1939 (Telegram 2720) in which Churchill informed the President that British warships would continue to violate American sovereignty to seize German ships within the U.S. three mile maritime territorial zone. How-

ever, in order to keep these violations secret, Churchill promised that the seizures would take place out of view from the American shore. "We cannot refrain from stopping enemy ships outside international three-mile limit when these may well be supply ships for U-boats or surface raiders, but instructions have been given only to arrest or fire upon them out of sight of United States shores."

In his message to Roosevelt of 28 February 1940 (Telegram 490), which was also intercepted and copied out by Kent, Churchill wrote that the British would continue to seize and censor U.S. mail from American and other neutral ships on their way to Europe. "All our experience shows that the examination of mails is essential to efficient control," Churchill told Roosevelt. This was, of course, a blatant violation of American neutrality and international law. There was considerable astonishment in the United States when the full extent of Roosevelt's connivance in the illegal British seizure and censorship of American mail to Europe became known many years after the war. If this message intercepted by Kent had been made public in 1940 or 1941, there would have been a first-rate scandal.

In the secret correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt intercepted by Kent, the two leaders conspired to insure that the United States government would secretly tolerate British violations of American territorial sovereignty and restrictions on neutral American shipping. The two men wanted to avoid any embarrassing incidents that would provoke public indignation in America over the illegal British actions. They also worked out procedures for joint British-American naval reporting of the location of German surface raiders and submarines which violated at least the spirit if not the letter of United States neutrality.

The fact that Kent's diplomatic immunity was waived by the U.S. government so that British authorities could throw him into prison is itself proof that the Roosevelt administration was neutral in name only. If Kent had been discovered intercepting dispatches at the American embassy in Berlin, it is inconceivable that the U.S. government would have waived his immunity so that German authorities could imprison him. To the contrary, the Roosevelt administration would have done everything it could to protect him from any possible prosecution and imprisonment by the German government.

In response to a growing clamor in the press and among the public about a possible official government cover-up in the Kent case, the State Department issued a lengthy public statement on 2 September 1944. The cleverly worded document implied, without ever actually making the charge, that Kent had been a German spy. The State Department in effect admitted, however, that it

had put British interests ahead of American interests and law in the case. Kent's trial had been held in secret, the statement said, "because of the harmful effects to British counter-espionage efforts which were to be anticipated if certain of the evidence became public." Even more revealing was the official admission that Kent's extraordinary treatment was because "The interest of Great Britain in such a case, at a time when it was fighting for its existence, was therefore preeminent." At a time, it must be remembered, when the United States was publicly and legally neutral in the conflict between Britain and Germany, the State Department considered British, and not American, interests in the Kent case to be "preeminent."

In 1939 and 1940, the vast majority of the American people wanted to avoid involvement in the European war. They felt that U.S. participation in the First World War had been a catastrophic error and wanted to insure that the mistake would not be repeated. The Congress was likewise committed to a policy of firm neutrality and had passed the Johnson and Neutrality Acts to make sure that America kept out of war in Europe.

The President is constitutionally charged with the duty to execute the will of the American people as expressed through the Congress. The Constitution reserves the power to make war and peace exclusively to Congress. But with brazen contempt for the will of the people, the law and the constitution, President Roosevelt conspired with a small circle of confidants to incite war in Europe and bring the United States into the conflict. He broke his oath to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

Over the years, numerous lies have been invented and spread about Tyler Kent. The most slanderous is that he was a traitor to the United States and a spy for Germany. In fact, Kent was a genuine patriot who put the welfare of his nation above his own personal happiness and security. He was never charged with violating any American law. Kent acted on the traditional principle that for United States government officials, American interests (and not those of Britain or any other country) come first. He was sacrificed to foreign interests by his own government.

In London Tyler Kent faced a painful dilemma: What should a government official do when he discovers that his boss, the President of the United States, is breaking the law? Kent felt a greater loyalty to his nation and its laws than to President Roosevelt. His sense of honor moved him to collect documentary evidence of Roosevelt's treacherous crimes and try to bring it before the American people. Kent paid for his "crime" with five years in prison and a tarnished reputation for the rest of his life, while Franklin Roosevelt, who violated the Constitution and numerous laws, was re-elected President and praised as a hero.

If Tyler Kent had somehow succeeded in making public his collection of intercepted documentary evidence, he would have unleashed an enormous public outcry for President Roosevelt's removal from office. At the very least he would have temporarily halted Roosevelt's campaign to get America into war. Roosevelt might well have been so discredited that Wendell Willkie would have defeated him in the 1940 presidential election. It is difficult to say whether the Kent disclosures would have been enough to bring about Roosevelt's impeachment. Certainly the documents provide proof of criminal activity sufficient to warrant removal from office. Congress would have been virtually compelled to begin at least preliminary impeachment proceedings. This much can be said with certainty: disclosure of the Kent documents would have dealt a powerful blow to Roosevelt's prestige and credibility. Tyler Kent might then have significantly altered the course of American and world history.

—Mark Weber

* * * *

There are those who would have us believe that to dust off the mildewed pages of history is an exercise in futility. Those especially believe this who consider the events of forty years ago "ancient history." Many such persons are motivated by a wish to conceal from the rest of us the relatively recent events which have created the world as it is today. There can be no question that the events which led to World War II, and that war itself, have shaped the lives of all of us alive now. In the United States, the political figure who looms largest on the scene as creator, through this war, of the world we live in today is of course Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

During his unprecedented 12 years as President, he was the arbiter of the fates of the hapless millions of his fellow citizens. Roosevelt became President at the beginning of a severe depression which found millions of Americans without work or the means of subsistence. Banks failed and factories shut their gates. Roosevelt inaugurated what he touted as a "New Deal." It consisted mainly of trying to solve the economic woes of the nation with make-work projects financed out of the public treasury. From previous administrations he had inherited a sound monetary system and virtually no national debt. He could therefore launch with impunity a policy of "spend and elect" as a permanent feature of his administration.

Unfortunately, this deficit-financed, government-sponsored program did not solve the problem of the Great Depression. As

I arrived in London in September of 1939 to assume duties at the United States embassy there. My duties included access to sensitive documents dealing with matters of policy. Almost immediately, I became aware that the clandestine activities of the Roosevelt administration were at variance with the public statements of its spokesmen. This included Roosevelt himself and the lesser figures around him. The Neutrality Acts passed by Congress were being cynically flouted. It seemed to me at the time that it was my inescapable duty to try to inform the right persons in the United States of what was going on. It should always be borne in mind that at this time there was no unanimity either in Congress or among the general public with regard to either passive or active participation of the United States in a European conflict. Opinion polls had, in fact, shown a huge majority—83%—opposed to such involvements. On the other hand, Jewish opinion was violently hostile to Germany and great use was made of their control of the media to whip up pro-war sentiments. It seemed hard to understand why the desires of an alleged 3% of the population should prevail over those of 83%.

As a corollary to his war policy, it was quite obviously necessary for Roosevelt to develop a system of alliances and coalitions against the Third Reich since no single Power could successfully challenge the German military. Aside from Roosevelt's collaboration with British agents in Washington, the President had two henchmen in Europe whose function it was to make sure that war would be declared against Germany. These were William C. Bullitt in Paris and Anthony Drexel Biddle in Warsaw. Bullitt had been ambassador in Moscow and had originally gone there full of enthusiasm for the "new civilization." That was in 1934. By 1936 he left, much disillusioned by what he had seen and by the way he had been treated. Bullitt was the quintessential Anglo-American-Fabian-Liberal. He was the wealthy playboy scion of a Philadelphia banking family who early in life took up "liberal" causes. As early as 1919, he was strongly urging Woodrow Wilson to extend recognition to the new Soviet regime lest "some more radical regime might take over." Whomever he had in mind as "more radical" than Lenin and Trotsky and company, he did not identify. Bullitt was not a Communist but he married Louise Bryant, a Communist newspaperwoman and the widow of the Communist John Reed. As is widely known, John Reed's remains are buried in the Kremlin wall in grateful appreciation of his services to the infant Communist regime in Russia. It is not my intent to impute to a husband all the views of his wife but in the case of William Bullitt and Louise Bryant, it would seem that birds of a feather do indeed flock together.

Bullitt, from his vantage point in Paris, became one of the most virulent anti-German war-mongers in the Anglo-American camp.

Possibly his partly Jewish ancestry (Hurwitz) blinded him from recognizing where the true interests of America lay. He was intelligent enough, if somewhat lacking in judgment. He should have known that the only winner in a war which eliminated Germany as a military power would be Soviet Russia. No doubt it was difficult for a lifetime Fabian to admit that he had been wholly wrong about the "new civilization."

The "Potocki Papers," the gist of which I learned in London, clearly and accurately reflected the views of both Bullitt and Biddle: *British interests first, American interests last.* (Subsequent American Presidents would seem to have learned nothing from the lessons of World War II. Ronald Reagan demonstrated in 1982 that British interests take precedence over those of his own country when he sided with the British in the Falklands-Malvinas dispute, choosing to destroy whatever good relations this country had with Latin America for the sake of British prestige.)

Only the passage of time and the unfolding of history can definitively settle matters of historical dispute. Sufficient time has elapsed—some 45 years—since the formulation of Roosevelt's disastrous pre-war and wartime policies so that any impartial observer of the contemporary world scene could now evaluate for himself the concrete results of those policies in terms of the specific interests of the United States. America has gained no advantage whatsoever from "winning" World War II. Thus the war must be considered a net loss—a failure. The very virulence of the "crusade against evil" propaganda which still today fills the air waves and the press is witness to the fact that there really is nothing else to say when assessing the effects of the war. The security of this continent was not enhanced. American trade advantages were ephemeral and transient. Only the Jews profited insofar as they gained their revenge on Nazi Germany as well as spreading Soviet Communism over 40% of the world, not to mention moving great numbers of European Jews into Palestine.

How odd it is that the statesmen of the Western world did not appear to grasp the truth that a defeated and crushed Germany would mean the emergence of Soviet Russia as a major military power inimical to our interests. But so it has come to pass. The modern United States is unable to implement the Monroe Doctrine which had, for more than a century, protected the Americas from European aggression and alien ideologies. We must swallow the bitter pill of Dr. Castro, the Soviets' proconcul in the Western hemisphere, and stand impotently by as Communist regimes wax and flourish in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America. My "crime" was in foreseeing some of this when I was a cypher clerk

in the American embassy in London, and in trying to do something to forestall it.

Much of the vicious slander that has been directed against me over the years has centered around the allegation of "disloyalty." The Department of State's press release of 2 September 1944 hammers away at this. Yet to whom and to what was my loyalty due? It was claimed that I owed loyalty to Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy and to President Roosevelt. Under most circumstances I would agree. But a government employee takes an oath to "support the laws and Constitution of the United States against all enemies, both foreign and domestic." (My italics.) Events have now proven that as regards the damage done to the interests of this country no foreign enemy could have done more than Roosevelt. He was the greatest "domestic enemy" and no subordinate owed him any loyalty whatsoever in the furtherance of his illegal activities. No court of law has convicted Franklin Delano Roosevelt but the court of history will do so in time. This is the essence of the "Tyler Kent incident" and the justification for my actions in London in 1939 and 1940.

No one—least of all myself—is ever going to claim that the 20th of May, 1940, will go down in history on a par in importance with Roosevelt's "date that will live in infamy." But the former date may well be of interest to those who entertain some respect for constitutional and international law. It was on the morning of that date—10 a.m. if my memory serves me accurately—that the government of the United States took a rather drastic step when it permitted—and in fact cooperated in allowing—the British police to arrest and incarcerate a member of the staff of the American embassy in London, a person who was the bearer of a diplomatic passport and officially protected by the provisions of "diplomatic immunity." In so doing, the government of the United States set an unusual precedent the nature of which we shall examine below. It would be an error to claim that the arrest and imprisonment of embassy officials had never previously occurred in history, but the incidence of such cases is very rare indeed.

This particular day in May was rare for another reason. In a city noted for many things but certainly not for the delights of its climate, this happened to be a quite beautiful day. I was not fated to enjoy it. At 10 a.m. I was startled to hear the smashing of wood and the snapping of locks as a burly goon squad from Scotland Yard, accompanied by an officer of British Military Intelligence and an official of the American embassy, burst into my apartment. My visitors could most certainly have arrived in a more conventional manner and I would certainly have admitted them had they simply knocked and requested admission in the normal polite manner. But they evidently preferred the dramatic smash-

ing of doors. Looking back on it all now, I have become convinced that such tactics were and are used by the police precisely in order to surprise and intimidate. If the wretched object of all this is not only cowed and overawed but is also, perhaps, in his pyjamas, so much the better for the police.

Why then, one must ask, would the United States government have been a party to this very rare kind of violation of all the normal rules and conventions governing diplomatic personnel? Surely the circumstances which gave rise to such an act must themselves have been quite extraordinarily wicked or dangerous. And why, after 42 years, have the circumstances not been brought out into the clear daylight? Above all: why have I waited so long to present the facts to the American public?

The answer is that there is a right time and a wrong time for everything. November 1945, the time when I finally returned to the United States after a period of incarceration in England which lasted the entire duration of the war, was certainly not the right time. This country was in a state of euphoria occasioned by its "victory" over the dastardly enemy. Any attempt to point out that the "victory" just achieved might turn out to be Pyrrhic and more costly to the general welfare than any other event in American history would not only have fallen on deaf ears, but might well have led to the actual physical lynching of anyone expressing such a view. It certainly did entail the moral and psychological lynching of a number of people by the vicious, alien-controlled press and electronic media. No, 1945 was not the time. Certain friends of mine and my family made it possible for me to travel about the country and take a sounding of the mood of the people. I found them, in the main, totally unreceptive to any criticism of Franklin the Great, of America's participation in the war or of the methods used to involve us in that conflict. So it was then; today, things have changed somewhat. There are facts which can no longer be successfully covered up even by the most virulent propaganda of the alien-controlled media. Even the least politically-minded citizens are beginning to ask why, today, after our greatest war and greatest final victory, we are faced with the greatest threat to our national security we have ever known. Someone is responsible; after all, it was Roosevelt himself who said, "Things don't just happen; they are planned that way." Well then, who planned what and why? Who planned to turn over 40% of the world to Bolshevism? Who planned to set up the Bolshevik's advanced bases only ninety miles from our coasts? And if the answer is that no one "planned" these things then the only alternative explanation is that someone committed the most colossal political errors in our history. Is it wrong to try now to assess the blame? Some would call it mere muckraking and inappropriate in such critical times as we now face. But there are

enormous vested interests in preserving the Roosevelt myth. For starters, there is the entire Democratic party. There was a time when they invoked the ghost of Thomas Jefferson as their patron saint. Since the 1930s, Roosevelt has largely taken Jefferson's place. To cast doubts on Roosevelt's sagacity and good judgment is, for some, like doubting the existence of God. Then there are the veterans with their huge organizations. Is it to be supposed that they would take kindly to being told that they were "suckered in" or "taken for a ride," or that the war they fought was ultimately disastrous for their country? As for organized American Jewry, its interests lay entirely in seeing Germany destroyed regardless of the long-term interests of the America in which the Jews hang their shingles.

Let it be posed that there are only two reasons for a State to mobilize its people into armed forces to fight another State: 1) the acquisition of booty in the form of territory or other forms of wealth and 2) to defend the nation from external threats. The "booty" theory is irrelevant in modern times, especially as Roosevelt repeatedly renounced during the war any American claims upon the territory of the enemy. (That, he would relinquish to his partner Joseph Stalin.) In innumerable public statements, Roosevelt argued that this country was compelled to take part in the war, either as a belligerent or as "the arsenal of democracy" supplying war materials (illegal under domestic and international law), in order to "guarantee the security of this country in the future." His constant theme was that if Britain were defeated, the immense Royal Navy would fall into German hands. Germany would then be able to invade South America and would do so. A fake map was circulated which purported to show the areas of South America to be taken over by the Nazis. The map was later revealed as a clever forgery by British intelligence which Roosevelt had knowingly cooperated in disseminating in order to frighten the American public. We know this from British sources; the whole matter is very clearly set forth in the biography of William Stephenson, the principal British agent in the United States engaged in bringing about American participation in the shooting war. Slowly, we are beginning to learn more and more about the intimate cooperation between Britain and the United States in the pre-war epoch. The purpose was allegedly to improve the security of the United States. Thus even though Roosevelt's activities have been shown subsequently to have been illegal, the justification was and is offered that he acted in the overriding national interest.

We return to that Spring day in London, the 20th of May 1940, and the interruption of the Scotland Yard goon squad into my apartment. They were accompanied by one Franklin Gowen, a Second Secretary at the American embassy of whom more anon.

Questions were put to me as to whom I knew and what I did. I gave non-committal answers. While this interrogation was going on, other of the officers were looking into a clothes closet in which they quickly discovered a leather suitcase full of American embassy documents. It has been alleged that there were 1500. I do not know. I never counted them. I was only interested in the contents. I was then whisked away to the embassy in a police car and brought before Ambassador Joseph Kennedy with whom I had a short but acrimonious interview. I could well understand his anger but I believed myself to have been presented with a moral dilemma. On the one hand I wished before it was too late to lay the evidence before the America First Committee and certain non-interventionist Senators. On the other hand, it would be quite useless to me—an unknown person with no political "clout"—to have returned to the United States expecting hard-boiled politicians to give any credence to my story unless I had positive documentation of my charges. I knew that taking documents from the embassy was, under all normal circumstances, a most reprehensible action. On the other hand I did not begin to do so until I had become convinced beyond any further possibility of doubt that Roosevelt and his diplomatic agents were going to embroil us in a war against the wishes of a vast majority of the American people whose opinions on that score had been made very plain in numerous opinion polls in the months just prior to the war and during the "phony war" period. Even the liberal-interventionists admit the accuracy of these polls; what they most vociferously deny is that President Roosevelt deliberately tried to circumvent public opinion. I knew different. From my vantage point in the embassy, I was able to see the dispatches from there to the State Department and to and from other embassies around Europe. From every place the picture was the same: war and intervention. "I hate war," said Roosevelt, but he was planning it. On 3 September 1939, just after the outbreak of war in Europe, Roosevelt said in a radio address: "We seek to keep war from our own fireside by keeping war from coming to the Americas. . . . This nation will remain a neutral nation." At the same time, William C. Bullitt, United States ambassador to France and one of the principal implementers and architects of Roosevelt's interventionist policy, was bringing the strongest pressure to bear on the French prime minister, Edouard Daladier and on his foreign minister, Georges Bonnet, to reject out-of-hand a last minute proposal by Benito Mussolini to organize another summit meeting of European heads of state to head off the impending war. Bullitt—fully in concurrence with Roosevelt—wanted the war to begin, the sooner the better. Any concession to peace-making efforts would only raise the unwelcome possibility that the war could be staved off. Accordingly, Bullitt resisted any such efforts with all his

powers of persuasion. In this he was aided greatly by Jules Lukasiewicz, the Polish ambassador, whose country had just been invaded and who was demanding French—and therefore also British—intervention. Bullitt and Lukasiewicz between them were able to dissuade the Daladier government from accepting Mussolini's initiative and thus ensured the outbreak of a major European war right on schedule.

At this point it is useful to mention that the Potocki papers which the Germans discovered in the Polish foreign office and which shed considerable light on other interventionist activities of Bullitt, are all quite genuine; their substance was reflected in dispatches which passed through the London embassy and were read by me in plain English. But when they were discovered and published by the Germans they were all declared by Roosevelt and the State Department to be impudent forgeries. Today, most reputable historians, though minimizing their importance, recognize that they are quite genuine. Their significance, however, is much better appreciated when they are studied in conjunction with other documents bearing on the American foreign policy of that period. Of especial interest are the conversations which Biddle, America's ambassador to Poland, had with the Polish foreign minister, Colonel Beck, and General Rydz-Smigly, head of the Polish army, during the Summer of 1939. The conversations were duly reported to the State Department.

It must be remembered that until the Germans demonstrated the efficacy of the blitzkrieg, all of the Allies and the United States as well believed that the coming war would be one of attrition and trench warfare. The Poles were expected to hold out for weeks or even months. And so we find Biddle assuring the Polish authorities that American military assistance would be forthcoming just as soon as Roosevelt could put the concept over on Congress. This was rather cold comfort for the Poles but they had, perforce, to put as good a face on it as possible and accept whatever crumbs fell their way.

Shortly after these interviews between Biddle and the high-ranking Poles, President Roosevelt had the sublime hypocrisy to address a letter to President Moscicki of Poland offering to mediate the dispute with Germany. So the picture is thus: on the one hand the American ambassador is urging the Poles to fight and promising military assistance if they do; on the other hand Roosevelt is offering himself as a mediator, olive branch in hand. Take your choice. It should be remembered that much of the warmongering engaged in by Roosevelt's diplomatic agents in the late 1930s, particularly in France and Poland, was in the form of verbal exhortations and promises of aid and support of all kinds, including direct military intervention. Every head of state in Europe, and especially in England, recognized perfectly well that

if the United States were to become sufficiently involved in an economic and political sense, military intervention would inevitably follow soon thereafter. Much of the American activity was never committed to paper in the exact manner in which it transpired. Thus, to the chagrin of historians, it will never appear in the National Archives as available "hard facts." Bullitt in France and Biddle in Poland did not commit to paper blunt promises of almost immediate military aid in the event of war but such was the gist of their private conversations. The record of them is to be found in the Potocki papers. But that is not the only source. There are records and memoirs of persons active at that time and memoranda which, though subsequently destroyed, passed among various embassies and remained in the memories of those who had seen them. Nor were all the details always officially and duly dated and numbered and sent to the State Department whence they could only with the greatest difficulty have been abstracted and destroyed. There is also the fact that much diplomacy is carried on at diplomatic receptions. One ambassador buttonholes another and behind a potted palm with a glass of champagne in one hand and a cigarette in the other, the two settle the fate of the world without the knowledge of the politicians or the public which elects them. Such contacts and negotiations might be reported by, say, Ambassador Bullitt directly to the White House by means of a scrambled telephone or in private letters which never pass through the records of the State Department. Such will clearly never appear in the National Archives. In these circumstances it may be asked how I could ever have had much knowledge of the schemings and plottings. Well, it happened that the London embassy served as a sort of unofficial clearing house for most of the diplomatic activities of the United States, at least in the European theater. Thus there was much flotsam and jetsam floating around in the form of memoranda and inter-departmental communications. Conversations were often overheard and they afforded insights into attitudes and activities which were a legitimate part of diplomacy but which ordinarily could only be gleaned from personal memoirs and seldom found their way into official records. Many memoranda were circulated to a few foreign service officers with instructions to read and then destroy.

Would it be reasonable to expect that a written record exists of the commitment to provide military aid which Roosevelt gave to Neville Chamberlain prior to the latter's announcement to Parliament in March 1939, that Britain and France would provide military assistance to Poland if she were attacked? Such a commitment was in fact given by Roosevelt to the British ambassador in Washington and a telephonic confirmation was sent to Ambas-

sador Kennedy in London. Next, a memorandum to this effect was circulated among some of the higher ranking foreign service officers and there the matter ended. Subsequent correspondence is quite clear on this point: there would have been no Franco-British guarantee to Poland and no World War II without the previous American commitment. Chamberlain and Daladier were fully aware of the limitations placed on the President by the Constitution with respect to the use of the armed forces, but such were the powers of persuasion of the ambassadors Biddle and Bullitt that the Polish and French governments were convinced Roosevelt could do whatever he wished. The British end of it was taken care of in Washington in direct communications between Roosevelt and the British ambassador.

The exclusive reliance on archival material is the essential weakness in the position taken by two historians who have written on the "Kent case." Warren Kimball and Bruce Bartlett in the fall 1981 issue of *Diplomatic History* wrote an account which purports to deal with the pre-war commitments of Roosevelt to Churchill. Pre-war, in this case, relates to the entry of the United States into World War II, not the beginning of hostilities in September 1939. These two academicians have poked around in the National Archives and looked at the Roosevelt-Churchill exchange of cables which have so far been published, and have come to the conclusion that there is nothing much there worth making a fuss over. But who has been making a fuss? Not I. This is the first time I have made any public statement on the subject. I do so now because the dire consequences of Roosevelt's "errors of judgment" (if indeed they were "errors" and not deliberate policies) are now so obvious that even egg-head academics like Kimball and Bartlett can no longer ignore their realities.

For far too long academics have been hypnotized by the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence and have ignored everything else in the diplomatic correspondence between the United States and foreign countries during this time-period. They have ignored, too, statements by quite prominent persons who were privy to the facts. The *Forrestal Diaries* was published several years ago and the editors, Walter Millis and E.S. Duffield, were at liberty to edit out or to keep in anything they wished. No one would have been any the wiser had they omitted to include the direct quotation of a remark made by Neville Chamberlain to Joseph Kennedy to the effect that "America and the world Jews" had forced Britain into the war. This of course is a very accurate statement but it is not to be found in the numbered telegrams and dispatches from the London embassy to Washington. The record is most probably in the private papers of Joseph Kennedy and it is unlikely that these will see the light of day until such time as politicians and histo-

rians no longer fear to tell the truth because of the menaces of the Jewish Anti-Defamation League. In the meantime I am making use of the incident to illustrate my contention that not all accurate history is to be located in government files and archives. To aver that it is so is to declare that governments do not lie—at least that democratic governments do not. The fact is, while they may possibly lie less often, and certainly less crudely, than the Bolsheviks, they nevertheless lie when it suits them to do so. One has only to consider the case of the Potocki papers mentioned earlier. The White House and the State Department declared them to be forgeries. Today, all reputable historians recognize them to be genuine.

What do Kimball and Bartlett know about the British plans to invade Norway or about the manner in which the United States government encouraged these plans on the grounds that something had to be done to raise the morale of allied troops in garrisons whose unrelieved idleness might eventually lead to insubordination and even mutiny? The "phony war" had been on for over half a year. The British plan was to draw out the German fleet for battle. Churchill and others believed that the best way to do this would be to challenge the Germans in an open competition to invade Norway. Churchill was typical of that breed of wartime leaders who always fight the previous war. He had a fanatical and absolute conviction that the British fleet could solve all of Britain's problems if only the Germans could be induced to come out and give battle. He was to be proven wrong in this as in so much else.

The plan connived between Britain and the United States was for the British to make overt and easily detectable plans for the invasion of Norway. The United States diplomatic service would assist in spreading the news all over Europe in such a way that the Germans could not possibly fail to learn about it. The Germans did take the bait and organized their own expedition to take Norway before the British could get there. There was a naval engagement in the Skagerrak, the body of water which separates Denmark from Norway, and a number of warships of Germany's rather small navy were sunk. But not enough to prevent the troopships from landing their contingents and taking over the country while meeting very little resistance.

The United States' role in this British ploy was certainly not consistent with neutrality either under domestic or international legal definition. But Roosevelt had already told the American public that they were not required to be "neutral in thought." So perhaps the diplomatic service was authorized to be one jump ahead of the public and to be un-neutral in deed as well. I do not know of any actual written instructions on record. By this, I mean direct instructions from the State Department. I personally saw,

however, some of the numerous memoranda sent out from the London embassy to various heads of missions around Europe. These gave very specific instructions to make known as widely as possible, without arousing suspicion, the British plan to invade Norway. Some of the envoys "not in the know" actually queried these instructions as they could not understand why they were required to make public supposedly secret British military plans. I do not know how their doubts were resolved but the scheme did work. Perhaps in addition the scrambled telephone from the White House was used to tell the ambassadors what to do. The professors will probably ignore this little item as being "undocumented" since they have a naive confidence in what the State Department says as "fact," and their blind reliance on the National Archives is tantamount to saying "We only publish what the State Department says we can." But then one wonders why they have gone beyond the department's press release of 2 September 1944 which purports to be the last word on the "Kent Case," although it is actually a hodge-podge of innuendo, smears and lies. It is the sort of thing that is made to order for the Anti-Defamation League. It could have been composed by one of their agents "planted" in the State Department. For example: it alleged that I had come to the attention of the British because of my acquaintance with Anna Wolkoff, a refugee from Bolshevik Russia. According to the police, this woman had a channel of communication with Germany of which she was making use. The implication was clear: I was supposed to be transmitting information to Germany through Wolkoff. At the time that the State Department issued the press release referred to above, it already had at its disposal a copy of the transcript of my trial which had been held in 1940. In that transcript the Director of Public Prosecutions stated: "Kent did not have any knowledge of the transmission (of a certain document) nor does the prosecution contend that he acted in concert with his co-defendant, Anna Wolkoff, in this matter." But even when possessed of this information, the State Department still disseminated the innuendo that I had contacts with Germany and some vaguely defined "confederates" who were attempting to communicate with Germany, with which Britain was then at war. But the British prosecuted me only for having in my possession "documents which might be useful to an enemy"—not for transmitting them knowingly to any foreign power. This, of course, did not prevent the American "free" press from printing banner headlines about me such as "He Helped The Nazis." In this connection, I have in my possession the sworn testimony of a certain Nathan Perlmutter, dated 6 November 1963, taken as a deposition in a libel suit filed by me against the Miami Herald and the St. Petersburg (Florida) Times. Perlmutter had taken to the two newspapers some material

which the Anti-Defamation League had about me, and was instrumental in having the Miami Herald print a defamatory article which occasioned the libel suit. Incidentally, Perlmutter did such a good job that he is now National Director of the Anti-Defamation League at its headquarters in New York. At the time I had dealings with him, he was head of the Florida chapter of that organization.

Professors Kimball and Bartlett in their article on the "Kent Case" have argued that, as regards the question of Roosevelt's role as a warmongering conspirator, there was "nothing in it." I would reply that Roosevelt was probably the most shameless liar ever to occupy the White House and that his lies have done what is probably irreparable harm to this nation. Curiously enough, those who were on the spot at that time in London—namely, British Military Intelligence, Scotland Yard, and others—held an opinion different from Kimball and Bartletts'. Otherwise, there would never have been a "Kent Case" at all.

On 8 June 1940, a couple of weeks after my arrest, Ambassador Kennedy informed the State Department by cable that:

The appropriate authorities inform me that investigation of the case in which Kent is involved is being carried out with great care and has involved an enormous amount of labor. A final decision as to whether Kent is to be prosecuted may be expected within the next ten days at the latest.

On 11 June these same British authorities informed Kennedy that:

Those who have investigated the matter say that these papers disclose the existence of a traitorous and dangerous conspiracy to assist the enemy. The persons concerned as defendants are Miss Wolkoff, Capt. Archibald Ramsay, M.P., his wife Mrs. Ramsay, Mrs. Christbel Nicholson (wife of an admiral) and Mr. Tyler G. Kent. All except the last named are British subjects. It is of the greatest importance, if indeed not essential, to the presentation of this case that a representative of the United States Embassy should attend the trial to give certain formal evidence.

The following significant words are something to which the two professors might usefully give attention before concluding that the "Kent Case" is a non-story.

It is appreciated that neither the State Department nor the Foreign Office would be prepared to contemplate at the present time the public discussion of the documents in question. It is thought, however, that some documents could be selected from the whole which, while sufficiently proving the case against the defendants, could properly be produced in court.

But if Kimball and Bartlett are correct, why all the secrecy? Why was the consent of Prime Minister Winston Churchill required before the proceedings could be initiated? As Kennedy informed the State Department on 6 July 1940: "The British prosecutors further inform [Kennedy] that the proposed defendants take the view that they are safe from trial and punishment because neither of the governments concerned dare have these matters discussed in public."

What was it that they dared not discuss in public? That is really the crux of the case. The real reason why I was tried and sentenced to a prison term in England and not tried in the United States is clear from the following statement of the British authorities, made to Joseph Kennedy: "The documents in question would certainly be produced only behind locked doors in a cleared court. Not only would the press be ordered not to publish their contents. No press man would be present."

There you have it in a nutshell. The British, like the Bolsheviks, still have secret trials—a relic from medieval times when an absolute monarch was able to dispose of his enemies on the quiet without any public outcry being possible, since the facts would not be known until it was too late to do anything about it. In 1776, the thirteen colonies revolted against Britain precisely to do away with such Star Chamber proceedings as well as much else repulsive in the form of British government. Nonetheless, the United States government in the year 1940 was very glad to make use of Britain's Star Chamber practices against one of its own citizens—for reasons of "cover-up" and secrecy.

In September 1944, in response to a certain interest in my case which had been aroused in Congress and led to questions being addressed to the Secretary of State concerning my imprisonment, the State Department issued a lengthy press release which purported to be the final word on the subject. I shall quote that part which deals with the reasons for turning me over to the British for a secret trial, since that action is prohibited by the 6th Amendment to the Constitution. The 6th Amendment requires that a criminal trial be "speedy and public." My trial was neither. This is what the State Department had to say: "The interest of Great Britain was pre-eminent . . . and all the evidence, witnesses, et cetera, were available to the British Courts." The true reasons were set forth in messages to and from the embassy and the State Department during the weeks following my arrest. I have already indicated what they were. So dense, in fact, were the clouds of secrecy around my case (in the "pre-eminent interest of Great Britain") that when the New York Times applied to see the transcript of the stenographic notes of the trial they were informed by the London embassy in these terms:

The British Government is unable to give its consent in writing for an inspection by the New York Times of a copy of the transcript in our possession or in the possession of any other. It would require an *Act of Parliament* and not even the Home Secretary could waive the restriction.

Such an elaborate web of secrecy cast over an incident by the government principally involved and whose "interests are pre-eminent," (Great Britain) has a tendency in the long run to defeat its purposes because it piques the curiosity of historians to get at the facts. The case must be recognized as truly extreme when even the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, had to give his consent before the trial could proceed, and the records could not be made public without an *Act of Parliament*.

And now I should like to discuss the case of Franklin Gowen, Second Secretary of the American Embassy in London. I call him a Knight of the Table Round, for he demonstrated such devotion to the British—above and beyond the call of duty—that if the British did not reward him with (at least) a knighthood then they were remiss in their duty to one of their best agents in the United States foreign service. I have already mentioned that he accompanied the police when they broke into my flat and arrested me. He was later to appear in court and give testimony against me which he did with enthusiasm and evident glee. On the day of my arrest, Gowen undertook to impersonate me and accept any telephone calls which were made to me at the Embassy. He would then pass on the names and addresses of the callers to the British police, more specifically to Sir Norman Kendall, head of Scotland Yard. Sir Norman said to Ambassador Kennedy:

In cases of this kind we cannot take anything for granted. To ascertain who were Kent's friends and their friends, where they met and what they did, is of the utmost importance. We can't thank Ambassador Kennedy enough for his invaluable help in this case.

On the same day, Galahad-Gowen undertook what must rate as one of the most bizarre activities in the history of the United States Foreign Service. During the afternoon he intercepted a phone call from a certain person who asked that I come to Number "X," Chesham Street. Gowen immediately recruited a Scotland Yard police detective and they both went to the address given. There, in the darkness of the blackout, he was handed a note by an unknown person which asked that Kent go to a certain restaurant to meet some people. Gowen gave the note to the police and then, later that night, returned to the Chesham Street address "to keep watch on the house itself" and to report the numbers of the license plates of any cars that might stop there.

Before the interception of the note, Gowan had taken off his overcoat and lent it to the policeman so that it would cover his uniform and thus not alarm the person being talked to. Here we have the extraordinary spectacle of an American Foreign Service officer working with the British police and even providing one of them with a disguise in order to entrap British subjects. Gowan had long since done all that could be required of him in the matter of my arrest. Now he was extending his sleuthing to the possible arrest of Britons whom he did not know and with whom he had no connection whatsoever. Although the foregoing is mainly of anecdotal interest, it does serve to illustrate how closely Americans and British officials worked together before America entered the war, and to what extent they were willing to ignore legality in such cooperation. I am quite sure the Foreign Service regulations do not include a requirement that an officer of that service do the dirty work of the police of a foreign country with regard to the citizens of that country.

It must have been Sir Galahad-Gowan's "finest hour." This paunchy, balding non-entity of a Second Secretary savored it to the last drop and no doubt regales his grandchildren with the account of how he, single-handedly, broke up a dangerous spy-ring in London during the war. This alleged spy-ring to which I was supposed to have belonged was headed by Captain Archibald Ramsay, a Member of Parliament. Ramsay was subsequently described by the very prosecutor himself, Solicitor-General Sir William Jowitt, as an honorable man who would not knowingly do anything to harm his country. That did not prevent Ramsay being interned for a long period during the war although never convicted of any offense. These facts are public knowledge, yet they did not stop the New York Times from printing and circulating in the United States and in England libelous statements to the effect that I gave Ramsay certain vital defense information which Ramsay then took to the German embassy in Dublin for transmission to Germany. Ramsay sued the New York Times for libel as he was easily able to prove that he had never left Britain during the period alleged, much less visited any German embassy in Dublin or anywhere else. He won the suit. Both the New York Times and the author of the article, a certain Raymond Daniels, were shown up as liars.

By the time the Ramsay suit came to trial, I had already been languishing in a cell in the almost medieval Wandsworth prison in London, I had gone on a hunger strike and was at that time in the prison infirmary. One morning, I was informed that some lawyers wished to see me. Supposing them to be my own, I agreed to see them. It turned out that they represented the London offices of the New York Times and they wanted my help in defending the newspaper against Ramsay's suit. They showed me

the defamatory article and I saw immediately that it was a tissue of lies. I promptly told them to get out—which they did. Later, I learned that the article had been inspired by a Colonel William Donovan. Donovan was later appointed head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) at the behest of Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy. Knox was one of those turncoats from the Republican Party who had leaped on the Roosevelt bandwagon. I was, of course, deprived of civil rights as a convicted person and could not sue on my own behalf, but the *New York Times* studiously avoided commenting on the "Kent Case" thereafter.

One thing that the embassy correspondence made abundantly clear was the truly desperate situation of the British after the Norwegian fiasco and on the eve of their tremendous defeat at Dunkirk whence the entire British army fled for their lives, leaving their weapons in the hands of the enemy. The British knew where they stood and told Roosevelt all about it. They knew that without direct military participation by America, they were finished in the war. All the pompous talk about "give us the tools and we'll finish the job" was pure Churchillian bluff and the British knew it. But it provided Roosevelt with the propaganda weapon which enabled him to induce Congress to pass the "Lend-Lease" bill making the United States, in contravention of international law and our neutrality statutes, the "Arsenal of Democracy." After the Norwegian fiasco, Winston Churchill became prime minister. This he did primarily because he could boast of his American connections and was able to convince those hidden powers behind the scenes that he was the best bet to get America into the war. Embassy correspondence left no room for doubt that after Dunkirk the policy of the British was to hang on by the skin of their teeth until Roosevelt could get America into the war. He did his best in the Atlantic but Hitler declined to take the bait. The British had, perforce, to wait until Roosevelt could get us in by the back door at Pearl Harbor. On several occasions we find Churchill threatening Roosevelt with the prospect of British surrender or, at least, some compromise with the Germans unless America came to the rescue and soon. These messages are in sharp contrast to the public image of Churchill in his jump suit, cigar cocked in one corner of his mouth, prating that "We shall never surrender. We shall fight them on the beaches. We shall fight them in the streets," etc. All that was for the public morale and we must all admit that Churchill was a fine actor. Perhaps he took lessons from Vic Oliver, his Jewish son-in-law who was a vaudeville comic.

The British had not forgotten the role played by the sinking of the *Lusitania* in getting the United States into the earlier war. We now know the real story from British sources. A well-researched book entitled *The Lusitania* published in England a few years ago

proved that the ship with its American passengers was deliberately sent to its doom by the British authorities. They knew positively that a German submarine was lying in wait for the liner off the south coast of Ireland, and purposely failed to inform the Lusitania's captain. The hulk of the Lusitania lies in comparatively shallow water and divers have examined it. Its holds have been shown to have been filled with contraband of war and its decks equipped with defensive weapons. This made it a warship and a legitimate target for the German submarine. Knowing the psychological effect that the sinking of the Lusitania had on public opinion in the United States and how the loss of American lives helped so greatly in gaining support for intervention, the British lost no time in contriving a similar incident very early in World War II. This was the sinking of the liner Athenia on 4 September 1939 when the war was only twenty-four hours old. Some thirty American lives were lost. However, the anti-war sentiment was so strong this time that the ploy failed in its object. The public more or less shrugged off the incident, saying in effect: "Stay out of the war zones if you don't want to get hurt."

Now some very mysterious correspondence came to my notice at that time. It was from the office of the Naval Attaché, a Captain Kirk. By close questioning, Captain Kirk had been able to ferret out of the British an admission that the Athenia might have been sunk on their own orders. Not that it was sunk by a torpedo from a British submarine. Rather, it was done by one of the two Polish submarines which escaped from the Germans and had come to England where they were under the command of the British Admiralty. It is true that a German U-Boat commander was forced by torture and intimidation to confess at the Nuremberg trials that he sank the Athenia. But such a confession is as credible as all the other confessions extorted by similar means.

By now it should be obvious to the reader that the screen of secrecy which surrounded my case was for a long time virtually impenetrable. Were the "Kent documents" of a vital military nature? Did they involve information about troops or armaments? The answer is provided by the words of the judge, Mr. Justice Tucker. Judge Tucker, in passing sentence, said: "I am taking into consideration that the documents in question did not involve any military matters." But if not military matters, then what? Obviously, there remained only political matters. And these were then so sensitive that the British told Kennedy that there could be no public discussion of the documents in question. What then was their nature, which could justify my trial and imprisonment? The United States was not at war at that time. The people of this country were overwhelmingly in favor of neutrality. This, in fact, was the great frustration which Roosevelt had to suffer. He had been a rabid Anglophile all his life. As early as 1915, when he

was Assistant Secretary of the Navy, he expressed great anxiety in his personal correspondence lest he should commit some unneutral act. His more limited authority at that time compelled him to put a tight rein on his natural sympathies which were entirely pro-British. This is the key to understanding the diplomatic activity of the United States in the immediate pre-war period—this, and a certain mental disease which had become endemic in the English-speaking world. I shall call this disease “Fabianism.” Its symptoms are a total inability to assess correctly the true nature of Marxism and the aims, purposes and methods of Marxist countries, which at that time meant the Soviet Union.

The Fabian Society was founded in England in 1884 principally by Sidney and Beatrice Webb and George Bernard Shaw. It was a group of intellectuals whose declared purpose was to correct the evils of British industrial society such as child labor, slave wages for women and very bad living conditions for workers in general: all very worthy aims. But these high-minded reformers all lost their senses when the Russian Revolution occurred in 1917. They made utter fools of themselves by holding up before the world this bloody, Jewish-inspired and -led regime as an example for all humanity. It was the characteristic failure of the intellectuals everywhere and in most fields, but especially in the socio-political. Intellectuals rely on the printed word and disparage common-sense conclusions based on direct observation of the facts.

The Webbs authored a ponderous tome entitled *Soviet Russia: A New Civilization*. For all the time it took putting it together, it was worse than useless as a guide to understanding Bolshevik Russia. The Webbs amassed millions of words from official Soviet reports, from the laws and the 1936 Constitution (“the most democratic in the world”) and presented this to the public as the definitive account of modern Russia. Anyone who, like myself, had resided even for short time in the “Workers’ Paradise” knew perfectly well that laws and constitutions meant absolutely nothing there as far as protecting human rights was concerned. That nation was—and is—ruled by a power elite which is outside and above the law much as its predecessor the Tsarist regime was. They do whatever they wish without the least regard for what the law might say. Yet even now, when the truth about Russia is widely known throughout the world, thanks to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and others, there are many academics in this country who still teach the Marxist line to the young and vulnerable. Harvard University is a hotbed of such teaching. Did Roosevelt become enamoured of Fabianism at Harvard? After all, he said to Congressman Martin Dies:

There is nothing wrong with Communists in this country. Several of the best friends I have are Communists. I do not regard the Communists as any present or future threat to our country. In fact I look upon Russia as our strongest ally in the years to come.

He said the same thing to Cardinal Spellman, as recorded in the prelate's biography. This unadulterated Fabianism is the key to Roosevelt's mentality and explains his mishandling of our foreign relations. It also explains his legacy with which we are now burdened.

Americans are a pragmatic people, or so they like to regard themselves. That is to say, they prefer to look at the world with a practical eye rather than through the colored glasses of ideology. Most readers will know something about the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). It is a sort of extra-governmental, semi-secret organization having on its membership list many leaders in the fields of education, finance, communications, politics, etc. Its purpose is to formulate policy and then pass that on to the government for implementation. To this end, it is able to place many of its members in high offices in various departments of government. What better source for an authoritative statement on America's attitude to the European war of 1939, then, than the CFR? This is what the CFR had to say:

The German strategical objective in this war is the destruction of the power of the British Navy. To maintain communications with Dominions, to insure the food supply, and to save herself from becoming literally a third-rate power, Britain must maintain the supremacy of that fleet. No compromise between these alternatives is possible. For the British Commonwealth of Nations this war is a matter of life or death . . . It is an important fact, however, that in protecting its own interests it [the British Navy] has simultaneously served to protect American interests too. . . .

The existence of Nazi Germany, with its power, its ambition and its momentum is the fundamental factor in the foreign relations of the United States. Against it the defenses of this country must be expanded; against it diplomacy must be turned; against it friends must be won and kept. And against the possibility of its success on the continent of Europe the unity of the United States must be re-established.

These words were written in 1938 and 1939. It could not be put more plainly. These peace-time statements were not made by some two-bit journalist. They came from the government behind the government; from the people who plan and (albeit in slightly veiled language) call for war and make it happen. Come what may, says the CFR, a German victory cannot be tolerated. First of all diplomacy must be used against Germany, which is what I saw happening. Surely, the drastic action of the authorities in the

"Kent Case" is a little more comprehensible in the light of these CFR statements. But even now, after 43 years, the veil of secrecy has not been entirely stripped away. What element of national security needed such drastic protection? No doubt nothing but the personal reputations of some of the protagonists.

I have spoken heretofore of the legacy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. In fact, he left several. There is the legacy of Keynesian inflationary economic philosophy—a long subject which merits a separate study. I am concerned here with the legacy of foreign policy and its conduct, and in that field I can claim some small but special knowledge.

Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939. The ostensible reason was to honor a pledge made to Poland; the real reasons were to preserve a precarious balance of power in Europe and the dominance of the British Navy in the Atlantic. This navy, according to the CFR, was also protecting America. The CFR stated publicly in 1939 that "Nazi Germany could not under any circumstances be allowed to win in Europe." As a part of this CFR guarantee to not allow the Nazis to win, Roosevelt thought up the Lend-Lease program which had been the subject of discussion between Roosevelt and Churchill in their private correspondense for many months. Roosevelt kept stressing that he needed time to overcome the objections of Congress, and Churchill was insisting that unless something were done soon, Britain would be forced to her knees. How Roosevelt got away with the transfer of fifty destroyers to the British fleet is one of the great mysteries of the period. But he did. And this was his most overt and un-neutral interventionist action in the pre-war period. It, too, had been discussed for months between himself and Churchill. Various subterfuges were suggested by one or the other and had to be rejected as impractical. All the time, the emphasis was on how to circumvent Congress and the neutrality laws. Eventually, Congress was successfully brow-beaten or cajoled into agreeing to Lend-Lease, which meant giving away billions of dollars worth of American wealth. The destroyer deal, however, was done without the participation of Congress at all and the government of laws went out the window.

Before this, the slow work of diplomacy had been pursued for months, even years, lining up coalitions by promises of aid which was not forthcoming in time to be of any use to those to whom it had been promised, namely Poland, France and Britain.

Nobody in a position of authority in this country expected the rapid and early military defeats of France and England. Dunkirk changed the whole picture. The United States government had been expecting a nice, leisurely trench war of attrition with the British fleet gradually blockading Germany to death. Hence Lend-Lease and the destroyers deal. These were the tools with which

the British were going to "finish the job" according to Churchill. But the loss of the British army at Dunkirk really threw the Anglo-American ranks into a panic. The unbelievable had happened. Germany had won the war in Europe—something the CFR said must never be allowed to happen.

Within a few days after the British debacle at Dunkirk I was arrested; I stayed in jail until November 1945. The impression was given that I and my friends were in some measure responsible for the collapse at Dunkirk. In retrospect, it now seems as if the drastic action taken against me, Captain Ramsay and several others might well have been for propaganda purposes as much as anything else. The British had suffered one of the worst military defeats in their history and their troops were straggling back across the Channel without as much as a rifle. Under such circumstances it is good for home-front morale to attribute disasters to the activities of a fifth column. Ramsay, myself and the others seemed to the British to constitute some sort of "fifth column." The stolid British can become hysterical at times and at this point they did so with good reason. Later, as the hysteria died down, Captain Ramsay was released from detention although I was incarcerated to the bitter end—and beyond. The Solicitor-General who prosecuted Ramsay said (as already quoted) that Ramsay was an honorable man who would never willingly have done anything which might harm his country. Since Captain Ramsay was my principal contact in London in the 1940s, an impartial observer might reasonably suppose that my motives were also honorable.

Some people have asked the quite legitimate question: Why, if my motive was to keep the United States out of the war, did I show the documents to British subjects? The answer is simple and straightforward. Ramsay and the members of his Right Club all knew that the principal warmongers in Britain were the Churchill-Eden-Duff Cooper-Vansittart gang, and it was our joint intention in our amateurish way to undermine Churchill's position in Parliament by making use of some of the American documents I had in my possession. This, it was hoped, could be done through the assistance of Captain Ramsay who was, after all, a Member of Parliament. We all understood that the Western democracies could not emerge from this war as genuine winners. The only real winner would be Bolshevik Russia. The British Empire would be no more and England would sink to the level of a third class power—as it has. I also felt sure that the threat to the security of the United States would be magnified a hundredfold. Curiously, our great leader Roosevelt did not understand this. But a lowly employee of the Foreign Service did; like Cassandra, he prophesied never to be believed. Americans are supposed to prefer hard facts to theories. Here is a hard fact. In 1939, the

United States defense budget stood at slightly over one billion dollars. The 1983 budget calls for expenditures for defense amounting to 221.1 billion dollars. If we halve the last figure to allow for inflation we still have expenditures one hundred times greater today than before World War II. Since it is to be assumed that the United States does not now plan to launch a major war of aggression against any power, this 221 billion dollar sum is to defend ourselves against attack by the only plausible external enemy—Soviet Russia. By demanding the total destruction of Germany and “unconditional surrender,” Roosevelt established Soviet Russia as a world power without any counter-balance on the vast Eurasian heartland. But he had said that he saw nothing wrong with Communists or Communism and that Russia was our natural ally. Was it deliberate or was it only a colossal error of judgment? Most people would feel that a man who occupies the White House is not entitled to make mistakes on such a grand scale nor to play fast and loose with his nation’s security. Lesser mortals can plead ignorance but the President has information on the world situation pouring into his office twenty-four hours a day. He cannot legitimately plead that he didn’t know, that nobody told him.

How then did my friends and I know, in the tumultuous months of 1940? History, not I, will answer that.

Today, the ruling circles in this country recognize that none of the touted war aims were achieved. Hence they are not discussed. Instead there is a constant harping on the moral triumphs allegedly achieved. Hence the incessant ravings about the supposed Nazi atrocities, about the Belsens and Dachaus, the Buchenwalds and Auschwitzes—above all, the “Holocaust.” These are all deliberate diversions—red herrings dragged across the trail to obfuscate the facts of life. And those facts are that this country is in constant mortal danger from the overwhelming power of Soviet Russia. This is the Frankenstein monster created by Roosevelt and loosed upon the world. We live with this Roosevelt legacy each and every day. A Soviet base ninety miles from our shores is only one of the negative strategic incursions we have to deal with. Any possible moral basis for World War II was completely destroyed when Americans allied themselves with Soviet Russia, of which it may well be said that there has never been a viler regime in modern history. If the existence of concentration camps within a country is a sound basis for waging war against that country, then we should have been at war with Soviet Russia since about 1922, and with Britain since the turn of the century for it was the British who first employed them during the Boer War, interning thousands of civilians, many of them women and children who died in large numbers due to the unsanitary conditions within the camps.

The hoax of the twentieth century, as the title of Dr. Butz's book on the "Holocaust" goes, is the smoke-screen to conceal the utter failure to achieve the professed war aims of Roosevelt, Churchill and the CFR. Now the Zionist Establishment will continue to have a free hand to commit genocide in the Near East and smear any person in this country who dares to dispute the orthodoxy or point out the real results of World War II. And the Establishment is so besmirched with the responsibility of failure that it needs the Jewish publicists and news media to destroy anyone who has the temerity to ask awkward questions. The horrid prospect looms of having to say: "Maybe we were wrong." A further prospect then looms: "Maybe Hitler was right." But such confessions buttered no parsnips in the harsh judgments of the post-war world. They were not accepted as excuses at Nuremberg under the new ex-post-facto "law" worked out by the United States and their Soviet allies. The new basic law of nations requires only one clause, very simply: "It pays to be on the winning side."

Bibliography of Works on the Tyler Kent Affair and the Roosevelt-Churchill Exchanges

Harris, Robert. "The American tearoom spy." *The Times* (London) (4 December 1982), p. 6.

[Irving, David]. "Tyler Gatewood Kent: The Many Motives of a Misguided Cypher Clerk." *Focal Point* (23 November 1981), pp. 3-10.

Kimball, Warren F. "Churchill and Roosevelt: The Personal Equation." *Prologue* Vol. 6 (Fall 1974), pp. 169-82.

Kimball, Warren F., and Bartlett, Bruce. "Roosevelt and Prewar Commitments to Churchill: The Tyler Kent Affair." *Diplomatic History* Vol. 5, No. 4 (Fall 1981), pp. 291-312.

Lash, Joseph P. *Roosevelt and Churchill 1939-1941*. New York: Norton, 1976.


Leutze, James. "The Secret of the Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence: September 1939-May 1940." *Journal of Contemporary History* Vol. 10 (1975), pp. 465-91.

Loewenheim, Francis L., Langley, Harold D., and Manfred Jonas (eds.). *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence*. London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1975.

Snow, John Howland. *The Case of Tyler Kent*. New York: Domestic and Foreign Affairs, 1946; New Canaan, Conn.: The Long House, 1962.*

Whalen, Richard. "The Strange Case of Tyler Kent." *Diplomat* (November 1965), pp. 16-19, 62-64.

*Available from the IHR, \$3.00 ppd.



"...A DISGRACE..."

—Hugh Trevor-Roper

CONSIDERING THE REVIEWER, we can't think of a remark that better recommends A.J.P. Taylor's classic, brilliantined, and quite unflaggingly controversial study of the diplomatic tragedy of errors that caused Europe to "slither over the brink" a second time. **This book forthrightly challenges the myth of Hitler's war guilt, of his "plan" for aggression.** It rakes over the coals in scathing fashion the entire structure of Hitlerian "demonology" that was laboriously set up at the Nuremberg Trial as an explanation for what happened, and as a hoped-for guide to historical writing about the origins of the war for all time.

First published 22 years ago, Taylor's **The Origins of the Second World War** is the **only** thoroughly revisionist work on this subject to have attained a place even on the **Establishment's** list of "must reading." Few undergraduate history students get their degrees without having had to buy, read and be tested on this book. Seminars are devoted to it. Debates are organized around it. Classroom topical schedules become a shambles when students go "overtime" for days discussing it. Some professors seem to have devoted their whole careers to knocking it down. Anthologies have been published about it. Where other books on this subject appear and shortly disappear, this one has **staying power**. There are two basic reasons why: Taylor is a brilliant writer who **entertains** as well as informs; his case is so persuasive and his reputation already so pronounced (he is the most widely-read serious English historian of modern times) that the book just couldn't and can't be ignored—even by Establishment paladins like Trevor-Roper, and others of like ilk who have variously called it "**perversion**," "**dangerous**," and a "**whitewash of Hitler**." Taylor cannot get away with this one! The fuss among the historians has served to make Taylor very happy, and to keep his book in print.


If you haven't encountered A.J.P. Taylor's masterpiece yet, you are missing out on one of the great experiences in reading history. If you are a revisionist, you will delight in seeing with what supreme power—yet also ease and understatement—Taylor blithely walks along toppling one Establishment myth about Hitler after another. (Revisionist or not, you will also probably find things of your own to disagree with. Taylor can, and usually does, hold a controversial opinion on **anything**). One thing is for sure: if you truly want to understand how and why war broke out in 1939, you cannot ignore Taylor's classic contribution. The anti-revisionist Establishment certainly hasn't.

THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Paperback, 357pp., \$5.75 postpaid from

INSTITUTE FOR HISTORICAL REVIEW

P.O. Box 1306 • Torrance, Calif. 90505



A.J.P. TAYLOR

President Roosevelt and The Origins of the 1939 War

DAVID L. HOGGAN

Editor's Note: This article is excerpted from David L. Hoggan's book The Forced War: The Origins and Originators of World War II. The complete book will be published in hardcover by the Institute for Historical Review in December 1983. Professor Hoggan's treatment of the Roosevelt/American role in his book is not limited to one section, but runs rather through the course of the narrative as that role develops. Here we have culled the pertinent sections, providing a running commentary (italicized) which fills in the chronological gaps and gives the essential background, as presented by the author, of European events against which Roosevelt moved. The treatment of President Roosevelt in The Forced War begins in earnest in the year 1938, and that is where this article takes up the story. Crucial both to Professor Hoggan's portrayal of Roosevelt and his general thesis as to war responsibility is his assertion that in October 1938, after the Munich conference, personal control of British foreign policy passed from Prime Minister Chamberlain to his Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, who thereupon waged an unremitting campaign to force a war with Germany.

The Secret War Aspirations of President Roosevelt

The attitude of President Roosevelt and his entourage was perhaps more extreme than that of the British leaders, but at least the American President was restrained by constitutional checks, public opinion, and Congressional legislation from inflicting his policy on Europe during the period before World War II. A petulant outburst from Assistant Secretary F.B. Sayre, of the

American State Department, to British Ambassador Sir Ronald Lindsay on September 9, 1938, during difficult negotiations for an Anglo-American trade treaty, illustrated the psychosis which afflicted American leaders and diplomats. Sayre later recalled: "I went on to say that at such a time, when war was threatening and Germany was pounding at our gates, it seemed to me tragic that we had not been able to reach and sign an agreement." To imagine Germany pounding on the gates of the United States in 1938 is like confusing Alice in Wonderland with the Bible.

Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., telephoned Paris on March 14, 1938, to inform the French that the United States would support and cooperate with a Socialist measure of the Blum Popular Front Government to control, and, if necessary, to freeze foreign exchange in France. This would have been a drastic measure contrary to the international system of arbitrage and to the prevailing international financial policy of the United States. Morgenthau was eager to see Leon Blum retain the premiership in the hope that he would plunge France into conflict with Hitler. He had no compunctions about taking this step without informing either the United States Congress or American business leaders. Leon Blum, the Socialist, did not dare to go that far, and his Government fell because of an inadequate fiscal policy.

The German leaders correctly believed that the unrestrained anti-German press in the United States was profoundly influencing both public and private American attitudes toward Germany. Goebbels told United States Ambassador Hugh Wilson on March 22, 1938, that he expected criticism, and "indeed, it was inconceivable to him that writers in America should be sympathetic with present-day Germany because of the complete contrast of method by which the (German) Government was acting." On the other hand, he objected to libel and slander and to the deliberate stirring up of hatred. Wilson confided that it was not the German form of government which was at issue, but that "the most crucial thing that stood between any betterment of our Press relationship was the Jewish question." Ribbentrop was able to challenge Wilson on April 30, 1938, to find one single item in the German press which contained a personal criticism of President Roosevelt. He also intimated that the situation could be otherwise.

In early 1938, Jewish doctors and dentists were still participating in the German state compulsory insurance program (*Ortskranken-kassen*), which guaranteed them a sufficient number of patients. Wilson relayed information to Secretary of State Hull that, in 1938, 10% of the practicing lawyers in Germany were Jews, although the Jews constituted less than 1% of the

population. Nevertheless, the American State Department continued to bombard Germany with exaggerated protests on the Jewish question throughout 1938, although Wilson suggested to Hull on May 10, 1938, that these protests, which were not duplicated by other nations, did more harm than good. The United States took exception to a German law of March 30, 1938, which removed the Jewish church from its position as one of the established churches of Germany. This meant that German public tax receipts would go no longer to the Jewish church, although German citizens would continue to pay taxes for the Protestant and Catholic churches. The situation established by this new law in Germany was in conformity with current English practice, where public tax revenue went to the Anglican Church, but the Jewish churches received nothing.

On March 14, 1938, Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles complained to Polish Ambassador Jerzy Potocki about the German treatment of the Jews and praised Poland for her "policy of tolerance." Potocki, who knew that current Polish measures against the Jews were more severe than those in Germany, replied with dignity that "the Jewish problem in Poland was a very real problem." It is evident that the Jewish question was primarily a pretext of American policy to disguise the fact that American leaders were spoiling for a dispute with Germany on any terms. In September 1938 President Roosevelt had a bad cold, and he complained that he "wanted to kill Hitler and amputate the nose."

Perhaps frustration and knowledge of the domestic obstacles confronting his own policy increased President Roosevelt's fury. Jules Henry, the French Charge d'Affaires, reported to Paris on November 7, 1937, that President Roosevelt was interested in overthrowing Hitler, but that the majority of the American people did not share his views. French Ambassador Saint-Quentin reported on June 11, 1938, that President Roosevelt suddenly blurted out during an interview that "the Germans understand only force," and then clenched his fist like a boxer spoiling for a fight. He noted that the President was fond of saying that if "France went down, the United States would go down." Apparently this proposition was supposed to contain some self-evident legalistic-moralistic truth which required no demonstration.

Ambassador Saint-Quentin noted that the relations between President Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt, were especially close. This was understandable, because Bullitt was a warmonger. Bullitt was currently serving as United States Ambassador to France, but he was Ambassador-at-large to all the countries of Europe, and he was accustomed to transmit orders from Roosevelt to American Ambassador Kennedy in London or American

Ambassador Biddle in Warsaw. Bullitt had a profound knowledge of Europe. He was well aware that the British did not intend to fight in 1938, and that the French would not fight without British support. He improved his contacts and bided his time during the period of the Austrian and Czech crises. He prepared for his role in 1939 as the Roosevelt Ambassador *par excellence*. He could accomplish little in either year, because the whole world knew that the President he was serving did not have the backing of the American people for his foreign policy.

In the wake of the peaceful settlement of the Sudeten-German problem in Czechoslovakia at the Munich conference, and after a German-backed Czech-Polish agreement on the transfer of ethnic Polish territory (Teschen) to Poland, Polish Ambassador to Germany Lipski meets with German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop at Berlin in November 1938, to discuss the Danzig and Corridor questions. Little is accomplished, as Lipski carries out Polish Foreign Minister Beck's instructions not to engage in realistic discussion. But, bearing in mind Hitler's recent generous proposal of a German guarantee of Poland's Western border (provided that the Danzig question, with the question of free and sovereign German access to Danzig across the Corridor, is settled), Lipski ostensibly leaves room for a possible agreement on German road and railway access across the Corridor.

Potocki Reports from America

Lipski returned to Poland on November 22, 1938, to discuss the Danzig situation. His assurance to Ribbentrop about the super-highways and the railways had been a mere ruse designed to appease the Germans. The Polish leaders agreed that no concessions would be made to Germany either at Danzig or in the Corridor transit question. The affable manner of Ribbentrop, despite the adamant Polish stand on Danzig, impressed the Polish leaders. Beck speculated that Danzig might not be the issue after all which would produce a conflict between Germany and Poland. He suggested that Hitler might be allowing Ribbentrop unusual liberty in the Danzig question to see what he could accomplish. Lipski's attitude was similar to Beck's. His latest conversation with Ribbentrop had caused him to modify his earlier opinion that Germany would never retreat at Danzig. He suggested that the injury done to German relations with the United States by the anti-Jewish policy might affect German policy toward Poland.

Lipski tended to exaggerate the effects on German foreign relations of the demonstrations against the Jews in Germany on November 10, 1938. He predicted that a Franco-German declaration of friendship, which had been discussed by Hitler and the

French leaders since the preceding month, would never be signed because of the negative French reaction to the anti-Jewish demonstrations. This prediction proved to be false, and Ribbentrop signed the declaration at Paris on December 6, 1938.

Lipski and the other Polish diplomats were influenced in their judgment of this question at the moment by a report which had been telegraphed by Count Jerzy Potocki from Washington, D.C., on November 21, 1938. The Polish Ambassador was informed by William C. Bullitt, the American Ambassador to France who was visiting in the United States, that President Roosevelt was determined to bring America into the next European war. Bullitt explained to Potocki at great length that he enjoyed the special confidence of President Roosevelt. Bullitt predicted that a long war would soon break out in Europe, and "of Germany and her Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, he spoke with extreme vehemence and with bitter hatred." He suggested that the war might last six years, and he advocated that it should be fought to a point where Germany could never recover.

Potocki did not share the enthusiasm of Bullitt and Roosevelt for war and destruction. He asked how such a war might arise, since it seemed exceedingly unlikely that Germany would attack Great Britain or France. Bullitt suggested that a war might break out between Germany and some other Power, and that the Western Powers would intervene in such a war. Bullitt considered an eventual Soviet-German war inevitable, and he predicted that Germany, after an enervating war in Russia, would capitulate to the Western Powers. He assured Potocki that the United States would participate in this war, if Great Britain and France made the first move. Bullitt inquired about Polish policy, and Potocki replied that Poland would fight rather than permit Germany to tamper with her western frontier. Bullitt, who was strongly pro-Polish, declared it was his conviction that it would be possible to rely on Poland to stand firmly against Germany.

Potocki incorrectly attributed the belligerent American attitude solely to Jewish influence. He failed to realize that President Roosevelt and his entourage considered World War I to have been a great adventure, and that they were bitter about those Americans who continued to adopt a cynical attitude toward American militarism after President Roosevelt's quarantine speech in 1937. President Roosevelt had been one of the few advocating permanent peacetime military conscription in the United States during the complacent 1920's. Such factors were more than sufficient to prompt Roosevelt to adopt an aggressive attitude toward Germany. He had no strong pro-Jewish feelings; he jokingly said at the 1945 Yalta Conference that he would like to give the Arabian leader, Ibn Saud, five million American Jews.

The Jewish issue was mainly a convenient pretext to justify official American hostility toward Germany, and to exploit the typical American sympathy for the under-dog in any situation.

Potocki overestimated the Jewish question because of his own intense prejudices against the Jews, which were shared by the entire Polish leadership. He was highly critical of the American Jews. He believed that Jewish influence on American culture and public opinion, which he regarded as unquestionably preponderant, was producing a rapid decline of intellectual standards in the United States. He reported to Warsaw again and again that American public opinion was merely the product of Jewish machinations.

Though the unresolved issues between Germany and Poland over Danzig and the Corridor begin to come to the fore, in early 1939 the problem of Czechoslovakia—the rump, polyglot state created at Versailles, comprising many central European ethnic populations—continues to dominate European affairs. Hitler backs the aspirations for independence from the Czechs of the Slovaks, the largest minority within the artificial Czech state.

Roosevelt Propagandized by Halifax

Halifax continued to maintain a detached attitude toward the Czech problem, and he secretly circulated rumors both at home and abroad which presented the foreign policy of Hitler in the worst possible light. Hitler would have been condemned by Halifax for anything he did in Czechoslovakia. Had he decided to throw German weight behind the Czechs in an effort to maintain Czech rule over the Slovaks, he would have been denounced for converting the Czech state into a German puppet regime. His decision to support the Slovaks could be denounced as a sinister plot to disrupt the Czecho-Slovak state which the Munich Powers had failed to protect with their guarantee.

The situation is illustrated by the message which Halifax dispatched to President Roosevelt on January 24, 1939. Halifax claimed to have received "a large number of reports from various reliable sources which throw a most disquieting light on Hitler's mood and intentions." He repeated the tactic he had used with Kennedy about Hitler's allegedly fierce hatred of Great Britain. Halifax believed that Hitler had guessed that Great Britain was "the chief obstacle now to the fulfillment of his further ambitions." It was not really necessary for Hitler to do more than read the record of what Halifax and Chamberlain had said at Rome to recognize that Great Britain was the chief threat to Germany, but it was untrue to suggest that Hitler had modified his goal of Anglo-German cooperation in peace and friendship.

Halifax developed his theme with increasing warmth. He claimed that Hitler had recently planned to establish an independent Ukraine, and that he intended to destroy the Western Powers in a surprise attack before he moved into the East. Not only British intelligence but "highly placed Germans who are anxious to prevent this crime" had furnished evidence of this evil conspiracy. This was a lamentable distortion of what German opposition figures, such as Theo Kordt and Carl Goerdeler, had actually confided to the British during recent months. None of them had suggested that Hitler had the remotest intention of attacking either Great Britain or France.

Roosevelt was informed by Halifax that Hitler might seek to push Italy into war in the Mediterranean to find an excuse to fight. This was the strategy which Halifax himself hoped to adopt by pushing Poland into war with Germany. Halifax added that Hitler planned to invade Holland, and to offer the Dutch East Indies to Japan. He suggested to Roosevelt that Hitler would present an ultimatum to Great Britain, if he could not use Italy as a pawn to provoke a war. Halifax added casually that the British leaders expected a surprise German attack from the air before the ultimatum arrived. He assured Roosevelt that this surprise attack might occur at any time. He claimed that the Germans were mobilizing for this effort at the very moment he was preparing his report.

The British Foreign Secretary reckoned that Roosevelt might have some doubt about these provocative and mendacious claims. He hastened to top one falsehood with another by claiming that an "economic and financial crisis was facing Germany" which would compel the allegedly bankrupt Germans to adopt these desperate measures. He added with false modesty that some of this "may sound fanciful and even fantastic and His Majesty's Government have no wish to be alarmist."

Halifax feared that he had not yet made his point. He returned to the charge and emphasized "Hitler's mental condition, his insensate rage against Great Britain and his megalomania." He warned Roosevelt that the German underground movement was impotent, and that there would be no revolt in Germany during the initial phase of World War II. He confided that Great Britain was greatly increasing her armament program, and he believed that it was his duty to enlighten Roosevelt about Hitler's alleged intentions and attitudes "in view of the relations of confidence which exist between our two Governments and the degree to which we have exchanged information hitherto." Halifax claimed that Chamberlain was contemplating a public warning to Germany prior to Hitler's annual Reichstag speech on January 30, 1939. This was untrue, but Halifax hoped to goad Roosevelt into

making another alarmist and bellicose speech. He suggested that Roosevelt should address a public warning to Germany without delay.

Anthony Eden had been sent to the United States by Halifax, in December 1938, to spread rumors about sinister German plans, and Roosevelt had responded with a provocative and insulting warning to Germany in his message to Congress on January 4, 1939. Halifax hoped that a second performance of this kind would be useful in preparing the basis for the war propaganda with which he hoped to deluge the British public. He did not achieve the desired response to this specific proposal. Secretary of State Hull explained, in what a British diplomat at Washington, D.C., jokingly described as "his most oracular style," that the Administration was blocked in such efforts at the moment by hostile American public opinion. Halifax was comforted on January 27, 1939, when he was informed officially that "the United States Government had for some time been basing their policy upon the possibility of just such a situation arising as was foreshadowed in your telegram." This was another way of saying that the New Deal, which had shot the bolt of its reforms in a futile effort to end the American depression, was counting on the outbreak of a European war.

Halifax learned on January 30, 1939, that leading American "experts" disagreed with a few of the details of his analysis of the Dutch situation. They expected Hitler to mobilize his forces along the Dutch frontier and to demand the surrender of large portions of the Dutch East Indies without firing a shot. The ostensible purpose of this Rooseveltian fantasy would be to "humiliate Great Britain" and to "bribe Japan." This dispatch was not sent on April Fool's Day, and it was intended seriously. It enabled Halifax to see that he had pitched his message accurately to the political perspective of Roosevelt, Hull, and their advisers. Anyone in their entourage who did not declare that Hitler was hopelessly insane was virtually ostracized. Roosevelt hoped to have a long discussion with Joseph Stalin at Teheran in 1943 about the alleged insanity of Adolf Hitler. He was disappointed when Stalin abruptly ended this phase of the conversation with the blunt comment that Hitler was not insane. It was like telling the naked Emperor that he was wearing no clothes. It was evident to Stalin that Roosevelt was a clever and unscrupulous politician who lacked the qualities of the statesman.

On January 4, 1939, President Roosevelt tells Congress that U.S. neutrality policy must be re-examined. The next day, Beck and Hitler converse at Berchtesgaden. Hitler stresses German-Polish cooperation, pointing to that of the previous year over the Czechoslovakian crisis (and noting that he would have preferred a

settlement in which only Poland, Germany, and Hungary—the countries with ethnic interests within Czechoslovakia—would have participated, rather than the Great Power convocation at Munich). Though quite cordial, the conversations are unproductive in terms of concrete progress toward resolution of the Danzig and Corridor problems. But Hitler at least makes clear his attitude that Danzig would return to Germany sooner or later. Beck hides his strong private aversion to this idea behind a friendly, if reserved, mask. He does reassure Hitler of a dependable (that is: suspicious) Polish attitude toward Russia. Privately, Beck is less interested in preventing a short-range setback or even defeat for Poland than in promoting the ruin of both Germany and Russia. His attitude reflects a Polish mystique arising from World War I: a defeat of Russia by Germany, and of Germany by the Western Powers, would permit a Great Poland to emerge from the ashes of a momentary new Polish defeat.

The Poles Regard America

The Poles also attached great importance to the role of the United States. They knew that American intervention had been decisive in World War I. They knew that the American President, Franklin Roosevelt, was an ardent interventionist. Roosevelt differed markedly from his predecessor, Herbert Hoover, after whom many streets were named in Poland in gratitude for his post-World War I relief program. Hoover had been favorably impressed by a conversation with Adolf Hitler on March 8, 1938, and he was a leader in the struggle against current American interventionism. The Poles knew that Hoover, who was wrongly accused of being the father of the American economic depression, that began in 1929, had little influence on American policy in 1938. They knew that President Roosevelt was eager to involve the United States in the struggles of distant states in Europe and Asia. American opponents of Roosevelt who opposed his foreign policy were disdainfully labelled isolationists.

The Poles did not trouble themselves about the reasons for President Roosevelt's interventionism. They were too realistic to assume that he necessarily had any legitimate reasons. They were content to accept the convenient explanation of Count Jerzy Potocki, the Polish Ambassador to the United States. Potocki claimed that President Roosevelt's foreign policy was the product of Jewish influence. This was untrue, but there was little interest in Poland for an elaborate analysis of American policy. The surveys sent by the Polish Foreign Office to missions abroad rarely mentioned the American scene. The Poles recognized the importance of the American position, but they were content to leave the problem of promoting American intervention in Europe to their British friends.

Beck discussed the European situation after his return to Warsaw with American Ambassador Anthony Biddle. Biddle reported to the American State Department on January 10, 1939, that Beck was not enthusiastic about his recent trip to Germany. The most he was willing to say about his conversation with Hitler was that it had been "fairly satisfactory," and that Hitler had promised him that there would be no "surprises." Beck confided to Biddle that Hitler was disappointed about President Roosevelt's address to Congress on January 4, 1939, which had been bitterly hostile toward Germany. Biddle noted that Beck was complacent about Anglo-French relations and concerned about current Polish relations with France. Biddle reported that "Beck emphasized that Poland and France must meet at an early date to clarify their joint and respective positions *vis-a-vis* Germany. They were now both in the same boat and must face realities." It was evident from the general nature of Beck's remarks that the official Polish attitude was incompatible with the successful negotiation of an agreement with Germany.

American Ambassador Bullitt in Paris reported on January 30, 1939, that he discussed recent German-Polish negotiations with Juliusz Lukasiewicz, the Polish Ambassador. Lukasiewicz admitted that Danzig and the Corridor transit problems had been discussed. He informed Bullitt that Beck had warned Hitler that Poland might act in Ruthenia. Bullitt also discussed general German policy with Lukasiewicz, French Foreign Minister Bonnet, and British Ambassador Sir Eric Phipps. The three men agreed that Hitler would not deliberately make war on any country in 1939. These views were an interesting contrast to the alarmist reports which Halifax had sent to President Roosevelt a few days earlier.

American Charge d'Affaires Gilbert reported from Berlin on February 3rd that Hitler's basic policy in the East was friendship with Poland. It seemed certain to Gilbert that Beck would be willing to allow the return of Danzig to Germany in exchange for a 25-year Pact, and for a German guarantee of the Polish Corridor. Gilbert noted that official German circles were quite open in announcing that the reunion of Memel with East Prussia was planned for the Spring of 1939. The Germans believed that the Lithuanians, British, and French would agree to this development without any ill-feeling.

On March 14, 1939, the artificial Czech state disintegrates. The Slovakian parliament proclaims its independence. Hungarian troops enter the Ruthenian region to protect and embrace the ethnic Hungarian population there. The Czechoslovakian president, Emil Hacha, requests an immediate meeting with Hitler. On March 15th, Hacha signs an agreement with Hitler establishing

the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia on the former Czech territory. German troops move in that day, and Germany accepts the protection of Slovakian independence. Britain initially accepts the new situation, reasoning that her guarantee of Czechoslovakia given after Munich is rendered invalid by the internal collapse of the Czech state. But on March 17th, Chamberlain—egged on by Halifax and Roosevelt—announces a stunning reversal of British policy: the end of the peace policy ("appeasement") with Germany. From now on Britain will strenuously oppose, even to the point of war, any further territorial moves by Hitler, no matter how justified.

America and the British Policy Reversal

William C. Bullitt, the leading American diplomat in Europe, was pleased by the reversal of British policy in March 1939. He knew that President Roosevelt would welcome any British pretext for a war in Europe. Ambassador Bullitt sent a jubilant report from Paris on March 17, 1939, in which he triumphantly concluded that there was no longer any possibility for a peaceful diplomatic settlement of European differences.

Halifax welcomed the enthusiastic support for a change in British policy which he received from the American Government after March 15, 1939. The collapse of Czechoslovakia produced a greater immediate outburst of hostility toward Germany in Washington, D.C., than in any other capital of the world. German Charge d'Affaires Thomsen reported to Berlin that a violent press campaign against Germany had been launched throughout the United States. There was much resentment in American New Deal circles when Sir John Simon delivered a speech in the British House of Commons on March 16, 1939, in support of Chamberlain's conciliatory message on the previous day. The Simon speech produced a vigorous American protest in London on March 17, 1939. Halifax replied by promising President Roosevelt that the British leaders were "going to start educating public opinion as best they can to the need of action." This is a different picture from the one presented by Gilbert and Gott [in their book *The Appeasers*] to the effect that "for most men the answer was simple" after the events at Prague on March 15, 1939. Roosevelt warned Halifax that there would be "an increase of anti-British sentiment in the United States" unless Great Britain hastened to adopt an outspokenly anti-German policy.

Roosevelt requested Halifax to withdraw the British Ambassador from Germany permanently. Halifax replied that he was not prepared to go quite that far. British opinion was less ignorant than American opinion about the requirements of diplomacy, and Halifax feared that a rude shock would be produced if

the British copied the American practice of permanently withdrawing ambassadors for no adequate reasons. He promised that he would instruct Henderson to return to England for consultation, and he promised that he would prevent the return of the British Ambassador to Germany for a considerable time. He also promised that Chamberlain would deliver a challenging speech in Birmingham on the evening of March 17, 1939, which would herald a complete change in British policy. He assured Roosevelt that Great Britain was prepared at last to intervene actively in the affairs of Central Europe.

Halifax requested President Roosevelt to join Great Britain in showing "the extent to which the moral sense of civilization was outraged by the present rulers of Germany." He knew that this lofty formulation of the issue would appeal to the American President. Roosevelt was satisfied with the response from Halifax. He promised the British Foreign Secretary that he would undermine the American neutrality legislation, which had been adopted by the American Congress, with New Deal approval, in response to pressure from American public opinion. Halifax also received the promise that American Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau would take vigorous new steps in his policy of financial and economic discrimination against Germany. Halifax was greatly encouraged by the support he received from President Roosevelt for his war policy.

Polish Foreign Minister Beck received an assurance from Juliusz Lukasiewicz and William Bullitt on March 19, 1939, that President Roosevelt was prepared to do everything possible to promote a war between the Anglo-French front and Germany. Bullitt admitted that he was still suspicious about British intentions, and he feared that the British might be tempted to compose their differences with Germany at some later date. He promised that any such deviation from a British war policy would encounter energetic resistance from President Roosevelt. Bullitt had received word from Premier Daladier that the British were proposing an Anglo-French territorial guarantee to Rumania, and the American diplomat welcomed this plan.

Bullitt informed the Poles that he knew Germany hoped to acquire Danzig, and that he was counting on Polish willingness to go to war over the Danzig question. He urged Lukasiewicz to present demands to the West for supplies and other military assistance. Lukasiewicz told Bullitt that Poland would need all the help the West could possibly offer in the event of war. Bullitt said that he hoped Poland could obtain military supplies from the Soviet Union, but Lukasiewicz displayed no enthusiasm for this possibility. He warned Bullitt that it was too early to predict what position Russia would take in a German-Polish dispute. Bullitt

recognized from this remark that Lukasiewicz was assuming that Soviet policy toward Poland would be hostile. It was equally clear that Bullitt recognized the military hopelessness of the Polish position, if the Soviet Union did not aid Poland in a conflict with Germany.

Halifax attempts to create a broad anti-German front by proposing an alliance to include Britain, France, Poland, and the Soviet Union. But the Poles are as distrustful of the Soviets as they are of the Germans, preferring to maintain a maximum independence of Soviet influence and protection from possible future Soviet moves. Nevertheless they continue in a bellicose anti-German attitude—though Germany is the only nation that could possibly offer them realistic protection from the Soviets.

Poland Rejects Halifax's Soviet Alliance Plan

Halifax discussed his alliance project with American Ambassador Kennedy on March 22, 1939, and he complained at great length about the negative attitude of Beck toward an alliance front to include both Poland and the Soviet Union. He intimated that he was resolved to continue his anti-Germany policy, and that hostilities in Europe might be expected fairly soon. He was convinced that the British Navy was more than adequate to cope with German naval forces. He urged Kennedy to request President Roosevelt to concentrate the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, as an appropriate gesture to protect Australia and Singapore from a possible Japanese attack, after the outbreak of war in Europe. Halifax admitted at last that the story of a German threat to Rumania could not be substantiated, but he assured Kennedy that [Rumanian Ambassador] Tilea's statements at London had served a useful purpose.

The moderate attitude of Hitler produced no effect on Beck on the eve of Lipski's return to Berlin. Beck told American Ambassador Biddle an outrageous falsehood about Hitler's policy toward Poland on March 25, 1939, which was a fitting prelude to his later public distortions about German policy. Beck claimed that Hitler had demanded the settlement of the Danzig question by Easter, which was only a few days away. In fact, Hitler had never set a time limit on the duration of his negotiation with Poland. Biddle reported with satisfaction on March 26, 1939, in a terse telegram: "Poland today on war footing having achieved same swiftly but quietly."

It was difficult under these circumstances for Ribbentrop to maintain the impression that peaceful negotiations between Germany and Poland were in progress. The German Foreign Office was receiving a large number of reports from friendly foreign

diplomats that the British were making all possible preparations for war against Germany, and it seemed certain at Berlin that Halifax would seek to exploit the bellicose Polish attitude. American Minister Joseph E. Davies reported to Washington, D.C., from Brussels on March 30, 1939, that in Belgium the Chamberlain speech at Birmingham was regarded as a disaster which had reversed the favorable prospects for peace in Europe.

French Ambassador Leon Noel reported to Paris that he had attended a diplomatic dinner on the evening of March 27, 1939, at which Beck, Count Michal Lubienski, and the Polish Chief of Staff, General Stachiewicz, were present. Noel complained that the Polish leaders deliberately avoided any reference to the obviously unsatisfactory recent negotiations with Germany, and that they appeared to be distracted and preoccupied with private problems. Beck was also vague in his conversations with American Ambassador Anthony Biddle, but he told Biddle on the evening of March 28th that the Polish partial mobilization was "a firm answer to certain suggestions made by Berlin."

Lukasiewicz informed Beck from Paris that he was continuing to collaborate closely with American Ambassador Bullitt. Lukasiewicz was repeatedly informed by Bullitt of the conversations between the British leaders and American Ambassador Kennedy at London. It was obvious to Lukasiewicz that Bullitt continued to distrust the British. The American Ambassador assured him that the United States would be able to exert sufficient pressure to produce a British mobilization at the peak of the next crisis. Lukasiewicz also suspected that part of this distrust reflected a childish desire on the part of Bullitt to exaggerate the importance of his own role on the European scene.

Polish Ambassador Edward Raczyński reported on March 29, 1939, that the principal fear in Great Britain seemed to be that a German-Polish agreement would be reached despite the Polish partial mobilization. The British were arguing that such an agreement would be especially dangerous because it might lead to the rapid disintegration of Soviet Russia. The Polish Ambassador had learned that American Ambassador Kennedy was personally distressed by the war policy of the British leaders, and by the support for this policy which came from President Roosevelt. Raczyński warned Beck that Kennedy appeared to be privately somewhat out of step with Bullitt in Paris and Anthony Biddle in Warsaw, but that otherwise he was reluctantly carrying out his instructions from President Roosevelt to warn the British that their failure to act would produce dire consequences. Raczyński added that he received repeated requests from the British to reassure them that Poland would not accept the German annexation of Danzig. The Polish diplomat noted that it was difficult to convince the British that Poland was really willing to go to war over the Danzig issue.

American Ambassador Bullitt did what he could to support the Polish position at Paris. Lukasiewicz informed Bullitt on March 24, 1939, that Poland would reject the pro-Soviet alliance plan and press for a bilateral alliance with Great Britain. Bullitt assured Lukasiewicz that the British would agree to such an alliance. The Polish Ambassador admitted that he did not trust the British, and he asserted that the cynical English leaders were quite capable of leading Poland into an untenable position and deserting her. He knew that Bullitt shared this attitude to some extent. Lukasiewicz reminded Bullitt of British participation in the partition of Czechoslovakia in 1938. He feared that Great Britain would offer to support Poland, and then insist on Polish concessions to Germany. He knew that until recently the British leaders had favored Polish concessions to Germany, and he was not certain that there had been a complete change in their attitude.

Bullitt used many arguments to reassure the Polish Ambassador. He declared that he was in complete agreement with every aspect of Beck's stand in the alliance question, and he regarded the creation of a solid Anglo-French-Polish front without the Soviet Union as the best thing which could possibly happen. He claimed that Halifax was not very serious about his Four Power Pact offer, and that it was mainly a gesture to increase British prestige and to appease the French. He said that the British leaders hoped that there would be a war between Germany and Russia, but that they were not eager to make commitments to the Soviet Union.

Bullitt told Lukasiewicz on March 25, 1939, that he had instructed American Ambassador Kennedy at London to tell Chamberlain that the United States was in full sympathy with the Polish position in the alliance question. Bullitt contacted Kennedy again on March 26th. Kennedy was instructed to tell Chamberlain that the United States hoped that Great Britain would go to war with Germany if the Danzig dispute produced an explosion between Germany and Poland. Bullitt told the Polish Ambassador that he was confident that the British response to these suggestions would be favorable. Halifax, of course, was not displeased to know that he had unconditional official American support for his war policy. Lukasiewicz told Bullitt on March 26, 1939, that Lipski would reject the German proposals at Berlin the same day. He praised Bullitt as "an industrious friend who at many complicated points resolved our situation intensively and profitably."

On March 22nd, Germany and Lithuania reach an agreement for the return to Germany of the ethnic German Memel district. The next day, Poland orders a partial mobilization. It follows in the last week of March with a boycott campaign against ethnic

German businesses, and a declaration that any German-caused change in the international ("Free City") status of Danzig will be regarded as an act of war. Acts of violence against ethnic Germans in Poland increase. Britain announces a doubling in size of the home army. On March 30th, several days before the planned visit of Beck to London, Halifax decides to give a "blank check" guarantee to Poland, supporting it in the event of any action which the Polish government considers a threat to its independence. Chamberlain is to announce the guarantee in the House of Commons on March 31st.

The British Guarantee and America

Halifax had made an epochal decision, and he was impatient to bring his new policy into the open. He decided not to wait until the arrival of Beck in London on April 3, 1939, before assuming a public British commitment to Poland. He wired [British Ambassador to Poland] Kennard on March 30, 1939, that a guarantee to Poland would be announced in the British Parliament on the following day. He added that this guarantee would be binding without commitments from the Polish side. He attempted to place the responsibility for his extraordinary impatience on President Roosevelt. He informed Kennard with a touch of ironical humor that the American Embassy had bombarded him with assertions that Ribbentrop was urging Hitler to invade Poland before the British assumed any commitment. This was a transparent pretext to rationalize a rash policy. It was true that Bullitt at Paris was for immediate British action, but the American diplomats at Berlin hoped that Great Britain would adopt a policy of caution and restraint. American Charge d'Affaires Geist suggested from Berlin that it would be wise for Great Britain to avoid placing obstructions before German eastward expansion. No one could have been more emphatic in deplored a hasty British guarantee to Poland.

Halifax carefully avoided giving the impression that he believed the alleged story about Ribbentrop's aggressive intentions. He did repeat the old argument that President Roosevelt and the United States of America would become hostile to Great Britain if she did not go to war against Germany. The constant reiteration of this theme by Bullitt at Paris was undoubtedly useful to Halifax. It also enabled him to shift part of the responsibility for his various moves to the United States, although in reality President Roosevelt was unable to play an active role in Europe at this stage. The official position of the United States was governed by neutrality legislation from the 1935-1937 period, and it is impossible, regardless of the attitude of Roosevelt, to saddle the United States with the responsibility for the moves which Halifax made. The decision of Halifax to confer an advance guarantee wiped

out the hopes of Hitler that personal negotiations between Halifax and Beck would end in disagreement. The friction between the two men was a very real thing when Beck came to London, and it is possible that their negotiation would have ended in failure had it not been for the previous British guarantee.

Beck arrives in London on April 3rd. He accepts the British guarantee, and offers a reciprocal promise of Polish intervention on the side of Britain in the event of war between Britain and Germany. But Halifax wants more: a wide-ranging Polish commitment to go to war with Germany if Germany attacks Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, or Denmark. Beck balks at this request for what amounts to "permanent intervention," as at renewed suggestions for a pro-Soviet alliance against Germany. The British leaders suggest that Beck transform the Polish-Rumanian alliance (an anti-Soviet pact in effect) into an anti-German pact. Beck refuses to ignore the dangers from the Soviet Union to Poland and her neighbors' Eastern borders, and rejects this proposal.

The British Propagandize Beck

The British leaders did not like Beck's response. They wished him to think exclusively in terms of destroying Germany, and to forget other considerations. In other words, they wished his thinking to be more similar to that of President Roosevelt in the United States. They began to employ the same propaganda methods on Beck which they used with Roosevelt. They began to suggest a number of hypothetical situations with their usual formula of saying "this may sound fantastic, but" what would you do in such and such a case. Beck put a stop to this by declaring bluntly that "it was against the tradition of the Polish Government to express definite opinions about third countries without directly consulting them."

Chamberlain switched from hypothetical fantasies to rumors, and he declared that he had heard Germany was planning a sudden invasion of Hungary. Beck did not like this English style of rumor-mongering. He was convinced that this assertion of alleged German designs against Hungary was entirely false. He wished that the British leaders would desist from their efforts to alarm him in this way. He assured the British leaders with studied emphasis that he was entirely convinced Germany was not planning any political action outside her present frontiers except at Danzig. This was an effective method of reminding them that Poland was indispensable to their plan of launching a British preventive war against Germany.

Theo Kordt of the German Embassy in London was able to telegraph information to Berlin on April 5, 1939, about the principal topics which had been discussed between Beck and the British leaders. Chamberlain admitted in the House of Commons on the following day that there had been no attempt to limit what might constitute a threat to Polish independence. The final word on this matter was left entirely to the Poles. Beck admitted to American Ambassador Kennedy before he left London that the British leaders had complained about the allegedly uncooperative Polish attitude. He also claimed that he had been able to diminish this dissatisfaction somewhat in the last conversations. Beck referred cleverly to his "old friend America" and his "new friend Britain." He confided to Kennedy that he was "more than happy" to have the British blank check. He assured the American Ambassador that he did "not want to be the direct cause of plunging the world into war." This was encouraging, but Beck deprived the statement of any real meaning by admitting that he had no concrete plan to preserve the peace. Indeed, it may be safely assumed that Beck's statement to Kennedy was entirely for the record.

Kennedy talked with Halifax on April 6th. The British Foreign Secretary admitted that Beck was definitely opposed to a Russo-Polish understanding. Halifax believed that he deserved a vacation after the work of the past three weeks. He told Kennedy that Chamberlain was leaving for Scotland on the evening of April 6th, and that he was going home to Yorkshire the following morning. The Poles had their blank check, and a separate British approach to Russia would be the next step. The general European situation was discussed, and Halifax privately admitted to Kennedy that neither Hitler nor Mussolini wanted war.

Roosevelt's Policy and Beck

Bullitt was delighted at the opportunity to greet Beck on his return from England to the continent. He knew that this privilege resulted from the fact that he "was a strong admirer of the policy of Minister Beck" and enjoyed "friendly relations" with him. Bullitt discussed Roosevelt's policy with Beck at some length. He claimed that he and Roosevelt were much dissatisfied with both English and American public opinion at this point. Beck expressed mild surprise at this remark as far as England was concerned, and he indicated that he was satisfied with the atmosphere which he had encountered in England. He was quite unperturbed that a formal Anglo-Polish alliance had not been negotiated, and he observed with satisfied irony that it would require much delicacy and discretion on the part of Chamberlain to handle the guarantee agreement other than by the standards of a

normal alliance. Beck did not believe that the British Prime Minister possessed either delicacy or discretion. Beck observed, with a knowing smile to his listeners, that Chamberlain had said he was glad Poland had come instantly to an agreement with England. This amused Beck, because Poland had been waiting over a considerable period for the English offer of an agreement.

Beck admitted that Halifax had sought to entangle him with obligations to Holland, Belgium, Denmark, and Switzerland, but he did not attach serious importance to this fact. He was more interested in speculating about the German response to his visit to England and to his acceptance of the British guarantee. He declared that the alliance with England (*sojusz z Anglia*) had dealt a real blow to Hitler's plans for a German-Polish agreement. He believed that British approval of Polish aspirations at Danzig had buttressed the Polish cause there as never before. A main topic of speculation was whether Hitler would respond to the British guarantee by denouncing the 1934 Pact with Poland.

Bullitt took his leave from Beck at Lille and returned to Paris. He sent an exuberant report to Washington, D.C., at 11:00 p.m. on April 7, 1939. He informed Roosevelt and Hull that Beck was immensely pleased by recent developments in England, and that the degree of understanding which had been achieved was quite adequate to fill Polish needs. Beck had said that he knew that Hitler would be furious. Bullitt also added with obvious satisfaction that Beck had described Ribbentrop as a "dangerous imbecile."

Poland's Use of the British Guarantee

It was likely that the Poles would seek to provoke Germany into attacking them. Unlike Germany, they could not expect to achieve any of their objectives in a major war through their own efforts. Their hope of ultimate victory rested with distant foreign powers. The Polish leaders were far more enthusiastic about a German-Polish war than Hitler ever was, but considerations of high policy suggested the wisdom of a role which was at least passive in appearance.

Poland was counting on the support of Halifax for the realization of her program at the expense of both Germany and Russia. It was conceivable that Halifax could lead Great Britain into a war which began with a surprise Polish invasion of Germany, but the Polish leaders knew that France and the United States were also of decisive importance to British policy. The Poles knew that Halifax would never support Poland unless he could drag France into war. This policy was dictated by the simple fact that Halifax did not believe Great Britain could win a war against Germany without the participation of France. The Poles also knew that it

would be difficult for President Roosevelt to arouse the American people against Germany unless it was possible to maintain that Poland was the innocent victim of German aggression.

Polish provocation of Germany after March 31, 1939, was frequent and extreme, and Hitler soon had more than a sufficient justification to go to war with Poland on the basis of traditional practices among the nations. Nevertheless, Hitler could not justify German action, unless he believed that he was prepared to meet the consequences. He hoped to avoid war with Great Britain, and he knew that he would run a grave risk of an Anglo-German war if he invaded Poland. It was for this reason that German-Polish relations became progressively worse over a long period before they produced a conflict. Hitler, who was usually very prompt and decisive in conducting German policy, showed considerable indecision before he finally decided to act, and to face the consequences. He did not abandon his hope for a negotiated settlement with Poland until he realized that the outlook for such a settlement was completely hopeless.

French Foreign Minister Bonnet is not as enthused as his allies the British over the guarantee to Poland. Learning that Marshal Smigly-Rydz, the commander-in-chief of Poland's armed forces, expressed delight at the guarantee, he fears Polish cockiness and foolhardiness now that Britain, dragging along France, stands unconditionally behind Poland whatever Poland does. Bonnet continues to desire a Western/Polish accommodation with the Soviets, fearing that a Western guarantee alone will not be enough to stop any Hitler moves for Danzig and the Corridor. All this is communicated to the Polish ambassador at Paris, Lukasiewicz. Marshal Smigly-Rydz proclaims with satisfaction to assembled Polish diplomats that an immediate war with Germany is quite possible, and that such a war would mean the end of Germany.

Bullitt, the French, and the Americans

Lukasiewicz was less sanguine than Smigly-Rydz about the position of the Western Powers following the British guarantee. He discussed the situation with American Ambassador Bullitt on April 9, 1939. He said that he hoped France would attack Germany from Belgium in the event of war, but he was pessimistic about the future course of French policy. Bullitt and Lukasiewicz also discussed their recent meeting with Beck. The American Ambassador told Lukasiewicz that he had given President Roosevelt extensive information about Beck's analysis of the situation. Beck had claimed that basically Hitler was a timid Austrian who might be expected to avoid a war against determined and strong

opponents. He said that "it should be obvious now to Hitler that threats to Poland would get Germany nowhere." These exuberant remarks seemed less convincing to Lukasiewicz after his conversation on the previous day with Bonnet.

Bullitt was dissatisfied with the attitude of the French leaders, and he was inclined to blame what he considered the unwarranted complacency of American public opinion. He complained to President Roosevelt in a report on April 10, 1939, that the American public was not aware of the alleged direct threat to the United States from Germany, Italy, and Japan. He hoped that Roosevelt could do something to arouse the American people. His complaint was the decisive factor in persuading President Roosevelt to deliver sensational and insulting public notes to Mussolini and Hitler on April 15, 1939, after the Anglo-French guarantees to Rumania and Greece. Bullitt complained that [French Première] Daladier was unresponsive to the attempt of Lukasiewicz to secure the same blank check from France which had been presented to Poland by England. Kennedy reported to Roosevelt from London on April 11, 1939, that Halifax was still pretending to entertain an idealistic hope for peace. Kennedy naturally supposed that it might be worthwhile for the British Foreign Secretary to announce to the world that peace was still possible, but Halifax claimed that to do so would convince everyone that he was "burying his head in the sand." These remarks illustrate the method by which Halifax sought to convince people that he was merely the prisoner of larger events.

The Roosevelt Telegrams to Hitler and Mussolini

President Roosevelt was doing everything in his power to increase alarmist sentiment in the United States. He announced at Warm Springs, Georgia, on April 9th that he might not return for his annual autumn health cure, because it was quite possible that the United States and the European countries would be involved with the problems of a major European war by that time. Fortunately, much of the reaction to this statement in the United States was extremely hostile, and many foreign observers concluded that this was merely an expression of wishful thinking on the part of the American president.

The British expected some lively developments at Danzig after their guarantee to the Poles. They did not realize that Hitler had ordered the Danzig authorities to go to extreme lengths in seeking to conciliate the Poles. British Ambassador Kennard heard on April 12, 1939, that Lipski had returned to Warsaw from Berlin. He suspected that this might indicate some new developments of major importance in the Danzig question. He asked Beck for the latest news about Danzig, but he was told that nothing had changed.

The quiet at Danzig began to annoy Kennard. He called at the Polish Foreign Office ten days later to insist that Great Britain was "entitled" to receive information about any new steps at Danzig. He noted that the Germans were blaming Great Britain for the deadlock at Danzig, and he claimed that the British were "somewhat anxious" about the situation. Kennard was told once again that there was nothing to report. The Germans had requested the return of Danzig and a transit corridor to East Prussia. The Polish diplomats believed that the Germans expected Lipski to appear some day with "proposals of a detailed nature." Kennard was not told whether or not such proposals would actually be presented to the Germans by Poland.

The evasive vagueness at the Polish Foreign Office irritated Kennard. He complained to Halifax, and he noted with malicious satisfaction that there were objections to Beck in Polish financial circles. It was known in Poland that Beck had said nothing about British economic assistance during his visit to London. He had proudly emphasized Poland's alleged preparedness and strength. The Polish financiers regarded this as an unpardonable and expensive blunder.

Beck was waiting impatiently for Hitler's response to Polish acceptance of the British guarantee. He wondered if Hitler would abrogate the 1934 Pact, which Poland had violated by accepting the guarantee. He did not realize that Hitler had no intention of increasing Poland's sense of self-importance by devoting a special public message to this matter. Hitler knew that the repudiation of the Pact would be a step of major importance which could scarcely be confined to an official communique and a few reports in the newspapers. This problem was unexpectedly resolved for Hitler by President Roosevelt. The American President responded to Bullitt's suggestion for an important move to influence American public opinion by committing a colossal diplomatic blunder, which played directly into Hitler's hands.

Roosevelt disclosed to the American public on April 14, 1939, the contents of telegrams to Mussolini and Hitler which were received in Rome and Berlin on the following day. Roosevelt sought to create the impression that Germany and Italy were exclusively responsible for every threat to European peace. He presented himself as an unselfish peacemaker, who had expended much thought and energy to devise a plan to remove the danger of war. This peace plan required Germany and Italy to declare that they would abstain from war under any and all circumstances for ten to twenty-five years, and to conclude non-aggression pacts with a large number of states, of which several had no independent existence other than in the imagination of the American President.

The Roosevelt message met with a vigorous response in the German press. The German journalists wondered if the United States would agree not to attack Haiti or Santo Domingo within the next twenty-five years. Joseph Goebbels addressed three questions to the American public on April 17, 1939. He wondered if they recognized that Roosevelt was similar to Woodrow Wilson in his desire to promote a permanent policy of American intervention throughout the world. He asked if the American people recognized that Roosevelt's recent message was a new maneuver to destroy the American neutrality laws, rather than to promote world peace. He inquired if they realized that Roosevelt had advocated a common American front with Bolshevism since his Chicago Quarantine speech in October 1937. The German press announced on April 17th that Hitler would answer President Roosevelt for the German people in a speech to the German Reichstag on April 28, 1939. This step had been agreed upon by Hitler and Ribbentrop in a special conference on the previous day.

Hitler was presented with an opportunity to deal with the Poles as a secondary factor in a general situation. He planned to devote the greater part of his message on the Pact with Poland to a careful criticism of the American President and to a criticism of English policy. He also intended to abrogate the 1935 Anglo-German naval treaty. Hitler ordered the German press to abstain from criticizing the Poles during the period before he delivered his speech.

Marshal Goering was on a visit to Italy from April 14th until April 16, 1939. He had instructions from Hitler to discuss the total context of Italo-German relations. Ribbentrop was somewhat uneasy about the Goering official mission at this crucial stage when he was seeking to promote an Italo-German alliance. He was relieved to learn later that the Goering mission was completely successful.

Goering discussed the Roosevelt telegrams with Mussolini and Ciano on April 16, 1939. He told Mussolini that it was difficult to avoid the impression that the American President was mentally ill. Mussolini criticized the factual text of the telegrams. It was ridiculous to request Germany and Italy to conclude non-aggression pacts with Palestine and Syria, which were British and French mandates rather than independent states. Mussolini was interested in improving Anglo-Italian relations, and he elected to react publicly to the American challenge in a minor key. A brief initial expression of indignation was followed by Mussolini's speech at Rome on April 29, 1939. The Italian leader merely denounced the alarmists who sought to disturb international relations, and he emphasized that Italy was peacefully preparing

for the International Exposition in Rome scheduled for 1942. The privilege of delivering a detailed reply to the American President was left entirely to Hitler.

The difficult situation between Germany and Poland was a touchy subject in the conversations between Goering and the Italian leaders. Goering did not attempt to minimize the seriousness of the situation, and he complained that "England had deviated from her old line . . . (and) now obliged herself in advance to render support (to Poland, Rumania, and Greece), and that under conditions which could be determined by the other partner." Mussolini declared that in the existing dangerous situation it was important for the Axis Powers to revert to passive policies for an indefinite period. This seemed to be the only way to cope with the warlike attitude of the British Government. Goering hoped that it would be possible to settle German differences with Poland by peaceful negotiation, and he predicted that Roosevelt would have little chance for re-election in 1940 if the basic European situation remained unchanged. He admitted that an increase in provocative Polish measures against Germany might force German action against Poland. It was evident that the problem of Poland had become the problem of Europe at this hour.

Ribbentrop was encouraged by the Goering visit to press for a separate Italo-German alliance. The first official discussion of such an alliance took place in May 1938, when Hitler visited Italy. The original plan was to extend the anti-Comintern Pact into an alliance by including the Japanese. It became increasingly evident as time went on that the Japanese were unwilling to proceed this far. The Japanese feared that such an alliance might involve them in difficulties with Great Britain at a time when they were seriously committed in China. The German and Italian attempts to mediate between Japan and Nationalist China in 1938 were unsuccessful. Ribbentrop telephoned a last special appeal to the Japanese for an alliance on April 26, 1939, by way of German Ambassador Ott in Tokio. The reply to this appeal was negative as expected, and Ribbentrop proceeded to concentrate his efforts on a separate Pact with the Italians. He knew that this was a difficult project, because many Italians doubted the wisdom of an alliance connection with Germany. He also knew that the Italian leaders might seek to impose reservations which would deprive the alliance of its full effect.

The Roosevelt message of April 15, 1939, was helpful to Ribbentrop in improving German contacts with a number of countries. Ribbentrop also had the satisfaction of knowing that the British were not pleased by the crudeness of the Roosevelt telegrams. Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, the British Charge d'Affaires in Berlin,

declared quite candidly at the German Foreign Office on April 17, 1939, that the British regarded Roosevelt's messages as "a clumsy piece of diplomacy." Bullitt at Paris attempted to appease Roosevelt by placing the unsavory situation in a positive light. He claimed that Daladier had been "encouraged" by the latest move of the American President.

Ribbentrop dispatched instructions on April 17, 1939, to the German envoys in the countries named by President Roosevelt, with the exceptions of Great Britain and France and their possessions, and Poland and Russia. The envoys were to inquire if these countries believed themselves threatened, and if their Governments had authorized President Roosevelt's plan. The German Government knew that they would receive negative answers to both questions, but in coping with Roosevelt they required explicit confirmation of these assumptions.

The British were actively pursuing their policy against Germany in the period of the Roosevelt messages. Polish Ambassador Potworowski reported to Beck from Stockholm on April 15, 1939, that the British were putting pressure on Sweden to join them in blockading Germany during a future war. The Swedes resented the British attempt to dictate their policy, but it was evident to Beck that England was preparing her future blockade of Germany with single-minded energy. Halifax was employing sphinx-like silence as a weapon against his critics in the British House of Commons. He ignored charges that Poland and Rumania would never permit Soviet troops to operate on their territory, and that the guarantees extended to those countries rendered impossible a treaty with Russia. Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Rab Butler refused to reply to a direct question on April 18, 1939, about the role of Danzig in the British guarantee to Poland. Only one speaker in the House of Commons contended that Poland and Rumania alone had sufficient troops to cope successfully with the Germans. The House as a whole found it quite impossible to accept such a contention.

Hitler's Reply to Roosevelt of April 28, 1939

British Ambassador Henderson appeared rather pessimistic when he called at the German Foreign Office on April 27, 1939. He had returned to Berlin the previous day, after having been compelled to remain forty days in England at the insistence of Halifax, who had waited until April 20, 1939, before announcing in the House of Lords that Henderson would soon return to Germany. Henderson admitted to [German State Secretary] Weizsaecker that he had suffered a great loss of prestige at the British Foreign Office. The reaction there toward the reports he had sent home before the March 1939 Czech crisis was distinctly

negative. He complained that the task of defending recent German policy had been rendered difficult by Hitler's various earlier statements that he did not intend to seize purely Czech-populated territory. This situation was not changed by Hitler's willingness to negotiate about the current situation at Prague, because the British Government was unwilling to do so. Weizsaecker complained about the British guarantee to Poland, and he declared that it was "the means most calculated to encourage Polish subordinate authorities in their oppression of Germans there. Consequently it did not prevent, but on the contrary, provoked incidents in that country." Henderson submitted a formal statement about the British announcement of April 26, 1939, that peacetime military conscription had been established in Great Britain. The French leaders had requested the British to take this step as early as April 1938, and the German leaders had recognized for some time that the British were planning to introduce formal conscription to supplement the 1938 National Service Act. Weizsaecker told Henderson that the British note would receive formal acknowledgement, but that nothing would be done before Hitler's speech on the following day. He told Henderson that the text of Hitler's speech had gone to press. The printed text of the speech was delivered to the Diplomatic Corps in Berlin before Hitler addressed the Reichstag.

Hitler had received considerable American advice for the preparation of his speech. Some of this had reached him by way of the American press, and the rest by means of private communication to the German Embassy in Washington, D.C. The German Government was especially grateful for the suggestion of General Hugh Johnson, who had administered the National Recovery Act for President Roosevelt. Hitler had received through Hans Thomsen, the German Charge d'Affaires in Washington, D.C., the detailed suggestions of General Johnson on April 24, 1939. Hans Dieckhoff, the last German Ambassador to the United States, had also made a number of suggestions. Dieckhoff worked at the German Foreign Office in Berlin after his permanent return from the United States in November 1938. He made no secret, in his conversations with the Diplomatic Corps in Berlin, about his fear of American intervention in the event of a new European war, and he expressed this concern in his suggestions to Hitler on April 25, 1939. He was convinced that President Roosevelt intended to invade Europe with powerful American forces in the course of any future war, and he added: "I do not believe that there are elements in the USA which have courage enough or are strong enough to prevent this." Hitler was impressed by this warning, but he continued to hope for American neutrality in any possible future European conflict.

The German Foreign Office on April 27, 1939, completed the preparation of notes to be delivered at noon on April 28th in London and Warsaw. The notes announced German abrogation of the 1934 non-aggression Pact with Poland and of the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Pact. The note to the Poles, which contained a review of recent German-Polish difficulties, was more than twice the length of the note to London.

Kennard surveyed the Polish scene for Halifax on April 26, 1939. He claimed that Poland might have fought Germany without British support, but he assured Halifax that the Poles after they received the British guarantee believed it was "absolutely fundamental" to fight Germany. The German note announcing the abrogation of the 1934 Pact with Poland was delivered at Warsaw early on the morning of April 28, 1939. Beck's immediate reaction was one of unbridled scorn. He noted that the Germans still envisaged the possibility of negotiation with Poland. He declared to his subordinates that Hitler was seeking to solve his problems by diplomacy, and he vowed that he would not permit Poland to be imposed upon in this way. Beck had anticipated Hitler's address on April 28th by persuading the Polish military authorities to declare a state of alert and danger of war for the Polish Navy based at Gdynia.

French Ambassador Coulondre at Berlin discussed the situation with Lipski. The French Ambassador complained that the European scene was very confused, and that this was due in no small measure to the fact that the British in their diplomacy rushed abruptly from one extreme to another. Lipski described in detail the German offer for a settlement which Poland had rejected. Coulondre and Lipski agreed that the German offer was remarkably generous. Coulondre hoped to discover the true motive for Polish policy, but the Polish Ambassador merely mentioned that it was the avowed purpose of the Polish leaders never to be dependent on either Moscow or Berlin.

The day of Hitler's greatest oratorical performance had arrived. The German Reichstag assembled on the morning of April 28, 1939, under the presidency of Marshal Hermann Goering. It received a good-humored speech from Hitler, which American Charge d'Affaires Geist described as his "lighter vein of oratory." The Reichstag reciprocated this mood, and Geist noted that many of Hitler's remarks were received with "malicious laughter." The laughter seemed malicious to Geist because it was at the expense of the American President.

Hitler carefully left the door of negotiation open toward both Great Britain and Poland. He made it clear that he intended to remain moderate in his future negotiations with these two states.

He began his remarks by referring briefly to Roosevelt's telegram. He explained the German disillusionment in council diplomacy, which was the inevitable heritage of the deceitful mistreatment of Germany at Versailles. He had a formula which enabled Germany to participate in all negotiations with renewed confidence. The formula was a healthy determination to protect German national security. Hitler admitted that he did not believe Germany ever should negotiate again when she was helpless.

He analyzed and explained many of his principal domestic and foreign policies from 1933 until the German occupation of Prague in March 1939. He treated the prelude to the occupation of Prague at great length. He pointed out that deviations from the Munich conference program began at an early date. The Czechs and Hungarians in October 1938 appealed solely to Germany and Italy to mediate in their dispute, although at Munich it had been decided that mediation was the obligation of the Four Powers.

Hitler placed special emphasis in the latter part of his speech on the failure of the United States to emerge from the world economic depression under Rooseveltian leadership. He announced that Germany was responding to Roosevelt's initiative of April 15, 1939, by proceeding to conclude non-aggression pacts with a number of neighboring states. But he ridiculed the idea of non-aggression pacts with states on different continents, or with so-called states which actually did not enjoy independence. Ridicule was Hitler's chief weapon, next to facts and statistics, in his reply to Roosevelt. He had been genuinely amused by Roosevelt's telegram, and he succeeded in avoiding the impression that he was personally angry with the American President. Hitler made it appear that Roosevelt's constant efforts to provoke him had been mere slaps at the water of the vast Atlantic ocean which separated the two countries.

The German Chancellor paid glowing compliments to the British Empire, and he stressed his desire for permanent Anglo-German friendship. He revealed that he had decided with reluctance to abrogate the Anglo-German Naval Pact. He suggested that British resentment toward recent German foreign policy successes might have prompted the British leaders to select Poland as an obstacle to place against Germany.

Hitler devoted less than a tenth of his speech to Poland. He explained that he respected Polish maritime interests, and that this had prompted him to proceed with extreme moderation in the Corridor question. He praised Marshal Pilsudski for his desire to improve German-Polish relations. Hitler explained that in 1934 the two states had renounced war as an instrument of national policy in their relations. This was in accord with the terms of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. The pact had recognized one signifi-

cant exception to this declaration on behalf of Poland. The Poles were allowed to maintain military obligations to France which were directed exclusively against Germany.

Hitler mentioned the many important questions which had not been settled either by the 1934 Pact or by his own efforts for a more comprehensive German-Polish agreement. He described in detail all the points of his offer for a general settlement with Poland. He declared that the Polish counter-proposals offered no basis for an agreement. They envisaged no change in the existing unsatisfactory situation with the exception of the suggestion to replace League authority at Danzig with a German-Polish guarantee. The German Chancellor regretted Poland's decision to call up troops against Germany, and to reject the German offer. He deplored Polish acceptance of the British guarantee. He announced that Germany was no longer willing to offer her October 1938 proposals as the basis for a settlement of differences with Poland. He explained that he was abrogating the 1934 Pact with Poland, which he had offered to extend for twenty-five years, because the Poles had violated it by accepting the British guarantee. He remarked that no non-aggression pact could survive a unilateral departure from its provisions by one of the contracting parties.

Hitler declared that the abrogation of the Pact did not mean that Germany would refuse to assume new contractual obligations toward Poland. He insisted that, on the contrary, "I can but welcome such an idea, provided, of course, that there arrangements are based on an absolutely clear obligation binding both parties in equal measure." Hitler avoided treating the Polish issue as the climax of his remarks. The principal theme throughout the speech was his reply to President Roosevelt, which he sub-divided into twenty-one principal points. He created the impression that such momentous decisions as the repudiation of important pacts with Great Britain and Poland were an anti-climax compared to his debate with the American President.

The immediate reaction to Hitler's speech in Poland was hostile, although French Ambassador Noel observed that Hitler was pressing for negotiations rather than closing the door. The Polish Government announced that Beck soon would reply to Hitler in the Polish Sejm. *Polski Zbrojna* (The Polish Army) described Hitler's abrogation of the 1934 Pact as a tactical blunder. One Polish editor claimed that Hitler's speech gave the Polish press a moral basis to attack Germany without restraint. Wild rumors accompanied Hitler's announcement of his proposals to Poland. It was claimed in Warsaw that the Germans had demanded a superhighway corridor through Polish West Prussia over fifteen miles in width instead of the actual 5/8 mile. The

Gazeta Polska claimed that Poland would have to go further in Danzig than she had done in the past. One million Polish soldiers under arms by the beginning of summer was considered a minimum necessity. The *Dziennik Narodowy* (National Daily), a National Democratic paper, asked whether or not Danzig really wished to return to the Reich. It was suggested that possibly a handful of Nazis in the Free City were making all the noise. A rumor circulated that Poland had decided to establish a protectorate in Danzig based on the model of Bohemia-Moravia. The *Kurjer Warszawski* (Warsaw Courier) expressed the general sentiment that Hitler would not ask anything of Poland if he were really a generous person.

This time the German press retaliated. Joseph Goebbels had received permission to unshackle the press after the Reichstag speech. It was hoped that the German press, and an aroused German public opinion, would be effective weapons in inducing the Poles to negotiate under the less friendly circumstances which prevailed after the British guarantee. Goebbels himself began the campaign in *Der Angriff* (The Assault) with a commentary on the Polish press, entitled: "Do they know what they are doing?" The article was studded with citations, and its main thesis was that irresponsible Polish journalists were violating the precepts of Pilsudski. Hans Fritzsche, who was one of Goebbels' chief assistants in the newspaper campaign, later recalled that "each larger German newspaper had for quite some time an abundance of material on complaints of the Germans in Poland without the editors having had a chance to use this material." When the restrictions were removed, "their material now came forth with a bound."

American Ambassador Bullitt at Paris refrained from reporting the reactions of Daladier and Bonnet to Hitler's speech, but he claimed that Secretary-General Alexis Leger at the French Foreign Office had denounced Hitler's oratory in sharp terms. The German Embassy in Paris reported on April 29, 1939, that the moderate tone of Hitler's speech had produced a reassuring effect on the French leaders. Charge d'Affaires Theo Kordt also reported from London that Hitler's speech had produced a conciliatory effect in England. American Ambassador Biddle at Warsaw submitted a report to Washington, D.C., on April 28, 1939, which contained a tortuous attempt to square the circle in the face of Hitler's logic, and to support the Polish stand against Germany. German Charge d'Affaires Thomsen reported the American press reaction to Hitler's speech on April 29, 1939. He expressed his personal fear that the Western countries would make an irresistible effort to produce a new World War out of the Danzig-Corridor problem. President Roosevelt read the Eng-

lish translation of Hitler's speech on April 28, 1939. Hitler's ridicule threw Roosevelt into a violent rage and produced undying hatred of Hitler personally. This personal factor was added to the other motives which prompted Roosevelt to desire the destruction of Germany. Roosevelt had been doing everything possible to promote war in Europe before Hitler's speech. Now his personal hatred of Hitler might cause him to make some mistake even more foolish than the telegrams of April 15, 1939, to Hitler and Mussolini. He did not have the support of the American public for his war policy, and it was possible that a few more blunders might lead to the total failure of his policy.

Throughout the late Spring and into the Summer of 1939, relations between Poland and Germany worsen, as Beck—with the reassurance of the British guarantee behind him—remains adamant in not negotiating with Germany over the Danzig and Corridor questions. Militarist and expansionist sentiment runs high in Poland; prominent Polish newspapers print maps claiming that large slices of German territory in fact belong to Poland ethnically and historically. Incidents of terror against the German minority in Poland increase. German schools in Poland are closed on a large scale. Germany appeals to Poland to stop the wave of terror and violence within its borders, to no avail.

Potocki Urges a Change in Polish Policy

The Germans were forced to conclude that attempts to arouse sympathy for the German minority in the West or to exert indirect pressure on Poland were ineffective. The only alternatives were direct intervention or passive acquiescence in the final elimination of the German minority. There were many indications that hostility toward Germany was increasing simultaneously in Great Britain and the United States. Charge d'Affaires Thomsen sent word from Washington, D.C., on May 17, 1939, that President Roosevelt had told the Senate Military Affairs Committee that it would be a very good thing if both Hitler and Mussolini were assassinated. The situation in France was less unpromising. Ambassador Welczeck reported on May 20th that French Foreign Minister Bonnet had assured him on the previous day that he maintained his firm belief in the advantages of Franco-German cooperation. Bonnet declared that he was not folding his hands in his lap, and that he was working actively on a plan to preserve the peace. Official circles in the United States and Great Britain were more or less in step with Polish fanaticism, whereas France was obviously reluctant to go along with it.

Beck was faced at this time with several pleas from Polish diplomats for an understanding with Germany. Polish Ambassador

Jerzy Potocki, who was on leave from the United States, discussed the situation with Beck at the Polish Foreign Office on July 6, 1939. He told Beck that he had returned to Poland with the express purpose of proposing a change in Polish policy. He complained that the United States and England were suffering from a severe war psychosis. There had been wild rumors on the ship which brought him to Europe that the Germans had occupied Danzig. He insisted that the Jews, the leading capitalists, and the armament manufacturers of the West were united in a solid front for war. They were delighted to find their pretext in the Danzig issue and in Poland's defiant attitude. Potocki added that the most repulsive factor was their complete and cold indifference to the destruction of Poland.

Potocki insisted that the Poles were merely negro slaves in the opinion of the Western profiteers. They were expected to work without receiving anything in return. He sought to appeal to Beck's vanity by claiming that the Polish Foreign Minister was the only man they feared in Poland. He argued that the United States, despite Roosevelt's fever for intervention in Europe, were actually concentrating their own imperialist drive on Latin America. He assured Beck that it would be sheer illusion to expect the United States to intervene in Europe on behalf of Poland. Potocki was forced to conclude that his eloquent arguments produced no effect on the Polish Foreign Minister.

Polish Ambassador Sokolnicki at Ankara supported Potocki in this effort. He was a close friend of Jan Szembek, and it was evident to Potocki and Sokolnicki that Szembek would accept their position if he were Polish Foreign Minister. It seemed likely, too, that Pilsudski would have rejected the Beck policy had he been alive. Sokolnicki confided to German Ambassador Papen at Ankara on July 14, 1939, that he would like to see a negotiated settlement between Germany and Poland before the Jews and the Free Masons had convinced the world that a catastrophic conflict was inevitable. The Polish diplomat added that he would be pleased to see the Anglo-Soviet alliance negotiations end in failure as soon as possible.

The American diplomats in Europe continued to oppose peace and urge war. Bullitt was disgusted with the failure of Bonnet to encourage Poland with a blank check at Danzig. He continued to warn Roosevelt that the French Foreign Minister was working for peace. Bullitt was delighted at times to find that Bonnet was pessimistic about the chances for peace. He reported with satisfaction on June 28, 1939, that Bonnet could see no way out for Hitler other than war. Biddle at Warsaw gave uncritical support to Polish policy at Danzig. He claimed in a report on July 12, 1939, that Viktor Boettcher, the unofficial Danzig foreign minister and a

close personal friend of [League High Commissioner at Danzig] Burckhardt, had become openly aggressive and was no longer a "repressed imperialist." Biddle failed to explain why a man who desired the reunion of his native city with his native country, according to the wishes of the vast majority of both parties, was an imperialist.

By the beginning of August, tensions between Germany and Poland are at the boiling point. The anti-German incidents have continued unabated. Thousands of ethnic German refugees flee Poland and are sheltered by Germany. Marshal Smigly-Rydz is more bellicose than ever. The Polish government engages in provocations and takes economic reprisals at Danzig. On August 4th, a Polish ultimatum is presented to the Danzig Senate, notifying it that the frontiers of Danzig will be closed to the importation of all foreign food products unless the Danzig government promises that it will not interfere with the activities of Polish customs inspectors. Since the Danzig populace depends in the main on food from the outside to survive, this is a formidable threat. Germany is outraged.

Roosevelt Responds to the Crisis of Early August

American Ambassador Bullitt at Paris informed President Roosevelt on August 3, 1939, that Beck was predicting that an intense and decisive phase of the crisis between Germany and Poland might occur before August 15, 1939. President Roosevelt knew that Poland was obviously to blame for the crisis which began at Danzig on August 4th, and he was alarmed at the prospect that the American public might learn the truth about the situation. This could be a decisive factor in discouraging his program for American military intervention in Europe. He instructed Under-Secretary Sumner Welles on August 11, 1939, to order American Ambassador Biddle to advise the Poles about this problem. President Roosevelt urged the Poles to be more clever in making it appear that German moves were responsible for any inevitable explosion at Danzig.

The response of Beck to American intervention was not encouraging. Biddle reported to President Roosevelt, at midnight on August 11th, that the Polish Government had decided that there could be absolutely no concessions to Germany. Beck was obviously unwilling to engage in a series of elaborate but empty maneuvers which might have been useful in deceiving the American public. Beck wished the American President to know that he was content at the moment to have full British support for his policy. Beck showed Biddle a report from Polish Ambassador Raczyński at London on August 13, 1939. The report contained the explicit approval of Halifax for recent Polish measures at Danzig.

Since March Halifax has been courting Russia for an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance, if not with Poland then without her (though her at least passive acquiescence to any arrangement would have to be obtained). The British and French missions to Moscow proceed into August, but the negotiations bog down especially on the question of Poland's role. The British and French give their OK to the possible movement of Soviet troops through Poland in a "protector" role in the case of German-Polish war. But Poland absolutely refuses any such deal. It is clear that time is running out, especially as Stalin—distrustful, with reason, of the Western Powers, and having given a series of diplomatic "hints" for months previous—begins to eye Hitler favorably, and vice-versa. Stalin would like to see a war of attrition between Germany and the West without his involvement, so that he could move in and pick up the pieces after the combattants had bled themselves dry. Hitler would like to have his hands freed in the East, after a defeat of Poland, by an accomodation with Stalin. Ideally, he hopes that such an accomodation will shock the Western Powers into thinking twice about their apparent plans for what would then amount to a one-front Western war with Germany. In this way Hitler hopes to prevent a general European war.

Roosevelt and the Attempt at an Anglo-French-Soviet Alliance

American Ambassador Bullitt at Paris was not enthusiastic about the Anglo-French attempt to conclude an alliance with the Soviet Union. He was inclined to agree with the hostile Polish attitude toward Russia. Bullitt had been American Ambassador at Moscow from 1933 to 1936, and he had few illusions about the Soviet Union. He suggested in his final report from Moscow on April 20, 1936, that the Russian standard of living was possibly lower than that of any other country in the world. He reported that the Bulgarian Comintern leader, Dimitrov, had admitted that Soviet popular front and collective security tactics were aimed at undermining the foreign capitalist systems. He insisted that relations of sincere friendship between the Soviet Union and the United States were an impossibility. He admitted that a conflict between Germany and France would expose Europe to the danger of Communist domination. He believed that it was worth taking this risk in order to destroy Germany, but he was fully aware of the danger involved.

President Roosevelt was aware that economic and social conditions in Germany were far superior to those in the Soviet Union. Ambassador Joseph E. Davies, who succeeded Bullitt at Moscow, reported to Roosevelt on April 1, 1938, that the terror in Russia was "a horrifying fact." Davies also complained about the gigan-

tic Soviet expenditures on armaments, and he reported that about 25% of the total Soviet national income in 1937 was spent on defense, compared to 10% in Germany. Davies reported that Stalin, in a letter to *Pravda* on February 14, 1938, had confirmed his intention to spread the Communist system throughout the world. Stalin promised that the Soviet Government would work with foreign Communists to achieve this goal. He concluded his letter by stating: "I wish very much . . . that there were no longer on earth such unpleasant things as a capitalistic environment, the danger of a military attack, the danger of the restoration of capitalism, and so on." Davies mentioned that General Ernst Koestring, the veteran German military attache in the Soviet Union, continued to hold a high opinion of the Red Army despite the gigantic purges of 1937 in the Russian military services. Davies concluded that the Soviet Union could best be described as "a terrible tyranny." The presentation of these reports did not prompt President Roosevelt to withdraw the statement he had made in his major address at Chicago on October 6, 1937, that the Soviet Union was one of the peace-loving nations of the world. Roosevelt was fully aware of the danger from Communism, but he believed that this consideration was unimportant compared to his preferred objective of destroying National Socialist Germany.

Premier Daladier of France would have been furious had he known that Kennard was sabotaging British pressure on Poland with the argument that American sensibilities had to be taken into account. He told American Ambassador Bullitt at Paris on August 18th that he was shocked and angered by the "violence" with which Lukasiewicz and Beck had rejected Soviet aid to Poland. Daladier claimed that it would be easy to internationalize Soviet aid to the Poles by sending two French and one British divisions to Poland by way of Russia. Daladier repeated to Bullitt three times with increasing emphasis that he would not send a single French peasant to give his life for Poland if the Poles rejected Russian aid.

Bullitt was alarmed by this revelation of what he considered a violently anti-Polish reaction on the part of Daladier. He had applied pressure for months on Daladier and Alexis Leger, the Secretary-General at the French Foreign Office, in the hope that they would distance themselves from the peace policy of Georges Bonnet and repudiate that policy. He had visited London in May 1939 to coordinate his strategy with the efforts of Sir Robert Vansittart. The Diplomatic Adviser to His Majesty's Government considered relations with France to be his own special province, and he hoped to support the Halifax war policy by securing French participation in any war against Germany. Vansittart assured Bullitt that Alexis Leger was his "intimate friend," and

that Leger could be relied upon to support the efforts of Halifax and Roosevelt to involve France in war with Germany.

Bullitt, Vansittart, and Leger feared that Sir Eric Phipps, the British Ambassador to France and brother-in-law of Vansittart, shared the negative attitude of Prime Minister Chamberlain toward an alliance between the Western Powers and Russia. Bullitt had begun to dislike Bonnet, and he reported to President Roosevelt without any regard for accuracy: "in point of fact both Bonnet and Sir Eric Phipps were opposed to bringing the Soviet Union into close cooperation with France and England." Bullitt also feared that Prime Minister Chamberlain might attempt to challenge the policy of Halifax and restore his own control over the conduct of British policy. American Ambassador Kennedy had reported from London on July 20, 1939, that Chamberlain was "sick and disgusted with Russians." The British Prime Minister believed that Hitler would welcome any tangible opportunity for a peaceful settlement. Chamberlain knew that Hitler was not bluffing and that he might gamble on a war, but he told Kennedy that Hitler "is highly intelligent and therefore would not be prepared to wage a world war."

President Roosevelt had intervened directly in the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers on August 4, 1939. Lawrence Steinhardt, who had succeeded Davies as American Ambassador to Russia, was instructed by confidential letter to tell Molotov that the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union were identical in promoting the defeat of Italy and Germany in a European war. President Roosevelt urged the Soviet Union to conclude a military alliance with Great Britain and France, and he intimated that the United States would ultimately join this coalition of Powers. The American Ambassador was informed that President Roosevelt had told Soviet Ambassador Konstantin Umansky, before the latter departed for Russia on leave, that the United States hoped to achieve a position of solidarity with the Soviet Union against Germany and Italy.

The Russians were pleased with the Roosevelt message because it strengthened their position in negotiations with both the Western Powers and Germany, and the support of Roosevelt made it easier for them to gain consent for their ambitious program of expansion in Finland, Poland, Rumania, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The Russians had no desire to conceal from the foreign Powers the contents of the confidential Roosevelt message. The news of the message appeared in the *Voelkischer Beobachter* at Berlin on August 11, 1939, and its contents were published by the *Ilustrowany Kurjer* at Krakow on August 13, 1939. Steinhardt knew that Umansky had been informed of the contents of the Roosevelt message before leaving the United

States. The letter with the message was sent by way of Bullitt at Paris, and Steinhardt did not receive it until August 15, 1939. He concluded that Molotov had instructed Umansky to reveal the contents of the letter before it reached Russia, and that Molotov had proceeded to permit the news of the letter to reach the foreign Powers before he had actually received it himself.

Steinhardt presented the Roosevelt letter to Molotov on August 16, 1939 and the two diplomats proceeded to discuss its contents. Roosevelt, in writing the letter, had hoped to influence Russian policy in favor of the Western Powers, but it is not surprising that he failed completely in this effort, and that Molotov used the message for his own purposes. Molotov told Steinhardt that the British and French military missions had come to Russia to discuss military collaboration in terms which the Soviet Foreign Commissar characterized as "vague generalities." Molotov added that these missions were unable to contend with the specific points which Russia had raised.

Steinhardt reported to President Roosevelt on August 16th that he was personally convinced that the Soviet Union would seek to avoid participation in the early phase of a European conflict. This annoyed President Roosevelt, who seemingly would have led the United States into a European conflict on the first day of war had American public opinion and the American Congress permitted such a policy. The American President was perturbed to learn, a few days later, that Alexis Leger at the French Foreign Office was not the unconditional advocate of war-at-any-price which Bullitt had claimed. Leger revealed his opinion that it would be exceedingly unwise for Great Britain and France to attack Germany without military support from the Soviet Union. This seemed to indicate that there would be virtually no support for a war policy in France if the negotiations at Moscow failed. Roosevelt also learned that Premier Daladier was continuing to denounce the "criminal folly" of the Poles. President Roosevelt knew that Halifax would abandon his project for war against Germany if he was unable to gain the military support of either the Soviet Union or France. The possibility that the peace might be saved was perturbing to the American President who hoped to utilize a European war to achieve his dream for the perpetuation of his tenure and the increase of his personal prestige and glory.

By August 11th, even as negotiations with the British and French are still in progress, Stalin decides to exercise the option with Germany. A definite indication is sent to Berlin the next day. Russian Foreign Minister Molotov and German Ambassador Schulenberg engage in preliminary talks. With the final failure of the British and French missions, the way is open for a German-

Soviet agreement. On August 23rd, after the settling of a commercial treaty, Ribbentrop flies to Moscow; that night a German-Soviet nonaggression pact is signed and announced to the world. It is a desperate, quickly-snatched triumph for Hitler, whose satisfaction at his position is marred only by the knowledge that Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, had backed Italy down and out of the "united front" with Germany in the face of an evident Anglo-French determination to go to war over Danzig.

The German-Soviet Pact

Hitler hoped to recover the diplomatic initiative through his Kremlin pact of August 23, 1939. The effort launched by Halifax on March 17, 1939, to build a formidable British alliance front in Eastern Europe had failed. Hitler also hoped that Great Britain and France would react to this situation by withdrawing their support from Poland. He knew that his pact with Russia placed him in a strong position to resume negotiations with the Western Powers. His recent success was too sensational to permit new negotiation efforts to be readily confused with weakness. The British Government gave Hitler an excellent opening for his new diplomatic campaign by commissioning Chamberlain to write to him. The British leaders, of course, did not intend to embark on major negotiations, but Hitler had other plans. The presentation of the Chamberlain letter by Henderson on August 23, 1939, was the signal for a major German diplomatic offensive in Great Britain.

The situation would have been relatively simple for Hitler by August 23, 1939, had it not been for the unpardonable indiscretion of Ciano and the incredible conduct of General Gamelin. The statement of Ciano on August 18th that Italy would not support Germany cushioned Halifax from the impact of the German treaty with Russia, and it gave General Gamelin an excuse to rationalize the unfavorable French military situation, which had been created by the Russian agreement with Germany. The action of Ciano was especially unwarranted because the Italian Foreign Minister knew that Hitler hoped to create the maximum effect of surprise with his Russian pact. Ciano knew that his own pledge to the British would greatly reduce the impact of Hitler's diplomacy. It was easy to argue in London that the position of Hitler would be insecure if the Italians refused to be loyal to their engagements with him. Italian loyalty to Hitler and a clear decision from France against war on behalf of the Poles would surely have pulled the teeth from the Halifax campaign to launch a preventive war against Germany. The absence of these contingencies made it exceedingly difficult for Hitler to capitalize on his Russian success in negotiations with the British leaders. He was not fully

aware of this situation on August 23rd. He knew nothing of the Italian pledge to the British on August 18th, or of the crucial debate in the meeting of the French Defense Council. He failed to appreciate the adamantine determination of Halifax for war. He knew that British Ambassador Henderson was opposed to war, and he hoped that the views of the British diplomat at Berlin were shared to some extent by his master at London. Hitler was more optimistic than the facts warranted, but this was mainly because he was not fully aware of the existing situation.

The Russians too were unduly optimistic about their prospects on August 23, 1939. They overestimated the military power of France, and they expected a hopeless military stalemate on the Franco-German front reminiscent of World War I. Stalin hoped to expand his position in Eastern Europe, and to intervene militarily against Germany in the latter phase of a European war, when both Germany and the Western Powers were exhausted. There was one notably great difference in the attitudes of Stalin and Hitler. The Soviet Dictator, like Halifax and Roosevelt, was hoping for the outbreak of a general European war. Hitler considered that a European war would be a great evil, and he was anxious to prevent it. It is ironical to anticipate that the leaders of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States ultimately joined together in true Orwellian fashion, at Nuremberg in 1945-1946, to condemn the German leaders for deliberately seeking, as "aggressors," to destroy the peace of the world.

In July, Hitler had launched a private program for peace at the suggestion of Reichsmarshall Goering. Goering's friend Birger Dahlerus, a Swedish engineer with many contacts in both Britain and Germany, arranged unofficial meetings throughout July and August between Germans and British supporters of the Chamberlain government. Other private contacts between the Germans and the British developed. Potentially good news about the attitude of influential Britons—their desire to see peace between Britain and Germany maintained—came from these conferences, including a report stating that William S. Ropp, who had been selected to head the British Air Ministry intelligence service division for Germany in wartime, claimed that there was lively opposition to war with Germany in the British Air Ministry. Ropp had further suggested that a British-French declaration of war on Germany need not be taken seriously, because it would be possible to conclude peace after the completion of the Polish phase of hostilities. Goering, ever suspicious, suspects the Ropp remarks may be a British ploy, designed to lure Hitler into gambling in Poland. But Alfred Rosenberg, head of the Foreign Policy office of the National Socialist Party, believes the sentiments may well be

genuine and accurate. His report on the matter is forwarded to the German Foreign Office and to Hitler.

Hitler Hopes for Peace—Despite Roosevelt

The German Foreign Office also received a confidential report on August 16, 1939, from Paul Legrenier, a French journalist who was sincerely friendly toward Germany. Legrenier insisted that Great Britain and France would not go to war against Germany in a conflict between Germany and Poland arising from trouble at Danzig. He was basing his report on the determination of French Foreign Minister Bonnet not to fight for Polish interests at Danzig, and on the obvious fact that Great Britain would not attack Germany without French support. Joseph Barnes, the Berlin correspondent of the New York Herald Tribune, estimated to the German diplomats on the same day that there was still at least a 50-50 chance that Great Britain and France would not attack Germany. Barnes added that he was basing his estimate on the assumption that Germany would make a great effort to avoid needless provocation of Great Britain and France. The reports of Ropp, Legrenier, and Barnes were received by Hitler on August 16, 1939, before the announcement of the Russo-German Pact. Hitler was convinced that the conclusion of the Pact with Russia would increase the chances for peace. It is not astonishing under these circumstances that he was more optimistic than Goering or Mussolini about the possibilities of avoiding an Anglo-German war.

The German Foreign Office was under no illusion about the official policy of President Roosevelt in the current crisis. They knew that his policy was based on the twin assumptions that there should and would be a general European war. There was also reason to believe that some of the American diplomats in Berlin did not share this attitude. British Ambassador Henderson informed the Germans that American Charge d'Affaires Kirk was constantly prodding him to insist that Great Britain would fight rather than retreat, but there was ample evidence that Kirk hoped a show of British firmness would prompt Hitler to make new proposals for a settlement. The Germans also knew that Kirk had severely reprimanded Louis P. Lochner, the American journalist, for questioning the determination of Germany to go to war. Lochner was following the tactics of the Polish journalists by claiming that Hitler was bluffing, because he knew that these tactics would encourage German defiance and make war more likely. It was obvious that Kirk would not have intervened with Lochner on his own initiative had he personally favored war, and the German diplomats were pleased to learn that Kirk had denounced his warmongering.

The Roosevelt Messages to Germany and Poland

President Roosevelt sent insincere peace messages to Germany and Poland at 9:00 p.m. on August 24, 1939. He ignored in his message to Germany the rebuff he had received from Hitler's speech to the Reichstag on April 28th by claiming that "to the message which I sent you last April I have received no reply." He proposed a settlement between Germany and Poland by direct negotiation, arbitration, or mediation. He was treading on difficult ground, because Poland, whom he favored, rather than Germany, whom he opposed, blocked the resumption of negotiations. The messages from President Roosevelt forced President Moscicki of Poland to pay lip service to negotiation, although the Polish Government did not desire to resume contact with the Germans. The reply of President Moscicki was a definite pledge to President Roosevelt that Poland would negotiate, although the Poles actually had no intention of doing so.

President Roosevelt informed Hitler that "it is understood, of course, that upon resort to any one of the alternatives I suggest, each nation will agree to accord complete respect to the independence and territorial integrity of the other." President Roosevelt imagined that this arrangement would preclude in advance any tangible Polish concessions to Germany, but its terms were entirely consistent with the Hitler offer of October 1938 which the Poles had rejected. The original German proposals were actually based upon the respect of the independence and territorial integrity of Poland. This had not prevented the Poles from rejecting them and from ordering the partial mobilization of the Polish armed forces against Germany. Hitler had revealed to the world the inaccuracies and fallacies in the Roosevelt proposals of April 15, 1939, to Germany and Italy, but President Roosevelt rarely accepted criticism. He blandly concluded his message to Hitler with the statement that the United States was prepared to contribute to peace "in the form set forth in my messages of April 14 (advance release of the messages to the American press on that date)." The Roosevelt messages to Germany and Poland were made public at Washington, D.C., at 10:00 p.m. on August 24, 1939. The message to Hitler was not submitted to the German Foreign Office by American Charge d'Affaires Kirk until 9:00 a.m. on August 25th. Hitler decided to defer his reply to President Roosevelt for several days. He was intent, because of the importance of German-American relations, upon preparing a carefully cogent and courteous exposition of the German position for the benefit of the American President.

German Ambassador Mackensen had a satisfactory conversation with Mussolini about the Russo-German treaty early on August 25, 1939. The Italian leader warmly assured Mackensen that he approved of this Pact, and he recalled that he had

suggested this himself the previous Spring. Mussolini told Mackensen that he was whole-heartedly in accord with Germany's position in the Polish question. The Italian leader described the worsening of German-Polish relations as "so acute that an armed conflict can no longer be avoided." He was convinced that the Polish mentality was "no longer responsive to reasonable suggestions, no matter from which side they might come."

Mackensen was immensely impressed by the attitude displayed by Mussolini in the absence of Ciano or [Italian Ambassador to Germany] Attolico. Mussolini claimed that the Poles should have responded to Hitler's original offer by accepting the German annexation of Danzig as an indication that they were sincere in their desire to come to a general agreement with Germany. Mussolini was convinced that "a general conference might have followed" which would have "assured European peace for fifteen to twenty years, as is desired by all." The attitude of the Italian leader on the morning of August 25th was everything which Hitler could have desired, and the German leader concluded that it would be possible to rely on Mussolini's full support. He expected a favorable statement from Italy later in the day in response to the earlier initiative of Ribbentrop.

Mussolini and Ciano had renewed their discussion about a general peace conference with [British Ambassador to Italy] Sir Percy Loraine after the announcement of the Russo-German pact. Loraine reported to Halifax on August 23rd that Mussolini wanted peace, and that he would like to mediate in the German-Polish dispute. Mussolini assured Loraine that Hitler would not accept the terms of a general settlement unless they included the German annexation of Danzig. Loraine reported that the Italians were concentrating on an attempt to gain a British concession on this one decisive point. Loraine informed Halifax that both Mussolini and Ciano were convinced that a successful diplomatic conference was the only hope for a solution of the current difficulties.

American Ambassador William C. Bullitt was advising both Halifax and the French leaders to maintain their military missions in Moscow, and to continue their efforts to detach Italy from Germany. Halifax recognized that the situation in Russia was untenable by this time. The Anglo-French teams had no choice other than to leave Russia empty-handed. Molotov granted an audience to French Ambassador Naggier on August 25th, immediately after the British and French military men departed from the Russian capital. The Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs took pleasure in announcing to the West that the Poles were exclusively responsible for the failure of Anglo-French negotiations with the Russians for a mutual assistance pact. This announcement confirmed suspicions which French Foreign Minister

Bonnet had entertained for many days, and he was inclined for this reason to accept the Russian explanation at face value. Bonnet continued to be furious with the Poles. They had allowed Lipski to engage in an inconclusive conversation with Marshal Goering the previous day, but they had haughtily rejected his suggestion for Franco-Polish consultation on Danzig. The French Foreign Minister was resolved to retaliate by seizing the first opportunity of releasing France from her military obligations to Poland.

Halifax was no longer concerned about Russia, and he did not share the desire of Bonnet to repress Polish excesses at Danzig. He was primarily interested in creating the impression everywhere in the world that the Russo-German pact had not caused him to reconsider his policy toward Germany. Halifax dispatched uniform instructions to British diplomatic missions in all countries on August 24th. He urged them to accept the superhuman task of correcting the impression that the pact had been a blow to the "peace front" headed by England and France. He also claimed that the pact "had produced no effect" on the British Cabinet. He exhorted his diplomats that the British course was straight ahead under the slogan of "preventing the domination of Europe by Germany." Halifax did not explain how a revived German nation of eighty million German citizens could fail to be the leading continental power. After all, it had been said after 1871 that the Germany of Bismarck, with her forty million inhabitants, dominated Europe. The policy of Halifax was calculated to destroy Germany rather than to permit that normal growth and development which for centuries had been considered the natural right of every nation. It was a policy which led to the destruction of a friendly Germany and to the domination of Europe by a hostile Union pledged to overthrow the capitalist system in Great Britain.

Percy Loraine in Rome exposed himself to ridicule in an effort to meet the diplomatic requirements of Halifax. He informed Ciano on August 24 that the Russo-German pact had given him "the first hearty laugh he had had for some weeks." The same man had previously informed the Italian leaders that a pact of mutual assistance with Russia was a necessary feature of the British program. The Italians could be pardoned for suspecting that his "hearty laugh" closely resembled an hysterical scream, because they had never heard him laugh. Loraine soon learned that Halifax was under heavy pressure at home on August 24th to modify the uncompromising British stand at Danzig. The British Foreign Secretary confided to Loraine, despite his earlier circular instructions, that Great Britain might ultimately consider the return of Danzig to Germany as part of an international

settlement. Loraine was bewildered by this information, and he wondered if Halifax intended after all to encourage Mussolini to take the initiative for a conference, which again might resolve British difficulties. There had been no similar suggestion from Halifax during the entire period from the British guarantee to Poland of March 31st to the conclusion of the Russo-German pact. Unfortunately, the momentary weakening of Halifax's rigid stand at Danzig was of short duration, and he soon concluded that he could maintain his original position against the mounting opposition at home. Gilbert and Gott, in *The Appeasers*, attempt to present this incident as a sustained effort on the part of Halifax to come to terms with Germany at Danzig. Unfortunately, this was not the case.

The Polish Pledge to Roosevelt

President Roosevelt received the text of President Moscicki's message on August 25, 1939, and forwarded it to Hitler. Roosevelt emphasized to Hitler that he had a binding promise from Moscicki that Poland would engage in direct negotiations with Germany. The American President added that "all the world prays that Germany, too, will accept." Hitler knew that the message from President Roosevelt was merely a propaganda gesture to discredit Germany, and he was sufficiently shrewd to recognize that a promise made by Poland to the United States was not worth the paper on which it was written. The Poles knew that Roosevelt would support any Polish move to increase the prospect of conflict with Germany and that the American President would not react unfavorably if they refused to honor a pledge to negotiate with Germany. Hitler also knew this, and hence he concentrated on his effort to convince the British that the Poles should negotiate rather than seek to exploit the meaningless Polish response to President Roosevelt.

Beck assured American Ambassador Biddle shortly before midnight on August 25, 1939, that war between Germany and Poland was inevitable. He claimed that Poland had an adequate legal basis for a declaration of war against Germany, in case the Germans failed to take the initiative against Poland within the next few days. Beck denied that there was any truth in the Bielitz massacre, which had been confirmed by neutral sources. He claimed instead that a Polish soldier had been killed by the Germans on August 16, 1939, and that the Germans had proceeded to cut open the stomach of the corpse and to conceal in it the skull of a baby. This story was widely repeated by Polish spokesmen in the days and years which followed, although no attempt was ever made to document the incident. They failed to realize that this type of savagery was based upon certain primi-

tive voodoo-like superstitions in Eastern Europe which were not shared by the Germans. It would have been an unique historical event had modern Poland elected to base a declaration of war on this fantastic charge. American Ambassador Biddle was much impressed by the aggressive attitude of Beck. He predicted to President Roosevelt that Poland would present a series of ultimata to Germany if Hitler backed down in the Danzig dispute.

Beck was impressed by a public German announcement on August 25, 1939, that the Tannenberg and Nuremberg conclaves had been cancelled. The cancellation announcement, and the impressive number of incidents between the Germans and Poles on the following day, convinced the Polish Foreign Minister that a German attack would come at any moment. He did not conclude until August 27th that Hitler, after all, had taken no decisive military measures. French Ambassador Noel claimed that Beck was a very sick man at this time. The French diplomat charged that he was suffering from aggravated fatigue, tuberculosis, and an excessive addiction to stimulants. The Polish Foreign Minister ultimately died of tuberculosis in Rumania in 1944, after the British authorities had denied him permission to come to England. The French Ambassador, who detested Beck, delighted in conveying the impression that the Polish Foreign Minister was both morally and physically decadent.

German troops at the Slovak-Polish frontier had begun their advance on the morning of August 26, 1939, before countermanding orders reached them, and they crossed into Poland at Jablonka Pass. Fortunately, the Poles were not holding a position there, and an engagement was avoided when the Germans speedily retreated a considerable distance across the frontier and into Slovakia. The Poles engaged German patrols in nearly a dozen skirmishes in the Dzialdowo region directly north of Warsaw and across the East Prussian frontier. The engagements ended when the German units were suddenly withdrawn. It was significant that these serious incidents occurred on two of the most crucial sectors of the German operational plan. A massacre of minority Germans in the Lodz area and constant violations of the German frontier from the Polish side tended to deflect attention from these incidents. A Polish warship on August 26, 1939, fired at a German civilian transport airplane on which State Secretary Wilhelm Stuckardt of the Ministry of Interior was returning from Danzig. Stuckardt and the Danzig leaders had discussed the legal problems involved in the projected return of Danzig to the Reich.

Hitler's reversal of military orders naturally created perplexity in the German Army. One of the German Generals was dispatched to the Wilhelmstrasse on the night of August 25, 1939, to

inquire indignantly why the soldiers had been sent out if it was intended to settle differences with Poland by diplomatic means. The German Foreign Office had no ready answer with which to meet this embarrassing question.

In Berlin, British Ambassador Henderson, a sincere advocate of a British-German understanding who privately sympathizes with Germany in the Polish question, works tirelessly for peace in the difficult position of having to officially represent Halifax's war policy. He tries to persuade Halifax of the reality of the German minority's sufferings in Poland. He stresses that unless Poland finally negotiates with Germany there will undoubtedly be war. He remarks that from the beginning "the Poles were utterly foolish and unwise."

Roosevelt Hopes for War and Strives to Coordinate Policy

Phipps reported from Paris that Bullitt had received new instructions from President Roosevelt designed to facilitate a closer coordination of British and American policy against Germany. The American President suggested that everything possible should be done by propaganda to bring down the German regime in revolutionary chaos. Roosevelt believed that wireless propaganda should be broadcast to Germany around the clock. He expected that it would produce a great effect to argue in advance that Hitler would be solely responsible for any war. He hoped that the pacific desires of the German people might be exploited to undermine the loyalty of Germans toward their government after the outbreak of war.

Henderson continued to do what he could at Berlin to preserve peace. He contacted Polish Ambassador Lipski again on August 25th and urged him to discuss the problem of the German minority in Poland with the German Government. Henderson reported to Halifax that Italian Ambassador Attolico was horrified at the prospect of war. Attolico had declared with indignation that warmongers such as Anthony Eden should be hanged. Henderson avoided criticizing Attolico's statement about Eden in any way. Eden, to be sure, had worked with Churchill to sabotage appeasement, but the chief role in the scuttling of the appeasement policy had been played by Halifax, the man to whom Henderson addressed his report.

Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British Ambassador to the United States, addressed a series of final reports to Halifax prior to his return to England and his replacement by Lord Lothian. Lindsay indicated that Roosevelt was delighted at the prospect of a new World War. The American President had damaged his prospects in May 1939 with his unsuccessful attempt to pull the teeth from

the American neutrality laws, but he assured Lindsay that he would succeed in emasculating this legislation after the outbreak of war. He admitted that he would be forced to delay a new effort to do so "until war broke out." The American President also promised that he would not actually abide by the neutrality laws if he was compelled to invoke them. He would frustrate the purpose of the laws by delaying a proclamation of neutrality for at least five days after the outbreak of war. He would see that war material in the interim was rushed to the British in Canada in enormous quantities. Lindsay reported with his usual excessive moderation that there "was every indication in his language that the American authorities would be anxious to cheat in favor of His Majesty's Government."

Roosevelt also promised Lindsay that he would delay German ships under false pretenses in a feigned search for arms, so that they could be easily seized by the British under circumstances which would be arranged with exactitude between the American and British authorities. The British Ambassador was personally perturbed that the President of one of the important countries could be gay and joyful about a tragedy which seemed so destructive of the hopes of all mankind. He reported that Roosevelt "spoke in a tone of almost impish glee and though I may be wrong the whole business gave me the impression of resembling a school-boy prank." It was an American and world tragedy to have at this important juncture a President whose emotions and ideas could be rated by a friendly Ambassador as childish.

Halifax was inclined to regard the attitude of the American President as a product of one of the most successful British efforts in colonial propaganda. The American President, who was an enthusiastic militarist, had accepted the idea of World War II as his best escape from the economic depression in the United States. The British Foreign Secretary had studied the fantastic Lochner report about the alleged remarks of Hitler to his military men on the Obersalzberg on August 22nd. He wired Loraine in Rome on August 26th that recent information from Berlin indicated that Hitler had some kind of Polish partition in mind. His purpose was to convey to Mussolini the idea that the German leader was too extreme in his plans, at the expense of the Poles, to be amenable to a reasonable settlement of German-Polish difficulties. Halifax hoped in this way to discourage Mussolini's ideas for a diplomatic conference.

Thomsen's View of Roosevelt

State Secretary Weizsaecker had invited American Charge d'Affaires Kirk to call at the German Foreign Office on the evening of August 26th. Weizsaecker conveyed Hitler's acknowl-

edgment of the two recent messages from President Roosevelt, and Kirk expressed his pleasure at this act of courtesy. Weizsaecker advised Kirk that it would be more timely to present warnings in Warsaw than at Berlin. German Charge d'Affaires Thomsen reminded Hitler on August 28th that Roosevelt would do everything he could to encompass the downfall of Germany. He predicted that Roosevelt would employ ruthless tactics to force active American participation in a European war despite opposition from American public opinion. Thomsen was convinced that American raw materials and machines would be made available to Great Britain and France immediately after the outbreak of war, and that this measure would be popular because it would aid in overcoming the extensive unemployment. Thomsen concluded that the existing American neutrality legislation would be either abrogated or circumvented.

On August 25th, the British guarantee to Poland becomes a formal military alliance. Hitler appeals to Britain and France not to make a German-Polish dispute the cause of general European war. He offers a remarkable alliance to Britain in which German troops would guarantee the British empire around the world. The offer is brushed aside. Henderson continues his attempt to save the situation at Berlin; he urges Lipski to enter into discussions with the Germans, to no avail. Henderson's exertions are joined by those of Dahlerus, by now communicating directly between Hitler and Chamberlain and Halifax. France strongly urges Poland to negotiate with Germany. Britain does not. Poland calls up more reservists to active service. On August 29th, Hitler presents a moderate 16-point basis for direct negotiations with Poland. Poland does not respond. Beck refuses to go to Berlin to take part in discussions. On August 31st, Lipski, minus plenipotentiary powers, meets with Hitler but refuses to consider one final German proposal.

Chamberlain and Halifax

No one in the position of the British Ambassador could be blamed for desisting from further efforts to prevent war, but Henderson never stopped trying. It is this fact, combined with his unquestionable British patriotism and his determination to stand by his own country through thick and thin, regardless of the dreadful blunders of the British leaders, that make his mission to Berlin a study in courage. He tried every possible tactic to persuade Chamberlain to express his own views, and to encourage the British Prime Minister to resume leadership at the British Foreign Office before it was too late. He made a special effort to convince the British leaders that he had always been firm with

Hitler, and he recalled that he had bombarded Hitler with arguments and answers in the conversation of August 28th, which had apparently turned out very favorably for Great Britain.

Halifax continued to advise Chamberlain to ignore the complaints of Henderson and others about the attitude and policies of Poland. He received a very useful letter from Count Raczynski on August 30th. The Polish Government in this letter solemnly swore that no persecution of the German minority was taking place in Poland. The American journalist, W.L. White, later recalled that there was no doubt among well-informed persons by this time that horrible atrocities were being inflicted every day on the Germans of Poland. The pledge from Raczynski had about as much validity as the civil liberties guaranteed by the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union.

Chamberlain complained to American Ambassador Kennedy after the outbreak of World War II "that America and the world Jews had forced England into the war." Kennedy himself was convinced that "neither the French nor the British would have made Poland a cause of war if it had not been for the constant needling from Washington." Kennedy in 1939 was subjected to constant pressure from the American Ambassador at Paris, and he placed primary emphasis on "Bullitt's urging on Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 that the Germans must be faced down about Poland." Kennedy was instructed by President Roosevelt on the telephone "to put some iron up Chamberlain's backside," a gratuitous instruction because Chamberlain had abdicated control over British policy to Lord Halifax in October 1938. Kennedy, Bullitt, and Roosevelt never succeeded in understanding this situation. They were neither well-informed, nor astute about discovering facts for themselves, and Halifax never chose to confide in them. The subsequent sting of conscience which caused Chamberlain to complain to Kennedy about America and the Jews was an attempt to shift the blame rather than a full confession. He was merely saying in different words that he and his friends might have found the courage to challenge Halifax had not the latter enjoyed the support of President Roosevelt. This was undoubtedly a defensive rationalization, because none of them ever displayed the slightest inclination to oppose Halifax. Furthermore, Halifax had decided upon a policy of war with Germany long before the German occupation of Prague, and before Roosevelt attempted to exert any considerable bellicose pressure on the British leaders. Halifax had stirred Roosevelt against the Germans before Hitler went to Prague, rather than the other way around. Roosevelt was a novice in international affairs compared to Halifax, and it was inconceivable that he could exert a decisive influence on the British Foreign Secretary.

Halifax had considered an Anglo-German war inevitable ever since 1936, and he never wavered in his campaign to destroy Germany, from October 1938, when he assumed personal control over British policy, to the outbreak of World War II in September 1939. He was more than a match for Chamberlain, the Unitarian business leader from the Midlands, or for any of his soft-spoken friends. He had refrained from wresting control over foreign policy from Chamberlain until the British leader returned from Munich to face the hostile critics within his own Conservative Party. He had never seriously criticized Chamberlain's conduct of policy until he was in a position to dominate it himself. Halifax would have been amused to hear Winston Churchill telling his friends in August 1939 that he feared the British Government "would run out over Poland." This was the wrong way to put it. Halifax was primarily worried by the possibility that France would run out over Poland. This was the only event which would prompt him to abandon his own policy of war against Germany.

On the morning of September 1st, German troops attack Poland. Hitler announces the invasion before the Reichstag, stating that the brutal suppression of the ethnic German minority and the lack of freedom and self-determination for Danzig necessitated military action. Mussolini makes last-minute pleas for a grand peace conference dealing with all causes of European conflict, to meet on September 5th, on the precondition that Danzig is returned to Germany in advance. Hitler and, initially, France, are agreeable. Britain is not, and goads France into joining with Britain in insisting on a precondition that fighting must stop in Poland. The conference plan fails. On the night of September 2nd, British ministers led by Halifax virtually demand of Chamberlain that an ultimatum be issued to Germany. It is presented the next morning, demanding not only that the fighting cease but that all German troops withdraw from Poland. With the expiration of the ultimatum at 11 a.m., Britain declares war on Germany. A French ultimatum follows, somewhat reluctantly. With its expiration at 5 p.m., France declares war on Germany. World War II begins.

Halifax and Roosevelt

It was clever of Halifax to claim that further intimate Anglo-German conversations would displease President Roosevelt. Chamberlain had been severely criticized for failing to respond favorably to an impractical proposal from Roosevelt, in January 1938, for a grandiose diplomatic conference, which would not only have failed to commit the United States to the British imperialistic program, but undoubtedly would have weakened the effort of Chamberlain to increase British influence in Italy. Lord

Lothian had succeeded Sir Ronald Lindsay as British Ambassador to the United States. Lothian, like Henderson at Berlin, favored a peaceful understanding with Germany, but he was a disciplined diplomat who subordinated his own personal views to the requirements of Halifax's war policy. The new British Ambassador was destined to play a more active role behind the scenes of American politics than any previous British diplomat. Lothian confirmed Lindsay's judgment that there was "nothing neutral" about Roosevelt's attitude. The American President insisted that "the most serious danger from the standpoint of American public opinion would be if it formed the conclusion that Herr Hitler was entangling the British Government in negotiations leading to pressure on Poland by England and France to abandon vital interests." It was obvious to Lothian that Roosevelt wanted war in Europe.

The American President knew that a diplomatic settlement of the European crisis would extinguish his own plans for American military aggression in Europe. Lord Lothian assured Halifax that the partisanship of Roosevelt extended to the minute details. Roosevelt intended to urge the belligerents at the outbreak of the expected war not to bombard civilians, because he hoped in this way to protect Warsaw, one of the Allied capitals. Lothian knew that Roosevelt would never object to a later effort by Great Britain to massacre the civilian population of Germany by means of mass bombing attacks. Roosevelt confided to Lothian that his primary objective at the moment was to evade American neutrality legislation after the outbreak of war. He was intent on renewing the struggle in the American Congress to remove the legal embargo on war material. He promised that he would refuse to admit from the very start of hostilities that aluminum sheets for airplanes were "aeroplane parts" or that airplane engine blocks had anything to do with airplanes.

Lothian confirmed the report of his predecessor that Roosevelt was delighted at the prospect of a new World War. This warlike attitude of Roosevelt was exploited by Halifax in adducing artificial arguments for closing the door on further negotiations with Hitler. There was actually no reason to fear that President Roosevelt would be in a position to cause trouble for Great Britain in the event of a negotiated settlement in Europe. The American President did not have the support of Congress or public opinion for his aggressive foreign policy, and he was nearing the end of his final presidential term, final according to the sacrosanct political tradition established by George Washington and Thomas Jefferson. It was obvious that he would need a crisis of the greatest dimensions, such as a big war in Europe, to campaign successfully for further terms of office. It would have been easy

For space reasons the 98 footnotes with which Professor Hoggan supports his case in this article are omitted from this issue of *The JHR*. They appear in the German edition of *The Forced War* (*Der erzwungene Krieg: Die Ursachen und Urheber des 2. Weltkriegs* [Tuebingen: Grabert Verlag]), the latest (12th) revised edition of which contains some substantial supplementations, and will of course appear in the forthcoming English edition.

About the Contributors

MARK WEBER is a frequent contributor to *The JHR*. He received his M.A. in modern European History from Indiana University in 1977. He now works in Washington D.C. as a writer, researcher and translator.

TYLER KENT served in the American State Department foreign service from 1934 to 1940, first at Moscow and then at London. While working as a code clerk at the London embassy, he began to abstract and make copies for his own use of documents which he believed indicated that President Roosevelt was lying to the American people and Congress about commitments to Britain. He was arrested by Scotland Yard in May 1940, and his diplomatic immunity was waived by Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy. Charged with violating Britain's Official Secrets Act, he was convicted in a secret trial and remained in British confinement until November 1945. Since the war he has been a businessman and publisher. He currently resides in Texas, and is working on an autobiography.

DAVID L. HOGGAN received his Ph.D. in History from Harvard University in 1948. His academic career has included teaching posts at the University of California at Berkeley, San Francisco State College, and the Amerika Institut of the University of Munich. In 1964 he was awarded the Leopold von Ranke Prize for historical scholarship by the Society for the Promotion of Historical Research, of West Germany. His book on the origins of World War II, *Der erzwungene Krieg*, was based on his doctoral dissertation dealing with German-Polish relations. First published in 1961, it has been kept continually in print in revised, updated editions. Dr. Hoggan's other books include: *Frankreichs Widerstand gegen den Zweiten Weltkrieg*, *Der unnoetige Krieg: Deutsche Aussenpolitik 1939-1945*, *The Myth of the New History*, and *Das blinde Jahrhundert Teil I: Amerika - Das messianische Urteil*. In the 1960s he founded the Hoggan Research Institute, at Menlo Park, California.



HARRY ELMER BARNES
on
*THE ORIGINS OF
WORLD WAR TWO*

THE GREAT REVISIONIST EXPLORES THE ISSUES,
PERSONALITIES, MOTIVES, AND HISTORIOGRAPHY
OF THE GREATEST CONFLICT IN HISTORY.
PENETRATING INSIGHT FROM THE HISTORIAN
WHO REJECTED THE "VICTORS' HISTORY" OF
THE WAR AND SOUGHT TO TRANSCEND IT WITH
A MORE BALANCED AND OBJECTIVE APPRAISAL.

**THE BARNES
TRILOGY** *A Collection of
Three Classic Essays*

The Court Historians Versus Revisionism

A review of Langer and Gleason's *The Challenge to Isolation* and Herbert Feis's *The Road to Pearl Harbor*.
A scathing critique of the "official" history of Roosevelt's road to war.

Blasting the Historical Blackout


A comprehensive review of A.J.P. Taylor's *The Origins of the Second World War*.

Revisionism and Brainwashing

A review of David L. Hoggan's *The Forced War*, and a commentary on the state of West German historiography as it deals with the war origins issue.

THE BARNES TRILOGY

Paperback, 125 pages, \$4.00 postpaid from
INSTITUTE FOR HISTORICAL REVIEW
Post Office Box 1306, Torrance, Calif. 90505



The Journal of Historical Review

VOLUME FOUR, NUMBER FOUR / WINTER 1983-84

—Special Issue—

PEARL HARBOR Revisionism Renewed

PERCY L. GREAVES, JR.: Was Pearl Harbor Unavoidable? • The Mystery of Pearl Harbor • Senator Ferguson's Investigation • Marshall Comes on Stage • Marshall Testifies Before Congress • Admission of MAGIC • What We Knew

JAMES J. MARTIN: Where Was General Marshall?

The *Journal of Historical Review*
is published quarterly by the
INSTITUTE FOR HISTORICAL REVIEW

Thomas J. Marcellus, Director
Keith Stimely, Editor

EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

WALTER B. ALLENDE, Ph.D.
University of Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires, Argentina

AUSTIN J. APP, Ph.D.
La Salle College (Ret.)
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

GEORGE ASHLEY, Ph.D.
Los Angeles Unified School District
History Instructor

JOHN BENNETT
Victoria Council for Civil Liberties
Melbourne, Australia

ARTHUR R. BUTZ, Ph.D.
Northwestern University
Evanston, Illinois

ROBERT FAURISSON, Ph.D.
University of Lyon-2
Lyon, France

DITLIEB FELDERER
Revisionist History Magazine
Taby, Sweden

PERCY L. GREAVES, Jr.
Free Market Books
Dobbs Ferry, New York

ANDREAS R. WESSERLE, Ph.D.
Marquette University (Ret.)
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

SAMUEL E. KONKIN III
The New Libertarian
Long Beach, California

MARTIN A. LARSON, Ph.D.
The Spotlight
Washington, D.C.

WILLIAM B. LINDSEY, Ph.D.
Research Chemist

JAMES J. MARTIN, Ph.D.
Ralph Myles Publishers
Colorado Springs, Colorado

REVILO P. OLIVER, Ph.D.
University of Illinois (Ret.)
Urbana, Illinois

WILHELM STAEGLICH, Dr. Jur. (Ret.)
Badenweiler, West Germany

UDO WAENDLY, Dipl. Pol.
Verlag fuer Volkstum und
Zeitgeschichtsforschung
Vienna/Wien, West Germany

CHARLES E. WEBER, Ph.D.
University of Tulsa (Ret.)
Tulsa, Oklahoma

Contents

Selections by Percy L. Greaves, Jr.—

Was Pearl Harbor Unavoidable?	391
The Mystery of Pearl Harbor	397
Senator Homer Ferguson and the Pearl Harbor Congressional Investigation	405
Marshall Comes on Stage	425
Marshall Before the Joint Congressional Committee	437
Admission of MAGIC Demolishes FDR's Claim of Surprise	453
What We Knew	467
Where Was General Marshall? <i>James J. Martin</i>	475
About the Contributors	512

A Note From The Editor

Pearl Harbor: The Latest Wave

The latest furious round of publication and ensuing controversy about Pearl Harbor erupted at the end of 1981, and has not simmered down yet. The opening shot was the release in November that year of Gordon W. Prange's massive *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor*. Prange had been working on the book for more than thirty years; his first missed deadline for publication by McGraw-Hill was in 1951, and thereafter he continued to periodically promise completion of the manuscript and never came through, all the while adding more to it and using up advances. It finally got to the point where McGraw-Hill decided to cut its losses and refuse any further communication with the indefatigable, eccentric author. But two of Prange's former students, Donald Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, took up the task of reducing and shaping Prange's thousands of manuscript pages and notes into publishable form, the result of which was *At Dawn We Slept*. Prange had died in May 1980. The book was promoted by McGraw-Hill as the definitive work on the subject, full of new information. Without question it did contain more in the way of details from Japanese sources about the military genesis, planning, execution, and follow-up of the attack than any other work, details gleaned in interviews conducted by Prange in the late '40s and early '50s while he was serving in Japan as Chief of the Historical Section under General MacArthur, and which were indeed "new"—back then. The book's strength and value was as a military history of the Japanese side; when it ventured afield into painting the diplomatic and intelligence pictures, assigning responsibility and blame on the American side, its inadequacies were apparent. Prange's collaborators Goldstein and Dillon were determined to produce an account that would not only stand up as a general history, but in fact deal the final, crippling blow to the revisionists interlopers. They added an appendix called "Revisionists Revisited," a precis of chapters 139-43 in the fourth volume of Prange's original manuscript, in which they attempted a refutation of all revisionist theories and evidences, and concluded that "in a thorough search of more than 30 years, including all publications released up to May 1, 1983, we have not discovered one document or one word of sworn testimony that substantiates the revisionist position on Roosevelt and Pearl Harbor." (Emphasis added.) It was clear that the book was meant to supplant Roberta Wohlstetter's *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (1962) as the fundamental Establishment, pro-Roosevelt account, which would constitute the final word on Pearl Harbor and effectively end revisionism on the subject for all time.

It was not to be. No sooner had *At Dawn We Slept* appeared than it became clear just how much recent important evidence Goldstein and Dillon in fact ignored. Their statement that they had searched through all publications "released up to May 1, 1983" was simply not the truth—as later admitted by Goldstein, who explained that he and Dillon had relied for this statement on the assurances of another historian, Ronald Lewin, that none of the voluminous National Archives Records Service (NARS) and other data released in 1980-81 supported a revisionist view. Even if Lewin was right, which he wasn't, it was a reflection of Goldstein and Dillon's level of scholarly integrity that they would make a sweeping assertion of up-to-date accuracy and comprehensiveness on a claim of personal familiarity which was false.

Much of the NARS and other recent data did indeed support a revisionist position, and was used as such by John Costello, a British historian whose book *The Pacific War* appeared almost simultaneously with Prange's, starting a debate which soon drowned out the premature huzzas for Prange uttered by some overeager reviewers not familiar enough with the evidential record to even have an intelligent opinion on the matter. In two chapters at the end of his general history of the Pacific-theater war, Costello discussed the new evidence which, he claimed, indicated that: eleven days before Pearl Harbor FDR had received a "positive war warning" from Churchill that the Japanese would strike against America at the end of the first week in December—a warning which caused the President to do an abrupt about-face on plans for a time-buying *modus vivendi* with Japan and which resulted in Secretary of State Hull's deliberately provocative ultimatum of 26 November 1941 which guaranteed war; the United States had intercepted, between 2 and 4 December, the "Winds Execute" message which meant an imminent diplomatic break and thus war, this message had been passed on to the higher authorities in Washington, and its receipt had been covered up by Washington after the Pearl Harbor attack. The new evidence for the receipt of "Winds" was National Archives document SRH-051: "Interview with Mr. Ralph T. Briggs," conducted by the Naval Security Group and declassified by the National Security Agency on 11 March 1980. Briggs said in this interview that he was the one who had intercepted the crucial message, while on duty as chief watch supervisor at the Naval Communication Station at Cheltenham, Maryland. Briggs further stated that he was ordered by his superior officer in 1946 not to testify about the matter to the Joint Congressional Committee and to cease any contact with Captain Laurance Safford (then waging a lonely and career-destroying battle to convince investigators that a "Winds Execute" had been picked up), and that all copies he had made of the message intercept were missing from the files. Briggs's sensational interview, buttressing a key point in the revisionist position, was published in the Fall 1980 issue of the *Newsletter of the American Committee on the History of the Second World War*. It is therefore interesting to note the use that Goldstein and Dillon, of "thorough search off . . . all publications released up to May 1, 1981" fame, made of it: none. Briggs appeared nowhere in *At Dawn We Slept*.

He did appear in another book, published in early 1982: Ronald Lewin's *The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan*. In this Establishment brief Lewin spent several pages discussing the "Winds Execute" business in an attempt to discredit it. His tactic was to cast doubt on the accuracy of Briggs's recollection and thus on the receipt of the execute, but then to say that, well, even if the execute came in and was passed on, it didn't really mean much, didn't tell anyone anything not already known, and at any rate would have only added to the confusion among the intelligence-gatherers, what with all these other messages coming in creating so much apparently unconnected intelligence "noise" . . . and so forth. (Revisionists have come to refer to this Establishment tactic in dealing with uncomfortable evidence as "pulling a Wohlstetter.")

But, as was the case with the Prange book vs. Costello's, hardly had Lewin's work appeared than an answering blow with yet more—much more—new evidence came from the revisionist side: John Toland's *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath*. This book was remarkable in many ways, not least in that its author 1) had for many years been recognized as a certifiably Establishment, "safe" historian not known to hold any brief for the revisionist position (and who had indeed, in two earlier books on aspects of the Pacific war,

presented only orthodox opinions on Pearl Harbor), and 2) went further even than some of the "old-line" revisionists had been willing to go, in stating that FDR not only welcomed the war and thought that an attack somewhere was likely, but knew that the attack was coming at Pearl Harbor. Toland wrote: "Was it possible to imagine a President who remarked, 'This means war,' after reading the [thirteen-part 6 December] message, not instantly summoning to the White House his Army and Navy commanders as well as his Secretaries of War and Navy? One of [Secretary of the Navy] Knox's close friends, James G. Stahlman, wrote Admiral Kemp Tolley in 1973 that Knox told him that he, Stimson, Marshall, Stark and Harry Hopkins had spent most of the night of December 6 at the White House with the President: All were waiting for what they knew was coming: an attack on Pearl Harbor.... The comedy of errors on the sixth and seventh appears incredible. It only makes sense if it was a charade, and Roosevelt and the inner circle had known about the attack."

Unlike Prange's book, Toland's was not a military history, full of "I was there" anecdotes from gunners' mates and mess stewards second-class, and the like. It was a searching attempt to find and fix responsibility at the levels that counted. Essentially it consisted of a history of the nine official Pearl Harbor investigations, concluding with Toland's own "tenth investigation." In building his case for FDR's perfidy and both a pre- and post-attack conspiracy and cover-up, Toland utilized and claimed vindication of much of the evidence other revisionists had used over the years. But his "tenth investigation" included much that was new with him. Two key points backing his contention that "Washington knew" were that the Dutch army in Java had passed on to the United States intercepted Japanese messages predicting the attack, and that a Dutch naval attache in Washington received information at the Office of Naval Intelligence indicating that the Americans knew a Japanese carrier task force was steaming toward Hawaii. Further: an American steamship had picked up the Japanese task force's radio traffic and reported it to the FBI, and, independently, a seaman in the intelligence office of the 12th Naval District headquarters in San Francisco had intercepted the Japanese radio traffic and used it to plot accurately the location of the task force as it headed eastward toward Hawaii—providing this information to his superiors which, he was told by one, was passed on to the White House. Toland referred to this man, who had requested anonymity, as "Seaman Z."

There was much more in Toland's account, including intriguing references to important information possessed by an "Admiral V"—but these were his essential new points of evidence.

The critical response as a whole to Toland's blockbuster book was anything but equivocal. Reactions tended to be either very strongly pro or very strongly anti. The attack on his new evidence was led by scholars David Kahn and Captain Roger Pinneau, who sought to poke holes into each piece. They stressed that there was no hard evidence that Washington had in fact received the report from the Dutch in Java, that Toland totally misinterpreted the diary entries of the Dutch naval attache in Washington, and that, as regards the supposed evidence of interception and tracking of the Japanese task force's radio traffic, that task force was in fact under orders to maintain strict radio silence—a fact indeed confirmed by the record and by the surviving Japanese themselves. Another historian who joined in attacking Toland on these grounds was John Costello, the "mild" revisionist who had in his own book stopped short of claiming that FDR knew where the Japanese were going to strike.

(continued on page 404)

Was Pearl Harbor Unavoidable?

PERCY L. GREAVES, JR.

Remember Pearl Harbor? Of course you do. No American will ever forget December 7, 1941. Our casualties came to 3,435—Japan's were fewer than 100. We lost 188 planes outright—Japan 29. Our proud Pacific fleet was smashed. Eight battleships were useless. Japan lost five midget submarines. It was the greatest military and naval disaster in our history.

But Pearl Harbor didn't happen all in one day. The seeds for that disaster were sown at least as early as 1935. For that was the year of the seventh world congress of the Communist International, popularly known as the Comintern.

American Communists were then told how to capture our government. We protested, but being asleep to the communist menace, did nothing more.

The Comintern also resolved to undermine Russia's neighbors—Germany and Japan. As former Ambassador Bullitt tells us, the Soviet Union "ordered its communist agents abroad to create 'public front' and anti-fascist movements in order to obtain support for the Soviet Union against Germany and Japan." The same congress agreed to support communist activities in China. Japan didn't waste words. Japan acted.

The first thing Japan did was to inspire an anti-communist movement in north China. Secretary Hull* protested. Japan told our ambassador that Japan desired Chinese cooperation to combat the spread of communism and anti-Japanese activities. Japan

*U.S. Secretary of State 1933-1944 Cordell Hull

also expressed worry about the great increase of armaments in Soviet Russia.

Japan's next move was to sign an anti-Comintern pact with Germany. This pact held that communist interference not only endangered the internal peace and welfare of Germany and Japan but also threatened "the general peace of the world."

Japan's activities in north China were resented by the Chinese government. Friction increased until an incident provoked Japan's undeclared war on China. Japan claimed the hostilities were caused by a communist intrigue against her legitimate rights. Washington officials considered it Japanese aggression.

The undeclared war dragged on. By the fall of 1938 Germany was no longer satisfied with merely an anti-communist pact—she wanted a military alliance with Japan. She applied strong pressure.

All this placed Japan on a spot. The Japanese people, like the American people, did not want to be involved in a world war. Their leaders were divided into two factions. One group—the war party—wanted to join the Axis, remove the Russian threat, and conquer new worlds. One of these leaders was Foreign Minister Arita. Another group—the peace party—wanted to prevent war at all costs. They foresaw a victory for the "democracies." Then where would Japan be? This group was led by Premier Hiranuma.

Ambassador Grew** joined in the effort to prevent a military alliance with Germany. On April 19, 1939, he was assured there would be no alliance, although the anti-communist pact might be strengthened. So the peace party turned its efforts to preventing further political ties with the Axis.

Both parties wanted security for Japan. The war party pointed to England's negotiations with Russia and the American backing of anti-Japanese sentiment in China. They argued that Japanese security rested with the Axis. The peace party felt otherwise, but their opponents were hard to convince. Cabinet permission was finally obtained to seek a "gesture of welcome" from the United States. As a result, Arita handed Grew a note for President Roosevelt. It was cabled to Washington on May 18, 1939.

This note spoke of the gathering war clouds in Europe and stated that Japan and the United States had a mutual interest in seeing that civilization was not destroyed. It went on to say that true world peace might be established and maintained if all nations had their "own proper places in the world." They hoped this idea would make possible "closer cooperation between Japan and America as well as the foundation of a deeper mutual understanding between the two nations." It was indefinite, but it was a bid for friendship.

Later that day Grew cabled that he was leaving for America

**U.S. Ambassador to Japan 1932-1943 Joseph C. Grew

"and confiding the embassy to the effective hands of Eugene H. Dooman, in whose judgment and analytical ability I have full confidence and whose views on policies and procedures coincide very closely with mine."

On May 22 Germany became very tired of waiting. She signed a military alliance with Italy which didn't include Japan.

The American public was not told about Japan's plea for cooperation until 1943, when the State Department released two bulky volumes of selected documents relating to Japan. However, there were many other things that were not made public even then. It took a congressional investigation to reveal the facts which follow:

Behind this general message was a more specific proposal. The Japanese premier, Baron Hiranuma, met very secretly with our Mr. Dooman. He didn't even let his own foreign minister know about it. He felt that with American help the Japanese peace party might prevent a world war with dangerous consequences for Japan.

The premier told Dooman the Japanese had a "real feeling of grievance against the occidental powers, especially Great Britain. When the first World War broke out Japan was an ally of Great Britain. There was no legal obligation on Japan to support her ally, but she conceived she had a moral obligation to do so. She accordingly declared war against Germany, her navy undertook operations against the German fleet in the Pacific, her merchant marine cooperated in various ways and finally her military forces eliminated Germany from Shantung.

"The only thanks we got from Great Britain," continued Baron Hiranuma, "was the abrogation of that very alliance which inspired Japan to support Great Britain." Japan was also worried about negotiations then going on between Britain and the Soviets. She thought the naval treaties operated to prevent her from safeguarding her interests.

Hiranuma claimed that Japan's objectives in China were "essential for her security in a world of sanctions, embargoes, closing of markets to foreign competition, and lack of free access to raw materials, and so long as such conditions exist any moderation of her objective in China . . . could not be considered.

"Nevertheless, if conditions could be brought about which would assure to all nations markets for the world's goods on the basis of quality and price and supplies of the materials which they needed, the importance to Japan of securing a market and sources of raw materials in China would greatly diminish; and by the same token there would not be the same urge on Germany and Italy to expand at the expense of weaker and smaller nations.

"The United States and Japan were the only powers which

could help to prevent the crystallization of the trend toward the division of Europe into armed camps."

He felt that world-wide economic and political troubles could be settled by an international conference. Japan, he said, would agree to include the Far East situation among the problems to be discussed. He proposed that "if the President were prepared to make a confidential approach to the European democracies he would be glad to approach Germany and Italy, and if there were returned favorable replies by these nations he would be glad to have the President call the conference under such conditions as might be agreed upon after discussion thru normal diplomatic channels."

In conclusion the premier said: "This might prove to be the last opportunity to save the world from chaos."

Dooman reported all this to Washington in a 21 page document dated June 7, 1939. He gave it as his opinion that Japan was "groping for security against the gathering storm in Europe." Japan, he said, was faced with the alternative of going over unreservedly to the totalitarian side or restoring relations with those nations which the peace party believed would be victors.

He felt the desire for a settlement did not spring "from moral regeneration, but from realization of stark facts." The China incident had failed. A European war threatened. Japan's peace party leaders realized Japan's security depended on liquidating the China affair. The proposed conference would permit Japan "to moderate its peace terms in China" without losing face.

Dooman indicated that it might be a very crucial moment in world history. He urged careful consideration.

On July 1 Hull sent Dooman's message over to Roosevelt along with a proposed reply which FDR okayed and returned the same day. This reply answered the general proposal in diplomatic language that meant we would not cooperate in any joint peace efforts until Japan withdrew from China.

It made no reference to the specific proposal to call an international conference. It said the United States did "not perceive any practicable steps which it might usefully take at this time in addition to those already taken . . . and . . . would be pleased to have such further information as your excellency may find it agreeable to offer by way of amplifying and making more definitive your excellency's concept as to the steps which might usefully be taken toward moderating the situation in Europe."

On July 26, before Dooman received this reply, Washington added more fuel to the fire by giving Japan six months notice that we were terminating our commercial treaty. Japan's peace party, hoping for a friendship bid, was shocked. Even the pro-Axis, anti-British foreign minister couldn't understand "why the Amer-

ican government should have found it necessary to give notice of the abrogation in such a hasty and abrupt manner."

On July 31, when Dooman saw Roosevelt's reply, he immediately wired back for further guidance on the answer to the specific proposal for "an international conference to be called by the President to discuss problems causing world unrest, including Far Eastern problems." Dooman was anxious to know if we really wanted to explore the proposal or were in the process of studying it.

The next day Dooman was informed by Undersecretary Sumner Welles that the original reply was intended to cover both the general and specific messages and therefore neither of Dooman's suggestions applied. On August 3 Dooman wired back that the reply would be interpreted "by the premier as a closing of the door to insure peace in the Far East."

Welles then told Dooman that the termination of the commercial treaty had been drafted weeks before and was therefore not related to the Jap proposals. He instructed Dooman to hold back the answer until it would seem that the two matters were not interrelated.

The answer was finally delivered to Japan on August 8. That very evening a five minister conference was called in Tokyo to discuss an alliance with Germany and Italy.

On August 12 British, French, and Soviet military missions began staff talks in Moscow on measures of collaboration in the event that Germany should precipitate a war.

Japan, still worried about the Soviets and communism, desperately needed friends. The Axis offered an alliance. Roosevelt offered a cold shoulder. Until August 23 there was little doubt but what the Axis alliance would be signed. On that date it was the turn of Japan's war party to be shocked. Germany signed a 10 year nonaggression pact with Japan's traditional enemy, Soviet Russia.

This pact put an end to a Japanese-Axis alliance for the time being. It gave us another opportunity to woo Japan from the Axis camp. We muffed that, too, but that is another story. It wasn't until more than a year later, September 27, 1940, that Japan finally signed a defensive military alliance with the Axis.

Would Pearl Harbor have occurred if President Roosevelt had cooperated with Japan's peace party in 1939? Who can say?

The Mystery of Pearl Harbor

PERCY L. GREAVES, JR.

After the Pearl Harbor attack, Americans were told that it had come without any warning. The official story has been that it was a surprise attack that forced us into war against our wishes.

For years the charges that Roosevelt lied and cajoled us into war were vehemently denied. In 1948 the great historian Charles A. Beard presented a preliminary case for the truth in *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities*. He was immediately reviled.

In an article in the August issue of the *Atlantic*, he was accused of being "the darling of the McCormick-Patterson Axis The most indecent of Beard's numerous innuendoes in his book are those respecting the Roberts Commission. Mr. Stimson suggested Justice Roberts to head the Pearl Harbor Commission Beard insinuates that Justice Roberts' appointment was part of a triple play to put Kimmel and Short 'out' and conceal the iniquities of FDR and Stimson in a cloud of dust."

These were the words of the court historian, Samuel Eliot Morison. In 1942, Professor Morison of Harvard was drafted by President Roosevelt and placed on the public payroll as a Navy officer with orders to write the official *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II* (fifteen vols.).

Beard, searching for the truth, was not permitted to see the papers he considered pertinent. Morison, writing the official line, had no such problems. In the words of the Secretary of the Navy,

"All naval activities, afloat and ashore, were directed to make available to Captain Morison such records as he might desire to consult."

Even so, the facts confirm Beard's "innuendo." They bear out that Mr. Stimson had a heavy responsibility not only for the Pearl Harbor disaster, but also for the Roberts Report which made Admiral Kimmel and General Short the scapegoats for blame that rightly rested on high officials in Washington, notably Mr. Stimson himself.

Mr. Stimson not only nominated Justice Roberts, a pre-Pearl Harbor advocate of "Aiding the Allies," as top investigator, he also nominated the two Army members. This gave him a majority of the five-man Presidential Commission. In writing his suggestion to FDR he added: "Marshall and I united on all the foregoing suggestions after very careful consideration by each of us."

One of Mr. Stimson's nominees was Joseph T. McNarney, a recently promoted brigadier general and right hand of Chief of Staff George C. Marshall. Officially, the appointment was suggested in order to give the Commission an air expert. It was also hinted that the General was not personally suspect as he had been out of Washington at the time of the attack.

In fact General McNarney, as a colonel, had acted as General Marshall's junior representative when signing the March 27, 1941 secret military agreements with the British. Two of his superiors, the Chiefs of War Plans and Military Intelligence, as aides of Marshall, were heavily involved with Pearl Harbor responsibilities. At the time of the attack, General McNarney was actually in London participating in further secret negotiations.

The other Stimson nominee was Major General Frank R. McCoy, an aide, friend and co-conspirator of Mr. Stimson's for more than thirty years. Back in 1911-1912 Mr. Stimson, as President Taft's Secretary of War, became involved in a controversy with congressional leaders. Major McCoy, then his aide, helped him draft a Presidential veto which divided his party but helped Mr. Stimson defeat the congressional leaders.

In 1931-1932 Mr. Stimson, as Secretary of State, failed to sell his anti-Japanese ideas to President Hoover. He then turned to the League of Nations, of which we were not a member, and persuaded the League to investigate Japan's activities in Manchuria and to appoint General McCoy to the investigating committee. General McCoy sold Mr. Stimson's ideas to the committee and the League—with the result that Japan withdrew from the League.

Before the members of the Roberts Commission left for Pearl Harbor Mr. Stimson invited General McCoy to spend an evening at his home. The invitation was repeated upon the Commission's return. It should also be noted that another protégé of Mr. Stimson

son's, Felix Frankfurter, his assistant years before (1906), invited both Justice Roberts and Secretary Stimson to his home for a private dinner and quiet evening during the period the Roberts Report was being drafted. Mr. Stimson duly wrote in his diary that he had informed Marshall that he thought the Roberts Report took both of them off the hook.

A well done for Messrs. Roberts, McNarney and McCoy.

One of the Commission's Navy members, Admiral Standley, later publicly rebuked Justice Roberts and the War Department. Among other things, he wrote: "I knew from firsthand experience the shortcomings of our base at Pearl Harbor, for which Short and Kimmel were in no way responsible. From the beginning of our investigation, I held a firm belief that the real responsibility . . . was lodged thousands of miles from the Territory of Hawaii."

In his latest paean to his patron, *The Two-Ocean War*, the now retired Rear Admiral Morison praises FDR's foresight in leading this country into World War II by secret steps taken ahead of the public opinion he later led so skilfully to the goal he publicly denied—war.

Morison presents the events preceding Pearl Harbor in abbreviated and tendentious form, now the official one: that Japan invaded Manchuria and China and the American people had a duty to prevent any Nipponese expansion in Asia, whether the American people wanted to or not. His chapter, "Disaster at Pearl Harbor," presents self-serving sections on the "Last Days of 'Peace' in the Pacific" and "The Unsuspecting Victim." The fourth and final section, "Who Was Responsible?" gives a grotesque glimmering of the facts that were available to the historian.

Not satisfied with his own travesties, the retired Admiral tells us: "The best book by far on the question of why we were surprised at Pearl Harbor" is Roberta Wohlstetter's *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*. A first reading of this book revealed more than one hundred factual errors. It raised other questions which, if properly researched, would undoubtedly unearth still more errors, not to mention child-like acceptance of Administration releases in preference to the obscured realities.

Some of Mrs. Wohlstetter's errors are trivial (such as footnotes that do not check). Others are ridiculous (such as her "Note on Rank.") She wrongly accuses the Navy of having a monopoly on the double standard of "temporary" and "permanent" ranks. She evidently does not know that both General Short and Admiral Kimmel had higher "temporary" ranks on December 7, 1941 than the "permanent" two-star ones on which their later retirement pay was based).

As the student probably more familiar with the Pearl Harbor record than any other living person, the writer appreciates the

tremendous task that Mrs. Wohlstetter faced. The record is voluminous. The printed works of the Joint Congressional Committee ran to 44 volumes. Like many others, she overlooks four volumes—three State Department tomes and Ambassador Grew's *Ten Years in Japan*, which were part of the Committee's official record. In addition, there are the Departmental documents and histories, the official papers of other countries, including those of the defeated nations, the books written by participants and other authors, and the myriad magazine articles, newspaper stories and personal interviews which have added a tremendous amount to the information about Pearl Harbor. There is still more, much of it suppressed for political reasons even now, 25 years after the great tragedy.

Mrs. Wohlstetter completely ignores the revisionists, those historians who have sought to reveal the truths the political powers prefer to keep hidden. Nevertheless, her well-subsidized volume won rave reviews across the nation and even in the *American Historical Review*. Columbia University awarded her the \$4,000 Bancroft prize, apparently accepting Admiral Morison's accolade that "she is cognizant of all the intricate details of the codes, has made a thorough study of all extant sources, and uses them with the perception of a well-trained mind. Her book ought finally to dispose of some of the nonsense about Pearl Harbor that has been written."

In fact, the book contains as much nonsense about Pearl Harbor as any that has been written.

Mrs. Wohlstetter concentrated on the Intelligence phase of the episode. She accordingly devoted considerable attention to the messages of the two services and the information Washington gained from reading Japanese codes. These messages played a major role in the last months, days, hours and minutes preceding the disaster. If she had done a thorough and objective job, her book would have been a very valuable contribution. Unfortunately, she joined the union of court historians.

In a volume dealing with communications, particularly Naval communications, you would expect accuracy in reporting the filing time mentioned in each such message. This is particularly so since the top official Naval historian gave the book such a boost. Unfortunately, Mrs. Wohlstetter never learned the Navy's time system.

Every Navy message states its date and time in six digits—the first two represent the day of the month, the second two the hour of the day, and the last two the minute of the hour. For example, one of the key messages was number 242005. Mrs. Wohlstetter writes, "The digits 242005 mean November 24, 20:05, which is 8:05 P.M. Washington time."

If she had read the congressional hearings through Volume 33

to page 1150, she would have noted, "For communication within the Navy, Greenwich civil time (GCT) is used in headings of messages." If she had read the hearings at all thoroughly she would have learned that Washington's time is Plus 5, i.e., five hours earlier than Greenwich time. So that this crucial message was actually sent at 3:05 in the afternoon, Washington time.

How valuable is a book on pre-attack intelligence that is five hours off on the timing of all Naval communications coming out of Washington? How dependable is a Naval historian who acclaims such a book the best on the subject?

Whose Responsibility?

Another serious error is Mrs. Wohlstetter's statement, "No one knew who possessed the final command responsibility for defense of the Hawaiian Islands in the event of an enemy attack." It was clearly understood by all concerned at the time, as revealed in all the investigations, that Pearl Harbor was the responsibility of the Army in general and of the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, in particular. His agent on the scene was Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short. General Short took orders from and reported to no one else but George C. Marshall. What he lacked in matériel, orders, intelligence (information) and proper alert status was the responsibility of none other than General George C. Marshall.

Mrs. Wohlstetter also states, "The [Japanese] Pearl Harbor task force was under orders to return up to 24 hours before D-Day if anything favorable developed in the U.S.-Japanese negotiations." Actually, while this Task Force had orders to return to Japan if detected by any foreign forces up to 24 hours before D-Day, it could have been recalled up to the moment the planes left the decks, if anything favorable had developed in the United States-Japanese negotiations.

One could go on and on for a hundred more blunders. The facts were just too much for Mrs. Wohlstetter. Someday, someone, or some foundation, should underwrite an objective study of the Pearl Harbor disaster. Until that day comes, Americans who want to know the truth must rely on the writing of revisionists hacking away at the well-financed, well-reviewed writings of the court historians and official publications.

Like Mrs. Wohlstetter, Admiral Morison in his own book ignores the contributions of revisionists, while finding the writings of the Administration's apologists "especially valuable." He does, however, mention *The Great Sea War* by the late Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and E.B. Potter of the U.S. Naval Academy staff. Perhaps he did not notice that this semi-official volume states:

By December 6 it was known in Washington that the Japanese were sending their Washington embassy a message for the U.S. State Department breaking off diplomatic relations, the sort of message that in times past had been followed up with a surprise attack on the opposing fleet. It was known too that Japanese diplomats in London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, and Washington were burning their secret documents and codes—usually done only when war is imminent.

Thus by Saturday afternoon there was every reason to believe that war with Japan was only hours away. Then between 0400 and 0600 on Sunday, December 7, the U.S. Navy Department deciphered instructions to the Japanese ambassadors to deliver their message at 1 P.M. One o'clock in the afternoon in Washington would be 7:30 at Pearl Harbor.

However, Admiral Morison does admit that FDR's "short of war" was not so very short for the Atlantic Fleet.... These officers and men were enduring all the danger and hardship of war; yet it was not called war. They were forbidden to talk of their experiences ashore, or even to tell where they had been or what they were doing." He also admits that our economic measures against Japan were taken with the cooperation of the British and Dutch, and that "the fundamental reason for America's going to war with Japan was our insistence on the integrity of China."

Actually, of course, the contest for China, during more than a half century, had been between the Western ideas of Japan and the Communist ideas of the Soviet Union. We decided China's future as early as June 1940—when we decided on war against Japan. Yet, the Admiral tells us, "the Administration and the head of the armed forces, as we have seen, were doing their best to prevent or postpone a war with Japan. Roosevelt even sent a personal appeal to Hirohito on the evening of 6 December."

It is true that General Marshall and Admiral Stark did warn the President not to send Japan an ultimatum before we were ready. However, the President rejected their advice and sent an ultimatum on November 26. Roosevelt's message to Hirohito was sent only after FDR had been alerted that the Japanese message which meant war was already on its way. The message to Hirohito was one for the record, after he knew there was no hope for peace.

Missing Files

Speaking of the decoded Japanese messages, the Admiral states: "The recipient, without taking notes, had to read these signals in the presence of the messenger who returned them to Army or Navy Intelligence office, where all copies but one were

burned." Actually, of course, there was nothing to prevent these officials from making notes. At least one did. The so-called "messenger" was a top Army or Navy Intelligence officer who stood ready to supply any background or further explanation requested. On this point, the Intelligence admiral in charge of these intercepts testified: "They might hold the book as long as they wished, or send for it to come back again, but in the interest of security, we did not like to send out individual copies for retention." Any neglect of these important messages by any recipient was a sign of rank incompetency.

On at least one occasion, early in 1941, the State Department was permitted to retain a copy of a message. This was when Under Secretary Sumner Welles informed the Soviet Embassy of a decoded message indicating Germany's intention to invade Russia. There are indications that a German spy in the Russian Embassy reported this information to Berlin. Shortly afterward, we decoded a message from Berlin to Tokyo indicating that we had read the Japanese message. Fortunately, the Japanese continued to use the PURPLE code all through the war and we continued to read Japanese messages right up to VJ Day.

When the Admiral states that "all copies but one were burned," he is in serious error. Normally, four copies were kept —two in the Army files and two in the Navy files. In each case one set was filed by the Japanese serial number and another by the serial number assigned it by the Service filing it.

There are strong indications that copies of some of these intercepted messages were ordered to be destroyed shortly after December 7, 1941. They were missing from the files when sought in December 1943. Fortunately for the cause of truth a set was located and they were replaced in both the Navy and Army files.

(A Note From The Editor, continued from page 390)

Toland counter-attacked in a new "Postscript" for the paperback edition of his book, released in February 1983. He did not back down from the claim of the radio traffic intercepts, but pointed out that despite undoubted orders for radio silence, that silence must have been broken at some points, and he presented evidence for why this was so. Neither did he back down from the claim that the information of these intercepts, and other information about the task force, was passed on to Washington; if there remains no documentary proof of receipt, there is a good reason for that which should be familiar to all students of Pearl Harbor's aftermath. Toland's purpose in writing the "Postscript" was not, however, mainly to reply to his critics, but to present yet more new evidence which had come in to him since the first edition of the book was published. Among this was material relating to J. Edgar Hoover's foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack (knowledge which was, according to Toland's source, quoting Hoover, passed on to FDR), a question which has intrigued scholars for some time. Indeed, independently of Toland, the matter was revived in a major way in December 1982 in the form of an article in the *American Historical Review* based on newly declassified documents.

In December 1983 the National Security Agency declassified and released the text of a 16,000-word interview, conducted by the Naval Security group, in which Toland's "Seaman Z" was revealed as Robert D. Ogg, a retired businessman. In the interview conducted in May, and later approved in transcript by the subject, Ogg maintained the accuracy of what he had earlier told Toland: that he had picked up the Japanese task force's radio signals, had plotted its location, and had been told by his superior that the information was passed on to the White House. When asked about the Japanese insistence that their force had been under radio silence, Ogg replied: "I feel there is no possible question that they did not maintain radio silence, but I don't believe they used it [radio communication] in any great activity."

Ogg's relinquishment of anonymity, and the release of his interview statements, breathed new life into the Toland debate. But there was more in December 1983 which was to open up a whole new angle in Pearl Harbor revisionism, further fanning the flames of contention. Joseph Leib, a former New Deal bureaucrat and retired newspaper correspondent, wrote an article which appeared in *Hustler* magazine, "Pearl Harbor: The Story the Rest of the Media Won't Tell," in which he claimed that his friend, Secretary of State Hull, had confided to him on 29 November 1941 that J. Edgar Hoover and FDR knew that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor within a few days, and that the President, over Hull's strident objections, was going to let this happen as a way to get the country into war. Hull's dilemma was that he could not reveal this openly to the press, since the White House would simply denounce him, and no one would believe him. He turned over to Leib a document containing a transcript of Japanese radio intercepts which supposedly detailed the Pearl Harbor plan, making the reporter promise never to reveal the source. Leib rushed the story, minus the identification of Hull, to the United Press bureau, which refused to run it since it was so incredulous. But Leib did manage to persuade UP's cable editor, Harry Frantz, to transmit it on the foreign cable. Although the story managed somehow to get garbled in transmission, it did create a front-page banner headline in the Sunday, 30 November, *Honolulu Advertiser*: JAPANESE MAY STRIKE OVER WEEKEND! Thus Leib, writing in 1983, has finally cleared up the mystery of the origins of that headline, which has always been a particularly curious part of the Pearl

Senator Homer Ferguson and the Pearl Harbor Congressional Investigation

PERCY L. GREAVES, JR.

Prior to the Pearl Harbor Congressional investigation this writer had twice met Homer Ferguson. During the 78th Congress when Ferguson was a freshman Senator, I was Associate Research Director of the Republican National Committee. That sounds like a political position but essentially it was a fact-finding one—finding facts the Democrats didn't want known.

Our first meeting was in the Spring of 1943. Senator Ferguson was then an up-and-coming Senator feeling his way around Washington. He was interested, among other things, in the Republican effort to curb the political propaganda then being issued by the Office of War Information at taxpayers' expense.

The second meeting was during the 1944 campaign when the Senator came to New York to prepare for a Town Hall debate with Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes. On both of these occasions the Senator impressed me as a sincere, hard-working legislator who was seriously interested in the nation's welfare, Constitutional principles and the cleaning up of political corruption.

Well-informed Americans had long known that many facts of the Pearl Harbor disaster had been concealed for reasons other than national defense. Many clippings, tips and authentic leads had found their way into Republican files. Scared service officers had given facts confidentially. Throughout the 1944 campaign, the Republican high command was consistently faced with the

question: "Should we use the information in our possession?" Senator Ferguson, public servant that he was, thought that the public should know some of the facts before it voted. He was later to find out that General Marshall had personally acted to suppress the truth, including facts relating to his own responsibility.

Once the war was over, Senator Ferguson demanded "the whole truth about this unfortunate event." Public pressure mounted. Realizing that an investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack could not be averted, the Administration jumped the gun and set up a Committee which they thought they could completely control. Plans were made to rush this investigation to a hasty conclusion. An Administration-approved staff was carefully selected. The Republican minority was allowed no assistance. The schedule called for perusal of the evidence by the Committee staff, a month of hearings conducted by the Committee Counsel, and two weeks for writing the report. The Committee members would be kept busy listening to selected testimony. The staff, friendly to the Administration, would handle all details and prepare the report for the Committee members to sign. This was pretty much standard New Deal procedure.

However, there was one flaw in these plans. They reckoned without Senator Ferguson. Denied official assistance, he and Senator Owen Brewster, ranking Republican Senator on the Committee, sought research assistance. My background and experience fulfilled their needs. Senator Brewster retained me to assist all the minority members in their efforts to ferret out the essential facts which some people desired to be withheld. Since Senator Ferguson devoted more time and effort to this investigation than any other minority member, my work simmered down to working constantly with him while reporting to Senator Brewster and maintaining liaison with Republican Representatives Frank B. Keefe and Bertrand W. Gearhart.

Realizing the importance of this investigation of Pearl Harbor and the need to prevent a similar surprise attack as an advent to a possible World War III, Senator Ferguson immediately put aside his personal and social obligations and all but the most important of his other Congressional duties. His first move was to see the Committee Counsel, Mr. William D. Mitchell, a former associate of the Secretary of War—whose actions were being investigated. The Senator expressed his desire to cooperate with the Counsel and asked what he could do to assist in the preparation of evidence. The Counsel had not counted on such assistance. In fact, he seemed to consider it an indirect reflection on his own ability. Apparently he expected the Committee members to act as an audience while he did all the probing. He just didn't know Senator Ferguson. The Senator wasn't going to sit idle if there

was any investigating to be done. From this early interview the Counsel developed an antagonism toward the Senator. Because the Senator was always bringing out important evidence the Counsel had missed, this antagonism grew until Mr. Mitchell finally resigned before the completion of the investigation. The Counsel's methodical plan had been rent asunder by the Senator's uncanny ability to unearth facts the counsel either couldn't or didn't want to find.

The Senator was hampered at every turn. Before the Committee had been appointed, President Truman issued an executive order that no one would be allowed to make public any information concerning the success of the American experts in deciphering foreign codes. If this order had been allowed to stand, the American public would never have learned that the Japanese code had been solved and that Washington officials had been reading Japan's diplomatic messages for a long time before the Pearl Harbor disaster occurred. Republican members of the Committee convinced the majority that this order must be countermanded. Accordingly, the President modified it to permit public testimony before the entire Committee.

This did not satisfy Senator Ferguson. It still prohibited him from talking to Army and Navy officers individually. If left in force, the investigation would have become merely a "fishing expedition," for no Army or Naval officer would have endangered his career by talking to Committee members in private and disclosing leads for intelligent questioning. Senator Ferguson persuaded the Committee to request the President to direct all persons to volunteer whatever information they had to any and all Committee members. The President refused but finally, under pressure, permitted prospective witnesses "to disclose, orally, to any of the members of the Joint Congressional Committee" any information they had on the subject but qualified it by adding that this did "not include any files or written material." This effectively prohibited the placing of any files or written material in the hands of the Committee members unless it was previously approved by top authorities of the department involved. Cabinet members and the majority of the Committee were allowed to rule out evidence as "not material to the investigation," without members of the Committee ever seeing the material thus ruled out. Under a majority vote of the Committee the individual members were denied permission to search files, even when accompanied by Committee counsel, and not even the Committee counsel were permitted to look at the late President Roosevelt's files.

After much persistent effort, some of the testimony of the previous investigations was finally obtained. There were numerous volumes, and insufficient copies to go around. The Senator

carried some home with him every night and eagerly read the digests of others as quickly as they were prepared for him.

The hearings were opened on November 15, 1945. No one was adequately prepared. That would have been humanly impossible. Senator Ferguson had requested that the Committee be furnished copies of all exhibits at least ten days before the hearings. He was ignored. In fact, more than 1,000 pages of un-indexed exhibits were furnished Committee members in the 48 hours preceding the opening of the hearings. This deluging tactic continued throughout the hearings. Exhibits were seldom available for study before they were presented and used by the Counsel. It seemed part of a plot to prevent intelligent questioning by Committee members. It might be inferred that this was a deliberate design to cover up. The exhibits alone, when printed up 11 months later, were to comprise 28 full volumes. This does not include quantities of other material which were placed in the Record without exhibit numbers. No newspaper man had time to go through the thousands of pages of the exhibits. To this day many important facts remain buried in the Record and have never been adequately brought to the public's attention.

The inundation of Committee members with so much material had the desired effect on most of the busy members. They threw up their hands and relied on the testimony and what little they could read in spare moments between other Congressional duties. This was not so with Senator Ferguson. His secretary and staff were instructed not to interrupt him except in cases of extreme emergency. He settled down to a routine, devoting almost all of his waking hours to the Pearl Harbor investigation.

He became so engrossed in the problem at hand that one morning he even came to his office without a necktie. When we were ready to start for the Committee room, I remarked that he was not wearing a tie. He looked surprised and much dismayed. He immediately borrowed one from his secretary. He had been "living" Pearl Harbor with such concentration that he had neglected to put his tie on at home, and had arrived early and worked on Pearl Harbor matters for at least an hour, without noticing that he was "tieless."

Under the normal routine, the Senator and I got together every morning for about an hour before hearings opened. I gave him research material from my files and reported on what I had digested the night before. There had been nine previous investigations—four of them Secret and five Top Secret, involving code breaking. For each witness it was necessary to know the phases with which he was familiar, what he had previously testified and what others had previously testified about him or the facts with which he should have been familiar. In most cases there was

conflicting testimony that had to be recognized and brought together. Many of the hundreds of exhibits had to be re-examined for their relationship to each witness. There was never sufficient time for the Senator to do as good a job as he would have liked. It was a case of doing the best he could; he spared no effort to accomplish this.

At ten o'clock each morning we proceeded to the hearings, with an assistant or two to help lug the many bulky documents needed for the session. We were usually greeted with a new stack of documents at the Committee table. When Senator Ferguson was doing the questioning I remained at his side to supply the needed documents and make suggestions, should the answers take an unexpected turn.

At noon we returned to his private office. One of his secretaries would bring us some soup, a sandwich and ice cream, which we ate together as we discussed questions and procedures for the afternoon session. Frequently there was a call to his wife, who was ill during the first part of the investigation. She followed the proceedings very closely, encouraging and aiding him in his efforts. Occasionally someone with a clue or suggestion would drop in for a few minutes. The luncheon period, always busy, passed very quickly and we then reassembled in the Senate Caucus Room for the afternoon session.

The Senator rarely missed any of the hearings. Once he was called to the White House and on one or two other occasions he had to absent himself for a short period in order to cast his vote at a Committee meeting or on the Senate floor. However, he read carefully all testimony taken during his short absences. He followed every detail.

After the afternoon session we retired to his office again, discussed the events of the day and mapped out the program for the morrow. I gathered for him the material he wanted to read that night and he suggested how I might best spend my time in culling information for his use. At six or seven o'clock each evening he would start for home carrying several grips of documents. One set of testimony was delivered to his home and another to his office. He kept duplicates of the most important exhibits in both places. However, he became so interested in his work that he frequently mislaid his papers. This presented quite a problem to the young lady who was charged with keeping them in order. She, of course, was unable to follow all the contents and sometimes could not locate papers from his description of their contents. In some cases he would leave at home papers he wanted the next day. Fortunately, Senator Brewster's copies were available and we were able to locate the needed documents without too much loss of time. This, however, necessitated a

constant watch on all important papers to see that they did not go astray.

When the Senator was questioning witnesses he had a habit of tossing aside documents that had served their immediate purpose. They had to be gathered up and reassembled with care. There was a telephone booth behind the Committee table from where I could telephone for papers required in a hurry when the questions indicated a need for certain documents that were not in the Committee room.

The Senator once explained that when he was a Michigan Circuit Court Judge he had a very capable secretary who read everything before it was filed and could locate anything he ever wanted on very short notice. Apparently he operated with little thought for this important detail. Unfortunately, the young lady who handled his papers on Pearl Harbor did not have the time to read the many lengthy documents involved and frequently was at a loss when asked to provide a paper in which "such and such a witness" had made "such and such a statement."

During the entire investigation the Senator's attitude was strictly judicial. There was no hint of the prejudiced prosecutor. He was after the facts—all the facts. Rarely ruffled, questions poured from him with a regularity and relentlessness that would have exhausted the average man. A sip of water and his voice was good for another half hour. It did not matter to him where the chips fell. He must have the facts. Throughout the hearings he refused to pass judgment. Time after time he told newspapermen that he would wait until all the evidence was in. At the end he would finally relent when it became evident that the majority had effectively blocked the presentation of some of the most important evidence.

The first Navy Department witness, Admiral R.B. Inglis, in charge of Naval Intelligence, told the Committee that he thought that Congress and the American people were largely to blame for the Pearl Harbor disaster. This was apparently the Administration line. It was one of many Administration acts intended to divert attention from its own responsibility. Senator Ferguson then started the following colloquy:

Senator FERGUSON: Do you think the people were to blame?

Admiral INGLIS: Are you asking for my opinion?

Senator FERGUSON: Well, you put it in the memo and they persuaded you to take it out. I am asking you whether that is your opinion?

Admiral INGLIS: My opinion is that they did contribute to some extent to the Pearl Harbor attack.

Senator FERGUSON: Well, now, you explain how that contributed to the Pearl Harbor attack.

Admiral INGLIS: Because the Armed Forces were not as strong as they might have been had the country been unified and had the appropriations been larger for the Army and Navy.

Senator FERGUSON: All right; now, do you know anything about the appropriations?

Admiral INGLIS: I only know that the Navy kept asking for more than they could get.

Senator FERGUSON: Did you know this, that when the Navy asked for an item that on many occasions the Budget Director and the Executive branch of the Government cut it down?

Admiral INGLIS: Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON: And Congress often put them up?

Admiral INGLIS: I did not know about the latter. I did know about the former.

Senator FERGUSON: Did you know that the people, the Congress for the people, did put those up?

Admiral INGLIS: Now that you mention it I believe very likely that there were certain specific instances where the Congress did increase appropriations.

Senator FERGUSON: Well, now, how could you blame the people for not getting armament?

Admiral INGLIS: I am not blaming them, Senator. I am just saying that that was my opinion, that that was the frame of mind that this country was in at the time.

This was but one of many opinions the Senator exploded with facts. Appropriation figures placed in the record showed clearly that the Executive branch did cut Army and Navy requests while Congress raised the amounts requested by the President in his budget.

The first witness provided another good example of how Senator Ferguson brought out essential information from leads which the Committee Counsel and Democratic members of the Committee missed entirely. In reading his statement the Admiral had said, "The Chief of Naval Operations, on November 25, 1941, directed that all trans-Pacific shipping be routed through Torres Straits between Australia and New Guinea." When it was the Senator's turn to interrogate the witness the following interchange occurred:

Senator FERGUSON: From whom did you get your information that it was diverted on the 25th?

Admiral INGLIS: I have got the source right here, sir.

Senator FERGUSON: Will you give us the source?

Admiral INGLIS: Yes, sir, there was a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations dated November 25, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON: That was Admiral Stark?

Admiral INGLIS: Admiral Stark was the Chief of Naval Operations at the that time; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON: That came out in Washington; is that true?

Admiral INGLIS: That is true.

Senator FERGUSON: Have you the order with you?

Admiral INGLIS: No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON: Will you get me the order?

Admiral INGLIS: I will sir.

Later the Admiral produced the message which read:

Route all trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet, providing necessary escort. Refer your despatch 230258.

Senator FERGUSON: Now, I will ask you why you did not put in the part that was to provide for escorts.

Admiral INGLIS: I think that was perhaps omitted by my staff because it might have been somewhat controversial.

Senator FERGUSON: You think that this part of the message is controversial, "providing necessary escort"?

Admiral INGLIS: It might lead to controversy because of the word "necessary." There might be a difference of opinion as to ships for escorts as opposed to the need for keeping them concentrated for combat.

The reader should bear in mind that this message was sent two weeks before Pearl Harbor was attacked. There was a definite indication that officials in Washington were then worried about an attack on American ships in the Pacific Ocean. It was later to be revealed through the persistence of the Senator that President Roosevelt, on November 25th, according to Secretary Stimson, "brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday (December 1)." The Senator then tried, as follows, to find out why this information had been withheld from the Committee:

Senator FERGUSON: Why was this not turned over?

Admiral INGLIS: Perhaps it was.

Senator FERGUSON: I will ask Counsel now, when did Counsel get this Exhibit 37.

Mr. MITCHELL: I first saw it about 10 minutes ago.

And so through the efforts of the Junior Senator from Michigan the American public was able to learn that our ships in the Pacific were being provided naval escorts two weeks before war was declared. This little instance was typical of the way the Senator brought out important information throughout the entire investigation. It was most annoying to the Committee Counsel and majority members.

The witness who received the most attention from the Senator was the Army's Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall.

Before this witness appeared, an article in *Life* magazine by John Chamberlain had revealed that during the 1944 Presidential campaign General Marshall had twice written the Republican candidate Governor Thomas E. Dewey personally, confidentially requesting him not to bring up the Pearl Harbor disaster during the campaign. The Committee was interested in these letters but the General did not wish to disclose them publicly. He asked for an executive meeting of the Committee to discuss the matter. He asked Committee members to pledge themselves not to reveal what went on during this executive session. Senator Ferguson stalwartly refused to attend any Executive Committee meeting on these terms. He felt that the public was entitled to the whole truth. Through his insistence the complete contents of these letters were made public over the objections of the Committee Counsel and General Marshall.

General Marshall's testimony was staged in a very dramatic manner. An urgency for speed was created. It was first announced that he had to leave immediately on a presidential mission to China. The order of the witnesses was quickly changed. General Leonard C. Gerow was brought in out of order. This General had proved himself a hero in the Normandy landing. He was much bemedalled. He was asked to accept the blame for the fact that a proper alert message had not been sent to General Walter C. Short in Hawaii before the attack. Being a good soldier he accepted the blame manfully. He was then brushed aside and General Marshall was placed on the witness stand so he could testify before leaving for China. There was much off-the-record talk that a plane was warming up to take him there.

He appeared first on Thursday morning, December 6, 1945. The Committee Counsel and Democrats questioned him through Thursday and Friday. On Saturday morning he was turned over to the Republican Committee members with a great deal of gossip holding that he would have to get away that afternoon. Senator Brewster's father had passed away the night before, and he was unable to be present. Representative Gearhart questioned him a short while and then the General was turned over to Senator Ferguson.

The Senator had devised what we called a "blue plan" for questioning the General. The General was involved in almost every phase of Pearl Harbor from the ordering of the fleet to Pearl Harbor up to the very moment the fleet was struck. He was responsible for the fleet's protection while in Pearl Harbor. He was involved in all military preparations and lack of preparations. It was in his power to decide whether defense material went to Hawaii or foreign nations. He was consulted on almost all of the diplomatic maneuvers which preceded the disaster. There

was no witness before the Committee who was in a position to know as much about the events leading up to the disaster as the General. Accordingly, the Senator put his best efforts into preparing a thorough system for questioning him on every important phase. This "blue plan" was typed into a loose leaf binder with a full set of questions on each phase. He did not mean to let the General go until he had answered all his questions. The Committee Chairman, Senator Alben W. Barkley, stated on the record that he had hoped to conclude with the General on that day, and the Vice-chairman, Representative Jere Cooper, stated that he understood that the General's plane was waiting, ready to take him to China. (It later developed that the General had not even seen the President for a briefing, since accepting his appointment over the telephone.)

The Senator could not be side-tracked; he questioned the General all through Saturday and again on Monday and Tuesday of the following week—and still further during the second round of questioning on Thursday. There was an attempt to deride his questioning. Some majority members did not think his questions were pertinent. Senator Scott W. Lucas, a Democratic member of the Committee, spent the weekend with the President. Finally, the General was ordered to the White House. The fact was that Senator Ferguson was hitting home.

On the first day alone Senator Ferguson brought out, among other things, the following facts that the Committee Counsel had missed:

1. That General Gerow was in charge of war plans and had no authority over General Short; in fact, he had nothing to do with operations until we were actually engaged in war.
2. That under Army regulations General Gerow had no responsibility for sending or not sending a proper alert to General Short.
3. That General Marshall himself as Chief of Staff was the person responsible for the fact that General Short was not properly alerted.
4. That there was no responsible Army officer on duty Saturday evening, December 6th, or Sunday morning, December 7th, who could take action before General Marshall's belated arrival at 11:20 Sunday morning and, therefore, it could not be said that Washington was on a full alert, even though it was known that the situation was critical.
5. That General Marshall had appointed as head of Army Intelligence a man he knew was short of the required qualifications.
6. That although the head of Army Intelligence "should have had access to all intelligence" he did not have such access and, therefore, his confidential bulletins were not the best information available.

7. That lack of manpower available for deciphering Japanese codes was not due to lack of Congressional appropriations.

8. That General Marshall knew that Great Britain was informed of what we read in the Japanese codes before Pearl Harbor.

9. That "we have been trying to keep that [the above] quiet as much as we could."

10. That General Marshall knew no reason why Admiral Kimmel had been cut off from the group receiving the information obtained from reading Japanese codes.

11. That General Marshall denied knowledge that the Japanese knew we were reading their codes. (The Senator brought out from a later witness, much to the embarrassment of the Committee Counsel and other witnesses, that Washington had such knowledge and copies of it were circulated to the General in the regular manner.)

12. That before the Roberts Report "was made public there were certain things withdrawn and that the complete Roberts Report went to the President before portions were withdrawn."

13. That the United States initiated the American-Dutch-British Agreement.

14. That General Marshall had approved this agreement, as did the Secretaries of War and Navy, and that the agreement went into general effect before the attack.

15. That officers of the United States were furnished to China for combat duty against Japan before December 7, 1941.

All this and more was brought out solely by the Senator's questioning. It should be borne in mind that this was after the Committee Counsel and the majority members of the Committee were fully satisfied that they had placed in the record all the significant information that General Marshall could furnish. If their record had been allowed to stand, General Gerow would have been left responsible for an important act of omission for which in fact only General Marshall or Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson were responsible.

There was only one witness, among the scores who testified, who distressed the Senator to the slightest degree. That witness was the former Supreme Court Justice, Owen J. Roberts. President Roosevelt had appointed him to make the first investigation of the attack. The Roberts Commission started its investigation right after the event. Witnesses were then well able to remember clearly what had transpired. Justice Roberts first interviewed all the top Washington officials *off the record*. He then proceeded with his Commission to Honolulu where all the local witnesses were interviewed *on the record* without benefit of the information Washington had, and had failed to use adequately. The Roberts

Report later blamed Admiral Kimmel and General Short for the disaster, and caused their removal while Washington top officials were found to have "fulfilled their obligations." The Senator felt that this witness would be able to provide valuable information concerning what had transpired in Washington. Certainly when the Justice made this inquiry no one could have forgotten where he was on the night of December 6th nor would any important documents have been lost. The Senator with his judicial background revered and respected any man who had been a Supreme Court Justice. He prepared a long list of questions to ask this Justice—questions which, if they had been answered unequivocally, would have been invaluable to the Committee in fixing responsibility for the disaster.

There had been a great deal of mystery concerning a "winds message." It seems that the Japanese had broadcast a code to appear in a weather broadcast when they decided to break relations or go to war. If they were to break with the United States the broadcast would include the three words "east wind rain." Some witnesses testified that such a message was broadcast and received in Washington before the attack. Some thought it had been received in Honolulu. One key witness changed his previous testimony. The message itself could not be found. One intercepted message was missing from the files. One Navy witness swore he last saw the message when it was assembled with others for the use of the Roberts Commission. Four years after the event memories were hazy and conflicting. There were some indications that changed testimony might have been prompted. What was the truth?

When Senator Brewster asked the Justice about this message, the Justice replied: "I don't know anything about this winds message. . . .

Senator BREWSTER: So, so far as you now recall, there was no mention about either the original or implementing winds message, as it is called?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: *I have no recollection of any such thing and I think you will search the testimony in vain for reference to it.* (Emphasis supplied)

Senator BREWSTER: Well, we understood there were important gaps in that as the result of representations as to security.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Oh, No. The stenographic testimony is complete. There is nothing eliminated from the stenographic testimony. (Emphasis supplied)

A few moments later Senator Ferguson started his questioning. He read to the Justice the testimony of a Navy Captain that the last time he saw the Winds message was when it was assembled

into a file to show as evidence to the Roberts Commission.* The Justice testified that "The file originals of anything of this kind were not in our custody at any time." The Senator then quoted from a transcript of the testimony before the Commission of which Justice Roberts had been the Chairman:

Senator FERGUSON: You were the chairman and this is in your language:

The CHAIRMAN: It has been reported to me that about 10 days before the attack a code was intercepted which could not be broken, but it was forwarded to Washington to the War Department to be broken, and the War Department found out it could be broken and did break it, and found it contained three important signal words which would direct the attack on Pearl Harbor, and that the War Department subsequently intercepted over the radio those three signal words and forwarded them to the military authorities here as an indication that the code had been followed and that the attack was planned.

I wish you would look at that.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: You don't need to show it to me.

Senator FERGUSON: What were you talking about?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: I was talking about some information that had been given to me somewhere around Pearl Harbor. People were coming to me all the time telling me that there was such and such a rumor. You see I say "It has been reported to me."

Senator FERGUSON: Wouldn't this describe the winds code message?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Very likely it would; very likely so....

* * * *

Senator FERGUSON: Mr. Justice, this last part—

... and that the War Department subsequently intercepted over the radio these three signal words and forwarded them to the military authorities here . . .

You were in Hawaii then?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Yes.

Senator FERGUSON: As an indication that the code had been followed and that the attack was planned.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Yes; that is what I say.

Senator FERGUSON: Wouldn't that indicate that the winds execute message had been received and that you had some information on that point?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Surely. Somebody had told me that or I wouldn't have asked the question.

* * * *

*It was later found that they were assembled for the then Acting Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal.

Senator FERGUSON: Colonel Fielder (G-2 Intelligence, Hawaii) said:

I have no knowledge of that whatever.

The CHAIRMAN: You know nothing about it?

Colonel FIELDER: No.

The CHAIRMAN: You had no communications from the War Department as of December 5th forwarding to you the meaning of the three code words which would be the signal for the attack?

I was coming back to that.

Now, that would indicate that there were three code words showing there was going to be an attack as far as the United States was concerned, at least someone told you about it?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: That is right.

* * * *

Senator FERGUSON: Now, I refer to exhibit 32 on December 5, 1941, there was a message sent by General Miles:

Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters, G-2.

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu Territory, Hawaii.

Contact Commander Rochefort (Communications Security Unit, 14th Naval District, Hawaii) immediately through Commandant Fourteenth Naval District regarding broadcast from Tokyo with reference weather.

Signed "Miles".

Did you have that message before you, do you recall?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: I think so.

Senator FERGUSON: Did you know that they were talking there about the original code message?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON: I mean the original winds message.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: No, sir; I don't know it now.

Senator FERGUSON: Now, going on:

The CHAIRMAN: I refer to something else which you may or may not know anything about. I refer to the fact that some ten days before December it is supposed that a Japanese code message you intercepted and was broken down by the Department in Washington, one of the military departments, which gave certain key words which would be flashed over the radio directing the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Colonel BICKNELL: (Asst. G-2 Intelligence, Hawaii): Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: And that, having broken that down, one of the military establishment in Washington caught over the radio the three key words and relayed them here to you. When I say "you," to the Islands—

Colonel BICKNELL: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Do you know of any such story?

Colonel BICKNELL: I never heard of such a thing, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN: Never heard of it?

Colonel BICKNELL: No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN: I have no other questions. are there any other questions?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: I was talking about the same rumors that had come to me from somewhere.

Senator FERGUSON: As you were there with Bicknell?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON: Did you follow that up? I have looked over the testimony and I haven't been able to find it but I want to know now, from your recollection, do you know whether you ever tried to follow that up here in Washington after you failed on Bicknell and Fielder?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Yes, sir. We asked for all the messages there were about any broken codes and we were told we had had all they had except this magic thing. ("Magic" referred to intercepted Japanese messages in their most secret code.)

Such testimony from a former Justice of the Supreme Court was sickening.* Testimony which he said would be sought in vain turned out to have been the subject of almost the only questions he asked Hawaiian Intelligence officers. When the Justice did not find the information he expected, he had dropped this line of questioning. Apparently, Washington officials in 1941 thought they could place the blame in Hawaii if they could show that this message had been received there. Washington officials had been vindicated on their own say-so, while the two Hawaiian Commanders were held up to national scorn on the basis of the Roberts inquiry. The Senator was visibly taken back by such testimony, but he kept on a rapid fire questioning. He hit home again.

Senator FERGUSON: Do I understand you did not get the magic?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: No; we were never shown one of the magic messages.

Senator FERGUSON: Not one?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Not one.

Senator FERGUSON: Were you ever shown the substance of the magic messages?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON: Did you know there were such messages?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Well, I knew that the Army or Navy or State Department had been cracking a super code of the Japanese for weeks or months and that they had been taking off all kinds of information. We asked the War Department and the Navy Department to tell us what they got from that and they told us. They did not show us the messages, any of them, and I didn't ask them to.

*Justice Roberts retired in 1945 and this testimony was taken on Jan. 28, 1946.

Senator FERGUSON: That being true how was this finding possible, on page 19:

The Secretary of State—

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Now, Senator, is this an investigation of the Roberts Commission or an investigation of what happened at Pearl Harbor?

Senator FERGUSON: I am trying to get the facts.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: When you ask "How is this finding possible?" I don't find you criticizing me a bit.

Senator FERGUSON: I am not criticizing. I want to know on the facts you had before you—

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: How we could make a certain finding.

Senator FERGUSON: Yes.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: I think that is criticism.

Senator FERGUSON: You think that is criticism?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Go ahead. I will be glad to answer your question.

Senator FERGUSON: (reading)

The Secretary of State fulfilled his obligations by keeping the War and Navy Departments in close touch with the international situation and fully advising them respecting the course and probable termination of negotiations with Japan.

Now, I merely mean if you didn't have any of these messages, for instance, the message setting the deadline of the 29th, the pilot message, the 1 o'clock message, the 13-part message up until midnight or 9 o'clock, and the 14th part and 1 o'clock message on Sunday morning, how could the commission make a finding, if they didn't have the facts?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: I spent an entire day in Secretary Hull's office. Secretary Hull showed me, as a Commissioner sent over by the Commission, because we wanted to do him the courtesy of sending someone there to take his evidence instead of dragging him over to the Navy Department. Secretary Hull showed me his personal memorandum where he had noted that on a certain day he had told the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy this, that and the other thing, and where he got that information I did not ask him, but I was perfectly convinced, and our commission was convinced from my report to them of the testimony he brought to me, that Secretary Hull had been warning the War and Navy Departments day by day and day by day that something might happen this day or that day, that the situation was degenerating, and so on.

Senator FERGUSON: All right. Now, Justice, that part of the testimony is not in the testimony furnished us, is it?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Certainly not. They had a stack of memorandum from State Department that high, or Secretary Hull's personal memorandum and in order to recap it I asked him to write the letter which is in our record.

Senator FERGUSON: All right. Then we come to the next finding in your conclusions:

The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy fulfilled their obligations by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State and with each other and by keeping the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations informed of the course of the negotiations with Japan and the significant implications thereof.

Now, without having the intercepted magic messages, did you make this finding? I will put it that way.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Why, certainly. The Chief of Staff and Admiral Stark told us and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy told us that everytime Hull gave them a warning they would go and repeat it to the Chief of Staff and to the Admiral. I did not need to look at any messages to find out whether Marshall and Stark had been sufficiently warned. That is all I was interested in.

Senator FERGUSON: Now, Justice, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, the President, and Secretary of State were each being furnished this magic. Did you not know that they were all being furnished the magic?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: I did not know it and I would not have been interested in it.

Senator FERGUSON: Well then, as to whether or not—

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Now, let's go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON: Do you have something to say?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Let's investigate the Roberts Commission. I would not have been interested in it, Senator. I wanted to know whether the military men were put on full warning and put on their toes by the men who did have the information. I got a unanimous statement that they were.

By this time the Justice was becoming belligerent. He had indicated that he had been interested in what Hawaii had done, and not in questioning Washington policy or officials. The Senator, with at least two hours of further questioning before him, tried again.

Senator FERGUSON: On page 2 I see this:

The oral evidence received amounts to 1,877 typewritten pages and the records and documents examined exceed 3,000 printed pages in number.

Now the photostatic copy of the transcript has only 1862 pages, 25 less, and there is—would you look at the page?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: I do not need to, sir.

Senator FERGUSON: Can you answer it if you do not need to look at it?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Yes, I can answer it. I do not know why the discrepancy.

Senator FERGUSON: Do you know whether there is any evidence that we do not have?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: I know there is none you do not have.

Senator Ferguson made one more attempt to get some facts:

Senator FERGUSON: On the day that you spent some 2 hours with the President the day you made your report did you have a discussion of the facts?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON: There was no discussion of the facts?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Well, it depends on what you mean by a "discussion of the facts."

Senator FERGUSON: Well, will you try and give us what took place there and that will answer the question.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Well, I think it a highly improper thing but if you ask it I suppose I am bound to answer it.

* * * *

Senator FERGUSON: Well now, Justice, what was wrong with the question I asked you, to tell me what the President had said?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Well, now Senator, I am not going to indicate whether Senator Ferguson is wrong. We have been inquiring about how wrong Roberts is. Don't let us get clear off that line.

Senator FERGUSON: I was wondering why we shouldn't have the facts as a Committee.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Well, I am not going to argue it with you, Senator. I said I was going to try to answer your question.

The Senator seemed disheartened. My personal reaction was that the Senator was deeply shocked by such conduct. The Senator's own judicial background had led him to revere all Supreme Court Justices. He felt he was only doing his duty to get the facts for the American public. The Justice adopted a bellicose attitude. He resented the disclosure of the one-sidedness of his prior investigation. He created an atmosphere that implied the Senator had no right to question him. In his well-considered report the Senator had this to say:

It is extremely unfortunate that the Roberts Commission Report was so hasty, inconclusive, and incomplete. Some witnesses were examined under oath; others were not. Much testimony was not even recorded. The Commission knew that Japanese messages had been intercepted and were available, prior to the attack, to the high command in Washington. The Commission did not inquire about what information these intercepts contained, who received them or what was done about them, although the failure of Washington to inform the commanders in Hawaii of this vital intelligence bears directly on the question of whether those commanders

performed their full duties. Mr. Justice Roberts testified before this Committee:

I should not have bothered to read it (the intercepted Japanese traffic) if it had been shown to me.

If it were necessary to do so, detailed examples of the many shortcomings of the Roberts Commission could be set forth. The duty of our Committee to examine the entire subject afresh does not require an extended criticism of the Roberts Report.

It should be noted, however, that Justice Roberts had sufficient legal experience to know the proper method of collecting and preserving evidence which in this case involved the highest interests of the Nation. The facts were then fresh in the minds of key witnesses in Washington. They could not have then been ignorant of their whereabouts at important times or have forgotten the details of events and operations. No files would have been "lost" and no information would have been distorted by the passage of time. The failure to observe these obvious necessities is almost as tragic to the cause of truth as the attack on Pearl Harbor itself was a tragedy for the Nation.

(A Note From The Editor, continued from page 404)

Harbor puzzle. He promises to release more information about his knowledge in other forums.

Leib's story was not the capstone to the recent revisionist wave. Percy L. Greaves, Jr., who had been research chief for the Republican minority in the Joint Congressional Investigation, and contributed a masterly chapter on "The Pearl Harbor Investigations" to the fundamental revisionist work *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace* (1953)* announced the completion and forthcoming publication of his own book, provisionally entitled *The Real Infamy of Pearl Harbor*. It is a work long-awaited by revisionists, who recognize in Greaves the man who probably knows more about the Pearl Harbor record than any other alive, having been in on the investigation from virtually the start and devoted some 40 years to the subject. His is a voice of authority which will have to be contended with, and which promises to raise a new storm of controversy over an issue that just won't die.

* * * *

All of which brings us down to the late Winter of 1983-84 and this issue of *The JHR*, entirely devoted to Pearl Harbor. Represented here are some of the fruits of Mr. Greaves's new work, in the form of four chapters which he has granted us permission to pre-publish: "Marshall Comes on Stage," "Marshall Before the Joint Congressional Committee," "Admission of MAGIC Demolishes FDR's Claim of Surprise," and "What We Knew." These chapters contain extensive extracts from the testimony presented before the congressional investigators; precise citations from that record and other sources are dispensed with here, but will of course appear in the complete published book. The chapters are preceded by three of Mr. Greaves's most trenchant essays from years past, quite deserving of re-circulation. These begin with "Was Pearl Harbor Unavoidable?," which appeared originally in the Chicago Sunday Tribune Magazine of 7 December 1947. This explores the missed chances in 1939 for the United States to cooperate with and encourage the Japanese peace party; that Washington was not interested in such a course meant that Japan, in opposing Stalin's appetites in Asia, was left with nowhere else to turn for support than the Axis powers, and it explains a crucial part of the background to the later tragedy of war. Next appears "The Mystery of Pearl Harbor," taken from an original article published in *National Review* of 12 December 1966. (Yes: William F. Buckley, Jr., was once unafraid to publish revisionist material.) This article has been noteworthy in revisionist lore as containing a devastating rebuttal of the book which was, before Prange's, the anti-revisionists' principal bulwark, Roberta Wohlstetter's *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*—a work all too often cited by the innocent, even to this day, as "authoritative." Greaves notes that there were more than 100 factual errors in Wohlstetter, including one fundamental error of assumption which fatally undermines her entire thesis. He also goes after FDR's personal, hand-picked, paid, beranked and bemedalled court historian, the late Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison. Finally, we have a unique inside-look at the Joint Congressional Committee investigation in Greaves's "Senator Homer Ferguson and the Pearl Harbor Congressional Investigation," a valuable memoir written in 1948 and published here for the first time.

(continued on page 511)

*1982 paperback edition available from the IHR, \$11.00

Marshall Comes on Stage

FROM "THE REAL INFAMY OF PEARL HARBOR"

PERCY L. GREAVES, JR.

If the testimony on the knowledge and actions of the top Navy command on that momentous weekend seems to be confusing and inconsistent, that on the Army side was downright mysterious and almost impossible to comprehend without an understanding of two facts of human nature. The first is that few people will voluntarily confess their mistakes, particularly if they think they can keep them hidden. The second is that few of us have the courage to endanger our careers by confessing the truth, if silence, a little loss of memory, or a change in our recollections can raise our rating with our superiors. Members of the Army and Navy have always found it difficult to differ with, criticize or embarrass their superiors.

The mysteries hidden by the conflicting testimonies of the top Army officers and their juniors may undoubtedly have been due primarily to the derelictions of George C. Marshall, the FDR-appointed Chief of Staff. If Marshall had recalled the truth for the record, his reputation as well as that of his chief, FDR, would certainly have suffered.

One morning as this author met with Senators Ferguson and Brewster before the start of that day's JCC hearings, Ferguson reported an incident of the previous evening. In the men's room at a social affair, he, Ferguson, had overheard Marshall tell the JCC Chairman, Senator Alben Barkley, later Vice President under Truman, that he could not say where he was on the night of

December 6-7, because it might get "the Chief," FDR, in trouble. In confirmation of this, we now have the word of a very responsible person, James G. Stahlman, that Secretary Knox told him that both Marshall and Stark were among those who met with Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins at the White House on the night of December 6-7, 1941.

Marshall's Rise to Chief of Staff

Thus, we can easily understand Marshall's difficult position, as well as that of those serving under him. In his long Army career, Marshall had his ups and downs. He started in 1902 as a Second Lieutenant after graduating from Virginia Military Institute. He entered World War I as a Captain and, before its close, was promoted to a temporary Colonel. In May 1919, long after the Armistice, he became Aide-de-Camp of our World War I military hero, General John J. Pershing. Shortly thereafter, he was returned to his permanent rank of Captain to start the slow peacetime promotion back up to Colonel.

While General Douglas MacArthur, West Point 1903 and thus a contemporary of Marshall, was Chief of Staff (1903-1935), Pershing suggested to MacArthur that he raise the recently promoted full Colonel Marshall to Brigadier General. Marshall had served largely in service schools and staff positions, so to round out his experience he was given a command assignment with a top regiment. Marshall, however, devoted so much of his energies to establishing Civilian Conservation Camps, a New Deal program with which the Army was asked to cooperate, that the Inspector General found that the regiment's training program had suffered seriously. Marshall thus missed an opportunity to win his first star and was relegated to the position of Senior Instructor of the Illinois National Guard (1933-1936). Marshall appealed the appointment, but to no avail.

It was only after the first retirement of MacArthur that Marshall's friends succeeded in obtaining his promotion. In July 1938, he was brought to Washington as Director of War Plans. From then on, with the help of Roosevelt's close advisor, Harry Hopkins, his advancement was rapid. He was Deputy Chief of Staff in less than a year and Chief of Staff three months later, advancing from one star to four stars in that short period.

As Chief of Staff, Marshall was

the immediate advisor of the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the Military Establishment, and is charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development and execution of the military program.

After June 1940, the Secretary of War was Henry L. Stimson, a long-time advocate of tightening the noose around Japan's economic neck.

As Chief of Staff, Marshall was also

in peace, by direction of the President, the Commanding General of the Field Forces and in that capacity directs the field operations and the general training of the several Armies of the oversea forces and of the GHQ units. He continues to exercise command of the Field Forces after the outbreak of war until such time as the President shall have specifically designated a Commanding General thereof.

In this capacity, Marshall reported directly to FDR, a President who felt it was his duty to support and subsidize the Soviet Union while opposing the Japanese. Marshall did not always agree with the actions of his two superiors. However, he was certainly in sympathy with their overall plans and policies. Whatever his weaknesses may have been, Marshall was certainly a loyal and devoted deputy of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Marshall's Responsibility for the Fleet

As Chief of Staff, he and the President were the only ones with legal authority to issue command orders to the Field Commanders, including Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Marshall's appointee as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. The Secretary of War, as a civilian, was outside this line of command. On February 7, 1941, Marshall wrote a long letter to his new appointee.

My Dear Short: I believe you take over command today. . . .

Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the deficiencies of Army materiel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically to planes and anti-aircraft guns. . . . What Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this materiel throughout the Army, and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army.

The fullest protection for the Fleet is the rather than a major consideration for us; there can be little question about that; but the Navy itself makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii. . . .

You, of course, understand the pressure on the Department for the limited materiel we have. . . . However, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in mind that our first concern is to protect the Fleet.

My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy

against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.

Please keep clearly in mind in all your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentration, and that purpose should be clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel. . . .

During the JCC hearings, Marshall testified:

I had a very vital interest, the Army had a very vital interest, in the Fleet at Pearl Harbor because the obligation to protect Pearl Harbor was an Army obligation.

It was thus Marshall's obligation to supply the Hawaiian Command, to the best of his ability, the materiel it needed for the defense of the Fleet. Yet, he sat on the Board that allocated scarce materiel and in the capacity acquiesced to the granting of much of the materiel Hawaii needed to the British, the Chinese and the communist Soviet Union. He also ordered that most of Hawaii's needed four engine bombers be sent on to the Philippines. No doubt this was all in agreement with the wishes of his two superiors. Marshall testified that he concurred with a November 24, 1941, memorandum of his War Plans Chief on the proposed modus vivendi that:

Even a temporary peace in the Pacific would permit us to complete defensive preparations in the Philippines and at the same time insure continuance of material assistance to the British—both of which are highly important. . . . War Plans Division wishes to emphasize it is of grave importance to the success of our war effort in Europe that we reach a modus vivendi with Japan.

This would seem to indicate that in November 1941, Marshall gave the Philippines and "our war effort in Europe" a higher priority than Pearl Harbor and the Pacific Fleet.

Marshall a Key Figure

As we have seen, when Secretary Stimson sent his warning messages of November 27, over Marshall's signature, he included the sentence: "Report measures taken." Under Army regulations then in force, an officer reporting the measures taken as the result of such a message can assume his measures are approved unless later countermanded or supplemented by his superior. Short reported to Marshall that he had alerted for sabotage, which Marshall had earlier stated was one of the two "real perils of the situation." While Marshall could not recall that reply, he was forced to admit he must have seen it. The original had been

stamped, "Noted: Chief of Staff," and was stapled under MacArthur's reply, which Marshall had initialled. Yet, Marshall took no action. Hawaii remained on that sabotage alert from November 27th until the time of the attack. With planes bunched and ammunition inaccessible, our Hawaiian forces had the worst possible disposition for repelling an attack.

Marshall, and Marshall alone, was responsible for this unfortunate situation. While it is true that he had many other worries and was admittedly more concerned about the Philippines and "our war effort in Europe," he was on record that "The fullest protection for the Fleet" was his obligation.

The record is clear that much of the damage incurred at Pearl Harbor was due to Marshall's failure to inform or instruct Short further on the basis of the mass of information available to him. Marshall was very reluctant about admitting this and every attempt was made to relieve him of that responsibility.

With the possible exception of the diplomatic phase, Marshall was heavily involved in all the developments that led to the Pearl Harbor disaster. With Roosevelt dead, Hull too weak to face cross examination by the Republican members of the Committee and Stimson conveniently incapacitated until after the Committee Reports were issued, it seemed evident that Marshall was likely to be the most important Administration witness before the Congressional Committee.

And so it was.

Attempts were made to alleviate his ordeal. Marshall retired as Chief of Staff on November 18, 1945. He then expected to have a few weeks for preparation prior to his appearance before the JCC. A lawyer had been engaged to assemble and brief him on all previous testimony with which it was felt he should be familiar. Marshall was to be one of the last Washington witnesses (for the prosecution) before the appearance of the Pearl Harbor witnesses (for the defendants). Then, there was a quick shift in plans.

Communism in China

Back in 1931, at the time of the Manchurian Incident, the then Secretary of War, Patrick J. Hurley, happened to be in Shanghai. He interviewed some of the leaders of the fledgling Chinese Nationalist Government which we had recognized in 1928. He then proceeded to Japan where he in turn interviewed some of that country's Army leaders and cabinet members. He concluded that Japan was serious in her desire to dominate the mainland and had the military capability to do so. Like his cabinet colleague, Henry L. Stimson, then Hoover's Secretary of State, he

developed an anti-Japanese bias and opposed early freedom for the Philippines. Unlike Stimson, however, Hurley opposed sending Japan any threatening diplomatic notes unless we meant to back them up with force. He expressed his attitude on Japan's venture in Manchuria succinctly: "Like it or fight!"

There was no more vociferous opponent of the New Deal than Patrick Hurley. However, when war came he undertook a number of assignments for FDR, the New Deal's architect and archangel. On August 18, 1944, FDR appointed Hurley, a Republican, as his personal representative to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

to promote efficient and harmonious relations between the Generalissimo and General Stilwell to facilitate General Stilwell's exercise of command over the Chinese armies.

Hurley left for China the next day via Moscow.

The basic problem at that time was that General Stilwell wanted to unite the Chinese Communist Army with the Chinese Nationalist Army in the war against the Japanese. While in Moscow, en route to China, Hurley met with the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov. Molotov gave Hurley the impression that the Chinese Communists were only very impoverished people and that

The Soviet government should not be associated with these "communist elements" nor could it in any way be blamed for this situation. . . . The Soviets would be glad if the United States aided the Chinese in unifying their country. . . . Molotov made it clear also that until Chiang Kai-shek tried by changes in his policies to improve Sino-Soviet relations, the Soviet government did not intend to take any interest in Chinese governmental affairs.

Chiang Kai-shek vs Communism

So Hurley went on to China to meet with Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek. He found Kai-shek willing

to grant Stilwell command of the Chinese armies; but he would not consent to arming and use of the Communists' troops unless they would accept the authority of the Government.

However, the Generalissimo hesitated to give Stilwell the broad powers he desired. Exasperated, Stilwell got Marshall to draft an ultimatum over Roosevelt's signature for Stilwell to present to Chiang. That did it. Chiang realized it was Stilwell's doing and was "deeply offended." He wired Roosevelt that he was willing to place an American officer in command of the combined forces fighting Japan, "but, 'I cannot confer this heavy responsibility upon General Stilwell'." Marshall attempted to support Stilwell

as the only one fit for the task, but FDR finally relieved Stilwell and replaced him with General Albert C. Wedemeyer.

Hurley was later to learn that Stilwell's State Department advisors, John P. Davies and John Stewart Service, were strongly pro-communist and anti-Chiang. Stilwell's diary was later found to contain many statements derogatory of Chiang as well as the solution for which Stilwell had been working:

The cure for China's trouble is the elimination of Chiang Kai-shek. The only thing that keeps this country split is his fear of losing control. He hates the Reds and will not take any chance of giving them a toehold in the government.

It would seem that Chiang had some justification for telling Hurley that

he was convinced Stilwell "was in conspiracy with the Communists to overthrow the government."

Stilwell, like Marshall, considered the Communists our allies.

Hurley still had his work cut out for him. Chiang wrote Roosevelt that he had complete confidence in Hurley and was relying on him for help in negotiating with the Chinese Communists. As a result, FDR appointed Hurley to be the American Ambassador to China. Whereupon Hurley began negotiating with the Communists with the defeat of Japan as the primary objective. His difficulties were increased by a very active faction of State Department employees who were advising the Chinese Communists to hold out while they were devising plans for arming the Chinese Communist troops. Hurley had to request the removal of John Davies and John Service from the China Theater.

Hurley then thought he was making progress in establishing unity between the two Chinese factions. They seemed to agree on cooperating in unification of their Armed forces while moving toward the establishment of

a democratic constitution adopted by a convention in which all the people of China not just the political minorities would participate.

Chiang's Government was to remain in control for the time being with a War Cabinet which would include representatives of the Communist and other parties.

Yalta Gift to Communists

Then came the secret Yalta Agreement of February 11, 1945. The text was shown to General Marshall for comment, but he offered no criticism. It was signed by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. In order to induce the Soviet Union to enter the war

against Japan after the defeat of Germany, it had been secretly agreed, without consulting Chiang Kai-shek, to grant the Soviet Communists certain rights in China.

After reporting his progress in China, Hurley heard rumors of what he called "a far-reaching betrayal of China's interests." He returned to Washington to investigate. He found FDR only a physical shadow of his former self. FDR denied to him that he had made any agreement

that would destroy the territorial integrity and political independence of China, and assure Communist conquest of that country.

Witnessing FDR in his "sickness of death," Hurley felt that FDR believed he was telling the truth. Hurley finally located a copy of the agreement and showed it to FDR, who became disturbed. FDR then directed Hurley

to go to London and Moscow; to speak to Churchill and to Stalin; and seek a way to ameliorate the betrayal of China.

On visiting Churchill, Hurley was assured that Great Britain would support the American policy of support for Chiang Kai-shek's National Government. Hurley's report on his conference with Stalin, April 15, 1945, in the presence of Ambassador Averell Harriman and Foreign Minister Molotov stated:

In short, Stalin agreed unqualifiedly to America's policy in China as outlined to him during this conversation.

Japan Loses—Communists Win

Before Hurley could complete his mission, Roosevelt died on April 12th. On assuming the Presidency, Harry S. Truman soon took steps to assure both Churchill and Stalin that he would carry out FDR's policies, including those reached at Yalta. On June 18, 1945, Hurley was told by the Secretary of State:

As you know, the President is wholly committed to the fulfillment of the agreement made at Yalta.

On his return to China, Hurley found out that the Chinese Communists had learned of the still secret Yalta Agreement as it pertained to China. Mao Tse-tung proclaimed that

our ultimate program is to push China forward to Socialism and Communism; this is definite and beyond question.

A month and a half later, Truman sent Hurley a message to deliver to Chiang Kai-shek on June 15, 1945. It would inform him that the Soviet Union was entering the war against Japan and Soviet troops would be entering Chinese territory.

As compensation, Stalin had demanded, and the United States and Great Britain had agreed with his demands

for special rights in Mongolia and Manchuria. The Soviet interpretation of the Yalta Agreement went far beyond its actual terms. When Chiang protested to Truman, he was told to work out any differences in interpretation with Stalin.

It thus became evident that the Republic of China was left at the mercy of Stalin. A Chinese-Soviet treaty was signed on August 24, 1945. As General Wedemeyer has written, there was a stepped-up program of Communist propaganda. Chiang Kai-shek was painted as an enemy of the people. Soviet forces compelled United States naval vessels to withdraw from Manchurian ports. In fact, Communists actually fired on an American Admiral's launch. China's sovereignty over Manchuria, agreed upon at Cairo, was out the window.

We supposedly went to war to free China from Japanese domination. Yet we quietly acquiesced to Soviet domination of the very areas to which Japan had brought prosperity before the commies started their disruptions creating the very incidents that gave Japan an excuse to rush in troops for the protection of Japanese lives and property.

Chaos Returns to China

Hurley considered this acceptance of "Communist imperialism" a change in American policies. So he asked for an opportunity to discuss our policies in Asia with the President and Secretary of State James Byrnes. He left for Washington on September 22nd, and on October 13th, met with Truman and Byrnes. He told them he wanted to resign because there was no longer support for the policy which he had been sent to China to carry out. They urged him to reconsider and return to China. He was told that Truman's policy in China was the same as Roosevelt's. Thinking of the Yalta Agreement, Hurley asked for a "statement defining the current policy."

While awaiting the issuance of such a policy statement by the Secretary of State or the President, Hurley took a vacation. Getting impatient, he finally issued a statement of his own from New Mexico. He referred to our November 26, 1941, ultimatum to Japan asking Japan to vacate China, asserting that:

The American policy stated by Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt was the immediate cause of our war against Japan.... Japan is defeated. Chinese independence for which we fought Japan has not yet been achieved. Until it is our victory cannot be real.

Meanwhile, General Wedemeyer was facing increasing problems in China. Conditions in China were fast becoming chaotic. He was operating under directives that placed him, as both the American Commander of the China Theater and Chiang's Chief of Staff, in an impossible situation. On November 20th, he sent two long messages to his superiors. They described the situation, including the advances made by both the Soviet and Chinese Communists. It was his belief that

Chiang Kai-shek sincerely desires to achieve stability in China, to unify the country, to institute democratic procedures and to implement social reforms of a wide and sweeping character. . . . He is selfless in his approach to the situation. However, surrounding him are men without scruples who are primarily interested in self-aggrandizement. Chiang is extremely loyal to those officials and war lords who in the past have supported him. As a consequence, they have been appointed to positions of responsibility in the Government even though they are incompetent and/or unscrupulous. . . . Whereas the politician in China seeks to enrich himself through machination and chicanery, the Chinese businessman has a code of ethics that is exemplary and he usually conforms to this code.

Wedemeyer concluded that there was only a remote chance that the Chinese Communists and the National Government would ever come to a satisfactory agreement. He also concluded that the Soviets had broken their agreements and were creating "favorable conditions for the realization of Chinese Communist aims." He further concluded that the presence of American Forces

might possibly develop a tense and dangerous situation with the Soviet Government and will inevitably lead to serious involvement in fratricidal warfare.

Wedemeyer then recommended that he be relieved as Chiang's Chief of Staff and that American Forces be removed from the China Theater

as early as practicable and concomitantly furnish continued and accelerated economic assistance to the existing recognized China Government; or, until China has developed adequate internal power . . . proclaim a U.S. policy embodying the determination to continue military and economic support to the Chinese Central Government.

Without saying so specifically, Wedemeyer was describing a chaotic situation of irresponsible and inefficient government incapable of maintaining peace in the market place. The situation he disclosed closely resembled that which years earlier had led

the Japanese to send a police force to China to protect the lives and property of Japanese businessmen then subjected to constant communist propaganda and harassment.

U.S. Refused to Oppose Communists

Washington's reply to Wedemeyer stated that, while the State Department wanted to help Chiang get the Japanese out of China, it "does not wish to support the National Government directly against the Communists." The State Department,

convinced that Mao's Communists represented an important popular movement and that the United States could not openly combat it without suffering disastrously under the charge of "imperialist meddling," wished to stay clear of the struggle between Chiang and Mao.

In short, to oust the Japanese we had fought a world war, but to oust Communists would be "imperialist meddling." Many people still do not realize that FDR's desire to hide the economic failure of the New Deal and end the resulting mass unemployment led him to take us step by step into a bloody and expensive World War, a war that was to make large parts of Asia and Europe safe for communism.

On November 23, 1945, Wedemeyer wired back that it would be impossible to support Chiang and at the same time avoid his war with the Chinese Communists.

Such United States support to the National government will definitely involve American forces in fratricidal warfare. There can be no mistake about this. . . . If the unification of China and Manchuria under Chinese National forces is to be a U.S. policy, involvement in fratricidal warfare and possibly in war with the Soviet Union must be accepted and would definitely require additional U.S. forces far beyond those presently available in the theater.

This caused Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal to enter in his diary:

It appears that if Manchuria and perhaps North China are not to pass to Chinese control but rather pass to Soviet control or separate states under its domination by a progression of circumstances, then Russia will have achieved in the Far East approximately the objectives Japan initially set out to accomplish.

Hurley Resigns

Disgusted with his inability to get any clear statement of Amer-

ican policy in China, Pat Hurley tried to resign his Ambassadorship to China by phone. Hurley wanted to quit because he believed Truman "accepted the Yalta Secret Agreement as 'basic policy' toward China." Secretary Byrnes refused to accept Hurley's resignation. So Hurley returned to Washington. There he found that the pro-communist State Department men he had replaced in China had not been reassigned "as President Truman had promised." On November 26th, further developments annoyed Hurley, including attacks on him in the Communist newspaper, the Daily Worker, on the floor of the House of Representatives, and in private statements attributed to Secretary Byrnes that he would prefer as Ambassador in China a "deserving Democrat" who agreed with the Yalta policies.

Hurley wrote a letter of resignation

v

denouncing the un-American elements in the State Department, and warning that the failures in American policy in China were paving the way for another world war, and revealing the provisions of the Yalta Secret Agreement which had opened China to Soviet domination.

Senator Vandenberg persuaded him to remove any mention of the still secret Yalta Agreement on the premise that there was still some hope that changes might be made in it.

After rewriting his resignation, Hurley, who was unable to get an appointment with the President, called on the Secretary of State on the morning of November 27th. Byrnes again tried to persuade him not to resign, stating that both he and the President "upheld traditional American policy toward China." Apparently Byrnes believed that he had persuaded Hurley to return to China and so informed Truman by phone. Then, as the Cabinet gathered at the White House for lunch, the Washington news ticker carried parts of a speech Hurley was to deliver to the Press Club that noon, in which he announced his resignation. After lunch, Byrnes phoned Hurley, who confirmed his resignation. When Byrnes so informed the President, Truman rang up Marshall to offer him Hurley's former position as Ambassador to China. Marshall promptly accepted the appointment.

Marshall Before the Joint Congressional Committee

FROM "THE REAL INFAMY OF PEARL HARBOR"

PERCY L. GREAVES, JR.

Truman's quick action had two immediate effects. First, the news of Marshall's appointment completely blanketed the media publicity that Hurley had hoped would be produced by his resignation and his startling reasons for doing so. Second, it called for a change in Marshall's schedule and that of the Joint Congressional Committee (JCC) investigation of the events preceding the Pearl Harbor attack.

There was just no way Marshall could avoid testifying before the JCC. He had been involved in more of the matters under investigation than any other then living person. He was in good health and could not plead infirmities, as did Hull and Stimson. The Army Pearl Harbor Board had concluded that Marshall had failed to fulfill his responsibilities in a number of respects. However, the pressure of his new assignment to solve the pressing problems in China could be used as an excuse to reduce to a bare minimum the length of his JCC appearance.

To accomodate General Marshall, the Committee's schedule of witnesses was altered radically so as not to delay his departure for China. On Monday, December 3, 1945, the Committee's General Counsel, William D. Mitchell, informed the Committee that Marshall would appear on Thursday, December 6th. The impression was given that he could be finished with that week. Mr. Mitchell also informed the Committee:

We would like to call General Gerow [pre-Pearl Harbor Chief of the Army's War Plans Division] and get as far as we can with him

before General Marshall is called, because there are certain things that General Gerow knows that would be well to lay into the record, if we can, before General Marshall is called.

So on Wednesday, December 5th, the previously scheduled witness was put aside to permit General Gerow's appearance. He made a very striking appearance as he rose to take the oath. He stood erect in the spic and span uniform of a Lieutenant General with a chest full of brightly colored ribbons. He was the epitome of the war hero, which he was. Not only had he fought well for his country, but he was also willing to become the sacrificial lamb for his December 1941 superior, General George C. Marshall.

Gerow to Marshall's Rescue

Counsel Mitchell accepted without question the Administration's position on the Pearl Harbor disaster. His examinations of witnesses thus sought to establish it on the record. The Administration position was primarily that of the Roberts Commission. The Pearl Harbor commanders had been adequately alerted and they must therefore assume the primary responsibility for the enormity of the losses. If anyone in Washington had been at fault it might have been General Gerow for not realizing that General Short had failed to obey the commands Washington claimed were in the war warning message of November 27th. This was the message to which Short had replied:

CHIEF OF STAFF
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON DC
REURAD FOUR SEVEN TWO TWENTYSEVENTH REPORT
DEPARTMENT ALERTED TO PREVENT SABOTAGE PERIOD
LIAISON WITH NAVY
SHORT

After Counsel Mitchell had established the fact that General Gerow had led one of the Army Corps in the landing on Omaha Beach in Normandy on D-Day, he had Gerow read the official duties of the War Plans Division. As might be expected, they dealt with the preparation of plans and policies should we be engaged in a war. They said nothing at all about pre-war operations. Another Army Division was actually charged with Operations and Training, but neither Mitchell nor Gerow mentioned this.

Mr. Mitchell's questioning then revealed that Gerow had participated in the secret international conversations from January 29, 1941, to March 7, 1941, in Washington that led to the ABC-Agreement. It was also brought out that he was familiar with the April 1941 conversations in Singapore.

to prepare plan for conduct of military operations in Far East on basis of report of Washington conversations.

Mitchell then asked Gerow if he knew of any agreement "which assumed to bind the United States to engage in war against Japan before Japan attacked the United States?" The General replied, "No, sir." He was also asked if he knew "of any assurances that we had given the British at Singapore of armed support under three or four eventualities?" Gerow responded: "I know of no such assurances, sir." For Mitchell, that disposed of those matters.

Then, Mitchell pressed his luck a bit too far when he asked:

Mr. MITCHELL: Were any deployments, or steps ever taken by the United States prior to December 7 to put any of those plans into operation? December 7, 1941. You told us the British and Dutch plans were never approved. I want to know whether approved or not approved, the United States ever put those plans, or any part of them into effect before December 7, the joint plans, if you know?

General GEROW: I don't believe, sir, I can answer that question offhand. We certainly made some preliminary dispositions, so we would be prepared to carry out those plans but without studying the history of the orders prior to December 7, sir, I prefer not to answer that question.

Gerow testified that the November 27th conference "was directed primarily to the message to the Philippines." He admitted that he later held another conference at which it was "agreed that General Miles would send a message to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department with regard to being on guard against subversive activities." This had led him to tell the Roberts Commission that he assumed Short's reply, addressed to the Chief of Staff in reply to No. 472 "was an answer to the G-2 message that was sent out by General Miles." The number 472 meant nothing to him.

Mr. Mitchell then read part of Secretary Stimson's report which admitted that Short's reply:

was susceptible of the interpretation that he was on the alert against sabotage only, and not on the alert against an air raid or other hostile action. . . . a keener sense of analysis and a more incisive comparison of the messages exchanged, would have invited further inquiry by the War Plans Division of General Short and his failure to go on the necessary alert might well have been discovered.

The Chief of this division and certain of his subordinates knew that a report of the measures taken by General Short had been asked for. General Short's reply was brought to the attention of the chief of the division. A clear and satisfactory reply should have been required. This was not done, and a more efficient functioning

of the division would have demanded that a careful inquiry as to the meaning of General Short's message be made and no room for ambiguity permitted.

Then Mitchell asked the General,

Do you think that is a fair statement of the situation?

General GEROW: Yes, sir; I do, and if there was any responsibility to be attached to the War Department for any failure to send an inquiry to General Short, the responsibility must rest on the War Plans Division, and I accept that responsibility as Chief of the War Plans Division.

Several facts should be pointed out. The details of General Short's three possible alerts were a matter of record in Washington. So Short's response specifying the sabotage alert was informing Marshall that he had bunched his planes and placed his ammunition where it was relatively inaccessible. Secretary Stimson, who was responsible for sending the November 27th messages over Marshall's signature, saw Short's answer and did nothing about it. The truth would seem to be that the attention of all these Washington officials was concentrated on the Far East and the Philippines. They actually gave little thought to Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Mitchell questioned General Gerow until 4:40 p.m. on Wednesday, December 5, 1945. No Committee member was permitted to question the General or add to what Mr. Mitchell had asked Gerow to spread on the record.

Tender Loving Care for Marshall

General Marshall appeared the next day, Thursday, December 6th. The impression was created that his JCC testimony would be completed that week. He was subjected to a friendly examination all that day by Mr. Mitchell. It was really surprising the number of things the General could not recall, remember or recollect. He did not think our ABC and ADB "conversations" committed us to go to war "prior to our being attacked." When asked, "Did the Army make any deployments or dispositions of troops pursuant to those plans that you remember prior to December 7, 1941", he replied: "I do not think there were any definite moves unless it may have been into Iceland and I do not recall that."

When General Marshall had appeared before the Navy Court of Inquiry on September 2, 1944, he was shown the Japanese intercept setting the deadline of November 29, 1941, and asked whether he had seen or been informed of the contents. He had been trying to keep these Japanese intercepts out of the record. His reply at that time was:

I don't recall. These were highly secret matters and papers. The papers were carefully guarded, and our War Department copies today do not indicate when I saw them. I am reasonably certain, however, that I did see them or was informed concerning these papers at the time.

When JCC Counsel Mitchell asked him:

Do you remember seeing any of those [intercepts] in which the Japs instructed their Ambassadors here to get an affirmative agreement first by the 25th of November and later at least by the 29th?

General MARSHALL: I remember that very well, sir.

Such were the vagaries of the General's memory of some of the most important events of his life.

Evasive Answers

Mr. Mitchell continued his inquiry of Marshall on Friday, December 7, 1945. He did not question him concerning the Pilot message distributed Saturday afternoon, but he did ask if he remembered his "movements on the evening of December 6, as to where you were?"

Marshall answered, "I can only account for them by sort of circumstantial evidence." He then enumerated a number of places where he was not, ending with "the probability is . . . we were home." The General was supposed to have had a duty officer at his office and an orderly at his home who would know where he was at all times when he was not at their location. None of his duty officers or orderlies was ever called.

Mr. MITCHELL: You are sure you were not at the White House that evening?

General MARSHALL: No, sir; not at all.

That reply was undoubtedly the most enigmatic of the whole investigation. It would seem he was not sure.

Asked what he knew about "the 14 part message and the 1 P.M. message," referring to December 7, 1941, he replied:

On that particular morning I presumably had my breakfast at about eight, and following the routine that I had carried out on previous Sundays, I went riding at some time thereafter.

I think in one of the previous statements I made in this investigation of Pearl Harbor incidents that I said I probably rode at 8:30. Discussions with the orderlies and also evidence that I have seen of other individuals leads me purely by induction and not by definite memory to think that I must have ridden later; just what time I do not know; but between 8 o'clock and the time I went to the

War Department I ate my breakfast, I probably looked at the Sunday papers and I went for a ride. . . .

The average length of my rides was about, the time period of my rides is about 50 minutes because I rode at a pretty lively gait, at a trot and a canter and at a full run down on the experimental farm where the Pentagon now is and returned to the house, so I would say that the high probability is that the ride was an hour or less, generally or certainly not longer.

My recollection beyond that is that while I was taking a shower either as I went into the shower or while I was actually taking a shower, word came to me that Colonel Bratton had something important and wished to come out to Fort Myer. I sent word that I was coming to the War Department, so I finished my shower, dressed and left for the War Department.

My average time of taking a shower and dressing would be about 10 minutes, possibly less. As to what time I arrived at the War Department is a matter of conjecture; I have no recollection.

On my arrival there Colonel Bratton handed me these intercepts which included the 14 sections of the Japanese message, and I started reading them through. You recall it is a rather lengthy document and of such a nature that there were portions of it that I read twice.

When I reached the end of the document the next sheet was the 1 o'clock message of December 7.

Mr. MITCHELL: That is the message that directed the Ambassadors to deliver this thing at 1:00 p.m. Sunday to the American Government?

General MARSHALL: Yes, sir, that message. That, of course, was indicative to me, and all the others who came into the room, of some very definite action at 1:00 o'clock, because that 1:00 o'clock was Sunday and was in Washington and involved the Secretary of State, all of which were rather unusual put together.

I think that I immediately called Admiral Stark on the phone, and found he had seen the message, and I proposed a message to our various commanders in the Pacific region, the Philippines, Hawaii, the Caribbean, that is the Panama Canal, and the west coast, which included Alaska. Admiral Stark felt that we might confuse them, because we had given them an alert and now we were adding something more to it.

I hung up the phone, which was the White House phone, and in longhand wrote out the message. My recollection was that he called me back. I am told now that the White House telephone records show that I called him back. I had no recollection of reading the message to him. I thought, on the contrary, he called me just as I finished the message saving the last sentence.

However, one way or the other, there was a call or conversation between Stark and myself, the effect of which was he wished me to add to the message specifically "Show this to your Naval officers." which I did in longhand.

I then directed Colonel Bratton to take it immediately to the message center and start it. There was a proposal then that we

have it typed. The decision was that there was no time for typing, and Colonel Bratton left with the message.

On his return I questioned him as to the length of time involved and I could not make out whether or not he was talking about the time of encoding as well as the time of dispatching and the time of receipt, so I sent him back accompanied by Colonel Bundy, the officer in charge of the immediate details of all Pacific affairs.

They came back and gave me the estimates of the time of deliveries in these various parts of the world. My recollection is that I sent at least Colonel Bundy back again, and I thought Colonel Bratton with him. I believe others state that there was no third trip. There were certainly two—my own recollection is there were three. However that may be, that was the procedure on the dispatching of the message.

Do you wish me to go ahead?

Mr. MITCHELL: Yes.

General MARSHALL: The next information I had was the notification of the actual attack on Pearl Harbor. Of my own recollection I do not recall whether I was at the War Department or at the house. I am told on one side by the Secretary of the General Staff at that time, the Acting Secretary at that time, General Dean, that I had returned to the house. I am told, on the other hand, by my orderly that I was at the War Department. I do not know where I was.

Anyway, shortly thereafter, if not immediately then, I was at the War Department, because it was a very quick drive, and on Sunday there was no traffic. It was a matter of about 7 minutes from my house to the Munitions building.

The information then came in in fuller detail, and telephone communication was established and I talked to General Short's Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips. You could hear the explosions at the time.

Mr. Mitchell had one other very interesting and revealing exchange with the General.

Mr. MITCHELL: Did you have your staff organized at that time so that if an especially significant or important intercept was made of a Jap message, was there anyone on duty who had authority, if they were unable to reach you, to send a warning message out?

General MARSHALL: No, sir, I don't think there was a set-up for that special purpose. We had always had an arrangement there whereby the officer on the receiving end, at the central point in the War Department, knew where the principal people were, where to reach them. In my own case, for example, during that period and for about a year thereafter, I always maintained an orderly at the house at the telephone. If I left the house to go to a moving picture, which was about the only place I went, he was there and knew where to reach me. . . .

Mr. MITCHELL: If they had not been able to reach you on the

morning of the 7th, or at any time when an important message came in, was there anybody but yourself that had authority to send a warning message to the outlying post?

General MARSHALL: Yes. The authority was vested, for instance, in the Deputy Chief of Staff [Major General William Bryden]. Or even the head of War Plans Division.

Not according to Army regulations.

There is no dispute about that, I do not think, because the actions always had been on a very decentralized basis. . . .

Mr. MITCHELL: But the War Plans Division would have operations authority to send a message that involved action?

General MARSHALL: Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL: Was the Deputy Chief of Staff the only other one that had authority to send a message without reaching you?

General MARSHALL: I think that would be the accurate way of stating it, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL: I have, of course, been speaking of the military officers. The Secretary of War, if he had information, for instance, he wouldn't have had to ask your permission. He would have directed an order.

Secretary Stimson, if this thing had come to him, and he had felt a warning ought to be sent out, he would have authority to send it out?

General MARSHALL: Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL: Did you have any talk on the morning of the 7th with Secretary Stimson before the news of the attack came in?

General MARSHALL: I don't recall it. He was at the State Department I knew, but I can't recall that I saw him before lunch.

This interchange raises more questions than it answers. Under the Army order of Command, orders could be sent to Short only by the Commander in Chief, Roosevelt, the Chief of Staff, Marshall, or his Deputy, Bryden. Neither Stimson nor Gerow were in the line of command. That was why they had to send the "war warning" message they sent on November 27th over the name of Marshall. Another question raised but not answered was: How did Marshall know Stimson was at the State Department on the morning of December 7th? That meeting was arranged Saturday night after the three Secretaries were informed of the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply. If Marshall knew of that meeting on the morning of the 7th, he would have had to have known of the 13 parts delivered on the night of the 6th.

More Tender Loving Care

Mr. Mitchell finished his friendly inquiry in the middle of the afternoon of Friday, December 7, 1945. The questioning then passed to the tender, admiring care of the Democratic members

of the Committee. The Vice Chairman, Representative Jere Cooper, asked General Marshall if, in the weeks before the attack, he had been "kept fully advised as to the diplomatic developments." Marshall replied:

I was kept fully advised; and so far as Mr. Hull personally is concerned, I remember hearing him say with considerable emphasis in those last days apropos of his discussions with the Japanese envoys, "These fellows mean to fight and you will have to watch out."

The VICE CHAIRMAN: You heard him say that?

General MARSHALL: I heard him say that and I have a very distinct recollection of it.

At another point, the General stated that the Japanese

had committed themselves to the war, I think, on the assumption that the collapse of Russia was going to take place in the next 2 weeks. It did not take place. Had they not attacked on December 7, had they waited, for example, until January 1, there is a possibility that they would not have launched the attack, I do not know, because it appeared quite a definite possibility that Russia might get to her feet, which she did.

As the usual time of adjournment, 4 p.m., approached, and the fifth of the six Democratic Committee members was about to start his questioning, the Committee Chairman, Senator, later Vice President, Alben Barkley, interposed:

The CHAIRMAN: Before you begin, Senator, may I ask General Marshall, for the benefit of the committee and to determine about its sittings a little later today and tomorrow, in an effort to conclude with you what are your plans, as far as you have made them, to leave for China?

General MARSHALL: All I can do, sir, is have a plane in readiness as soon as you release me.

The CHAIRMAN: So your plans are to go forward at once as soon as we are completed?

General MARSHALL: Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN: Would it be agreeable for the Committee to sit a little later than 4 o'clock today to accommodate General Marshall, in the hope we might conclude with him tomorrow?

Senator GEORGE: Mr. Chairman, we ought to go on a reasonable length of time.

Senator BREWSTER: I suggest 4:30.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, we will go at least until 4:30.

Senator Lucas and Representative Murphy then each asked a few questions and the Friday session ended at 4:35 p.m. with:

Mr. MURPHY: Had you any warning, General, or any reason to

expect on the night of December 6 or on the early morning of December 7 that there was any general urgency requiring you to be at the War Department earlier than the hour you did arrive there on the morning of December 7?

The record at that point had Marshall arriving at his office at shortly before 11:30 a.m. on December 7. "On that particular morning I presumably had my breakfast at about eight, and following the routine that I had carried out on previous Sundays, I went riding at some time thereafter."

General MARSHALL: I had no such conception or information.

Mr. MURPHY: Did you at any time prior to December 7 ever have anyone tell you that the fleet, the United States Fleet in the Pacific Ocean, was not able to take care of itself in the event of an attack?

General MARSHALL: I do not think I ever did, sir. I had heard a discussion by Admiral Richardson as to the requirements that the fleet had to have to be built up before taking out to sea and be properly supplied.

Mr. MURPHY: I have no other questions, Mr Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The Investigation Begins

Fortunately, the Republicans did not yield to pressure. This author, as Chief of the Minority Staff, working with Senator Ferguson, had prepared a whole blue book of pertinent questions to be asked the General. Due to the sudden death of his father, Senator Brewster was unfortunately absent. So Representative Gearhart opened the questioning on Saturday morning.

The General admitted that he thought:

the Japanese were engaged in a campaign southward. . . . We had in mind the possibility of an effort on the Panama Canal. We had in mind the possibility of an effort to strike a blow at our air plants in Seattle, at our air plants in San Diego, and we had in mind the possibility of a blow in the Central Pacific, in the Hawaiian district.

We thought the latter was the most improbable. . . .

We thought it was impregnable against a Japanese landing expedition.

When the Congressman informed Marshall that Gerow in testifying had "accepted full responsibility for not having acted on the inadequacy, as he called it," of Short's November 27th report, Marshall replied:

I was not present in the room and I admire very much his attitude.

When the Congressman persisted in wanting to know why Marshall did not take exception to Short's reply, the General answered:

I can only say, sir, that that was my opportunity to intervene and have a further check made and I did not take it. Just why I do not know.

The General asserted that Short had been

issued a command and directed to do something. . . . Once you issue an order, amendments or, you might say, codicils are very dangerous business when it is an operational order.

When asked why more of the information he had was not forwarded to Short, he replied:

The point, I think, that should be made clear, if possible, is that you must avoid confusing the commander with a mass of data.

When pressed further he admitted:

I would say offhand that the messages you just read would have been helpful to General Short, but particularly more so to Admiral Kimmel.

When the Congressman read some of the Army Pearl Harbor Board's conclusions on Marshall's failures, his reply was that Short had been given

a direction to do something which was an alert against the possibility or probability of war. He was a responsible commander; he had a definite task.

The real question was whether or not Marshall had been a "responsible commander."

Attempt to Rescue Marshall

Then, at midmorning, Senator Ferguson, at the end position behind the Committee table, took over. This author, with his collection of questions and documents, was at his elbow. We had a host of important questions to ask that the Committee's Counsel and Democratic Party members had failed to raise. Ferguson persisted until Marshall had to admit it was his responsibility and his alone to have alerted Short. Additional admissions by Marshall and conflicts in testimony were spread on the record to the embarrassment of the Administration's friends. The Saturday afternoon hours rolled by until the following intercession took place:

The CHAIRMAN: May the Chair ask at this moment, it is practically 4 o'clock—whether the committee desires to sit longer today? I frankly, was hoping we might conclude with General Marshall today on account of his matters but whether we can is not within my control.

Would the committee feel justified in sitting longer if there is a chance to conclude with General Marshall or not?

Senator FERGUSON: There isn't a chance, unless the committee is willing to sit well into the evening.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair would not want to compel the Senator from Michigan to tell how long it will take.

Senator FERGUSON: I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN: In view of the fact that we cannot conclude with General Marshall, what is the wish of the committee as to recessing now?

The VICE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Chairman, might I inquire something of General Marshall. I understand he stated yesterday his plane was waiting, ready to take him to his duties in China.

General MARSHALL: It will have to continue to wait. I am to be at your disposal until you have finished.

The CHAIRMAN: Under those circumstances, the committee will recess until 10 o'clock Monday morning.

Senator Ferguson continued questioning Marshall all day Monday and all Tuesday morning. At the opening of the Tuesday afternoon session, the Chairman stated:

The President has asked General Marshall to come down to the White House at 3:15 for a conference on his mission to China. Therefore, the committee will have to excuse General Marshall at 3 o'clock in order that he may fill that engagement. If he has not concluded his testimony at that time we shall have to excuse the General in order that he may fill that engagement, with the understanding, of course, that he may resume at his convenience, but in all likelihood not today. The Chair might express the hope that we may conclude with the General by the time he has to fill that engagement. Senator will you proceed?

"Spy" at Pearl Harbor Probe

Senator Ferguson finished shortly thereafter and Congressman Keefe took over the questioning. He was a lawyer by profession and a tall man with broad shoulders and a deep voice when he wanted to use it. He had hardly gotten warmed up when General Marshall left for the White House and General Miles assumed the JCC witness seat. While Senator Ferguson was questioning Miles, Senator Lucas interrupted to raise a question about this author's presence at the Committee's table. He asked:

just who the gentleman is and what right he has to sit alongside the committee table and chuckle at a member of the United States Senate . . . I think it is about time that the committee find out just who he is, or what his business is.

Senator FERGUSON: I would be glad to tell the Senator and the committee. His name is Percy Greaves. He is with Senator Brewster and has charge of Senator Brewster's files in this case. . . . I understand Senator Brewster will be here tomorrow.

On this particular day, in view of Senator Brewster's absence, Senator Ferguson had moved over into Senator Brewster's seat. In order to be next to Senator Ferguson, this author had moved from his usual seat at the end of the table, around the corner to Senator Ferguson's seat behind the table. Thus this author was sitting in a Committee member's seat and could have been taken for a member of the Committee.

Senator Lucas then wanted to know:

Was he [Greaves] the Republican National Committee research man in the campaign of 1944? Let him answer that.

Senator FERGUSON: Is that your position?

Mr. GREAVES: I was with the Republican National Committee up until the end of last year.

Senator LUCAS: This is a nonpartisan hearing.

The CHAIRMAN: In view of that information, would it be out of place to inquire who has compensated Mr. Greaves for the services he has rendered to Senator Brewster or Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON: He is not rendering any services for me.

Senator LUCAS: Not much.

Senator FERGUSON: He is here with papers, but he is with Senator Brewster. You have to confer with Senator Brewster. He will be glad to tell you.

The CHAIRMAN: He has been sitting by the Senator from Michigan during these whole hearings and apparently prompting the Senator in the interrogatories he has addressed to the witnesses. Maybe that is not a service to the Senator from Michigan and the Senator will have to be the judge of that, but it has been a matter of common observation that that has transpired ever since we began the hearing. I do not object to it personally. I do not care how many assistants any member of this committee may have or desire, or need, but it is not at all out of place that the committee know who it is and who is compensating anybody who is assisting any Senator, in order that the whole facts may be known.

The incident was a one-day press sensation. At the close of the session, reporters crowded about this author. The Washington Times-Herald carried a four column picture of the JCC showing this author sitting next to Senator Ferguson with Senators Lucas and George in the background. The headline read, " 'Spy' Identified at Pearl Harbor Probe." New York's PM referred to this

author as "the mysterious 'sixth Senator' " whose "Incognito Is Punctured."

When Senator Brewster returned, we met with Senator Robert A. Taft, Senate Minority Leader. At this meeting it was agreed that this author should continue in his regular seat. Funds for his services and that of his staff had been raised privately by John T. Flynn. It was decided to place Greaves on Senator Brewster's personal payroll and Greaves was asked to prepare a memorandum on the incident for Senator Brewster. In this memorandum, this author stated that he never had any intention to

reflect on any Members of the United States Senate by thought, word or action. . . . As you know I receive no compensation from Republican Party sources and had not for many months before I entered your service. My activities with you have not been of a partisan or a political nature.

I sincerely hope that my conduct has not caused you any embarrassment and that my services meet with your satisfaction.

This was placed in the record by Senator Brewster. Senator Lucas proposed to find out more about this author in executive session but no more was heard about it.

Foiled Counsel Resigns

The above incident was an unsuccessful attempt to stop the Republican Senators from having at their elbows the assistance that was needed to break through the rather obvious attempt of the Majority Party to cover up the Administration's role in precipitating the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor while failing to provide the Hawaiian Commanders with the materiel and available information that could have enabled them to repel that attack. The hearings had been scheduled to last only four weeks. The Committee's friendly counsel, Mitchell, and his chief assistant Gerhard A. Gesell, later rewarded with a Federal judgeship, were to do most of the selection and questioning of witnesses. The Committee members were expected to be mere observers, asking only occasional questions. As shown by the tender, admiring care of General Marshall, the JCC Counsel had little thought of prying into matters which might embarrass the Administration or reflect on the reputation of FDR or his appointees.

The Democratic Majority had refused to supply any staff to the Republican Minority. In an attempt to have a real investigation of facts the Administration had hoped to suppress, John T. Flynn had privately raised the funds to supply the Minority with a staff of seven. With this aid the Minority was able to break the situation open. Daily hearings were held from November 15, 1945, to

February 20, 1946, followed by two short reopenings in April and May. The final printed hearings with exhibits, which included the hearings and reports of the previous secret and top secret investigations, ran to 44 volumes. While many pertinent witnesses were not called and much relevant material was suppressed, the printed record was replete with material those responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster had hoped would never see the light of day.

Within a week after the Greaves incident, JCC Counsel Mitchell and his assistant threw in the sponge and resigned effective January 5, 1946. The Committee then had to find a new General Counsel and a new Associate General Counsel. A recess of one week was called so the new committee staff could become familiar with the record.

Marshall Released to China

General Marshall resumed the witness seat on Wednesday, December 12, 1945. Representative Keefe then resumed his questioning of Marshall with increasing vigor. He spent all that day getting previously missed information into the record.

He would not let the General evade his responsibility for his many failures to act when his action was called for. He would not let the General evade his responsibility for his unexplained unavailability during the evening of December 6th and the early morning hours of December 7th. He questioned Marshall also on the selection of the members of the Roberts Commission which had whitewashed Washington officialdom while placing the full blame on Kimmel and Short. At this point Senator Barkley intervened:

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair would like to suggest that the hour of adjournment has come. Unless we can conclude with General Marshall in a few minutes, we will have to recess.

I don't know what the chances are to conclude.

Mr KEEFE: Well, Mr. Chairman, I confess I am not quite through.

The CHAIRMAN: Then we might as well recess.

Mr. Keefe finished up on Thursday morning and at noon General Marshall was released to fly to China to make his contribution to the Communist victory over Chiang Kai-shek. Through the efforts and persistence of Senator Ferguson and Representative Keefe, the likelihood that the JCC would ever reach the same conclusions as the Roberts Commission had been forever demolished. For interesting accounts of their contributions, the reader is referred to the pertinent pages (pp. 448-451) of this author's

chapter on "The Pearl Harbor Investigations" in *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace*, edited by Harry Elmer Barnes, and John Toland's *Infamy* (pp. 161-170). A minor slip in Toland's book has Marshall's testimony starting on "Tuesday morning, December 6." Actually December 6 was a Thursday. The pressure to finish with him in two days of friendly questioning was thwarted. Marshall's six days of testimony changed the tenor of the entire investigation.

HEAR PERCY L. GREAVES, JR. LIVE!

PEARL HARBOR—40 YEARS ON

A Stimulating Cassette Lecture By
PERCY L. GREAVES, JR.

Presented at the IHR's Third (1981) International Revisionist Conference, Mr. Greaves takes his audience on a documentary excursion leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the subsequent efforts to cover up for the key causative figures and shift responsibility for the debacle.

A dynamic lecture on two high-quality cassette tapes, bringing again to life the strategic decisions and incredible intrigues that would lead to, and then bury the facts of, the most devastating naval defeat the United States had ever sustained.

And who could tell the story better than the man who was in charge of all the research for the Republican Minority Staff at the 1945-46 Joint Congressional Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack—
Percy L. Greaves, Jr.

Order Cassette Numbers T-20 and T-21
\$8.95 each or both cassettes for \$15.00
from the

INSTITUTE FOR HISTORICAL REVIEW
Post Office Box 1306
Torrance, California 90505

Admission of MAGIC Demolishes FDR's Claim of Surprise

FROM "THE REAL INFAMY OF PEARL HARBOR"

PERCY L. GREAVES, JR.

We now come to the critical twenty-four hour period before the attack. What did the leaders in Washington know? When did they know it? What did they do about it? Unfortunately, the testimony is a jumbled mass of contradictions. Most witnesses swore under oath that they had performed their duties. Nonetheless, valuable hours were lost before responsible persons took actions that available information clearly indicated. The record seems to make clear one thing—junior officers were very reluctant to testify to facts that might embarrass their superiors. Undoubtedly there were private conferences before each investigation at which the involved officers tried to agree on how they would testify. In fact, some witnesses admitted this was so. They had merely met to refresh their joint memories. However, there were also cases where witnesses later changed their original testimony, given with the aid of notes written in December 1941, in order to conform with what they considered the wishes of their superiors.

Any serious attempt to account for the tremendous losses at Pearl Harbor must attempt to explain why the Hawaiian commanders were so ill prepared to repel the attack. They were taken completely by surprise. The first question is: Given the information available to them, did the Hawaiian Commanders make reasonably intelligent decisions? Were the Army's sabotage alert and the Navy's preparations to carry out the War

Plans calling for raids on Japanese islands reasonably proper policies for the period from November 27 to December 7, 1941? As requested. Short had reported the measures taken. Kimmel was certainly carrying out the instructions received in the November 27 message. They were both acting in conformity with the orders and information sent them.

This reduces the pertinent query to: Did Washington officials have information which, if known in Hawaii, would have improved the defensive situation for the Fleet, the available planes and the ground forces? If so, when did the Washington officials have this information and what did they do about it?

The most important information the Washington commanders had, which the Pearl Harbor commanders did not, was the detailed knowledge revealed by a reading of the intercepted Japanese messages. This included not only the detailed reports Tokyo had requested on the movements and conditions within Pearl Harbor, but also the rapid deterioration of Japan's economic conditions and U.S.-Japanese diplomatic relations, as specifically related by Japan's "deadline" messages, her reaction to our ultimatum, the contacts with Hitler and Mussolini, the code destruction orders and the series of last minute messages that were intercepted starting early on the morning of December 6th. The knowledge gained from these intercepts supplies the key that opens the door to the determination of the responsibilities for the Pearl Harbor disaster.

Secrecy of MAGIC

Before and during the war the information gained from these intercepts could not be leaked or revealed to the public and thus also to the Japanese. The later reading of Japan's Naval codes made possible our greatest naval victories in the Pacific. The reading of Japan's diplomatic codes, those involved in our pre-Pearl Harbor intelligence, also provided much valuable information. Before V-E Day, we were able to intercept and read all the Japanese messages between Berlin and Tokyo. After V-E Day we intercepted and read Japan's futile plea for the Soviet Union to act as an intermediary in negotiating an end to the war.

All this, however, does not relieve the Washington officials of responsibility for failing to change the alert conditions in Hawaii during the week, days or hours preceding the attack. It does, however, suggest a reason why those responsible for this failure to take such action might seek to keep all knowledge of these intercepts off the public record. It may also explain why an Army officer, in a position to know, twice told this author—once in the presence of General Bonner Fellers and again in the presence of General Albert C. Wedemeyer—that shortly after Pearl Harbor

General Marshall warned his staff officers they would have to go to their graves with this secret. This informant refused to let his name be used because he feared it might affect his son's Army career. It may also explain why Captain Safford could not find many of the pertinent intercepts in the files when he first looked for them in early 1944.

Marshall was the chief protagonist for keeping knowledge of the intercepts permanently secret. It was by his order that an attempt was made to keep such information from the secret Army and Navy investigations authorized by Congress. Stark also desired to keep this vital information from the secret wartime investigations conducted by trusted Army generals and Navy admirals, all with the highest security clearances. Accordingly, those who first testified under oath before the Navy Court of Inquiry and the Army Pearl Harbor Board failed to reveal any hint of the full truth known to them. Most of them sought refuge in the obfuscating reply, "I do not recall." Some avoided direct answers, pleading that the question was irrelevant or immaterial. Others refused to answer because they claimed to do so would not be in the public interest, or because it would force them to disclose a "state secret."

Safford Exposes the Secret

The chief protagonist for revealing the news learned from reading the intercepts was Captain L.F. Safford. In 1941, he had been in charge of the Communications Security Section of Naval Communications. Later, for his work in solving foreign codes and constructing our own, Congress awarded Safford \$100,000. Like millions of less informed Americans, Safford at first blamed Admiral Kimmel for the terrible losses at Pearl Harbor. Then, to his amazement, he found out that his superiors had not provided Kimmel with the benefit of the information that his Section had decoded in the months before the attack. His sense of injustice was aroused.

This led him to take two steps which were later to lead to the eventual revelations that both the wartime and first postwar Administrations sought to keep secret. In February 1944, he called on retired Admiral Kimmel in New York and, from notes and memory, related to him much of the information available in Washington that would have been of great value to the Pearl Harbor commanders.

Fearing war casualties, Kimmel sought a wartime recording of "testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor." As a result of Kimmel's prodding, Secretary Knox appointed the retired Admiral Thomas C. Hart to travel where necessary to record such testimony. At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack,

Hart had been the Commander in Chief of our Asiatic Fleet based in the Philippines. On April 28, 1944, Hart met informally with Safford to learn what he knew. From memory, Safford related some of his pre-Pearl Harbor knowledge, which he had gained from decrypting Japanese intercepts. This was news to Hart. He cautioned Safford against making statements he could not prove and instructed him to return the next day to give formal testimony.

Safford returned to the Navy Department and made a search for copies of the pertinent intercepts. He could not find them in either the Navy or War Department files. Nevertheless, he testified the next day from notes and memory as to what he and his superiors knew pre-Pearl Harbor. Then Hart asked him:

21. Q: Is there any documentary report which shows the date and hours of delivery of the foregoing information to various officials?

A: There is no documentary evidence.

22. Q: Are you able to state, from memory, the date and hour on which the important information, say, from 1 December onward, was transmitted?

A: I can, from my recollection of Lieutenant Commander Kramer's verbal reports to me.

23. Q: Please give what you recall. . . .

At that time, Safford's remarkable testimony contained one misstatement, viz.:

The "Winds Message" was last seen by myself about December 14, 1941, when the papers which had been distributed in early December were assembled by Kramer [Navy courier], checked by myself, and then turned over to the Director of Naval Communications for use as evidence before the Roberts Commission, according to my understanding at the time.

Actually, the intercepts were never made available to the Roberts Commission.

After speaking again with Kramer, Safford later testified before the Hewitt Inquiry that the assembled messages were given to James Forrestal "about 9 December 1941." The following day Kramer corroborated this. Forrestal became Acting Secretary of the Navy while Knox was out in Hawaii investigating the attack for FDR. As Under Secretary, Forrestal had not been privileged to see the intercepts. After the attack he learned about them and as Acting Secretary requested copies.

Forrestal's appointment schedule for December 10, 1941, shows entries for Commander McCollum of Far East Intelligence at 3:47 and Kramer at 4:49. Kramer recalled explaining to him "the way things shaped up from this traffic." It was this bundle of

intercepts shown to Forrestal that Safford located some months later in a Navy safe. Safford, in one of his many meetings with this author, told him that he, Safford, then duplicated them and had copies replaced in both the Army and Navy files. Thus, they were available for the later investigations. However, the "Winds Execute" message was not among them.

Kimmel's Struggle Succeeds

The Navy Court of Inquiry, authorized by Congress, opened hearings on July 31, 1944. With the information furnished him by Safford, Kimmel and his attorneys made every effort to have the intercepts introduced as essential evidence. As an "interested party," Kimmel and his attorneys were permitted to attend the NCI secret sessions. At the end of each witness's testimony, a representative of each "interested party" was permitted to ask questions.

At the end of that first short session, Kimmel stated before the court of three Admirals:

I have been branded throughout this country as the one responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster. I feel that this investigation should go far enough to disclose all the facts in connection with the matter and that witnesses from the Army, from the State Department, or from any other federal department ought to be called before this court in order to establish the facts that are necessary. It will be a long time before I am afforded any other opportunity to refute the statements made in the report of the Roberts Commission. People may die who can make statements before this court sufficient to establish the facts and to refute the utterly false and misleading statements made throughout the Roberts Commission.

The first witness, Admiral Stark, was asked his reason for detaching some ships from the Pacific Fleet for duty in the Atlantic early in 1941. Stark sought to go off the record as he thought "making this matter public would be detrimental to the best interests of the United States." Kimmel objected and his objection was upheld. Stark then stated his reason for shifting these ships was that the move was in accordance with WPL-46. This war plan was based on the secret ABC agreement with the British, which Administration defenders have tried to contend was only a tentative proposal, no part of which went into effect before we were actually at war.

Kimmel and his attorneys kept trying to get relevant evidence into the record over the objections of witnesses and the Court's Judge Advocate. On Friday, August 25, 1944, at the close of his testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Kimmel was asked:

Admiral, is there anything that you want to tell the Board now which may not have been said by you or not brought out by other witnesses in the hearing before the Roberts Commission? . . .

Admiral KIMMEL: . . . Since Pearl Harbor, information has come to my knowledge that vital information in the hands of the War and Navy Departments was not supplied to responsible officers in Hawaii; in particular, that the War and Navy Departments knew that Japan had set a deadline . . . for the signing of an agreement . . . that on 26 November an ultimatum was delivered to Japan by the United States. This was done notwithstanding a joint recommendation to the President by General Marshall and Admiral Stark that no ultimatum of any kind should be made to Japan. I had been advised of this recommendation and had received no qualification of that information. I had no knowledge of the delivery of the ultimatum to Japan on 26 November, 1941. I am further certain that several days prior to 7 December, 1941 there was information in the War Department and the Navy Department that Japan would attack the United States . . . that there was information in the War and Navy Departments on 6 December, 1941, that the hour of attack was momentarily imminent, and early on 7 December, 1941, the precise time of the attack was known. It was known at least three or probably four hours before the attack. All this information was denied to General Short and to me. I feel that we were entitled to it. . . . Had we been furnished this information as little as two or three hours before the attack, which was easily feasible and possible, much could have been done.

The Admiral was told by General Russell, a member of the Army Board, that:

Some of the things to which you have referred may become the subject of further investigation before the Board is through. . . . It might come to pass that we would want the source of certain information referred to by you in your statement. Would you be willing to cooperate with us to the extent that we might be furnished the source of the information contained in your statement?

Admiral KIMMEL: I will cooperate to the best of my ability, in conformity with the restrictions which have been imposed upon me.

Kimmel's difficulties and final success in getting the Japanese intercepts into the record have been well told in Chapter Seven of John Toland's *Infamy*. Except for an inconsequential error in one date, his account is both accurate and highly interesting. This author can vouch for it. In addition to his familiarity with the official record, this author had a number of confirming conversations with Admiral Kimmel and his two top counsels, Charles B. Rugg and Captain Robert A. Lavender, all of whom were dead when Toland undertook his painstaking research.

The intercepts were finally introduced before the Navy Court

on August 28, 1944, after Secretary Forrestal reversed the previous decision to exclude them. They were introduced as TOP SECRET evidence to be

extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

Stark's counsel immediately protested:

We object to bringing those documents in on the ground that the use which may be made of them in these proceedings may disclose secrets which should be held inviolate for the best prosecution of the war. Our objection is not because of what the documents themselves may contain but because their use here may compromise many years of hard work the results of which are most important to the Nation's future interest. We can have no assurance the wide publicity of parts or even all of these proceedings will not eventuate.

Stark's objection was not sustained by the Court.

En route to Hawaii, the Army Pearl Harbor Board (APHB) took testimony in San Francisco. While there, the Board's President, General George Grunert, addressed a letter to General Marshall on August 30, 1944. This letter said, in part:

Information, apparently material, has been brought to the attention of the Board, which it did not have when you testified. Hence, the Board requests that you subject yourself to a rehearing as early as possible after the Board's return to Washington, D.C., now scheduled for Sunday, September 24, 1944.

The particular subjects on which the Board would like to get additional information follow:

The letter then listed the information that Kimmel had conveyed to the APHB on August 25th.

Upon receipt of this letter, Marshall gave an "oral instruction" to Colonel Carter W. Clarke to conduct an "investigation regarding the manner in which certain Top Secret communications were handled." This became known as Part I of the Clarke Investigation. Eight Army officers were secretly queried by Colonel Clarke and his aide on their knowledge of the MAGIC intercepts. Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, whom Marshall had recalled from Europe, appeared on four different days. He was the G-2 officer responsible for the pre-Pearl Harbor distribution of the Japanese intercepts. A written report was made to Marshall on September 20, but the investigation continued through September 28. So Marshall was prepared when he reappeared before the APHB on September 29, 1944.

Part II of the Clarke Investigation, 8 July 1945—13 August 1945, was the result of another "oral directive" by Marshall. Clarke was directed to investigate a 5 July 1945 statement by an Army officer before the Hewitt Inquiry. In reference to the "Winds Execute" message, the witness had stated:

Then, if I remember correctly, I asked Colonel Sadtler whether he had a copy, had ever gotten or seen a copy of this message, and his answer was, if I remember correctly . . . that he had been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall.

After questioning that witness and four Army officers, supposedly implicated, Carter Clarke, a Colonel during Part I and a Brigadier General during Part II, concluded:

I find that no written message implementing the Winds Code message was ever received by G-2, and I find that no records pertaining to Pearl Harbor have been destroyed by G-2 or by anybody connected with G-2.

Officers, not wishing to destroy their careers, denied saying what they had been reported as saying.)

Pilot Message Distribution

This brings us back to the events in the War Department during the 24 hours before the attack.

Colonel Rufus S. Bratton was the Army officer charged with the distribution of the Japanese intercepts to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and Chief of Staff, the Chief of War Plans Division and the Chief of Army Intelligence (G-2). His chief assistant was Colonel Carlisle C. Dusenbury. While the conditions of delivery of these intercepts in locked pouches would differ, the standard operating procedure, if both of these men were present, was for one to take a pouch to the State Department while the other made the deliveries within the War Department at the old Munitions Building. When deliveries were made after office hours, phone calls would be made to the residences of the recipients before attempting deliveries.

The first key Japanese intercept of this crucial period was the so-called Pilot message. This message announced that the long awaited Japanese answer to our November 26th ultimatum would shortly be transmitted by the "Purple" code in English. The Japanese Ambassadors were to put it "in nicely drafted form" and hold it for delivery at a time to be specified in a later message. The time sheet for this Pilot message shows it was intercepted by a Navy station on the West Coast from 7:15 to 7:20 a.m., East Coast time on December 6, 1941. It was teletyped in

Japanese code to the Navy in Washington. The Army Signal Corps received it from the Navy more than four hours later at 12:05 p.m. This abnormal time delay was never accounted for. It was then decoded, translated and typed by the Army's Signal Intelligence Service before delivery to the Army and Navy officer couriers.

Bratton, the Army courier, testified he received the Pilot message "around about 2 o'clock" and distributed it "that afternoon about 3 o'clock." He stated it was delivered to the full list of persons for whom he was responsible. He recalled discussing its contents with both Generals Gerow and Miles.

When asked about receipt of the Pilot message, General Marshall at first gave an indirect answer referring to the first 13 parts of the answer to the ultimatum mentioned in the Pilot message. He admitted he was in Washington that entire day. He further admitted there was someone on duty in his office who would have known where he was. Finally, as Senator Ferguson pressed he stated: "The point is I did not receive the [Pilot] message."

General Gerow, Chief of War Plans, took a position similar to his superior. When shown the message and asked about it, he replied: "I do not recall having received that message, sir." He too had a duty officer who "knew where to reach me, sir." This duty officer could go home "but he remained at his telephone so he could be reached at any time." General Gerow "had a search made" for the duty roster but had been unable to locate it. He did testify:

I think that I was down at the office myself until 6 or 7 or 8 o'clock. Of course, that was a very busy time and we had a lot of unfinished business.

General Miles, Chief of Army Intelligence, was another matter. Testifying before the Congressional Committee, in advance of General Marshall, he stated:

We were thoroughly prepared and had been for some days to receive an unfavorable reply to the message of November 26.

As to when he first knew of it, he testified he "certainly knew it" before he left for home that Saturday. He attended a dinner party that evening at the home of Admiral Wilkinson.

At a later time, Senator Ferguson asked him:

How do you account personally for the pilot message not being delivered to General Marshall, the Chief of Staff, who was the only man under his testimony that could act, he or the President or the Secretary of War, as I understand his testimony? Now how do you account . . . that that was not delivered on the day it was translated?

General MILES: Senator, my answer is, first that I had every reason to believe that General Marshall did receive the locked pouch which contained this message. I heard his testimony this morning. I think he is mistaken in saying he did not receive that message on the afternoon of the 6th. . . .

Two days later, after Marshall had returned from the White House and complete his testimony, Miles returned to the witness seat.

Senator FERGUSON: Well, you knew the pilot message—and you know what I mean by the "pilot message"—was in on the 6th?

General MILES: Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON: Did you have any reason why that was not delivered to General Marshall?

General MILES: I testified, sir, to the best of my knowledge and belief it was in the Saturday afternoon locked pouch among several other messages, which you will find were translated on that day, and that it did go to General Marshall. He does not remember seeing it.

Japan's Much-Awaited Reply

Next came the first 13 parts of Japan's 14 part reply to our ultimatum of November 26. We had known since November 22nd, that if agreement was not reached by November 29th, "things are automatically going to happen." A week had passed since that date with no agreement. The Navy's West Coast intercept station started picking up these coded parts on the morning of December 6th at 8:03 a.m. Washington, D.C. time. The first five parts were picked up by 10 a.m. and they had the first 13 parts by 11:25 a.m. They were sent in batches by teletype to the Navy in Washington.

The first four parts were received before noon and the Navy's decryption section went to work on them. The Army's section had closed down at 1 p.m. By two o'clock the Navy was swamped with work and the Army was asked to recall three of their decrypters. They came in by about three o'clock. All the first thirteen parts were in Washington by 2:51 p.m. The Army decoded parts 9 and 10 while the Navy decoded the other 11 parts. They were in English, so no translation was necessary. All thirteen parts were typed up and ready for delivery about 9 p.m.

Bratton's first testimony of record was before the Clarke Investigation on September 14, 1944. He had with him "a memorandum which I made at the time for the record." He was not then asked any question about the Pilot message. When queried on September 15, 1944, about Japan's 14 part reply, he responded:

I believe that the message started coming into the Navy on the 6th. My recollection is that I transmitted a copy to the Secretary of State that night.

There were no other questions or references to December 6, in his testimony before the Marshall-sponsored Clarke Investigation.

Bratton next appeared before the APHB on three occasions—September 30, October 2, and 6, 1944. His first appearance was the day after Marshall had testified.

Marshall had skipped over the question submitted to him in writing as to what the War Department knew on December 6, 1941. When later asked the same question orally, Marshall dodged a direct answer, referring to his testimony about December 7. He did finally say:

My understanding was—that I am not the best witness on this, and I am indulging largely in hearsay—that the major portion of that message was delivered to the Secretary of State on the night before, although I don't know.

On Bratton's first appearance before the APHB, he replied to a question concerning Japan's lengthy 14-part reply to our ultimatum:

I had had the bulk of it since the evening before, sir. It came in fourteen parts, I believe. Thirteen of those parts were received the afternoon and evening of the 6th and were delivered by me to the office of the Chief of Staff, the A.C. of S. G-2 [Miles], the office of the Secretary of State. The last part didn't come in, as I remember, until very late at night or very early in the morning of the 7th, and it was delivered at that time to those same agencies.

On his second appearance, he was asked:

General RUSSELL: Whom did you deliver them to that night?

Colonel BRATTON: To the office of the Chief of Staff; A.C. of S. G-2; WPD [Gerow]; and the State Department. I gave the Secretary of State's copy to the watch officer in the State Department, with the request that it be gotten to Mr. Hull immediately.

He was then asked, when the President and leading Admirals had that message Saturday evening,

why it was that the Chief of Staff [Marshall] was not called and advised, as were others, that this important document had been received. In view of the tenor of its contents . . . why did not the Chief of Staff get that message?

Colonel BRATTON: I cannot verify it or prove it, at this time, but my recollection is that those three officers [Generals Marshall, Miles and Gerow] got their copies the evening of the 6th.

* * * *

Colonel TOULMIN [APHB Executive Officer]: Is it your recollection that you handed that long 13-part message, on that evening, to the Secretary of the Chief of Staff?

Colonel BRATTON: Yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN: And it is your recollection that you handed it on that evening of December 6 to General Gerow, or some representative of General Gerow?

Colonel BRATTON: Yes.

Colonel TOULMIN: Did you hand it to General Gerow directly, or to his Secretary?

Colonel BRATTON: To his executive officer . . . Colonel Gailey.

Colonel TOULMIN: And what is the name of the Secretary of the Chief of Staff?

Colonel BRATTON: Colonel Smith, Bedell Smith, now Lieutenant General.

* * * *

Colonel TOULMIN: Did you talk to General Miles on the night of the 6th?

Colonel BRATTON: My recollection is that I did, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN: You talked to him on the phone, or in his office?

Colonel BRATTON: No, I believe I talked to him in his office.

* * * *

Colonel TOULMIN: And how about General Smith? Did you get any reaction from him, or any action, rather?

Colonel BRATTON: No. General Smith did not have access to these pouches. You mean General Bedell Smith?

Colonel TOULMIN: Yes.

Colonel BRATTON: He didn't have a key to the bag.

Colonel TOULMIN: Did you tell him that it was an important document in the locked pouch?

Colonel BRATTON: Yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN: And that the Chief of Staff should know about it?

Colonel BRATTON: Should see it right away.

Colonel TOULMIN: What was General Smith's response—that he would get in touch with the Chief of Staff, or would not?

Colonel BRATTON: It must have been, because if it had been otherwise, it would have registered on my memory.

On his third appearance before the APHB, the following interchange took place:

General RUSSELL: As I recall your testimony, you stated that

you delivered it to this man Smith on Saturday night, is that correct?

Colonel BRATTON: That is correct, sir, to the best of my knowledge and belief. My recollection is that I found Colonel Smith in his office. It may have been one of the other secretaries, but my recollection is that it was Colonel Smith, and that I told him that this was a very important paper, and that General Marshall should see it at once. My recollection is that he said we would send it out to the General's quarters by courier. In any event, my mind was at rest about the Chief of Staff, I didn't worry about him any more that night.

General GRUNERT: Had this occurred frequently in the past?

Colonel BRATTON: Yes, sir.

General GRUNERT: So it was just a normal thing to say, "Here is a pouch that has got important stuff in it"?

Colonel BRATTON: No. When I thought that the Chief of Staff should see it at once, I made a point of telling Smith so, and he would say, "All right, I will sent it out by a special courier."

General GRUNERT: Did that happen very frequently?

Colonel BRATTON: It happened several times; yes, sir.

General GRUNERT: Now, about this time, most everything was important?

Colonel BRATTON: Most everything was important; and I was further urged on by the fact that if the Chief of Naval Operations ever got one of these things before General Marshall did and called him up to discuss it on the telephone with him, and the General hadn't gotten his copy, we all caught hell.

What We Knew

FROM "THE REAL INFAMY OF PEARL HARBOR"

PERCY L. GREAVES, JR.

Before presenting the testimony relating to December 7th, it would be helpful to review the information available to Generals Marshall, Gerow and Miles as well as Secretary of War Stimson before they left their respective offices on December 6th. There was a mounting accumulation of facts and events that could not help but create an increasingly apprehensive atmosphere which called for an ever higher degree of alertness for possible Japanese action. There were a myriad of such developments, but only the highlights will be mentioned.

On November 5, 1941, Marshall and Stark signed a joint memorandum for Roosevelt in which they concluded that

The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain sound. . . . Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of several contingencies. These included a Japanese movement

against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies.

It also included the movement of Japanese forces across a specified line previously described. Because of their desire for more time to build up forces in the Far East, their final recommendation was:

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

That same day a MAGIC message told them that:

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month

if Japanese-U.S. relations are to be saved

from falling into a chaotic condition.

A week later they read in MAGIC that:

the date set forth . . . is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and therefore it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time. . . . The situation is nearing a climax . . . time is indeed becoming short.

This was further confirmed three days later when a November 15th Tokyo message closed:

The date set forth . . . is an absolutely immovable one. Please, therefore, make the United States see the light, so as to make possible the signing of the agreement by that date.

A November 16 message was read on November 17, stating:

The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before. . . . I set the deadline . . . and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

Final Deadline Set

On November 19, a MAGIC message informed them that if the U.S.-Japan diplomatic negotiations failed:

It is most probable that diplomatic relations between the two countries would be broken off immediately.

The Japanese Ambassadors in Washington sought instructions from Tokyo as to reducing Japanese personnel in the United States.

On November 22nd, the Ambassadors' plea to Tokyo for more time was answered:

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set. . . . There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if

within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen.

Two days later, on the 24th, our top Washington officials read a Japanese intercept stating that:

The time limit set . . . is in Tokyo time.

This is a day (14 hours) earlier than Washington time.

On Tuesday, November 25, the War Cabinet, including Marshall and Stimson, met at the White House. Stimson's diary notes the President:

brought up entirely the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday [December 1], for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition. . . . The others brought out the fact that any such expedition to the South as the Japanese were likely to take would be an encirclement of our interests in the Philippines and cutting into our vital supplies of rubber from Malaysia. I pointed out to the President that he had already taken the first steps toward an ultimatum in notifying Japan way back last summer that if she crossed the border into Thailand she was violating our safety and that therefore he had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition was a violation of a warning we had already given.

Our military and naval advisors had warned us that we could not safely allow the Japanese to move against British Malaysia or the Dutch East Indies without attempting to prevent it.

A number of Japan's intercepts were translated and circulated on November 26th. Perhaps the most informative was one sent on November 14, from Tokyo to Hong Kong and eleven other Chinese cities. It read in part:

Though the Imperial Government hopes for great things from the Japan-American negotiations, they do not permit optimism for the future. Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will find herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire's foreign policy as it has been decided by the cabinet . . . is:

- a. We will completely destroy British and American power in China.
- b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy important rights and interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China. . . .

We will cope with a world war on a long-time scale. Should our reserves for total war and our future military strength wane, we have decided to reinforce them from the whole Far Eastern area. This has become the whole fundamental policy of the Empire. . . .

Please keep absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions and the fact that they have been transmitted to you.

On November 26, our officials read another highly interesting intercept sent the day before, probably the 24th U.S. time, from Japanese forces poised at Hanoi to Tokyo:

We are advised by the military that we are to have a reply from the United States on the 25th. If this is true, no doubt the Cabinet will make a decision between peace and war within the next day or two. . . .

Should . . . the negotiations not end in a success, since practically all preparations for the campaign have been completed, our forces shall be able to move within the day. . . .

State Department Surrenders

On November 26th, that same day, Roosevelt summoned Hull to the White House and, without consulting his military and naval advisors, authorized Hull to hand the Japanese Ambassadors an ultimatum to Japan that it was known Japan could not accept.

On November 27, Hull told Stimson:

I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox—the Army and the Navy.

Stimson then checked with Roosevelt, consulted with Knox, Stark and Hull, before preparing with Gerow a message "we shall send to MacArthur" over Marshall's signature. A similar message was incidentally sent to Hawaii.

It was also the date of a joint Marshall-Stark memorandum to FDR, the Commander in Chief that stated:

If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack: the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces.

Marshall and Stark again asked for more time until more men and materiel reached the Philippines. However, they stood by their agreements with the British and Dutch, while asking that a joint British-American warning be sent to Japan if she should advance into Thailand.

November 28 brought alarming indications that Japan was getting ready for action. A telephone conversation the day before between the Tokyo Foreign Office and one of the Japanese Ambassadors was taped, translated and decoded. It told us that "a crisis does appear imminent." That same day, FDR and his War Cabinet also read a Tokyo cable to Japan's Washington Ambassadors. This cable revealed Japan's highly negative reaction to our ultimatum of the 26th.

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions. . . . From now on do the best you can.

The reports from the Philippines about the Japanese expeditionary force moving south were so alarming to Stimson on November 28th that he personally took them to FDR in the White House. 25,000 Japanese troops were going to land somewhere. Later that day, there was a meeting of the War Cabinet at the White House. Stimson's diary reports:

It was now the opinion of everyone that if this expedition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indochina and go off and land in the Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok or further west, it would be a terrific blow at all of the three Powers, Britain at Singapore, the Netherlands, and ourselves in the Philippines. It was the consensus of everybody that this must not be allowed. Then we discussed how to prevent it. It was agreed that if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight. It was also agreed that if the British fought, we would have to fight. . . .

It further became a consensus . . . that the only thing for us to do was to address it a warning that if it reached a certain place, or a certain line, or a certain point, we should have to fight.

War Not a Dream

On Saturday, November 29th, Hull met with the British Ambassador. He informed him that he had told our Army and Navy officials that the diplomatic phase "was virtually over." Then "speaking in great confidence" he said

that Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element of surprise and spread out over considerable areas.

On Monday, December 1st, the recipients of MAGIC read a Tokyo to Berlin message that stated:

The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April . . . now stand ruptured—broken. . . . In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. . . . Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams. . . .

Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

That same day we read Tokyo's instructions for her embassies in London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Manila to destroy their code machines while Washington was informed on how to destroy theirs by chemical means.

On Tuesday, December 2nd, these matters were all discussed at the White House, including proposed FDR messages to Congress and the Japanese Emperor. Stimson met with Marshall, Miles and Gerow concerning their attempts to speed up supplies to the Philippines. Stimson cancelled an out-of-town engagement "in order to stay in Washington over the week end."

Japan's Moves Known

On Wednesday, December 3rd, our War Cabinet read Tokyo's instructions to her Washington Ambassadors to destroy one of their two "Purple" machines and certain other codes. As a result, G-2's Bratton sent a man to observe the Japanese Embassy and confirm the fact that papers were being burned. As Bratton later testified, this "meant that time was running out and the approach of the crisis."

On Thursday, December 4th, we ordered our representatives in Tokyo, Bangkok, Peiping, Tientsin and Shanghai to destroy our top code system. Guam was told to "destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter" with minor exceptions which they should "Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency." The "Winds Execute" message, about which there has been so much controversy, was received. This

indicated Japan's break with the United States and Great Britain, but not Russia.

On Friday, December 5th, our War Cabinet read a December 1 Tokyo order to her London Embassy to dispose of its code machine and to report back when that was done.

Saturday, December 6, produced more evidence that Japan was on the move. On that date we first read a circular MAGIC message of December 2, in which Japan ordered her diplomatic representatives abroad to start "the burning of all their telegraphic codes." That order had been issued to all Japanese officials in North America and the South Seas, as well as those in British and Netherlands territories. Our War Cabinet also read a Japanese December 3rd Rome to Tokyo message reporting on a meeting of Japan's Ambassador with Mussolini in which Mussolini was asked if Japan declared "war on the United States and Great Britain . . . would Italy do likewise immediately? Mussolini replied: 'Of course'." That same Saturday morning the members of our War Cabinet read a Japanese December 5th Washington to Tokyo message stating, "We have completed destruction of codes" except for the one "Purple" machine needed for receiving the expected reply to the United States ultimatum of November 26.

Still more alarming were the reports from both Admiral Hart in the Philippines and the British, via London, that large Japanese convoys had been seen moving south. Even more alerting was the report that at least one of these convoys had crossed the line which Marshall and Stark had on November 27 told Roosevelt was "a threat to Burma and Singapore." In that case the

"United States, British and Dutch military authorities in the Far East [had] agreed that joint military counter-action against Japan should be undertaken."

The End Approaches

Our War Cabinet members also read Tokyo's orders for the departure from the United States of certain important Japanese nationals. Then, on Saturday afternoon, December 6, the intercepted Pilot message informed those privy to MAGIC that the long awaited Japanese reply to our ultimatum would soon be on its way from Tokyo, to be held for delivery at a specified time. As we had learned on November 22, that specified time would undoubtedly be when "things are automatically going to happen."

The 14 part reply began coming in that Saturday afternoon, December 6th. At the White House, a young Navy Lieutenant was detailed to remain after hours to deliver to Roosevelt material "of such importance that the President expected to receive it." The

Lieutenant was told that "during the evening Captain Kramer would bring up some "magic" material and that I was to take it and give it immediately to the President." Meanwhile, the President was busy redrafting a face saving message which went off to the Japanese Emperor at 9 p.m., with an announcement to the press.

At the War Department, the urgency that Saturday afternoon was such that several Army cryptographers were summoned from their homes to expedite the decoding of the anxiously awaited Japanese reply. To keep him informed of important developments, Marshall had Colonels on duty around the clock at his office and orderlies at his residence up to 10 p.m. or, when he was out, until he returned. His office, home and bedside had secure telephones passing through the White House switchboard. Yet, according to Marshall's original testimony before the JCC, he wanted the world to believe that he, like Stark, was unaware of all this quickening of developments crying out for his attention and action.

The first time Stark and Marshall testified, each, in turn, implied that he was following his usual Sunday morning activities and weekend routine. As Marshall stated it, "the probability is" that he was at home on Saturday evening and that he took his habitual horseback ride on Sunday morning. Stark had no memory whatsoever as to where he was that Saturday night. As regards the time of his arrival at his Navy Department office on Sunday, December 7, 1941, Stark's first reply was:

I usually got down to the office on Sunday mornings around 10:30 or 11 o'clock. I was lazy on Sunday mornings unless there was some special reason for getting up early. I usually took a walk around the grounds and greenhouse at the Chief of Naval Operations' quarters and didn't hurry about getting down and my usual time, as I recall, was about 10:30 or 11. What time it was that particular Sunday morning I couldn't go beyond that.

The memory of a member of Stark's December 6 theater party forced Stark to revise his earlier testimony that he did not know his whereabouts that Saturday evening or recall the fact that Roosevelt had asked him to phone late that night. Stark thus learned there was a "special reason for getting up early" that Sunday morning. Testimonies of subordinates placed him in his office as early as 9 a.m. or a few minutes later. Unfortunately, no witness enlightened the JCC as to the actual whereabouts of Marshall during many of these crucial hours.

Where Was General Marshall?

**SOME NEW VIEWS AND CONTRIBUTIONS RELATIVE
TO THE ONGOING MYSTERY OF PEARL HARBOR.***

JAMES J. MARTIN

We have been solemnly assured even in our own day that gossip is part of history. We find it from Thucydides to Tacitus; Suetonius' *History of the Twelve Caesars* is liberally seasoned with gossip. And some of the most graceful and elegant gossip ever committed to posterity is to be found in Plutarch.

Apparently it is an almost inescapable part of any episode which persists in remaining cloudy as to origins or content regardless of efforts to penetrate to the core of the affair by assemblage or analysis of facts. Perhaps there is more excuse for gossip in classical accounts, when the writing of such often took place many years after the events described, by which time some of the sources may have disappeared, and could not be examined. There is undoubtedly less excuse for it now. But we have events all the time which result in such circumstances, with any number of reasons prevailing to help explain either why there is a mystery, or why none should prevail.

The real burden of holding up under gossip bears most heavily upon those who wish to maintain sweet and innocent versions of the past which they dearly love, despite being faced by all manner of harsh and discordant facts which simply do not fit, and cannot be reconciled with the original or desired accounts. This is the predicament of all history which must deal in subsequent times with uncomfortable disclosures and discoveries, resulting either in the noticeable alteration of the original narratives, or

subjecting them to deep suspicions and discount if they are able to withstand the uncomfortable heat of contradiction. And if this defense of official versions cannot come to terms with new facts or the uncovering of old ones, or discrepancies caused by lack of supporting documentary evidence, then gossip and its cousin rumor fills the space resulting from the failure of the upholders of prior rectitude to account for their inability to reinforce their credibility with anything but bluster, *ad hominem* criticism of their challengers, or the employment of devious and diversionary maneuvers intended to draw attention away from the problem. Like legal processes, history, when it cannot stand on documentary evidence, relapses and tries to make do by the substitution of testimony and opinion.

As we approach our own time, however, there are many complications which do not face those who are mainly concerned with the more distant past. One may write with relative ease of a time from which no one survives, and be guided only by respect for the sources, there being no one to issue heated challenges to one's product as a consequence of feeling injured by the account thus rendered. This state of affairs grows from residues of political significance which may still survive even if the events under question are many decades old. And the partisans of a person or policy surviving the demise of the actual participants become a veritable interest-group-industry in trying to perpetuate a memory and version more felicitous to their state of mind and well-being. Hence a clash is inevitable when those interested in the events too, come upon the scene unencumbered by the emotional and political baggage which marks the position of the defenders of an established narrative. The case of the late General George C. Marshall and his connections with the drama of the Pearl Harbor attack of December 7, 1941 can hardly be surpassed as an example of this phenomenon.

Despite an immense volume of print which has been inspired and stimulated by the complicated events transpiring, we still do not know much of anything, and in some cases, nothing at all, concerning some of the actions or whereabouts of Gen. Marshall for most of the 24 hours which elapsed between roughly noon of Dec. 6 and the same hour on Dec. 7. This is of immense significance, since Gen. Marshall was Army Chief of Staff and as such directly in charge operationally over all Army affairs, which included the command at Pearl Harbor. This fact is at the center of the entire incident, and should be clearly emphasized at the outset, lest the usual muddiness prevail as to what the situation was. Percy Greaves, Jr., summarized the command situation in the following way in his expert chapter titled "The Pearl Harbor Investigations," in the symposium edited by Harry Elmer Barnes.

Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1953), pp. 409-410:

The Pacific Fleet was subject to orders of the Chief of Naval Operations [Adm. Harold R. Stark, in 1941] in Washington, but when it was in Pearl Harbor, the Army was charged with its protection. The Hawaiian Army Commander [Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short] took orders directly only from the Chief of Staff [Gen. Marshall], the Secretary of War, [Henry L. Stimson], or the President of the United States [Franklin D. Roosevelt]. (Emphasis added.)

It will be seen, therefore, that the commander of the Pacific Fleet, which was based at Pearl Harbor beginning in April, 1940, and under Adm. Husband E. Kimmel beginning in January, 1941, had some defensive duties. But he and the Fleet were there largely to make ready offensive actions against the Japanese in the Pacific, in liaison with the Dutch and British navies in particular, as well as the naval forces of Australia, contingent upon various possible Japanese actions in this vast area.

All of this grew out of the very secret ('Rainbow') agreements which emerged from the joint strategy talks in Singapore, January-April, 1941. What Adm. Kimmel's real job with the Pacific Fleet was, in this context, was put on the record via the testimony of Adm. Richmond Kelley Turner before the board of inquiry conducted by Adm. Thomas C. Hart between mid-February and mid-June, 1944 (see Greaves, *Perpetual War*, pp. 421-422.) Knowledge of his duties undoubtedly played a big part in the official Navy Court of Inquiry (July-October, 1944) finding Adm. Kimmel innocent of any dereliction of duty during the events leading up to and through the attack of Dec. 7, 1941. (For an insight into how far political partisanship can go in covering up the truth, one should consult the observations on the infamous way in which the Roberts Commission went about its blackening of Adm. Kimmel, in the latter's own book on the entire business, *Admiral Kimmel's Story* [Chicago: Regnery, 1954], pp. 146-185. This should be supplemented by consulting the report of the interview with Adm. Kimmel by the Associated Press in December, 1966, published in varying length here and there about the country, e.g., *Denver Post*, Dec. 7, 1966.)

Part of the difficulty in sorting out the various elements in the Pearl Harbor situation prior to the day of the attack stems from what may be called the "From Here to Eternity" syndrome, a reference to the famed moving picture of 1953, based on the novel of the same name by the late James Jones. This movie, now made much worse in a re-filming which reduces the pre-attack total scene in Hawaii to a monstrous soap opera, did much to induce the hazy ignorance as to what the situation was in the closing

weeks of 1941. One gets from this much-shown picture that an aura of lazy unconcern with the world at war was the order of the day and that the Navy was simply there for a casual vacation, while the Army was involved in even more trivial diversions. One absorbs the impression that all were there to indulge in sexual peccadillos and mild dissipation, with nothing on their minds except a succession of empty dinner parties for the officers and opportunities for drunken forays into Honolulu for the enlisted men.

However, since the picture dwelled mainly upon the empty distractions consuming the Army, and hardly involved the other services, lost entirely is the purpose of the Fleet being in Hawaii in the first place. There is not the faintest allusion to its preparation for likely attack on the Japanese, or even a single reference to the general situation in the Pacific. The casual atmosphere of scatter-brained lightheartedness allegedly prevailing there conveyed by this film helps to ingrain among its viewers a possible desired propagandist attitude, reinforcing the conviction that the eventual attack truly was totally unexpected, and unprepared for, thus sanctifying Roosevelt's pious "day of infamy" rhetoric and rendering those exposed uninclined to consider any other view of the entire affair later on, when sobriety returned to temper hysteria. Moving pictures may be entertainment, but it is a rare one devoid of political messages.

That Adm. Kimmel was not empowered to engage in unilateral actions regardless of the situation, but had to await directions from Gen. Short, based on prior orders from Washington from either Stimson or Marshall, was already demonstrated in the case of the famous "warning" to Hawaii purportedly emanating from Marshall (his name was appended to the message, at least) of November 27, 1941, in which Gen. Short was the addressee, with instructions further to establish liaison with the Navy, in effecting a sabotage alert at the combined Pearl Harbor facilities.

The Base had promptly been placed on such an alert, and there it remained to the moment of the bombing on the morning of December 7. (There has recently been a curious diversion related to this subject growing out of the Burns Oral History Project at the University of Hawaii headed by Stuart Gerry Brown. In the transcripts of portions of Tapes #2, #5 and #6, former Gov. Burns seemed to recall that his informant on the upcoming attack on Pearl Harbor, Robert L. Shivers, the FBI's agent in charge in Honolulu, was supposed to have gone to the Pearl Harbor commanders with this information, though no evidence ever surfaced that he ever did, or even mentioned his special knowledge before the Roosevelt-handpicked whitewash Roberts Commission, before which he testified. Burns could not understand where Shivers got

this information, though one might suspect that the Bureau may have acquired such intelligence in New York from their liaison work with British intelligence headed by Sir William Stephenson, who had full access to Purple "Magic" via their cracking of the analog of Purple, the German "Ultra" code. British possession of a Purple machine in London from January, 1941 on surely did not get in their way, either. (One should consult William Stevenson, *A Man Called Intrepid* [New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1976] for a revelation of some of the interaction between American-based British intelligence and the FBI prior to U.S. formal involvement in World War II.)

This British connection was originally established by testimony of William F. Friedman, who headed the Army cryptanalytical team which first broke the Japanese Purple code in August, 1940, largely as a consequence of the work of Harry L. Clark, before the top-secret inquiries conducted by Col. (later Gen.) Carter W. Clarke for the War Department in September, 1944 (see Greaves, *Perpetual War*, p. 475.) However, in view of the chain of command prevailing, it does not seem that a visit by Shivers to either Adm. Kimmel or Gen. Short would have done much of anything other than stimulating a barrage of telephone calls and telegrams back and forth between Honolulu and Washington, with the Pearl Harbor commanders' superiors in the latter city becoming quietly hysterical over how Shivers and the FBI might have acquired such intelligence.)

We may now get on properly to an attempt to find the trail of Gen. Marshall, dividing the time span involved into three segments: 1) the afternoon of Dec. 6; 2) the evening of Dec. 6-7; 3) the morning of Dec. 7. Shortly after noon on the 6th there took place the interception of the so-called "pilot message" sent by the Japanese to their Washington embassy, announcing that a long communication, in 14 parts, was about to be sent to them, which was to be presented to the American Secretary of State the next day under conditions to be relayed later. A few moments after receiving this news, in his office in the old Munitions Building (the Pentagon did not exist in 1941), Gen. Marshall disappeared, and was not seen again until the following morning, at 9 a.m., 10 a.m., or around 11:30 a.m., depending on which testimony one wants to accept.

At the moment of learning of the "pilot message," asserted Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, chief of Naval Combat Intelligence at Pearl Harbor from June, 1941 on, and the key figure in the cracking of the Japanese naval code which led to the U.S. naval victory of the battle of Midway in the spring of 1942, Gen. Marshall, instead of disappearing, should have been on the scrambler telephone to Gen. Short in Honolulu. In a number of conversations

with Capt. Rochefort in which this writer took part, in the mutual company of Dr. Harry Elmer Barnes, in the 1960s at Redondo Beach, Calif., it was asserted by Capt. Rochefort, though professing to be ignorant of the famous "Winds Execute" message of Dec. 4 wherein the Japanese had announced to their diplomatic people around the world a situation which could hardly be interpreted as anything but a coming declaration of war on the U.S., disguised in a false weather report, that he too was convinced that what was coming through the 6th was a sure prelude to a formal announcement of the breaking of diplomatic relations. And with Pearl Harbor still on sabotage alert since Nov. 27, the Base was in grave danger if an attack were to follow, with aircraft and naval vessels still bunched up in various concentration points, in accordance with sabotage alert procedures. (That the aircraft carriers, heavy cruisers and submarines were not there at the time of the attack was a fortunate break.)

But Gen. Marshall executed one of the most famous disappearing acts in history instead. Testifying before the Joint Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack during the second week of December, 1945, Gen. Marshall declared under oath that he could not recall where he was the rest of Dec. 6 four years earlier, surely a day of major importance in his life. His memory was later "refreshed" by his wife, Katharine Tupper Marshall, resulting in the conclusion that he had been with her, through the evening. Her engagement book, indicating they had not been anywhere else, presumably was the evidence, though, strangely enough, in her book *Together* (Atlanta: Tupper and Love, 1946), published the following year, she did not say that. She spoke of returning to their quarters at Fort Myer, Va., the evening of the 6th, but she did not say the General was with her, or was already there when she got home, or that he came in later in the evening. Nothing was said about his presence until she commented on him having breakfast with her the morning of the 7th, about which more later. Though Gen. Marshall's comments were confused, even with the support of his wife's engagement book, by default, there still is no positive statement on his part as to whether he was home or not.

Though all of Gen. Marshall's strongest contemporary supporters flinch from making this positive statement as to his whereabouts, also, this does not faze his very formidable hagiographer, Forrest C. Pogue, who, in Chapter 10 of Volume II of what has been emphasized as the only official Marshall biography (*George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942*; New York: Viking, 1966), flatly declares the General was home all evening with his wife. He presents no evidence or citation for that declaration; we are supposed to take his word for it (*Ordeal and Hope*, p. 223).

For those who are not impressed with Pogue, and they exist, the absence of any solid documentary evidence of his whereabouts has led to the other areas which make up history: testimony and opinion. How much of this is plain gossip or speculation, regardless of point of origin, is unmeasurable, but durable.

Pogue, the reverent curator of the George C. Marshall Research Library for years, and now Director of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Institute for Historical Research, from the small mountain of official papers over which he presides, has been unable, apparently, to find anything at all to substantiate where Gen. Marshall spent the time from shortly after noon on Dec. 6 to around 9-11 a.m. the next day. In the meantime, some have volunteered suggestions. There is one account which tries to place him at a dinner reunion of fellow graduates of the Virginia Military Institute. There have been those who have ruminated out loud that Gen. Marshall spent into the early morning hours of the 7th hiding somewhere in the White House under Pres. Roosevelt's protection. One long-held account maintained he spent Dec. 7 morning at the airport in Washington as part of the welcoming committee greeting the arrival of Maxim Litvinov, Stalin's new ambassador representing the Soviet Union, though this proved to be based on false information derived from a worshipful biography of Litvinov, later, by a specialist in Iranian art and a dogged admirer of the USSR, Arthur Upham Pope. There is still another, in an oral tradition among retired Army intelligence who are still too frightened to reveal their identity, who insist Gen. Marshall was a "closet dipsomaniac," and could not be found the evening of Dec. 6, 1941 because he was being treated for over-indulgence at the Walter Reed hospital, presumably masked by a false identity in the hospital admissions log.

Of course, there is not a shred of documentary evidence for any of these, but the persistence of a lack of explanation for the legendary mysterious absence of Gen. Marshall from all of normal channels of association and communication for a man that prominent has lent encouragement to those stories. For those who are devoted to the veneration of Important People, these are horrendous, unmentionable things even to think about, even though they are not yet punishable as offenses against "the officially established and sanctioned opinions of the State," shall we say, as are certain views in West Germany on various aspects of wartime history, 1939-1945. But they are perfectly valid "questions" to advance about someone else's heroes, in the time honored manner as a further example of the whose-ox-is-being-gored department. Perhaps this irreverence may have useful consequences in times to come. An audience ready to accept the recent accounts of the sexual adventures of both Pres. and Mrs. Frank-

lin D. Roosevelt, let alone those of Pres. John F. Kennedy, may in due time come to terms with the revelation of the real whereabouts of Gen. George C. Marshall during the 24 hours preceding the Pearl Harbor attack, though this will obviously be something of a far different order than the matters mentioned above, if it ever takes place.

Shortly after Gen. Marshall vanished early Saturday afternoon, Dec. 6, the Japanese Memorandum #902 from Tokyo began to come in, and while the Japanese Embassy in Washington was busy taking it down, unknown to them, the American intelligence systems were doing the same, and converting it into English somewhat faster. And this had catastrophic consequences. The combined Army and Navy team of code-breakers were not only more successful than the Japanese Embassy people in coming up with an English language version of this memorandum, and well ahead of the latter. The difficulties of the Embassy decoders led to a delay in furnishing their diplomats with a version in time to make the scheduled presentation at the State Department, compounding their problem with accusations of planned deceit to cover the air attack on Hawaii as a consequence.

But this legend does not fit with the facts. Even the Japanese educator-historian Saburo Ienaga, though bitterly hostile to the Japanese regime which took Japan into war with the U.S.A., exonerates them of the almost universally-held notion in the U.S.A. that they had "planned a perfidious attack without any prior warning." This is "incorrect," Ienaga flatly declared. It was the Japanese government's clear intention to notify the State Department "immediately before the attack" at Pearl Harbor that diplomatic relations were considered broken, but this formal notice was delayed because "they had difficulty with the last long message from Tokyo." (Ienaga, *The Pacific War, 1931-1945*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978, p. 136. This book was first published in Japanese language in Tokyo in 1968.)

Ladislas Farago in his *The Broken Seal* (New York: Random House, 1967), the most recent heavily-documented pro-Administration apologia and diversionary effort, frankly admitted it was the Japanese Embassy's inefficiency in failing to have the 14-part message in acceptable English in time for delivery to Sec. of State Cordell Hull, as originally promised, and not a part of some devilish "sneak attack" plot, though the latter misconception persists as the almost universal American belief.

What is really repelling about the drama in the offices of the State Department early in the afternoon of Dec. 7, 1941 was the fakery of Sec. Hull in pretending to read what was tendered him by the Japanese diplomats Nomura and Kurusu, and then launching into a diatribe of billingsgate aimed at these two, intended

more for the record than anything else. Like everyone else privileged to read "Magic," Hull had already seen this message, thanks to the more speedy efforts of U.S. intelligence. Therefore, his whole performance was far more theater than it was the execution of his duties as a diplomat, and his simulated sense of outrage simply another contribution to the tight little scheme of propaganda being built around the entire incident by the Administration, to make themselves look like aggrieved innocent victims and the Japanese sinister, scheming deceivers. It worked in precisely that way, and the American public responded in a manner which must rank close to the top as an achievement of a propagandist's dream, probably unequalled in the history of devious statecraft.

Work on the Memorandum #902 was originally begun by Navy Communications Intelligence under the direction of Capt. Laurence F. Safford shortly after noon on the 6th, but the Army was eventually brought in to help out. This was no brief or routine communique. It went on for pages, amounting to well over 3000 words. Rather than being a catalog of "infamous falsehoods," as Sec. Hull raged, for public consumption, it was a sober and restrained summary of the Far East situation, from the Japanese point of view, and stating why they thought further attempts to negotiate the crisis in the Pacific were not worth continuing. Had Sec. Hull and his subordinates had to compose a similar memorandum, there are grave doubts that they could have come up with something less inflammatory in tone or more subdued in emphasis. It is significant that the U.S. public was not allowed to read the text of this fateful diplomatic paper at that time, which would have put to the test of critical appraisal whether or not it was a tissue of lies, as Hull succeeded in getting nearly all to believe, sight unseen. (What purports to be the entire memorandum, including the 14th part, received early Sunday a.m., the 7th, can be found in *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor* [8 vols., Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, Vol. IV Appendix, pp. A-130—A-134.] This ponderous gathering of intelligence derived from the secret cracking of the Japanese "Purple" diplomatic code has finally been made available for students of the year before American entry into the Pacific War, but gives the appearance of having been well-laundered and bleached, or "sanitized," as the euphemism goes in document-verification circles.)

Memorandum #902 was decoded and in an English-language version ready for distribution around 9 p.m. the evening of Dec. 6. Now began the activities connected with its distribution. And Gen. Marshall enters the front row once more, as a prime receiver of a copy, but whom no one could locate in order to deliver

it to him. Thirteen of the fourteen parts were in, and, according to Farago, the Navy delivered six copies, typed up on official Navy message forms, to Col. Rufus S. Bratton, Chief of Army Intelligence, Far East Section. According to the procedure in effect that week, it was the Navy's job to get "Magic" (translated copies of "Purple" code intercepts) to the President, among others, while the Army was entrusted with seeing that the Secretary of State and the Chief of Staff, among others, received copies.

At this point, the story splinters and nearly disintegrates. Col. Bratton told so many conflicting stories, some of them under oath before various Pearl Harbor investigations, that they cannot be clearly understood yet. Those he told off the record in subsequent times were even more puzzling. But the upshot of them all is that he failed to encounter Gen. Marshall at all, and it is unverified that he managed to deliver a copy to anyone even close to Gen. Marshall, despite claiming that he did so in delivering a copy to the Secretary of the General Staff, Col. (later Gen.) Walter Bedell Smith. Smith later filed an affidavit in 1945 denying that he had even been in the Munitions Building when Col. Bratton allegedly arrived there and purportedly left Gen. Marshall's copy for delivery to the General when he could be located. (Smith later was to become Chief of Staff himself, in the Eisenhower presidency.)

We do know, however, that Pres. Roosevelt¹ received a copy, and we are told that he shortly thereafter frantically tried to locate Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations. Why he should have done that, if a warning to Pearl Harbor was on his mind, escapes understanding. Contacting Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, Adm. Stark's superior, might have made more sense. However, warnings to Pearl Harbor were already stipulated as having to emanate from the office of the Chief of Staff, not the Chief of Naval Operations, keeping in mind that the protection of the Fleet and the Base was the Army's job, not the Navy's. Therefore, Pres. Roosevelt should have been looking for Gen. Marshall in great agitation, not Adm. Stark, or Gen. Marshall's superior, Sec. of War Henry L. Stimson, for sure. But we do not learn from any source that Pres. Roosevelt tried to locate Gen. Marshall anytime during the night of Dec. 6, and though it was plain from the context of the 13-part message in hand that a diplomatic rupture, at least, was soon to occur, no one lifted a finger at that moment to call or wire Gen. Short in Honolulu. In view of the above, it may seem to some that it might be more fundamental to ask where Sec. of War Stimson, Gen. Marshall's superior, was during the crisis of the night of Dec. 6, and why he was not enlisted in the effort to find Gen. Marshall, to tell him of the ominous context of this latest message, and have him direct Gen. Short, and through him, Adm. Kimmel, to reverse the sabotage alert under which the Base was operating, and replace it with an attack alert, which was the

reverse, a wide dispersal of all important operational factors, especially planes and ships. Yet no one located Gen. Marshall all the rest of the night, either, even though Pogue tells us that an orderly was at Gen. Marshall's quarters "to take calls." In a succinct comment on the lapses of the Congressional investigation of Pearl Harbor, especially in neglecting to call at least forty important witnesses who could have added immensely to what we were to know about the entire event, Greaves (*Perpetual War*, p. 459) mentioned specifically this aide to Gen. Marshall, who presumably was on duty at least until 10 p.m. the night of Dec. 6, and might at least have been able to report if the General had arrived home by that time. (In later hearsay, Gen. Marshall was supposed to have been overheard telling Sen. Alben W. Barkley of the majority side of the Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack that he could not tell anyone where he had been the night of Dec. 6 because it would have got Pres. Roosevelt in trouble, meaning, presumably, the President's memory, Mr. Roosevelt having died seven months before the investigation hearings began.)

We now come to the early morning hours of Dec. 7, and the picture becomes a little more cloudy. In Mrs. Marshall's book *Together* (subtitled *Annals of an Army Wife*) she reported that the General had breakfast with her, eating from a tray at her bedside, she being indisposed as a result of breaking four ribs in an accident a few days before (the General is reported to have thought that she spent the entire day of Dec. 6 helping out at "an old-clothes sale," a rather wearying chore for someone with four broken ribs, it would seem.) She did not say anything about his whereabouts prior to the bedside breakfast. Pogue reports a different story on Marshall's breakfast, taken alone, and an hour later than usual, though both stories agree the General proceeded to go thereafter on his customary Sunday morning horseback ride, certainly one of the most fateful canters in history. We still have not been told the time this took place, and over the years we have been treated to two accounts of where it took place. The earliest generation of Administration apologists for Gen. Marshall's non-presence in his office Sunday morning, when everyone was allegedly looking for him, explained that he had been riding in Rock Creek Park, and those who knew nothing about this place were led to assume that it was so inaccessible that while there the General was virtually incommunicado. But that was soon blown away after the publication of the booklet *Pearl Harbor* (1946) by Charles Sweeny, one of the earliest skeptics over the entire Pearl fable. Sweeny pointed out that Rock Creek Park was really little more than "a narrow gully" running through "the heart of the residential district of Washington," and that it was only a half mile wide, with all its trails clearly visible

from its ridges. A courier from the War Department could probably have contacted Gen. Marshall in a few minutes, using a motorcycle. But this account quietly shifted a later years, the ride then supposedly taking place on the Virginia side of the Potomac, and presumably occupying 50 minutes or more, according to the General's later recollections, as recorded by Pogue (*Ordeal and Hope*, p. 227).

It was followed by a return to quarters, a shower and dressing prior to the trip to the Munitions Building office. When did all this take place? It would seem that it would have had to have happened quite early. Though the Administration apologia had Gen. Marshall appearing at his office only at around 11:20 a.m., two other officers in sworn testimony declared they had seen him or were in his company in his office or that of someone else well before that time. Commander (later Adm.) Arthur N. McCollum, head of Naval Intelligence's Far Eastern desk, twice declared, once under oath, that the General, accompanied by an aide, had come to Adm. Stark's office around 9 a.m., and Col. (later Gen.) John R. Deane asserted he saw Gen. Marshall in the latter's office an hour later. However, the official legend rolls on, and in Pogue's masterpiece of official chronicling we find Gen. Marshall leisurely wandering on to the premises close to 11:30, a story dating back to the very first efforts at fabricating an innocent record for the Chief of Staff. By that time he was presumably the last of ten prominent political and military figures to read the Japanese Memorandum #902 *in toto*, something which Pogue thinks is almost commendatory (one may leave out here the possibility suggested by revisionists that Gen. Marshall's casual attitude toward this critically-important document, with its sophisticated implications of a state of war immediately impending, was due to his already having read it, or at least its first 13 parts, sometime in the previous evening.) Nevertheless, the tale told in the closing four pages of Pogue's chapter 10, "The Fatal Week," in *Ordeal and Hope*, is one of such unbelievable ignorance and innocence on the part of Gen. Marshall that one can conclude that perhaps it is a version of the past intended for a child's history of this grim and dramatic morning.

The picture that Pogue leaves with us, of a composed, almost diffident General Marshall, making his measured way about among several agitated, loud-speaking and near-hysteric subordinates and associates, is indeed charming, but the aspect involving his attitude of mystification as to the significance of the Japanese memorandum's content and further puzzlement over the import of the delivery-time of 1 p.m. at the State Department strikes especially hollow. If there was one man in the land who knew more of what the situation was all about than Gen. Marshall, it would be a prodigious task to pick him out. The direction

of the Administration's entire drive since late July, 1941 was obvious to many who hardly knew anything about American statecraft, diplomacy and intelligence, let alone one who had total access to the entire substance of Japanese confidential discourse and planning. The circumstances of late morning, Dec. 7, 1941, were such that hardly anyone in Gen. Marshall's position would have labored and pondered more than a minute over the implications of this lengthy piece of "Magic" in his hands.

The insubstantial portrait of Gen. Marshall at this critical moment clashes in total contradiction with that revealed nearly a quarter of a century later by Robert Sherrod, who attained great prominence as a combat reporter in the Pacific War on a par with Clark Lee and Ernie Pyle. Sherrod, in his memoir in the symposium *I Can Tell It Now* (New York: Dutton, 1964),² disclosed a completely different Marshall, who called together a very secret meeting of seven trusted Washington correspondents early in the morning of Saturday, Nov. 15, 1941, just over three weeks before the attack on Hawaii. Gen. Marshall explained that his purpose in calling together this hush-hush seance was to tell the attendants that the U.S. was "on the brink of war with Japan," (this was a week and half before Sec. of State Hull's brusque "ultimatum"), and that America's position prior to it was "highly favorable," because "We know what they know about us, and they don't know that we know it," a roundabout way of telling the reporters the consequences of "Magic," but concealing from them that the Japanese diplomatic traffic divulged that they were vigorously seeking an accomodation with the U.S.A., and trying their best to escape involvement in a war with America. And Gen. Marshall further seemingly outlined to them Adm. Kimmel's real mission at Pearl Harbor by confiding to them that "We are preparing for an offensive war against Japan."

But when one reads Sherrod's account in its entirety, it reveals a Marshall so abysmally ignorant of the realities of Pacific geography that one may wonder what was going on in the War Plans Division under his trusted underling, Gen. Leonard T. Gerow. When questioned by one of his handpicked journalists as to what part the Navy was scheduled to play in this coming offensive war against Japan, Sherrod quoted Gen. Marshall as saying, "'the grand strategy doesn't include the use of much naval force.' " Gen. Marshall, said Sherrod, stated that "he believed that our [the Army's] bombers could do the trick against Japan's Navy and Japan's cities 'without the use of our shipping.' " Were Sherrod not such a trusted member of the official reportage team and rewarded so many times for his faithful description of the war later on in harmony with official guidelines, one would be

inclined to think he was out to make Marshall appear to be a simpleton. Nevertheless, Sherrod's "Secret Conference With General Marshall" (in *I Can Tell It Now*, pp. 41-42) described someone which makes one wonder a bit about who Forrest Pogue was limning on pages 228 to 231 of *Ordeal and Hope*.

But, as has been observed before, someone in his position with his knowledge of the total situation should have issued an attack alert both to Hawaii and the Philippines some 14 hours earlier, by the fastest means available. A rather feeble excuse in Gen. Marshall's behalf, that he eschewed the scrambler telephone on his desk because he did not want to run the risk of being intercepted by Japanese electronic surveillance, does not wash. There was no indication whatever that the Japanese had broken any American code (Marshall had boasted to the reporters about Japanese ignorance of American secrets three weeks before), and, furthermore, making recourse to commercial telegraph cable was certainly no better guarantee of confidentiality. The odds in favor of suspecting that RCA might already have been tapped were far higher than that the scrambler telephone ran such a risk. In any case, the real issue was the several thousands of American lives being jeopardized; new codes can always be structured. But Japanese discovery of defense precautions being taken in Hawaii would surely have led to the calling off of the attack.

In this matter it may be pertinent to inquire if Gen. Marshall violated Army regulations by failing to send such an important message by multiple means of transmission, in addition to waiting until the last moment. The one chosen, the slowest available, resulted in the ultimate futility. There has long been a suspicion among people intimate with the Pearl Harbor affair that this action alone by Gen. Marshall was the tip-off that something extremely important was at stake, and that the incredible slowness in warning the Base was not just a happenstance.

The story from this point on has been told many times and does not need to be gone over exhaustively. The lethargic response to the Japanese message, with the additional intelligence that it would be presented to the Secretary of State at 1 p.m., and the final realization of the significance of that, and then the sending out of a "warning" to Pearl Harbor, by the slowest method available short of homing pigeon, which arrived to Gen. Short after the attack had already concluded, is embalmed in our folklore.

A carefully-plotted-out excuse for Gen. Marshall has been expertly constructed over the years, though little of it holds up under criticism based on facts. Administration apologists have been able to produce an explanation for almost everything, especially the circumstances surrounding the sending of the last

message to the Hawaiian command, circumstances which are far from clear and straightforward. In a re-examination of this it is clear that a large part of the total account demands another look, and a consideration of previously skimped, or ignored or avoided facts and implications.

It is acknowledged by Pogue and others that the famous "warning" of Nov. 27 which ordered Gen. Short, in liaison with Adm. Kimmel, to put Pearl Harbor on a sabotage alert, was not prepared by Marshall at all, the General being in South Carolina observing Army maneuvers that day. Its authors were the Secretary of War, Stimson, and Gen. Gerow, Chief of the Army War Plans Division, who apparently was responsible for attaching Gen. Marshall's name to the message, for years assumed to be an authentic signature.

In later years, this message, and that of Dec. 7 also addressed to the Hawaiian Army commander, universally attributed to Gen. Marshall, attracted the critical attention of the famed Navy intelligence officer, Capt. Safford, a central figure in the controversies aroused over the 13-part and "East Wind Rain" Japanese intercepts. Capt. Safford became a student of serious insights into the Pearl Harbor story, and was the key figure in stimulating Adm. Kimmel in taking up his own vigorous defense after having been made the "goat" of the Hawaii fiasco by the clever dissimulation of the cover-up diversionary artists working in behalf of whitewashing the Administration's favorites and pets.

It was Capt. Safford's firm view, after comparing the message of Nov. 27 with that of Dec. 7, that Gen. Marshall had not composed either of them. Utilizing the tools of internal criticism, he noted four separate particulars in which the two messages were almost identical in composition, not to mention the vague and civilian-like construction of both, which he ascribed to Sec. of War Stimson.

In a long 15-page single-spaced typed memorandum which he wrote with Commander Charles C. Hiles, and distributed to a fairly wide circle of interested revisionist students in the late winter and early spring of 1963, accompanied by a copy of his letter to Dr. Barnes of Feb. 1, 1963, Capt. Safford scrutinized the two messages in detail (Exhibits #36 and #61, respectively, as reproduced in the Joint Congressional Committee Proceedings of the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack), the first from Part 14, p. 1393, a better copy of which was Exhibit #15 of the Clarke investigation hearings, Part 34, pages 182-183, and Part 15, page 1640.

The latter, the Dec. 7, 1941 message, was not the version previously introduced, but was the transmission copy of the message, Capt. Safford emphasized, and that as Exhibit #61 it marked

the only time he believed it ever appeared in the entire investigatory proceedings. He called attention to the clearly legible pencilled notations on the Clarke #15 photostatted version, which listed the times-and-places order of transmission, definitively listing Hawaii as fourth, and last, and not third (the official line), thus putting the location most likely to be struck by a sunrise attack last in order of notification. (1 p.m. Washington time was also about the same. Canal Zone time, the first notified, a very poor time for a sneak attack, while it was midnight, Manila time, the second notified, utterly out of the question as far as a carrier-based aircraft attack was concerned. Why they took precedence over Honolulu, where it would be 7:30 a.m., an ideal time for such an attack that time of the year, was what aroused Capt. Safford's questioning of the adequacy of this "warning.")

In support of his contention that not only did Gen. Marshall have no part in the construction of the fateful war "warning" of Dec. 7, 1941 but was not even on the premises housing his office when the message in question was filed for transmission in the War Department Signals Room, Capt. Safford called attention to the stumbling responses to questions by Major Edward C. French, in charge of the message Center, before the Clarke investigation on Sept. 28, 1944 (JCC Proceedings, Part 34, pp. 32-33.) The gist of this was that there was no proof Gen. Marshall was present when the efforts were made to get a legible copy of the "Warning" for telegraphic transmission.

The above material may be peripheral to the topic of this extended commentary on the story which has grown around the whereabouts and activities of Gen. Marshall in the 24 hours prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, but that does not render it insignificant. And all such labors have been systematically minimized and defused over the years by official apologists skilled at creating diversionary obfuscation. Probably the best example of such is Roberta Wohlstetter's *Pearl Harbor* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962), ostensibly prepared, as Dr. Barnes suggested, with the assistance of the RAND Corporation think-tank and the presumable support of related networks of "mega-death intellectuals" fashionable 20 years ago.

In a somewhat different tactical exercise, this was also the fate of the "East Wind, Rain" Execute, in the course of which incredible efforts were undertaken to discredit repeated testimony even on the part of Admirals who testified under oath that it had been received by the Navy. Here the device was employed of getting their inferiors in rank to declare they had not seen the transmission copies. (The battery of people recruited to diminish the credibility of Captain Safford in this case was indeed a revelation. The shameful roundelay of witnesses changing their sworn

testimony under the frantic pressure of armed service legal officers, ultimately leaving Capt. Safford alone in maintaining that a Winds Execute had been received Dec. 4 and translated copies widely circulated, is a very dismal story. The 14th and 15th chapters of George Morgenstern's *Pearl Harbor* [New York: Devin-Adair, 1947] is still the best account of this sad affair. The plain implication is that several higher-ups, with knowledge of this impending break in diplomatic relations between the Japanese Empire and the U.S.A., had violated their trust in failing to place American bases all over the world on an attack alert despite possession of this crucial information.)

In a further consideration in this exploratory commentary, is there any significance in the observation that, among retired principals involved in the Pearl Harbor business who later became engaged in revisionist investigations, almost all of them have been from the Navy? Admirals Standley, Kimmel, Theobald and Tolley, Commander Hiles, Captains Safford and Rochefort, and the expert testimony of Captain Alwyn Kramer and Admiral McCollum, stand out.

Nor should one omit from this group of retired Navy revisionists on Pearl Harbor the celebrated Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, who actually carried out a mock attack on Pearl Harbor uncannily similar to what the Japanese brought about, but some nine years earlier than they. In war games testing the Hawaii defenses, Adm. Yarnell, with a task force consisting of two aircraft carriers, four destroyers and 152 aircraft, launched an air assault 30 minutes before dawn on Sunday, Feb. 7, 1932 from sea about 60 miles from Oahu, coming in from the ~~northeast~~, as did the Japanese Navy planes nine years later. The referees of the war games ruled that Adm. Yarnell's action caught the Base entirely by surprise, and theoretically sank every ship in the harbor and destroyed every Army warplane on the ground.

Adm. Yarnell was one of the very first and very enthusiastic reviewers of Morgenstern's *Pearl Harbor* and similarly commended the joint contributors to the *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace* symposium, edited by Barnes. In a letter to Barnes, Dec. 16, 1953, Adm. Yarnell warmly congratulated them on their work, and said, "If the efforts of yourself and others could only succeed in your efforts to break down the Iron Curtain of dictated literature, it will do much to save our nation."

As against Navy busyness, there is no comparable output of publication, research and testimony from Army figures, despite occasional oblique contributions such as those by Gen. Douglas MacArthur's intelligence chief in the East Asian sector, Gen. Elliot R. Thorpe, and the strangely-unexploited commentary attributed to Gen. Clarke of May 4, 1961 in a widely circulated

manuscript report by Professor Charles Callan Tansill, about which more later.

Could this preponderance of critics in one branch of the armed services have been an unconscious resentful response to the realization that the Navy had been unconscionably smeared with responsibility for the fiasco in Hawaii, via a process which had at the same time taken the Army, the real responsible entity for the safety and security of the Base, off the hook? Especially irritating must have been the extenuating circumstances found for excusing the top figures of the Administration, the War Department, including the Secretary, the Chief of Staff, his subordinates, and nearly everyone else related to them, while allowing Gen. Short to be thrown to the wolves as a diversion and a specious gesture of "objectivity" in spreading and allocating responsibility around a bit. The exception in this matter is of course the findings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, whose deliberations began in July, 1944 and whose secret report was not made until after the end of the war in Europe in May, 1945. This report heavily involved the Secretary of State, Hull, the Chief of Staff, Gen. Marshall, and his War Plans head, Gen. Gerow, citing them for delinquency in failing to keep the Hawaiian command informed as to what was going on and, as Greaves put it (*Perpetual War*, p. 424), pointedly mentioning Gen. Marshall as responsible "for the fact that the Army was not prepared to defend the Fleet on the morning of December 7, 1941."

But the APHB noticeably omitted Gen. Marshall's superior from the list of responsibles neglectful of their duties: could it have been because Sec. of War Stimson had brought their investigation into existence in the first place, and making them loath and tender when it came to the subject of criticizing the man at the head of all of them? Though the central matter in this essay concerns those aspects of the Pearl Harbor subject related to Gen. Marshall, it becomes clear to almost anyone pursuing the literature surrounding the entire matter that the General's superior, Sec. Stimson, was an even more sacred cow when it came to pressing him for information. Sec. Stimson reportedly suffered a heart attack the day he was scheduled to testify before the congressional investigation, and did not recover until it was all over. He answered only in part the questions submitted to him in writing, and largely escaped the barrage of light and sound that was directed at all the main characters in the cast which took part in that fateful event.

Sec. Stimson, a sophisticated and veteran Japanophobe who gave away points in this department to no one, not even the implacable Stanley K. Hornbeck, of the Far East desk of the State Department, has been documented by several historians as an

enthusiast for war in the Pacific against Japan even when he was Pres. Herbert C. Hoover's Secretary of State, leaving office early in 1933. His reappearance as Pres. Roosevelt's Secretary of War seven years later found him still of the same view.

And historian-apologists have been pushed to the limits of their abilities in explaining away that painful entry in his diary for Nov. 25, 1941, just two days before he sent out over Gen. Marshall's signature the famous sabotage alert to Hawaii with its mixture of "dos" and "don'ts" to Gen. Short (it was Capt. Saford's view that the "dos" were Stimson's and the "don'ts" were Gen. Gerow's, "like a duet in grand opera.") Whatever may be the truth, this famous diary entry, which became part of the public record which has stuck in the craw of every official apologist for the last 35 years, discussed a White House strategy meeting, and included the following: "The question was how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves." As much paper and ink has been spent in trying to denature this remark and to mollify the quizzical as to its import, and to tell us what Sec. Stimson "really meant" here, as used to be expended by Marxian zealots trying to tell us what Marx "really meant" by various bits of his much more murky and tangled prose in one or another semi-intelligible book. (It was ironic that U.S. forces fired the first shot anyway, the Navy sinking a Japanese submarine at the entry to the Harbor well before the air attack came on the Base.)

A constant in the whitewash-blackout defense of Rooseveltian official history on the evolution of the attack ~~on~~ Pearl Harbor is the repeated categorical denial that there was any traffic among the armed forces, their civilian political chiefs, and the intelligence services, indicating that Hawaii was the prime, if not the only target in case war broke out between Japan and the U.S.A. Right down to the very hour of the bombing on Dec. 7, 1941 we find repeated statements in the defensive apologia that the attack was suspected as likely to be on half a dozen other places, even as distant as Borneo, but Pearl is pointedly left out as a locus for concern. A favorite distraction of the diversionists is the Philippines, though what American forces were there which might inhibit in any way the invasion of Southeast Asia which the Japanese were simultaneously conducting is indeed a dark secret. That the Philippine-based forces could not even defend themselves for more than a few weeks was shortly demonstrated, let alone cause much trouble for Japan south and west of there.³ It was the American Fleet in Hawaii that represented the only assistance the European colonial powers could expect in their effort to retain their grip on Singapore, Malaysia, what is now

known as Indonesia, and the former French colonies now known as Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. But posing the Philippines as where the Administration expected an attack (precious little was done to frustrate one) distracts the inquisitive, and partially satisfies the hope that the latter will come to share the simulated surprise and conclude that this innocence pose is genuine.

In actuality, the strong possibility that the war might start with a Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor was a subject of heavy discourse, officially, in January and February, 1941. Navy Sec. Knox dispatched a four-page letter to Army Sec. Stimson on January 24, which became part of the record of the Roberts Commission investigating the attack, in December, 1941—January, 1942. But few people have ever seen it or bothered to read it. This letter was entirely devoted, not to just a vague speculation on the possibility of attack somewhere, as one would gather from the preliminary remarks in Vol. 1 of the Defense Department's 1977 compilation, *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor* (p. 1), but to a single topic, the likelihood of a bombing and torpedo plane attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet while it was berthed at Pearl Harbor. Sec. Knox began by declaring that the "security of the U.S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor" had been under consideration among the Navy for several weeks prior to his letter, long before U.S. Ambassador Joseph Grew's much-publicized letter from Tokyo, also in January, 1941, suggesting a likely attack coming upon Hawaii.⁴ Navy concern probably went back to the moving of the Fleet to Hawaii in mid-summer of 1940. Said Sec. Knox in the last sentence of his first paragraph,

If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

Again it should be understood that Sec. Knox's long letter was devoted in toto to Pearl Harbor, not to Panama, Manila, the Presidio, Guam or Enderbury Island, and was responded to by Sec. Stimson on Feb. 7, 1941 in a 1½ page letter addressed to Sec. Knox, headed "Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii." Like Sec. Knox's letter of Jan. 24, there was not a word devoted to any other place except Pearl Harbor. Copies of both letters reached Chief of Naval Operations Harold R. Stark, which he acknowledged Feb. 11, while Sec. Stimson declared at the end of his reply to Sec. Knox that copies of both letters were also going to the Commanding General in Hawaii. The presumption was that the Chief of Staff, Gen. Marshall, the Hawaiian Commander's superior, would also be a recipient, though this is not specified in the postscript notation concerning other designates of copies. But Sec. Stimson would hardly have deprived his immediate subordinate of documents of this importance.

Four days later (Feb. 15, 1941), a six-page confidential letter from Adm. Kimmel from his flagship, the USS *Pennsylvania*, under the heading address "Pearl Harbor, T.H." went out to nearly everyone possibly concerned with naval affairs in Hawaii, and also was exclusively devoted to a discussion of the problems involved in guarding against the possible sabotage of the Fleet, or its protection in case "That a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor." The timing was too close to the Knox-Stimson exchange and the recognition of it by Adm. Stark to indicate anything but concordance and cooperation on Adm. Kimmel's part. (The Knox-Stimson correspondence of early 1941 and Adm. Kimmel's confidential letter to the Pacific Fleet are dealt with by Gordon Prange in his book *Tora! Tora! Tora!* [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963], but in an obfuscatory manner. It might be pointed out that Joint Chiefs of Staff position papers throughout the 1920s and 1930s reveal repeated concern about a possible attack by Imperial Japan upon Pearl Harbor.)

It is in the light of the above, and because of the above, that Sec. Knox's 19-page double-spaced typewritten "Report by the Secretary of the Navy to the President" is such a sorry commentary, in effect suggesting the defensive neglect all around was so grave and encompassing, that one finds it hard to comprehend what he is trying to establish. Handed to Pres. Roosevelt personally by Sec. Knox the eveing of Dec. 14, 1941 on his return from Hawaii (the President endorsed it in his own handwriting, "Given me by F.K. 10 p.m. Dec. 14 when he landed here from Hawaii"), the report on what had happened at Pearl a week earlier crawled with inaccuracies, especially in the parts dealing with non-combat aspects. One obvious concession was Sec. Knox's willingness to saddle the Navy with a large part of the blame, "due to a lack of a state of readiness against such an air attack by both branches of the service," a half-non sequitur, since this ignored the Army's primary responsibility for protecting the Fleet and the entire Base.

But what was immensely intriguing was Sec. Knox's declaration, also on the first page of his report, that a "message of warning" had been sent to Gen. Short from the War Department in Washington at midnight, Dec. 6, a warning which did not reach him, as he told Sec. Knox, until after even the warning sent under Gen. Marshall's signature around noon the following day. It would be of great interest to know who sent that warning from Washington at midnight, Dec. 6, and what it consisted of. Since no one could locate Gen. Marshall and since Col. Bratton testified that his superior, Gen. Sherman Miles of Army Intelligence, told him not to try to find him any longer after 11:30 p.m. that night,

the sender of this warning must surely be a mysterious entity, if not ectoplasm. There is no account of anyone in authority in the War Department being awake at midnight, Dec. 6, 1941. No one credited Sec. Stimson with this action, and undoubtedly no subordinate of Gen. Marshall would have dared to do so without the General's permission. One may be induced to ruminate over whether this actually happened, or were both Gen. Short and Sec. Knox involved in a substantial error?

Sec. Knox seemed to be befuddled on the reason for the Hawaii Base being still on a sabotage alert, at the time of the attack, failing to recall that this was precisely what the two commanders had been ordered to do on Nov. 27, and had not been ordered to do anything different after that date. Another question comes up: why had not the men responsible for the defense of the Fleet and the ~~Base~~, Sec. Stimson and Gen. Marshall, been sent to Honolulu by the President to conduct an investigation? Sec. Knox should have been third in line, along with Adm. Stark, for such an assignment. However, his mission there alone, with the Army men not participating, further spread the impression, false but probably desired, that it was the Navy, which had sustained by far the largest part of the damage, which had been the delinquent in its protection, rather than the Army. This is how it worked out in terms of public relations and propaganda, and the traditional accounts to this day reflect this bias.

Knox, crediting Japanese espionage with informing their attacking forces of the precise location of the American ships, for obvious reasons did not give the slightest hint that American intelligence was well aware of this traffic via "Magic" intercepts for many months, though here he may have been in the dark himself as a result of the failure to communicate this "need-to-know" information to him. An examination of the majority of the actual copies of the "Magic" intercepts received ultimately by the Navy, though liberally covered with rubber stamps "Army," "Top Secret," "Ultra," and others, also reveals a rubber stamp legend, "Records of Naval Communications do not indicate transmittal of this specific information to authorities in Hawaii." One may conclude that, knowing Sec. Knox's reputation for integrity, this "specific information" never reached the Navy in Washington, either, and he simply did not know about all this.

To cap it all off, Sec. Knox omitted making the faintest reference to his four-page warning letter to Sec. Stimson early in 1941 of the need to develop a plan to defend Pearl Harbor specifically from a Japanese attack. And, of course, there is no indication of anyone's knowledge of the growing desperation in Japan as a result of the accelerating economic pinch caused by the global economic warfare against Japan by the Western colonial powers, also plainly discussed by the Japanese diplomatic service in the

"Magic" intercepts of the late fall of 1941. (Especially pertinent here are the November, 1941 intercepts reproduced in Vol. IV Appendix of *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor*.)

This aspect of the Pacific crisis is systematically neglected by the fuglemen of Anglo-American innocence, the increasing economic warfare carried out against the Japanese after the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting off Newfoundland in August, 1941. On October 23, the U.S. Commerce Department reported that Japanese raw material shortages had become so acute as a result of stepped-up curtailment that Japanese trade with a number of its biggest customers had virtually stopped, and that shipping to and trade with the U.S., the British Empire and the Netherlands East Indies had become almost "non-existent." (New York Times, October 24, 1941, p. 36). On December 1, the National Industrial Conference Board published a work titled "The Effects of the Allied Economic Blockade on Japan," in which it stated that normal Japanese imports of raw materials covering not only war supplies but necessities for the civilian population had been reduced by about 75%, and cited a report of the Chinese News Service that Japan was "on the verge of economic collapse." (New York Times, December 2, 1941, p. 6.) And in the Congressional Record, 77th Congress, Second Session, December 8, 1942, Rep. Jeanette Rankin of Montana, the only member of Congress who had refused to vote for a declaration of war on Japan the previous year on that date, remarked that near the same day as the NICB report on Japanese economic desperation was published the previous year, a "prominent non-Japanese Oriental" had told her that the situation in the Pacific was not only "serious," but that "Japan has no choice but to go to war or to submit to economic slavery for the rest of her existence." General information of this nature, if widely read and understood, might have made possible an appreciation of another reason for Pearl Harbor other than the simpleminded explanation fed into public discourse for the purpose of maximizing patriotic sentiments and nationalistic outrage and hatred.

The veteran reporter, political analyst and commentator for the New York Times, Arthur Krock, made a glancing remark in his memoirs (*Sixty Years on the Firing Lines*) about the "posse of apologists" who made a veritable industry out of "explaining away" all the disjointed irregularities in the Roosevelt Administration's conduct of affairs in the months prior to the Pearl Harbor bombing. In actuality, Krock's "posse" grew over the last 40 years to comprise a multitudinous constabulary. No defensive apologetic effort in American history has been so extensive or sustained as that which has sought to perfume Mr. Roosevelt and his eager-for-war regime, and how they eventually got it, while

seeking to banish all criticism and suspicion of their role in this disaster.⁵

However, the more this industriousness in behalf of Administration purity and innocence branches out, the more tenacious grows the conviction that the total situation seen in the light of over 35 years of revelations, exposures and discoveries confirms the reverse, and the belief hardens that a gigantic camouflage diversion has taken place instead, succeeding in part at least in diverting attention from many basic disagreeable and distressing facts, while seeking to encourage favorable consideration of an evasive mollification.

As the people involved die (very few of the participants and principals in that great drama are still alive), and as the documents either vanish, one by one, or are declared never to have existed, there will tend to precipitate out a vague narrative steering its readers into accepting a genteel and respectable Establishment whitewash. But the anti-Establishment's counter-story will hardly give ground for that reason. The former's eyewash may appear to have won the day, if one considers the simple tales told the youth, to this time still nearly clean of any reconciliation with the contradictory material placed on the record by their adversaries, the revisionists. But it is unlikely that the latter will disappear or go away, or abandon the field, in the future. It is just as possible that the efforts to modify or demolish the Establishment monolith will be augmented instead. For there are many in close accord with the observations of Joseph D. Harrington, the author of *Yankee Samurai* (1979), who maintained that challenging the official accounts of everything was not only a "civic responsibility" but also "great fun."

A Pertinent Postscript on the "Winds" Message Affair

When the Japanese Foreign Office sent out Circular #2353 Nov. 19, 1941, advising their embassy and consular people in Washington and presumably a number of other places in the world of the possible coming announcement of the suspension of diplomatic relations with any of three other countries, it was sent in Purple code, which they believed no one had deciphered. Early in December, the 1st and 2nd, all materials and machines connected with handling Purple were ordered destroyed. Therefore, when the decision was made to break relations and go to war with the U.S.A. on Dec. 4, the decision buried within a radio newscast disguised as a pre-arranged false weather report, the Foreign Office sent it out in Japanese Morse Code, which made its transmission and subsequent understanding quite simple to all. Believing that the confidential message informing intended recipients what HIGASHI NO KAZE AME would mean in this context

was still a secret, its execution would therefore excite no suspicion among non-Japanese interceptors, while widespread dissemination, repeatedly, would guarantee that few if any of those for whom it was intended would miss it. The official American line is and has been that though Circular #2353 was intercepted, the "execute" was not.

The editors of the world-known Tokyo newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*, in their book *The Pacific Rivals* (New York: Weatherhill, 1972, p. 91), declare that the "Easterly wind, rain" message was "flashed repeatedly" at the direction of Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo. But the defenders of official innocence here have made a convention out of denying that it was received here no matter how often it was sent out, or that it was received in a garbled form which made it unintelligible, or that it was too ambiguous to be construed as a coded message indicating a definite decision of Japan to go to war with the U.S.A. Furthermore, if received, it could not have been of any real assistance to American intelligence because it had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor. This latter line apparently is based on the notion that the Winds Execute should have been accompanied by a map of the naval and military installations in Hawaii, in order to be taken seriously.

The smugness about and surefooted dismissal of this critical issue has especially characterized the approach of the Roosevelt defense squad since the publication of Mrs. Wohlstetter's book in 1962, and is reflected in the official publication of the "Magic" intercepts beginning in 1977 by the Defense Department, described above. This massive multi-volume work, weighing 20 pounds, escapes mention of the subject entirely, except for a repetition of a 1945 commentary which passed over the matter airily as of no consequence.

However, before we move on from the Winds Execute matter, one more contribution should be made to the subject which should shake the official diversion specialists and the "blackout" and "blurout" (to use Barnes' terms) exponents, and bring into focus again Capt. Safford's stubborn position on the reception and wide distribution of this message. What time has effected should make all the scoffers at Capt. Safford stand back a bit (even the would-be revisionist book on Pearl Harbor by Bruce R. Bartlett, *Cover-Up: The Politics of Pearl Harbor, 1941-1946* [New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1978], contains a malicious sally at Capt. Safford in the manner of Pogue that would have done justice to the work of any "blackout boy," from the original old masters, Morison, Millis, Feis, Bailey, Perkins or Rauch, to any of the undistinguished non-entities of the current scene.)

On March 11, 1980 there was declassified and placed in the National Archives Document SRH-051, in Record Group 457, a

"sanitized" version of a 17-page typewritten interview, January 13, 1977, conducted by Raymond Schmidt, a historian with the Naval Security Group (since reassigned to the National Security Agency), with Ralph T. Briggs. Briggs, chief watch supervisor at the Naval Communications Station at Cheltenham, Maryland in December, 1941, related in detail his interception of the Winds Execute message the evening of Dec. 4.⁶ He went on to relate his transmission of it to Naval Communications in Washington by teletype, the message also being delivered later by pouch. He also stated that he entered this interception of the false weather report, HIGASHI NO KAZE AME, in his log sheet of intercepted messages.

Briggs added the sensational information that this log sheet, presumed by all to have been destroyed sometime during the war, had survived, and that he had come across it himself between 1960 and 1962 while he was officer in charge of Naval World War II intelligence and "crypto" archives. He described his verification of the time of receipt on the log sheet, and said, "I then made a written entry on the upper right hand margin of this log sheet concerning the fact that I, as officer in charge, on the date in question, had sighted and verified that this was a recorded original entry of the Winds execute message."

Briggs then returned the log sheet to the files without making a copy, from which point it presumably went into Naval Security Group archives. It is believed that Briggs's log has been rediscovered by NSG, and that it is possible copies have been made available to favored personages, though others seeking it have been thus far stonewalled in their efforts also to get access to it.

The puzzling aspect of all this is the silence of Capt. Safford for so many years on Briggs. It might be explained that Briggs's existence was known to revisionists as well since 1945-46, yet the failure of a single work on Pearl Harbor to mention even his name is fully as mystifying. Briggs relates in his interview with Dr. Schmidt that Capt. Safford had contacted him and that the possibility of his testifying before the Congressional investigation had been discussed by them four or five times. Briggs stated that he was not averse to this, but that he was eventually ordered by his superior at the Cheltenham installation, a Capt. John Harper, that he was not to testify, nor was he to continue meeting with Capt. Safford. (Briggs stated that Capt. Harper was very disturbed when he ordered him, Briggs, to remain silent about this subject; it would be most interesting to discover how far up the chain of command Capt. Harper's orders could be located.)

It is strange that no revisionist ever asked Capt. Safford where his operation, on Nebraska Avenue in Washington, got their copy of the raw intercept of the Winds Execute. They were not an

intercept station, and obviously had to get it from someone. That Cheltenham had made the intercept was a matter of record among all, but how it got from there to Capt. Safford's team, and Capt. Alwyn Kramer, under whom the translated copies were prepared for distribution, was never explained by anyone. The Briggs interview furnishes us with this missing piece.

In a similar manner, the famed luncheon of May 4, 1961 involving Gen. Carter W. Clarke, Gen. Bonner Fellers and Prof. Tansill, during which other materials relating to Winds Execute were revealed, never became utilized by an writers of revisionist persuasion, then or later, even by Prof. Tansill himself. Though a 4-page single-spaced typed copy of Tansill's notes has circulated for nearly 20 years, it has not been employed in any context, to this writer's knowledge. Gen. Clarke, Deputy Chief of the Military Intelligence Service, was reported by Prof. Tansill to have declared that the Winds Execute was picked up also by the Coast and Geodetic Survey Station at Mobile, Alabama and sent on to Washington the following day.

The next move is up to the official defenders and the salvagers of prior legends of ignorance and innocence. But the publication of Ralph T. Briggs' January, 1977 interview and his December, 1941 message reception log should take place at the same time the next obfuscatory campaign is made to wrap up the Winds Execute in impenetrable diversionary irrelevance and historical bafflegab.

DOCUMENT

No. 148

From: Tokyo
To: Washington

November 19, 1941
Circular 2353

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency, (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

- (1) In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger—HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (East Wind rain).
- (2) Japan-USSR relations—KITANOKAZE KUMORI (North Wind cloudy).
- (3) Japan-British relations—NISHI NO KAZE HARE (West Wind clear).

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and last sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Trans. 11-28-41

Above from p. A-81 of *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor*, Vol. IV Appendix (8 vols., Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1977).

Notes

*It is not the purpose of this essay to try to condense in this much space the entire story of Pearl Harbor. This is a task which has eluded more than a score of writers who have tried to do it in large books. The principal objective here is to concentrate on the drama of the ten days, and especially the last 24 hours, prior to the outbreak of war between the U.S.A. and Japan following the attack of the latter on Hawaii December 7, 1941. It is intended to be read in conjunction with this writer's essay, "Pearl Harbor: Antecedents, Background, and Consequences" (in *The Saga of Hog Island and Other Essays in Inconvenient History* [Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles Publisher, 1977], pp. 114-131). The essay at hand was inspired as a follow-up to a single sentence in the former (9th line from bottom, p. 122), where something of the larger picture of U.S.A.-Japanese relations was one of the principal concerns.

The course and collapse of the diplomatic talks between the American and Japanese governments between September and late November, 1941 is the real backdrop of the account here narrated, with emphasis on what are new or previously unstressed aspects of the happenings from November 26 through December 7. Analysis of the fine points of the diplomatic presentations dealing with the Far Eastern situation is also of secondary consideration at this stage. Partisans of the rival positions may quarrel over the rightness or wrongness of them for a long time. But Americans had the upper hand in these conversations, by dint of cracking the Japanese diplomatic code of highest priority, "Purple," having made it possible to read their adversary's ideas and secrets while at the same time keeping theirs from Japanese scrutiny. The foundering of the talks over differences on China policy can be blamed as easily on the Roosevelt Administration as on the Japanese, even if neither side were ready to make any substantial concessions to the other on this specific point. But, in retrospect, what the Roosevelt partisans wanted in East Asia was never implemented, even after winning a war, and probably could never have been implemented, unless it was preferred that there be a solidly-Communist Far East at the conclusion, which does not seem to have been expected by the short-view politicians. But such a possibility was plain to see prior to the war, and a Red East Asia was certainly no political improvement over a Japanese-dominated East Asia as it was in 1941. As the near-total destruction of the European colonial system in East Asia and the Pacific, the succoring of which was jointly a high Roosevelt original priority, also swiftly followed the immense Communist encroachment from 1945 onward, one can hardly look upon the "New Order" thereafter as something to take much pride in, and the later wars over real estate still in dispute from the Pacific War, in Korea and Viet Nam, have certainly added emphasis to this observation.

A thousand evasions of this political reality are possible and many of them have been paraded by us over the years, including the revival of such primitive ones as the bogus indignation over, and the necessity to destroy, the allegedly unequalled political sin of unique Japanese "militarism" (for the past 20 years our politicians and journalists have

whined and stewed that the Japanese are lamentably too anti-militaristic). So the problem is an endemic one, and may be centuries in existence prior to satisfactory resolution, a matter deeply imbedded in our total situation. As good a statement as one is likely to find in so few words on the remaining difficulty is that of the late William L. Neumann:

"Good patriot, bad historian," a comment first made in regard to Poggio Bracciolini, author of *Eight Books of Florentine History*, can all too often be applied to modern historians as well. Enveloped in nationalism, that omnipresent malaise of the modern world, the scholar has made little progress toward his commonly proclaimed goal of objectivity when his subject has involved the interests of his own nation or its enemies.

(Neumann, "World War I Revisionist," in Arthur Goddard, ed., *Harry Elmer Barnes, Learned Crusader: The New History in Action* [Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, Publisher, 1968], p. 261.)

1. Lewis Carroll's fantasy character who suggested salutary consequences might follow in developing the ability to believe six impossible things before breakfast probably had an unconscious impact upon establishment official writers of Roosevelt Administration innocence in developing their version of the Pearl Harbor story. *In toto* they eventually gathered together somewhat more than six, but the most imaginative of all, perhaps, was the fable the Roosevelt rarely if ever saw the "Magic" intercept transcripts, despite being first on the list of intended recipients via the joint Army-Navy delivery system. This has been advanced with the airy and casual aplomb of someone reporting that it is raining outside. When placed against the many-times-told account of the delivery to the President of the "Magic" intercept of the first thirteen parts of the Japanese Memorandum #902 shortly after 9 p.m. the evening of Dec. 6, and his agitated response upon reading it, surely it must stretch the credulity of even his most devoted self-serving partisans to the cracking point to be told this was one of his rare exposures to these English language transcripts of intercepted Japanese diplomatic intelligence traffic. Several historians of England and the British Empire have declared that the Russians in their campaigns against Napoleon conducted their intelligence service in the language of the enemy, French. This "Magic" windfall surely was the next best thing to that, and one can hardly expect the American Chief of State to be ignorant of it in the manner described by his apologists.
2. David Brown and W. Richard Bruner, eds., *I Can Tell It Now*, by members of the Overseas Press Club. Foreword by Dwight D. Eisenhower, 363 pp. New York: Dutton, 1964.

3. The Defense Department, instead of publishing the "Magic" intercepts in chronological order, or all of the traffic between any two points (e.g., Panama-Tokyo or Tokyo-Bangkok) all in one place, has arranged them in various sequences, some of which are a little fanciful or imaginative, but probably making more sense to those with mainly technical interest in the content. But one effect of this procedure, or "methodology," if one prefers contemporary cliches, is in effect the preparation of a scheme leading to a sort of history of the 15 months before Pearl by themselves, unintentional or otherwise.

Scattered through this assemblage of what is supposed to be exclusively "Magic" derived from translated intercepts of Japanese intelligence are several pieces of American Naval communications which are not part of "Magic" at all, and seem to be inserted at strategic spots which convey the impression of being self-serving additions to the potential account which might result from using this material. Some of this may also have the intention of reinforcing the official line on innocence of Pearl Harbor being the primary attack point for the Japanese upon rupture of diplomatic relations.

However, there is one especially interesting dispatch included ("Magic" Background, Vol. IV Appendix, pp. A-109/A-110) from the Chief of Naval Operations (Adm. Stark) to the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Far Eastern Fleet (Adm. Thomas C. Hart) #271442, Nov. 26, 1941, the same date as that of the State Department's "ultimatum" to Japan. This instructs Adm. Hart to wage, at the outset of a state of belligerency with Japan, unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare south and west of an area bounded by 7° and 30° North Latitude and 122° and 140° East Longitude. The region covered by these stipulated compass points incorporates the Philippines and the Philippine Sea, and some areas of British and Dutch interest as well, and was to be treated as a "strategic area." The unrestricted warfare was to be conducted south and west of this, presumably in the areas of the South China Sea, plus the environs of Singapore, Malaya in general, the Dutch East Indies and the region stretching into and including the Gulf of Siam (Thailand) and adjacent areas of the seacoast of the French Indo-Chinese colonies, now Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia (Kampuchea).

Adm. Hart was further instructed to work in liaison with the British and Dutch forces in defining the circumstances under which this vast region of the Far Eastern waters was to be policed, but it was especially interesting that Adm. Stark specifically cautioned Adm. Hart that in dealing with the leaders of these two other powers he was to "take care not to disclose for the present these instructions to wage unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare."

This communication said nothing about Army cooperation or any contingency priority deriving from the Army until two days later, when Adm. Stark's #271912CR0863 informed Adm. Hart that Gen. Marshall had requested that Gen. MacArthur be informed so that the Army Air Force might "make appropriate plans" to cooperate

with this unrestricted warfare plan. (This writer has repeatedly encountered in recent years individuals who reflect a faint smile and murmur, upon hearing such details of 40 years ago, "I didn't know the Army has its own air force," and must conclude that he is in the presence of someone who does not go back very far.)

We thus have additional information about American plans for southeast Asia, and further confirmation that a concerted effort to wage offensive war versus Japan was substantially envisioned well before the Hawaiian attack, as opposed to the general misconception of mindless lazing-about in huddled defensiveness a la *From Here to Eternity* in utter ignorance of the Pacific realities.

That this contingency involved deception of "allies" as to the decision to wage unrestricted submarine and aerial war in a large area of the East Asian waters is of more than casual importance, and suggests that such a change had been made by the Administration and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a secret decision to "revise" the arrangements previously incorporated in the Rainbow/WPL-46 understanding arrived at during the extended meetings in Singapore between January 29th and March 27th, 1941. That the Japanese had rather quickly found out about these meetings, where Rainbow had been born, has been suggested by a variety of reactions, but whether they found out about Adm. Stark's Nov. 26 message to Adm. Hart is uncertain. Constant interest in Tokyo concerning the presence and movement of U.S. submarines in Manila, in addition to news about troop movements in the Philippines and the disposition of Army fighting aircraft, accelerated in November, 1941 but in part preceded Adm. Stark's "unrestricted warfare" pronouncement. Submarines far outnumbered other U.S. Navy craft based in Manila and vicinity, and two "Purple" messages from there to Tokyo Nov. 24 and Nov. 26, intercepted by American intelligence and available for consultation in English translation a short time later, mentioned some two dozen U.S. submarines leaving Manila Bay, "destination unknown." On the general interest in submarine movement one can consult the following Japanese "Purple" dispatches: #742 (Nov. 8, 1941); #745 (Nov. 10, 1941); #757 (Nov. 14, 1941); #767 (Nov. 15, 1941); #785 (Nov. 22, 1941); #790 (Nov. 25, 1941); #805 (Nov. 29, 1941); #812 (Dec. 1, 1941). The last two were not translated until Dec. 8 according to official records but the others were available as "Magic" intercepts shortly after each of the original sending dates in question. The messages mentioned above have been reproduced in *The "Magic" Background To Pearl Harbor*, Vol. IV Appendix, pp. A-161/A-170.

In retrospect, this U.S. plan for the conducting of unrestricted submarine warfare was resolutely put into operation after Dec. 7, 1941. In a shrewd and percipient commentary on the U.S. Senate ratification of the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 by a vote of 77-0 in July, 1955, summarizing their essential futility and predicting their sure coming violation by future belligerents (so amply vindicated by what happened between 1955 and 1980), the Chicago Tribune ("Civilizing War," July 11, 1955) pointed out the grave Allied violation during World War II of the previous proto-

cols of this sort, especially the Hague Convention of 1907, the Washington conference of 1922, the Geneva Convention of 1928 and the London naval treaty of 1930. As to the latter the Tribune pointed out pithily,

. . . the laws governing submarine warfare were clearly and precisely defined in the London naval treaty of 1930, which specified that attacks were to be confined to unmistakable men o'war, and then only after seeing to the safety of all hands. The American navy, in its official report on the submarine campaign against Japan, admitted an indiscriminate campaign in which nine of every 10 Japanese ships sunk were noncombatant vessels. Of 276,000 Japanese drowned in these attacks, 105,000 were civilians.

Among the rarest of all the narratives of history is an account of the indictment, successful prosecution and punishment of the winners of a war for violations of international law governing the conduct of belligerency. In the round of post-World War II trials in Germany conducted by the U.S. under Allied Control Council Law No. 10, when German defense counsel pointed out Allied breaches of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 during the war, spokesmen among the prosecutors such as Telford Taylor airily dismissed the pertinent articles of these Conventions as inapplicable to Allied behavior because they were "antiquarian." Some wry comments on such selective application of international law can be found in such books as those by August von Knieriem, *The Nuremberg Trials* (Chicago: Regnery, 1959) and Werner Maser, *Nurnberg: Tribunal der Sieger* (Dusseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1977), rendered in fanciful English translation as *Nuremberg: A Nation on Trial* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1979).

4. Grew's report to the State Department is undoubtedly the best-known and most widely divulged pseudo-intelligence tidbit allowed to reach the American public. This may have been an electrifying possibility to Sec. of State Hull, but could hardly have stirred much response from the Navy, which had already rehearsed two Pearl Harbor attacks on their own in simulated war games off Hawaii in the half dozen or so years prior to the outbreak of war in Europe in September, 1939. Probably picked up third hand as a consequence of drunken talk at a diplomatic cocktail party, there is an almost-comic dwelling upon its significance in the book *The Pearl Harbor Cover-Up* by Frank Schuler and Robin Moore (New York: Pinnacle Books, 1976). In parts this book reads like a brief in behalf of the pro-Maoist wing in the State Department's version of how war came in the Pacific.

What is missing from the record, to the release of the "Magic" intercepts by the Defense Department just recently, is the simultaneous war scare in the Japanese Foreign Office, a matter of even greater curiosity. On February 15, 1941 the Japanese vice-consul in Honolulu, Otohiro Okuda, dispatched his #027, which was addressed to the Foreign Ministry for routing to the General Staff and the chief of Japanese Naval Intelligence, American Section, Capt.

Kenji Ogawa. This relayed second hand information that the Roosevelt Administration would declare war on Japan sometime between the sending date and the end of the first week of March.

Since American intelligence had cracked "Purple" almost six months previous to this, it may be that Japanese intelligence in Hawaii had been victimized by the process we now call "disinformation," in an effort to determine how long it would take to be released in Japan, being able to read both transmission and return reaction with equal ease. Nothing has been made public via release of appropriate "Magic" intercepts as to how this sensational piece of non-fact was handled or whether any response was made to this manufactured war scare. In view of the mollifying press conference given by Japan's new ambassador to the U.S.A., Adm. Kichisaburo Nomura, on Feb. 20 (he had just arrived in Washington on Feb. 11), the Japanese Foreign Office seems not to have taken seriously this prediction of a war declaration by the U.S.A. Nevertheless both Japan and the U.S.A. on the highest diplomatic levels went through separate war scares in the first two months of 1941.

Whether both were the result of deliberate incitement by one another's "dis-information" agents can only be ruminated upon at this point. But there is no doubt of Japanese interest in possible U.S. Navy action in the event of a state of war during this time, as the intercepts #011 and #029 (neither of which are in the Defense Department's published collection of "Magic") attest. As one can see, these reports on ship-harbor activities in Pearl Harbor began well before the presence in Honolulu of the new Japanese consul general, Nagao Kita, who first arrived on March 14, 1941. (Though Kita's name is associated with similar reports to Japan dealing with what was going on in Pearl Harbor starting in September, it is obvious that this letter was well after a stream of "Purple" intercepts indicated that in the event of trouble between the two countries, Hawaii was a prime target for an early if not initiating attack by Japanese forces. Even Farago, in his essentially establishment-supporting book *The Broken Seal*, concedes as much. Though American intelligence never found in their interceptions of traffic of the Japanese Imperial Navy one word even hinting that Pearl Harbor might be a future target, Farago concedes, "On the other hand, 'Magic' produced this evidence actually in abundance, from February 15, 1941, until the morning of the attack.") (*The Broken Seal*, p. 167.)

5. Some idea of the richness of the obscurantism and diversionary genius now applied to the Pearl Harbor epic as we approach the 40th anniversary of the attack can be derived especially from fairly current histories of wartime intelligence. Especially revealing is how the subject is handled in William R. Carson's *The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire* (New York: Dial/James Wade, 1977, pp. 151-159). After a brief treatment excoriating those who reject the official establishment line as "isolationists" enamored of "conspiratorial" fixations, Carson manages to sketch out the layers of camouflage which have been laid

upon the subject over the years, while getting to mention only two students of the affair, the undeviating establishment apologists and chroniclers, Mrs. Wohlstetter and Hans L. Trefousse. No one is to blame, and the author seems to believe that the main trouble was that not enough people were privy to the "Magic" intercepts to enable the dispatch of a proper "warning" to the Hawaii commanders. That every responsible figure in the highest authority echelons was quite conversant with or on the automatic delivery list for "Magic," including the President, his Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, and the very top commanders in the intelligence departments of the armed services, does not appear to impress or to have been adequate according to Carson. How an underling with less knowledge could have gone over the heads of this group of men to "warn" Pearl Harbor escapes all understanding. But the unknown ignorant and unauthorized all appear to gain in stature and importance in the wake of the event, when anything they might have attempted to say or do would have left them vulnerable to swift censure and possible demotion, in addition to off-hand dismissal of their words or actions.

Further evidence that histories of intelligence in harmony with accepted official positions prefer to come no closer than the views of 20 years ago, and conclude in a consensus that Mrs. Wohlstetter had the last word in 1962, can be found in Ronald Lewin's *Ultra Goes to War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978). "Ultra" (as the British named it) was the German analog of the Japanese "Purple" code, and the actual "Magic" intercepts circulated by American intelligence all bore the word "Ultra" rubber-stamped on them. Lewin's view is close to Carson's, but is more subdued, though similarly following closely in support of the too-mixed-"signals," no-one-could-be-blamed obscurantism of Mrs. Wohlstetter's *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*. The position taken by Lewin not only requires ignoring the multitude of errors in this latter book, in part pointed out by Percy Greaves and Charles C. Hiles, but also a most selective approach to the matter of the chain of command, approvingly pinpointed when something of credit is to be assigned, but studiously avoided when something blameworthy demands the designation of some responsibility.

6. An unusual development in this dramatic account relating to the significance of the Briggs interview, unprecedented in the literature related to the Pearl Harbor topic, was the publication of the entire interview, from a facsimile copy originally deposited in the National Archives, in the Fall, 1980 (No. 24) Newsletter of the American Committee on the History of the Second World War, a solidly official-establishment organization, with presumably no real interest in this kind of disclosure. The reproduction indicates the elisions and other deletions made in the copy made available to other scholars previously (the Newsletter did not make its appearance until around Christmas time, 1980 despite its date), and which substantial interest from March, 1980 onward on the part of several investigators undoubtedly precipitated. But the persistence

of deleted material even forty years after the event helps to convey the impression that we are still too close to the event to allow full disclosure.

There is a mysterious aspect of the Briggs Winds Execute matter which requires some official explanation and extended discourse. though the previous accounts for 35 years have centered on Captain Safford's repeated insistence on its receipt December 4, the material related to the Briggs interview recently made public clearly indicates the latter originally received the Winds message December 2, which actually makes the official gloss on the matter look even worse.

The above essay was originally published in the author's *Beyond Pearl Harbor: Essays on Some Historical Consequences of the Crisis in the Pacific in 1941*, 1983, Plowshare Press, RR1, Little Current, Ontario P0P 1K0, Canada, \$10.00.

(A Note From The Editor, continued from page 424)

In two of the chapters from his book pre-published in this issue, Mr. Greaves presents an extended look at Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall's crucial testimony before the congressional committee. It was on the stand there that Marshall had his famous attack of "amnesia," explaining that he could not for the life of him remember his whereabouts on the night of 6-7 December, the most important few hours of his life. The mystery of his whereabouts and activities, not only on that night but late into the next morning as well (with precious intelligence on hand at the War Department indicating war and an attack somewhere in the Pacific at one p.m. Washington time, and precious hours slipping away until the fatal hour—which was sunrise over Pearl Harbor on a lazy Sunday morning, the best possible time for a surprise attack on the best possible target, the Pacific Fleet moored peacefully at anchorage), is one of the key elements in the whole Pearl Harbor saga. Any conspiracy by Washington to withhold vital information from the Hawaiian commanders, especially in these late hours, would have had to involve the Army's Chief of Staff. If FDR had something up his sleeve, Marshall was in on it. And anything Marshall was up to would have to have been with the approval of his Commander-in-Chief, the President. With FDR no longer alive in 1945-46 to answer questions (a situation which would very likely have been impossible in any case, given Democrat-imposed political realities), it was up to investigators to focus on Marshall, and prominent others, attempting to find out what had gone on at the very top by finding out what had gone on just-below-the-top. The whereabouts of Marshall on that crucial night and morning thus might not only be considered a "key element" of the puzzle, but perhaps even the key. Was Marshall in fact—as revisionists have suspected all along—at the White House part of that night, huddled with FDR, conveniently and deliberately out of the reach of War Department underlings who, knowing what was coming, would have pressed for the warning to Hawaii's General Short that had to come with Marshall's authority? Clear evidence of this would be the equivalent of the "smoking gun" tape recording that did a later president in, in a similar tale of conspiracy at the highest levels of government.

Greaves having provided us here with the best description and analysis yet of just what Marshall said (and couldn't, or wouldn't, say) before the congressional investigators, we follow with James J. Martin's pointed *tour de force*, "'Where Was General Marshall?'"—the most comprehensive piece of research yet accomplished on this question, which reviews all the evidence and theories ever generated, and leaves the reader at the point where he cannot but draw conclusions which are devastating indeed to the "official" version of events. The essay was completed in 1981 and has been published heretofore only in a limited edition in Canada, directed mainly to Japanese there. We are pleased now to put it in general circulation in the United States and throughout the world. This publication event is especially felicitous in view of the recent interest in Marshall generated by hagiographer Leonard Mosley, whose *Marshall: Hero For Our Times* constitutes the latest whitewash effort, and by the announcement of yet another major biography of Marshall currently being prepared by a professor at the University of Southern California.

With the combination herein of new and highly significant revisionist material from Mr. Greaves and Dr. Martin, The JHR makes its contribution to a process which has been at work, slowly but inexorably, for four decades, and is ever-hastening: the dismantling of the cherished Establishment myth of

(concluded on page 512)

(A Note From The Editor, continued from page 511)

Rooseveltian innocence on the road to war with Japan and at the gate to war which was Pearl Harbor. That myth has been, and continues to be, bitterly defended by those who for whatever emotional or practical reasons have a stake in it, and who have more than once taken it upon themselves to blithely announce that revisionism on the subject is "dead"—as if the mere announcement itself were the bullet. But revisionism in fact maintains a vibrant existence, bounding along; the old questions will not go away, some answers are found, some new questions are raised. And significant converts gained. Nothing demonstrates better than the remarkable wave of interest, revelation, and contention of the last few years the utter persistent quality of Pearl Harbor revisionism.

There has long existed a sly musing in revisionist circles that the Roosevelt defenders, in view of their long record of fantastic performances in the realms of obfuscation, double-talk, whitewash, tortuous justification, suppression, sleight-of-hand, ad hominemism, etc., would, in order for their minds to be finally changed, require the revisionists to prove their viewpoint with nothing less than clear evidence not only that FDR welcomed and knew about the Japanese attack in advance, but that he had actually flown the lead Japanese plane! The musing is meant facetiously, of course. And so is this:

Considering the evidentiary progress of the last few years, revisionists might well say: "No, we can't show you FDR making his dive-bombing run. But, by God, that fellow suited up on the flight deck with the Scotch terrier better get rid of his cigarette holder before he starts a fire!" □

—Keith Stimely

About the Contributors

PERCY L. GREAVES, JR. is the former chief of the minority research staff of the 1945-46 Joint Congressional Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. He is probably more qualified to speak with authority on Pearl Harbor than any man alive, and indeed has spoken and written prodigiously on the subject, including a chapter, "The Pearl Harbor Investigations," for the classic book edited by Harry Elmer Barnes, *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace*. Mr. Greaves is additionally a free market economist of note. He has served as financial editor and research economist for *U.S. News and World Report* in Washington, D.C., as Armstrong Professor of Economics with Professor Ludwig von Mises at the University of Plano, Texas, and as a seminar speaker and discussion leader with the Foundation for Economic Education in New York.

JAMES J. MARTIN graduated from the University of New Hampshire in 1942 and received his MA (1945) and Ph.D. (1949) degrees in History from the University of Michigan. His teaching career has spanned twenty-five years and involved residence at educational institutions from coast to coast. Dr. Martin has contributed some of the outstanding books of revisionism related to the Second World War: the two-volume classic *American Liberalism and World Politics, 1931-1941*, *Beyond Pearl Harbor*, the collected essays *Revisionist Viewpoints* and *The Saga of Hog Island and Other Essays in Inconvenient History*, and the soon to be released, *The Man Who Invented 'Genocide'*. He is a three-time contributor to the *Dictionary of American Biography* and has as well contributed to recent editions of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*.